

supplement

ISSN 0201-4297

1985

4

STIP

The struggle of ideas in the contemporary world

Washington "Star Wars" doctrine ●

Prospects for the socialist revolution ●

Western authors re-writing history ●

**Freedom of conscience—
real and imaginary ●**

supplement

4

stip

1985

SOCIALISM:
THEORY
AND PRACTICE

The struggle of ideas in the contemporary world

Published bimonthly in English,
French, German and Spanish

CONTENTS

PROBLEMS OF WAR AND PEACE

Making ends meet. On the so-called strategic defence initiative of the USA 3

MARXIST-LENINIST THEORY AND ITS CRITICS

G. VODOLAZOV

Does the socialist revolution have a future? 9

M. AVSENEV

Is it possible to go over to socialism bypassing capitalism? The class structure of newly free countries and the prospects of socialist orientation 18

REAL SOCIALISM AND ITS CRITICS

A. ORLOV

In a maze of spurious theories. Western historiography on World War II 24

G. KOPYAKOV

"To profess or not to profess any religion is a personal matter for every citizen in the USSR" 31

MODERN CAPITALISM

G. TROFIMENKO

US military strategy—an instrument of aggressive policy 34

BOOK REVIEWS

G. GRIGORIEV

Soviet youth: questions and answers 42

Abridged articles are marked with an asterisk *

Editing completed May 21, 1985

© The Novosti Press Agency, 1985



Many capitalist countries do not like to talk about the victory of the valiant Red Army over Nazi Germany during World War II. They do not want to remember that the Red Army was able to do what the armies of their countries failed to do. They do not want to recall the Soviet people's contribution to the victory over the common enemy. Anti-Soviet propaganda has set out to keep the horrors of war from young people and belittle the role of the USSR in that war. History teachers have to distort the role played by the Red Army and the partisan movement and present all former positive statements with regard to this as irrelevant.

Jean-Marie Hecker,
pensioner, France

Your publications expose the slanderous fabrications about the Soviet Union and give a better idea of political, economic and public life in the Soviet Union. The foreign policy of the USSR is truly a policy of a peaceful state unlike that of the USA which does not want to follow the path of peace and disarmament.

Abdul-Samed Tanko,
student, Ghana

I have read that there is no freedom of conscience in the USSR and that atheism is being forcibly implanted there. Indeed, how can religious organizations operate in a country ruled by Communists who advocate atheism? It is hard to understand this.

Habib Salem,
worker, Britain

Journalist Gennady Kobayakov answers Habib Salem's letter (see p. 31).

Address: STP Editorial Office,
APN Publishing House,
7 Bolshaya Pochtovaya Street,
Moscow 107082, USSR

PROBLEMS OF WAR AND PEACE

MAKING ENDS MEET

On the So-Called Strategic Defence Initiative of the USA

At the beginning of January the White House distributed a special booklet entitled, The President's Strategic Defence Initiative (this is the official name of the "Star Wars" programme, announced by the President in March 1983). It elevates the militarization of space to the rank of a top priority of US state policy till the end of this century.

The declared key aim of the strategic defence initiative is to set up a comprehensive anti-ballistic missile system which, as Washington asserts, would shield the entire US territory from the "enemy's" strategic ballistic missiles. A considerable part of this system is to be deployed in space and include missile-destroying elements based on new physical principles (lasers, beam weapons, etc.).

Billions of dollars have already been allocated for this. Intensive research and development work is going on to develop experimental models of individual elements of the comprehensive anti-ballistic missile system (ABM). The models will then be tested to demonstrate that the system "works". Plans are being drawn up for its consistent stage-by-stage deployment as the corresponding technological problems are solved. Special commands and centres for control of its space units are being established.

Faced with opposition to the so-called defence initiative, both from the US public and abroad, Washington has launched a broad propaganda campaign, in the course of which it is trying to justify the White House's line for the militarization of space in people's eyes. The publication of the booklet was just such an attempt.

Izvestia Editorial. Abridged.

Complaining that they are simply not understood on this question, Washington has churned out a new packet of propaganda stratagems designed to bring home to the "slow-witted" and the hesitant the "advantages" of the US Administration's "Star Wars" programme.

STRATAGEM 1. Realizing that the world public is concerned over the growing avalanche of US military preparations, the architects of the strategic defence initiative are laying the main emphasis on presenting the creation of a comprehensive ABM with space-based elements as a means to reinforce strategic stability. As US leaders have declared, they have opened up encouraging prospects for an effective self-protection capability founded on this system, which makes it possible to shift from strategy based on the threat of an offensive force to one that threatens no one. And this, according to them, will assure the possibility of attaining a more stable deterrent.

But what is the real state of affairs in this matter?

US and Soviet strategic nuclear arms have existed for over 30 years. All this time, since their very appearance, the Soviet Union has been forced, in creating and subsequently deploying them, to respond to the challenge issued by the United States of America, which is out to gain military superiority. The strategic parity achieved by the early seventies deprived the USA of the possibility of blackmailing the USSR with a nuclear threat and compelled the former to agree to talks on the limitation of strategic armaments.

At that time, the USSR and the USA arrived at a clear understanding of the fact that, in the conditions of parity in strategic offensive forces, the acquisition by one of the sides of an additional defensive potential would be tantamount to its acquisition of a preemptive nuclear strike capability.

The logic of nuclear confrontation is such that the creation of a ramified anti-ballistic missile system does not pursue defence objectives at all, but is integral to a bid for military superiority. Such a system would erode the strategic parity of the forces and destabilize the strategic situation as a whole. To redress the balance, the other side would have to reinforce its strategic potential either by a direct build-up of its offensive forces or by supplementing them with defence facilities. In any case, the net effect would be an unlimited arms race.

The recognition by the USSR and the US of the interconnection between offensive and defensive strategic systems was reflected in the simultaneous signing, on May 26, 1972, of the Treaty (of unlimited duration) on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. The ABM Treaty has become the cornerstone of the whole process of nuclear arms limitation and reduction. The Treaty stated clearly that only mutual restraint in res-

pect of the ABM systems made it possible to advance towards offensive arms limitation and reduction.

It is this cornerstone provision about the interconnection between strategic offensive and defensive arms that is now being undermined by the American "Star Wars" advocates. They claim that the earlier agreement was arrived at not as a result of the recognition of the role of the ABM systems as an arms race booster but only because the technical opportunities did not exist for creating effective ABM systems at the time.

In actual fact, such an interconnection between strategic offensive and defensive systems is permanent and exists objectively. It does not disappear, of course, with the appearance of the opportunity of creating technologically more advanced and effective ABM systems. On the contrary, the creation of such systems would even more appreciably effect the strategic balance, making it extremely unstable. By the same token, the danger of a nuclear war breaking out, with all the ensuing consequences for humanity, would drastically increase. Expert estimates show that, even with both sides having roughly equivalent large-scale ABM systems, even a rather tiny difference in their performance would itself mean a substantial erosion of the strategic parity and destabilization of the overall strategic situation. Incidentally, sober-minded research workers in the US have been rightly pointing out that the work of carrying out the programme announced by Washington is of a provocative and destabilizing character, regardless even of its end results.

STRATAGEM 2. The US Administration's spokesmen have been saying much to the effect that the creation of a comprehensive ABM system, complete with space-based elements, has the "humane" purpose of making strategic nuclear missile arms "unnecessary" and "outdated" and will just about open up the way to the elimination of nuclear weapons. However, everything that the US Administration is doing shows that the actual design is entirely different. In beginning to carry out its "Star Wars" programme, Washington is by no means proposing to forgo the multi-billion programmes for building up all the constituent elements of their so-called strategic triad and, first of all, ballistic missiles. What talk can there be of missiles "growing obsolete", if the US Administration, along with keeping up its large-scale ABM system, is developing six new types of strategic offensive arms simultaneously. The Pentagon intends to have new intercontinental MX ballistic missiles by 1986, Midgetman missiles by the early 90s, and new strategic sea-based Trident-2 missiles by 1989. It is developing two new types of heavy bombers and planning to deploy over twelve thousand long-range cruise missiles of all basing modes.

When Washington talks about "scrapping ballistic missiles", it means the Soviet IBMs, the backbone of Soviet strategic power. It

thinks that by having them substantially cut it can substantially weaken the Soviet Union's retaliation capability. And all that against the background of the USA rearming its missile carrying submarine fleet with first-strike ballistic missiles (Trident-2), stationing first-strike nuclear missiles in Western Europe and deploying around the USSR endless numbers of long-range cruise missiles of all basing modes and new types of conventional armaments near-equivalent to nuclear systems in terms of performance.

Equally hypocritical are the American leaders' assurances that the US intends to "defend" its European allies with its prospective ABM system. In actual fact, Washington is not particularly concerned over the lot of the Europeans. The advantages of the deployment of American space weapons are openly discussed in the USA—a nuclear conflict could be waged over Europe, not over the US.

The true design behind the US strategic defence initiative is to undermine, rather than strengthen, strategic stability. The "reliable anti-missile shield" Washington is dreaming about is nothing short of an intention to create an opportunity of carrying out a nuclear attack from behind that shield and to ward off a Soviet retaliatory strike. So what we are talking about is not a weapon for defence against nuclear systems but a new type of weapon for nuclear aggression.

STRATAGEM 3. In a bid to mislead people, the US leaders say that the implementation of the strategic defence initiative does not go beyond the bounds of research and development (R & D) and that this R & D does not carry the risk of deployment of a national missile defence system, nor does it contravene any of the US commitments in the field of arms control, in particular those envisaged by the ABM Treaty.

There is not a grain of truth in these allegations. It is clear that billions of dollars are spent on R & D not for the love of science and technological discoveries. The testing of various elements of a large-scale missile defence system, which is being conducted or planned by the Pentagon, is designed to create the conditions in which the United States would only have to take a decision on the practical deployment of such systems. The United States wants the USSR to accept the fact that the Americans will have a national missile defence system anyway and have it soon, and also, to get the Soviet side to agree, if possible, to such actions.

It is clear that the Soviet Union will not sit and wait to see the end results of US R & D but will have to take adequate counter-measures. The reservations about R & D change nothing therefore. The US plans seriously undermine the foundations of the arms control process. They not only block all nuclear arms limitation agreements but are directly aimed at escalating the arms race.

A national missile defence system with space-based elements can only be deployed at the price of demolishing the ABM Treaty. The implementation of large-scale R & D and the practical testing of individual components of a missile defence system would undermine that major Soviet-American treaty. Even the Pentagon has to admit this.

The Washington leaders are not bothered by the fact that the development of a comprehensive missile defence system with space-based elements would cross out the fundamental provision of the ABM Treaty, which committed the sides not to create a missile defence of their country's territory. Nor are they perturbed by the fact that they would be violating the treaty clause banning the development of space-based components and anti-ballistic missile systems and limiting the development of such systems on new physical principles. They also intend to wreck many other multi-lateral agreements, such as the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space and the 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques.

The USA's continued violation of its international commitments cannot be concealed by allegations that the Soviet Union does not comply with the ABM Treaty or other agreements. The purpose of such charges is an open secret. It is clear who does not want to honour the agreements concluded, and who seeks to steer clear of them, and even violate them.

The so-called US research in the field of the ABM system with space-based elements may threaten the whole system of international law which still restrains states' military activities, and might lead to a situation in which any constructive agreement on arms limitation or reduction would be impossible.

STRATAGEM 4. Washington, eager to persuade all Americans of the need for a national ABM system, is alleging that the Soviet Union itself is engaged in anti-ballistic defence programmes covering its whole territory. But the Soviet Union has no such programmes, and Washington is well aware of this. So it is trying to confuse the issue by saying that the Russians are either about to establish such a system, or already have it in operation. Since there is no proof, references to the Soviet Union's limited ABM and anti-aircraft defence systems are used to back up the false accusations.

The authors of these fabrications, aimed at the uninitiated, are not bothered by the fact that the limited ABM system (defending one area only) has been built in the USSR in accordance with the ABM Treaty (a similar system was created earlier in the USA) and bears no resemblance to the large-scale ABM space system conceived

in the USA. It is also obvious to any unbiased person that the Soviet anti-aircraft defences have nothing to do with anti-ballistic defences.

Moreover, there is little, if any, consistency in the arguments put forward by strategic defence initiative advocates. On the one hand, the implication is that both opponents—the USA and the USSR—should have all-territory ABM systems to have the promised “stabilizing effect”. And yet, not in the least embarrassed, Washington politicians claim that the situation will be “stable” even with the USA alone possessing such a system, and the sooner the better.

That’s the “stabilizing” role of defence installations, hypocritically discussed by Washington. The US warlords are well aware of the consequences of an all-embracing ABM system installed by one of the sides. That is why they are pushing for one in the USA. That explains also their attempts to impute to the Soviet Union their own dangerous plans and to conceal the attempts to tip the balance in their favour and gain a strategic edge over the Soviet Union.

* * *

The fact, however, is that there is increasing opposition to this initiative, both in the United States and outside it, in spite of the US Administration’s propaganda of a space-based ABM system. US leaders are being warned. They are cautioned time and again that the “Star Wars” idea is a highly dangerous miscalculation.

Far from strengthening America’s security, the development of a new ABM system will put the country on the brink of nuclear war. Attempts to militarize space will only stimulate the arms buildup.

The prevention of militarization of space is a vital issue for mankind. It would be fatal to turn space into an area of the arms race and a base for aggression. We must do everything to prevent this.

The USSR is working to ban the use of force in space and from space against the Earth, and from Earth against objects in space. No weapons, manned or unmanned, conventional, nuclear, laser, beam, etc., should be orbited or deployed in space. Offensive space weapons, based on any principle or employing any basing scheme, should not be developed, tested, deployed or used in or from space against targets on Earth, in the air, or at sea. The existing weapons of these types should be destroyed.

The non-militarization of space would pave the way for major reciprocal cuts in nuclear weapons and their eventual phasing out with the strict observance of the principle of equality and equal security.

Izvestia, January 27, 1985

DOES THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION HAVE A FUTURE?

by Grigory VODOLAZOV

Western ideologists pose as “unbiased” investigators trying to convince the democratic world public that “analysis of the latest developments inevitably leads to the conclusion that socialist revolution and the communist movement have no future, that they are becoming things of the past, losing all ground. What are the arguments adduced to support these theses? What is the answer given by Communists?

IS IT ALL PAST HISTORY!

The most widespread thesis of Western ideologists is that socialist revolution against private property, foretold by Marx, is being removed from the order of the day, that it is falling into oblivion as a result of the “managerial revolution” and the onset of technocracy. The rise of technocracy (an indisputable fact in itself) means, according to bourgeois ideologists, that private property disappears, since managers who, owing to their know-how, move into leading production posts are hired workers living on a salary, not on profit.

What a simple way to repeal the verdict which Marxism passed on the exploiter society! What strikes the eye here is the abstract opposition of private property to science, knowledge and qualification, instead of a concrete analysis of the place and role of science under capitalism.

● Prof. G. VODOLAZOV, D.Sc. (Philosophy), heads the chair of the international communist movement at the Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee.

A concrete analysis shows that, in bourgeois society, science and knowledge, the key elements of all scientific production, are in the hands of a minority, the elite. Indeed, science is becoming a productive force. But is this force passed on to the worker, is it becoming his own productive force? Unfortunately, it is not. Like all other productive forces under capitalism, it does not belong to him. Of even greater relevance in capitalist countries today than in the past are Marx's words that science works as an alien, hostile force against labour and totally dominates it.

Technocracy is not just production competence and efficiency. It means privatization of knowledge, education, information and management, of what Engels called "means of development". It does not eliminate the division of labour crippling the worker, but on the contrary, is a rigid form of its division entailing the separation of managerial labour from executive labour.

Grossly mistaken (or deliberately juggling with the facts) are those Western ideologists who dissolve the social essence of technocracy in such a nebulous concept as "the learned estate" or in such a wide-ranging concept as the "scientific and technical intelligentsia". And, then, the entire mass of mental workers cannot be represented as an integral whole from the social and class viewpoint. The homogeneity of the "learned estate", the "scientific and technological intelligentsia" is purely external, superficial and is becoming more and more illusory with the growth of class antagonisms under capitalism. The illusion is dispelled once we start to investigate the conflict between managers and executives. Then the "intellectuals" fall into two groups: the smaller proportion of managers belong to the dominant class in their own right and the greater proportion of executive workers are members of the oppressed class, also "in their own right".

When Communists say that technocrats are, in their mass, part of the dominant class, they do not overlook the additional possibilities created for the revolutionary, democratic movement by the growth of technocracy as such. With the expansion of the sphere of exploitation, the numbers of the ruling elite grow and the ever faster growth of production and productive forces entails an increase in the volume of knowledge. By dint of these objective factors technocrats cannot for long remain a narrow, closed caste. Modern, highly dynamic production with its powerful scientific and technical base requires more and more qualified specialists. Consequently, contributing to the development of science and production, technocracy, which views production as an end in itself, creates the need for expanding the army of specialists. Paradoxically, technocrats, these monopoly owners of knowledge and information, carry their own negation

within themselves. The rigid bureaucratic and private property seclusion is thus breached.

Nor can capital be restored to its full vigour by other recipes prescribed by its ideological healers: broader state participation in economic life (according to Keynesian precepts) or, conversely, restriction of government intervention in the economy (as advised by neo-liberals); the policy of the bourgeoisie's social partnership with the working class or the tactics of harsher reprisals against working people; curtailment of unprofitable production or expansion of the military industry for the sake of higher profit. All this is to no avail. The ailing society is incurable. Moreover, such drugs are poison for it.

This dialectic of capital's disintegration was foretold by Marx more than a century ago: "Forced destruction of the capital, not due to its internal relations, but as condition of its self-preservation, is the most striking form in which it is advised to leave and give way to the higher state of social production".¹

Life has also shown that Communists who, unlike the optimistic bourgeois opportunists, foretold at the turn of the 1960s an acute crisis of the capitalist system, were right. The crises of 1969-1970, 1974-1975 and 1979-1983 corroborated Marxist-Leninist theory.

It should be added that Communists predicted not just another economic crisis, but a new type of crisis, hitherto unknown. The social developments of the 1970s and early 1980s fully confirmed their prognosis, allowing the theory of contradictions of modern capitalism, many aspects of revolutionary theory, to be enriched. Particularly important among the new theses formulated by Marxist scholars are the following: the crisis of capitalism is constant and practically uninterrupted, when brief spells of improvement cannot lead to production booms; nor do the attempts to boost the economy by expanding military production yield the desired effect. This thesis, too, was formulated by Communists who clearly realize the danger spelt by the militarization of the economy. Militarism means hundreds of billions of dollars wrung from the working people. Militarism converts forces of production into those of destruction. Militarism is, perhaps, the main and most general indicator of the danger capitalism poses for mankind.

Thus, Communists have profoundly exposed the specific features of the crisis gripping modern bourgeois society which, though highly specific, confirms even more graphically now than in the past the devastating influence of the capitalist system on society's productive forces. Therefore, nowadays, as in Marx's time, Communists follow

¹ K. Marx and F. Engels, *Collected Works*, Lawrence and Wishart, London, vol. 1, p. 271.

the principle: "As the main thing is not to be deprived of the fruits of civilization, of the acquired productive forces, the traditional forms in which they were produced must be smashed".²

And this is the historical mission to be performed by socialist revolution in the capitalist countries. Thus, socialism has not ceased to be a historical necessity.

IS THE WORKING CLASS DISAPPEARING!

Drawing on the "latest developments", Western ideologists argue that the modern working class is ceasing to be a revolutionary force. The following two arguments are produced most often to back up this claim: the improvement of its conditions and its dwindling numbers. Is this really so?

Let us first consider the Marxist-Leninist thesis about the world historical mission of the working class, a thesis which is most vehemently attacked by capitalism's ideological henchmen.

The Marxist doctrine of the historical mission of the working class follows directly from the materialist conception of history and the essence of the capitalist mode of production revealed by Marx.

The working class is the product of capitalism. Capitalism created the material prerequisites for its own destruction and the force, in the shape of the proletariat, capable of doing it. Capital made social reorganization a life or death issue for the working class. Marx formulated the dilemma facing the working class in the words of George Sand: "Le combat ou la mort; la lutte sanguinaire ou le néant. C'est ainsi que la question est invinciblement posée."³

The working class is an agent of social production creating all social wealth, trained and rallied by this production yet, at the same time, an oppressed, exploited and socially underprivileged class which is denied the opportunity to enjoy the wealth it created. The combination of these qualities is an important prerequisite of its revolutionary mission. The proletariat's oppressed position inevitably and unavoidably drives it against the bourgeoisie.

The working class performs its historical role not only because it is the grave-digger of an outdated social form (in its time, the bourgeoisie destroyed feudalism), but primarily because the proletarian revolution not just replaces one social form by another, but heralds a new epoch in world history in which "there are no more classes and class antagonisms" and "social evolutions will cease to be political revolutions."⁴

² K. Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1973, p. 107.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 152.

⁴ *Ibid.*

Now let us take a look at the Western ideologists' arguments. Is the material status of the working class improving? Yes, there is a certain growth of real wages. Yet we should not overlook the new evils engendered by modern production which afflict the working class: nervous strain, industrial accidents, labour intensification, the mounting threat of unemployment, monetary crises, rising prices, etc. Then we should remember that the reverse side of the relative material security of the population in developed Western countries is the poverty and misery of the peoples in the young national states which were long under the heel of capitalism. Add to this the arms race, unleashed by imperialism, the burden of which is borne by all peoples. But, most important, the working class won material improvements in a long and hard class struggle.

There is more to it than that. A dialectical researcher, Marx never viewed the contradiction of the system in the context of the dynamics of one of its sides (the material position of the working class). He took the "capitalist-worker" opposition as a whole, for the tension and conflicts of a social world are determined by these two poles. Then it becomes clear that "if the income of the worker increases with the rapid growth of capital, the social gulf that separates the worker from the capitalist increases at the same time, and the power of capital over labour; the dependence of labour on capital, likewise increases at the same time."⁵ In other words, the workers' material conditions have improved but at the expense of their social status which has fallen one degree lower than that of the capitalists. Marxist scholars have established that social tension is characteristic of many modern capitalist countries. At its roots lies, on the one hand, the further widening of the social and economic gulf between the monopoly bourgeoisie growing richer at an unprecedented pace and, on the other, the working class which has managed to improve its position to a certain extent. The working people's requirements grow much faster than the possibilities for meeting them.

Thus, the social status of the worker is deteriorating: he is more insecure socially, his earnings fall short of the requirements engendered by production development and the worker becomes an appendage to the machine, etc. Over the past century there have been no fundamental changes in the position of the working class in the West. Capitalism constantly reproduces the same system which sustains the revolutionary drive of the working class.

Equally untenable is the other argument put forward by bourgeois theoreticians. Seeing that the number of mental workers in developed

⁵ K. Marx, *Selected Works*, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1976, vol. 1, p. 167.

capitalist countries is falling as a result of the scientific and technological revolution, they conclude that the working class is declining numerically, that a new leader of the modern social struggle, the intelligentsia, is coming to the fore. Consequently, Western ideologists argue, Marx was a poor prophet when he put his stake on the working class.

This conclusion would have been justified if, by the term "proletariat", Marx had meant exclusively manual workers. But this would be tantamount to imputing blatant nonsense to Marx. According to Marx's concept, the proletariat includes wage workers deprived of their own means of production, who live exclusively by selling their labour and who are exploited in the process of capitalist production. Clearly, this does not rule out the likelihood of some contingents of mental workers being classed as proletarians. It is precisely the task of a serious researcher to pinpoint the social status of modern mental workers, their place in production and the character of their work.

An explicit answer to this question posed by the 20th century cannot be found in Marx's writings. He only suggested the method which can be used effectively in analyzing the situation today. Communist studies of the position of present-day mental workers reveal the growing tendency towards their drawing closer to the working class and then their incorporation into its ranks as a special contingent.

It is important, of course, not to spurt ahead and not to take as accomplished what is only a tendency. The intelligentsia is being converted into exploited hired workers, social polarization is intensifying and intermediate elements and inter-class strata are losing their identity. The working class is growing numerically, it is becoming more class conscious and better educated, its requirements and its social and economic might are rising.

Thus, it is clear that the objective necessity of socialist revolution in capitalist countries has not disappeared, as opportunist and bourgeois theoreticians suggest, that the working class has not dissolved under the impact of the technological revolution. In this context, every unbiased person has serious grounds for being very sceptical of the Western ideologists' thesis about the decline of the communist movement which is called upon to express the interests of the modern working class in its struggle against capitalism.

IS THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT DECLINING?

Unlike their predecessors of the 1940s and 1950s who often resorted to crude falsification, bourgeois ideologists of today act more subtly, citing actual facts, but in a specific context and interpreting

them in their own way. The following are the most frequently quoted facts designed to support their thesis about an "impasse" of the communist movement in the capitalist countries: most of the small communist parties do not grow numerically and, therefore, do not stand a chance of becoming mass-based; a number of large communist parties in Western Europe are on the retreat, losing the electors' votes and some of their members; disagreements arise within and between parties. It is stressed unambiguously that the causes are rooted not in someone's subjective misjudgements and mistakes which can be rectified as soon as they are spotted, but in the fact that the theoretical foundation of the communist movement, Marxism-Leninism, Lenin's theory of socialist revolution have not withstood the test of the time.

What do Communists reply to these tendentious allegations?

One can speak of a "crisis" and "impasse" only when, first, the setbacks of the communist movement begin to outweigh its achievements, second, there is a clear tendency towards the snowballing of difficulties in the movement and a steady decline of its successes during the transition from one historical stage to another and, third, these difficulties are caused by some intrinsic and fundamental features of the movement and they cannot be surmounted on the basis of the strategy and theory followed by this movement prior to that.

Is there any evidence of these crisis signs in the communist movement? Not at all. The communist movement is advancing steadily. Here are some figures. In 1917 there was only one communist party in the whole world. In 1928, there were communist parties in 46 countries, in 1946 in 78, in 1969 in 88 and in 1984 in 95 countries.

Here is the breakdown of parties by continents and countries: there are communist parties today in 27 countries of Asia, Australia and Oceania, in 27 countries in the Americas, ten in African countries and 31 in European countries. In other words, the communist movement covers all continents. There is no other such political movement developing on a truly worldwide scale.

The Communists' numerical strength is growing too. In 1960 there were 2.5 million Communists in the non-socialist countries, in 1969—3 million, in 1974—3.6 million and in 1984—over 5 million. In the course of 25 years the number of Communists doubled. And this against a background of political harassment, ideological baiting, psychological or military and police terror. Over 20 communist parties are now working underground.

We would like to make two points about the so-called small communist parties (a term rejected by Communists as ambiguous) whose position, according to capitalism's ideological henchmen, proves that the communist movement in these countries has bleak prospects. First, these parties, too, are growing numerically and their prestige is on the rise. Just take the Communist Party of Greece which polls up to 10 per cent of votes at various elections, the Portuguese Communist Party with its membership of over 200,000 or the German Communist Party whose membership has topped 50,000. Second, a numerically small party is not always so bad after all. Of course, Communists' fundamental task, as formulated by Lenin in his time, is to form large, revolutionary, mass communist parties. But this task must be related to the social and political situation in which the party functions at a given moment. When reformist moods run high among the working people (as is the case now and then), to urge an immediate and impressive growth of its membership amounts to a call for converting the party into a large but reformist organization. The long-term interests of the working class require that the party be protected from the influx of reformist masses. A party small in numbers but firmly standing on proletarian class positions stimulates the spread of revolutionary ideas among the masses. It is a core round which all democratic and anti-capitalist forces of society can rally in changing situations.

Lastly, some figures on the number of electors voting for Communists in the non-socialist countries. In the 1950s, 30 million people cast their votes for Communists, in the 1960s—35 million and in the 1970s—40 million. There are periods when some communist parties lose ground, polling fewer votes (for various reasons but, most often, because of persecution and terror by the dominant class or because of their own mistakes, concessions to reformist moods and parliamentary illusions). But if we take not just "some periods" and "some communist parties" but long historical stages in the activities of the communist movement in the non-socialist countries, we can see the steady and considerable growth of the communist electorate from decade to decade.

Today, when a government is formed in a number of countries, the question of communist participation arises. This applies to France and Finland, Italy and Japan, Portugal and Greece, Cyprus and Luxemburg where Communists poll from 10 to 34 per cent of votes and their parties have tens and even hundreds of thousands of members. The largest parties are in Italy (about 1.7 million), France (over 608,000) and Japan (about 500,000). This does not look like the "imminent collapse" of these parties.

Western ideologists could, of course, name one or two communist parties which, in recent years, have lost membership and a significant

proportion of votes. But, first, it is illogical to identify the crisis of one or two parties with that of the whole movement, numbering nearly 100 parties. And, second, without making a detailed analysis of the policy of the parties suffering a defeat (this would mean interference in their internal affairs), we would advise bourgeois ideologists to pay greater heed to these parties' self-criticism, which associates the causes of failure not with the "excessive" commitment of their party strategy to revolutionary ideas and Marxism-Leninism, as their opponents suggest, but, conversely, with this strategy's insufficient commitment to revolutionary ideas and Marxism-Leninism. We think this is more in line with the truth.

In appraising the prospects of the world communist movement, account should be taken also of the growth of its immediate reserve in developing countries in the shape of revolutionary democratic and vanguard parties, which, when formulating their strategy of struggle, are turning more and more to Marxist-Leninist ideas. The formation of the Workers' Party of Ethiopia, which has proclaimed its intention to draft social change programmes along Marxist-Leninist lines, is one convincing proof of the above.

* * *

The foregoing analysis shows that both socialist revolution and the communist movement do have a future. They are neither "becoming things of the past" nor "losing ground", as "unbiased" bourgeois ideologists are trying to make out.

Marxism's ability to solve the complex problems of our time convincingly proves this theory's potency and viability.

Rabochy klass i sovremenny mir, No. 6, 1984 *

IS IT POSSIBLE TO GO OVER TO SOCIALISM BYPASSING CAPITALISM?

The Class Structure of Newly Free Countries and the Prospects of Socialist Orientation

by Mikhail AVSENEV

Western economists and sociologists say that transition to socialism bypassing capitalism is impossible. In their view, socialism cannot be built at all in economically backward countries. As a rule, they do not even mention the historical instances of successful transition to socialism bypassing capitalism.

What arguments do bourgeois ideologists use to support their view and how far are they justified?

This issue launches a series of articles which will provide answers to these questions.

MISUSED CONCEPTIONS

One of the main arguments put forward by bourgeois and right-wing socialist ideologists who deny the possibility of socialist construction in developing countries is that their class structure is not suited to this because non-proletarian strata, chiefly the peasantry, predominate there.

As we can see, capitalism's apologists pose as custodians of

"pure Marxism". They reproach communists for having forgotten the foundations of Marxism. The position of the opponents of socialist orientation is clear enough. In their view, there is no one in the newly free countries of Africa, Asia and the Middle East capable of building socialism. The working class is practically non-existent or is too weak and numerically small. The peasantry is, in general, not disposed to build socialism.

● Prof. M. AVSENEV, D.Sc. (Economics), specializes in problems of developing countries and criticism of anti-communism.

Moreover, it lacks the revolutionary potential. Feudal lords, tribal chiefs and other members of the privileged classes clearly are disinclined to build the new society and thus act against their best interests.

One important point should be stressed here: imperialist ideologists deliberately confuse two totally different issues to mislead the readers—that of the immediate construction of socialism and the potential of socialist orientation, a policy aimed at providing the conditions for socialist construction. Certainly, none of the newly free countries—those which have already chosen or will choose the socialist road of development in the future—has or can have the requisite conditions for the immediate transition to socialism (these conditions can exist only in advanced capitalist countries or in countries at the medium level of capitalist development). It is indicative—and bourgeois ideologists deliberately avoid mentioning this—that even in the Soviet Union many of the measures carried out immediately after the October 1917 Revolution were not directly socialist (e.g., nationalization of the land, formation of the first co-operative farms which Lenin, the founder of the Soviet state, qualified as state-capitalist enterprises, and others). Appraising the prospects of socialist construction in the USSR, Lenin said at the First All-Russia Congress of Land Departments (1918): "We know very well

that in countries where small peasant farming prevails the transition to socialism cannot be effected except by a series of gradual, preliminary stages."¹ In October 1921, almost four years after the establishment of Soviet government, speaking of the New Economic Policy (NEP)², Lenin emphasized: "We must bear in mind that the next stage cannot be a transition straight to socialist construction."³ All these measures prepared the ground for the subsequent building of socialism. Very typical in this respect is also the history of Mongolia, which began laying the foundations of socialism only 20 years after the revolution. Thus, by substituting the Marxist-Leninist thesis about the possibility of socialist orientation for developing countries with calls for their

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol. 28, p. 342.

² The sum and substance of the New Economic Policy was the consolidation of the alliance between the working class and the peasantry on an economic basis, the linking of socialist industry with small commodity farming through extensive use of commodity-money relations, and involvement of peasants in socialist construction. NEP permitted some scope for the growth of capitalist elements, but the key positions in the national economy were in the hands of the state of proletarian dictatorship. It ensured the growth of productive forces through the expansion of socialist elements and the ousting of capitalist ones, reorganization of the multistructural economy into an integrated socialist one based on industrialization and agricultural cooperation—*Ed.*

³ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol. 33, p. 96.

immediate transition to socialism, the opponents of scientific socialism falsify Marxism-Leninism. They set out to "refute" what Marxists have never said.

ON THE PEASANTRY

Equally untenable is the capitalist apologists' thesis about the liberated countries having no revolutionary potential, about there being no classes or social forces capable of directing economically backward countries towards the path of socialist orientation. The central issue here is the peasantry's revolutionary potential. Referring to the fact that in the majority of young states it is unorganized and politically passive, bourgeois economists and sociologists claim that the non-proletarian strata of these countries are "opposed to revolution" and to socialist orientation.

True, in many underdeveloped countries the non-proletarian social strata and, chiefly, the peasantry constituting the overwhelming majority of the population, are unorganized and passive. The mass of the peasantry are outside politics and do not take any meaningful part in political and economic decision-making. But in most of the cases cited by bourgeois ideologists this passivity is, in fact, a specific form of protest against the anti-popular policy of the ruling elites in these countries. Besides, in some young states the reactionary elements in power—the bourgeoisie linked with im-

perialism and conservative tribal chiefs—do everything to keep the non-proletarian strata outside politics.

But whenever the national interests are understandable and near to the peasants they cease to be inert. They have shown their revolutionary spirit in many former colonies during the independence struggle. In Algeria, Vietnam, Angola and other countries peasants took up arms to fight for freedom. Today, they are active in the struggle against the anti-popular regimes in many Asian and African countries. This is shown by the numerous peasant uprisings against "bureaucratic capitalism" thriving in some liberated countries.

At odds with the facts is also the thesis that the peasantry in general, and in liberated countries in particular, cannot embrace the ideas of scientific socialism and consequently a socialist organization of the economy. Back in the 1920s this was refuted by the Soviet Union's experience. Addressing the Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets at the end of 1920, Lenin said about the consolidation of Soviet power in Bukhara, Azerbaijan and Armenia: "These republics are proof and corroboration of the fact that the ideas and principles of Soviet government are understood and immediately applicable, not only in the industrially developed countries, not only in those which have a social basis like the proletariat, but also in those which

have the peasantry as their basis. The idea of peasants' Soviets has triumphed."⁴

Living proof of Lenin's thesis was also provided by Mongolia where, prior to the emergence of the national working class, the poor and middle strata of arat peasants constituted the party's chief social base and were the main driving force of the popular revolution. Lenin's ideas were tested in Vietnam where, before the revolution, the peasantry constituted (and now constitutes) the majority of the population and, nonetheless, is successfully building socialist society. The non-proletarian majority did not prevent Algeria, Benin, Ethiopia, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and many other developing countries from choosing socialist orientation.

In Ethiopia, for instance, in the crucial September days of 1974, the point at issue was whether the illiterate peasants and farm hands, weighed down by traditions and oppressed by big landowners, would be able to consistently support the revolution. The leaders of the revolution feared that the attack on the monarchy would provoke mass unrest and even lead to bloodshed, especially since Emperor Haile Selassie I, who once headed the Ethiopian people's liberation struggle against the Italian colonialists, was still a national hero for a certain sec-

⁴ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol. 31, pp. 490-491.

tion of the population. These fears were misplaced. The emperor's overthrow was welcomed and all strata of the population sighed with relief.

We could cite another example—the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. Following the adoption of the second law on the agrarian reform of November 8, 1970 (the first law, adopted in March 1968, was actually rejected by the peasants as a half-hearted and compromise measure), the non-proletarian rural strata actively implemented it. The agrarian reform, i.e., expropriation of feudal land holdings and the distribution of land according to the principle "Land to those who till it", was carried out, as a rule, by the peasants themselves with the nominal participation of government agencies. The peasant movement in the country gave rise to a wave of revolutionary enthusiasm and helped rally the rural working people who came to support other progressive changes.

The record of the socialist-oriented countries also refutes the bourgeois ideologists' argument that when independence is won (or when other direct aims are accomplished, say, when peasants are given land), formerly oppressed classes become conservative and lose their revolutionary potential. In the political field, the overwhelming majority of peasants and other non-proletarian strata support revolutionary governments, with the exception of a section of

lumpen proletarians perhaps.

In Ethiopia, for example, after the establishment of the people's rule over seven million peasants formed more than 27,000 peasant associations which, in 1978, became the All-Ethiopia Association of Peasants. Associations of urban residents (kabales) similar to peasant associations were formed in towns. Their members come from different classes and social strata. Municipal organs were formed on the basis of kabales, which have already proven themselves in the struggle for revolutionary gains. Women's and youth committees play an important social role. Appraising the situation in Ethiopia, the Austrian journal *Weg und Ziel* wrote: "The main factor behind the internal consolidation of the Ethiopian revolution is the masses' consistent participation in social transformations in the form of peasant, trade union and women's organizations, town district committees, the militia and also the army."⁵

Indicative is also Benin's example where peasants are forming voluntary rural associations. Eighty-four peasant deputies are represented in the National Revolutionary Assembly, the highest legislative body.

Fallacious too is the capitalist ideologists' thesis about the "conservatism" of peasants, their opposition to progressive change. To back up their thesis bour-

geois ideologists refer to the failures of agricultural cooperation in Tanzania, the Congo and some other socialist-oriented countries. What can be said about this?

Peasants oppose cooperation whenever the principles of this progressive process, above all, the principle of voluntary association, are violated. Thus, in Tanzania, cooperation difficulties began in 1971, when the association of peasants was decreed obligatory and when almost military methods were used. In the Congo, setbacks in this field were due to the neglect of the material and technical base of cooperation and personnel training in the '70s. But when the state gives proper attention to cooperation, the peasants far from resisting the process actively promote it. We could quote many examples of how peasants are eager to form cooperatives in Benin, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and other countries opting for socialism.

Life itself refutes the assertion that African, Asian and Arab peasants are hostile to socialist ideas. Overwhelming numbers of them accept these ideas.

We should not, of course, go to the other extreme and exaggerate the revolutionary potential of the peasantry, viewing it as an independent revolutionary force that can build socialist society alone, without an alliance with the working class, as is suggested by some petty bourgeois theoreticians.

"The country inevitably follows the town," Lenin said. "The only question is *which class*, of the 'urban' classes, will succeed in leading the country, will cope with this task, and what forms will *leadership by the town* assume."⁶ So, if the revolutionary potential of peasants is to be brought into play, the workers of developing countries must make them their ally and strengthen this alliance by all means.

Major tasks face the Marxist-Leninist parties and revolutionary democrats of the Afro-Asian region in this field. They must learn, as Lenin said, "to build socialism in practice in such a way that *every* small peasant could take part in it."⁷ Moreover, their task is "to arouse the working masses to revolutionary activity, to independent action and to organization, regardless of the level they have reached; to translate the true communist doctrine, which was

⁶ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol. 30, p. 257.

⁷ *Ibid.*, vol. 33, p. 468.

intended for the Communists of the more advanced countries, into the language of every people; to carry out those practical tasks which must be carried out immediately, and to join the proletarians of other countries in a common struggle."⁸

Of course, the peasantry and other non-proletarian strata as well as a sizable section of the working class in socialist-oriented countries for that matter, are, at present, unable to assimilate and accept all the ideas of Marxism-Leninism. The main obstacles to this are: the insufficiently high level of class consciousness, low educational standards, the traditional world outlooks, the prestige of village elders and tribal chiefs. But the experience of many countries which have opted for socialism indicates that the prevalence of the non-proletarian strata is not an insuperable obstacle to creating the conditions for socialist development in this or that newly free country.

⁸ *Ibid.*, vol. 30, p. 162.

From M. Avsenev's book *The Choice of the Path of Development and Modern Anti-Communism*, Mysl Publishers, Moscow, 1984 (in Russian) *

⁵ *Weg und Ziel*, No. 1, 1980, p. 63.

FORTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF VICTORY OVER NAZI GERMANY

IN A MAZE OF SPURIOUS THEORIES

Western Historiography on World War II

by Alexander ORLOV

Why did the Soviet Union, whose collapse in the war against nazi Germany (1941-1945) had been repeatedly predicted by bourgeois propaganda, rout the strongest army in the capitalist world at that time? For forty years now have Western historians and politicians been asking themselves this. Unable to refute the very fact of Soviet victory, Western ideologists have been trying hard to distort the reasons for it and to present it not as the logical outcome of the advantages of the socialist system but as a chance event.

AT ODDS WITH REALITY

Bourgeois literature is particularly fond of citing the following factors as allegedly contributing to the defeat of the nazi forces on the Soviet-German front: Russia's unfavourable natural conditions: its severe climate, vast expanses, poor roads and the total absence of them in some regions; Hitler's fatal mistakes; the fact that he did not heed the advice of his "wise" generals and, therefore, lost the war; the Russians' numerical superiority; and, finally, the aid which the USA and Britain rendered the Soviet Union, enabling it to defeat the enemy.

Such "arguments" have, over the decades, been reiterated by many Western authors. However, none of these theses holds water in the light of the facts.

● A. ORLOV, Cand. Sc. (History), specializes in the study of problems of military history.

Can the defeats suffered by nazi forces on the Soviet-German front be attributed to Russia's severe climate and poor roads or lack of them? No, they cannot. Both sides were equally at the mercy of geographical and meteorological conditions which gave no advantage to either of them.

It was not the weather but the high morale and combat efficiency, the martial skills and generalship of the Soviet soldiers and commanders that enabled the Soviet Army to defeat the nazi troops.

Another pet thesis of bourgeois literature is that the defeats of the nazi forces on the Soviet-German front can be put down to "Hitler's incompetence", his inability to direct combat operations, his mistakes and miscalculations and his reluctance to heed the advice of military specialists.

What can be said on this score? There is a grain of truth in those charges. A dilettante in operational and strategic matters, Hitler indeed could not give combat operations the level of control they required. He, and the generals under his command, did make quite a lot of miscalculations. But the main causes of the nazi forces' defeats cannot be reduced to such subjective factors. They lie much deeper. They should be sought above all in the strength of the Soviet state and its Armed Forces, in the patriotism of the Soviet people and in the fact that the nazi leaders overestimated the capabilities of nazi Germany and its army.

The thesis about the "significant numerical preponderance" of the Soviet forces over the nazi troops is also beneath criticism.

It is well known that the enemy forces which invaded the USSR in June, 1941 were 5.5-million strong. The Soviet western-border military districts and fleets had half that number of combatants and their military hardware consisted mainly of outdated arms and weapons. By the beginning of the Soviet Army's counter-offensive at Moscow the enemy forces in this sector had over 1,708,000 combatants, over 13,500 artillery guns and mortars, 1,170 tanks, and 615 combat planes while the Soviet forces had 1,100,000 combatants, 7,652 artillery guns and mortars, 774 tanks and 1,000 combat planes. Thus, with the exception of the air force, nazi Germany had a superiority which can be expressed in the following ratios: in combatants—1:1.5; artillery guns and mortars—1:1.4; tanks and self-propelled assault guns—1:1.6; only in combat planes did the USSR have a numerical advantage—1.6:1.

In January, 1943 when the counter-offensive of the Soviet forces was in full swing—in the battle of Stalingrad and in the battle for the Caucasus—the numerical superiority of the Soviet Army could be expressed in the following ratios: 1.4:1 in troops, 2.1:1 in artillery, 1.8:1 in tanks and 1.7:1 in combat planes.

By the start of the battle in the area of the Kursk salient, the Soviet Army outnumbered the enemy by 1.4:1 in combatants; 1.2:1 in

tanks, 1.9:1 in artillery, 1:1 in combat planes. Thus, it follows from the above that the Soviet Army did not win the most important battles and operations because of its "immense numerical superiority". The Soviet forces in the Caucasus and in the battles of Stalingrad and Kursk did not outnumber the enemy by 3:1, which was generally held to be the minimum ratio, including by the military commands of the USA and Britain, necessary for the success of offensive operations in World War II. Soviet war experience showed that this correlation of forces could secure success only if all available means and resources were skilfully marshalled. The fact that in the battles of Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk the Soviet Supreme Command was able to achieve a significant preponderance in forces in the directions of the main effort by drawing forces away from the other sectors of the vast Soviet-German front and thus weakening them is convincing evidence of the high level of Soviet military art and generalship, an all-important factor for victories in these battles.

CONTRARY TO FACTS

The thesis that the Soviet Union's success in the struggle against nazi Germany was assured by "Western aid" also enjoys wide currency in the West. Bourgeois authors claim that the Soviet Army won its victories thanks to the operations of US and British forces in other theatres of war. Is that so? Let's take a look at the facts.

During the battle of Moscow 70 per cent of all of nazi Germany's forces operated on the Eastern front, while slightly over one per cent were deployed in North Africa and just under 30 per cent—in Western Europe. The nazi forces enjoyed numerical superiority in the battle of Moscow before the start of the Soviet counter-offensive. Nevertheless, they suffered a devastating defeat. In early November, 1942, 266 enemy divisions, including about 200 German ones, operated on the Soviet-German front, while only 4.5 German divisions fought in Africa: the allegedly "vast" German armies in the West had a total of 70 divisions. The invasion of North Africa by the Soviet Union's Western Allies did not pin down the German reserves in Western Europe. The fact is that in the course of the Soviet counter-offensive in the battle of Stalingrad half of them was transferred to the Soviet-German front, i.e. at the time the Western Allies in North Africa were advancing upon Tunisia. Analyzing the US offensive in North Africa, G. Marshall, then US Army Chief of Staff, admitted that those actions would not have forced Hitler to turn southward. We proceed from the fact, he said, that he has got well and truly bogged down in Russia.

The second front, opened by the Allies in June, 1944, never became the most important front. The main events continued to take place in the East. By diverting the bulk of nazi Germany's forces

(by July 1, 235 enemy divisions were operating on the Soviet-German front, while only 60 were fighting in the West), the Soviet Army did much to ensure the success of the Allied forces in Normandy. Suffice it to say that of the 34 nazi divisions which were disbanded in June-July, 1944, because of their irreparable losses, 29 of them had fought on the Eastern front. Nazi Germany's losses on the Eastern front, in June-August of that year, totalled 917,000 officers and men, while in Western Europe they stood at 294,000.

In the Ardennes operation launched by the Allies, the entire grouping of nazi forces employed to mount the counter-offensive was activated from the Western front forces and units and formations earlier stationed in Germany. Nazi documents show this. Moreover, when the situation on the Western front began to threaten the Allies, British Prime Minister W. Churchill sent a message on January 6, 1945, to Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Armed Forces J. Stalin which said in part:

"The battle in the West is very hard. . . I shall be grateful if you can tell me whether we can count on a major Russian offensive on the Vistula (the river in Poland—Ed.) front, or elsewhere during January. . . I regard the matter as urgent".¹

There was an almost immediate reply from Moscow: ". . . in view of our Allies' position on the Western front," Stalin wired to Churchill on January 7, "GHQ of the Supreme Command have decided to complete preparations at a rapid rate and, regardless of weather, to launch large-scale offensive operations along the entire Central Front not later than the second half of January."² A sweeping Soviet offensive, originally set for January 20, began on January 12. The rapid advance of the Soviet forces, which posed a direct threat to Germany itself, played havoc with Hitler's plans and crippled the offensive capabilities of the nazi forces in the West. The nazi command began to pull its forces out from the Ardennes and to transfer them to the German-Soviet front where the lot of the Third Reich was being decided. In late January the German forces in the West retreated in the Ardennes and Alsace to the positions they had occupied initially, and then went over to the defensive.

Thus, in all the indicators, throughout the war, the Eastern front was the main one; it was there that 607 divisions of nazi Germany, and her satellites, were routed. Meanwhile, the Allies defeated 176 German and allied divisions. It was on the Eastern front that the nazi army sustained over 73 per cent of its total losses and abandoned 75 per cent of its military hardware.

¹ Correspondence Between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Presidents of the USA and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1977, p. 296.

² *Ibid.*

The destruction of the bulk of the forces of the Third Reich on the Soviet-German front precipitated the collapse of the Nazi war machine and state apparatus. It was the Soviet Union and its army that bore the brunt of the war and made the decisive contribution to Victory over Nazi Germany.

AN OBJECTIVE VIEW

Also bankrupt are the claims that the Soviet Union won the war thanks to "generous US aid under the lend-lease" arrangement.

The lend-lease deliveries³, especially motor-vehicle deliveries (400,000 vehicles) did, of course, play a positive role in equipping the Soviet Army, and the Soviet people are grateful to the American and British peoples for this support. However, these deliveries were not so significant as the Western propaganda-makers have been trying to make out. The total volume of material aid under the lend-lease from the USA and Britain throughout the war is equal to a rather small proportion of the total Soviet industrial output for the war effort, a mere four per cent of it. Moreover, the bulk of lend-lease material and arms deliveries began to arrive in the USSR in late 1943, i.e. after the tide of the war had turned. But in the most difficult years of 1941 and 1942 when the Soviet Union was waging a life-and-death battle against the countries of the Nazi bloc, lend-lease deliveries were rather modest. In 1941, the USA and Britain delivered to the Soviet Union 750 planes (including 5 bombers), 501 tanks and 8 anti-aircraft guns; but they were supposed to deliver, in October-December alone, 1,200 combat planes, including 300 bombers, 1,500 tanks and about 50 anti-aircraft guns.

The delivery programme for 1942 was met only by half (849,000 tons of cargo arrived instead of the agreed 1,608,000 tons). In 1943, no supply convoys were sent to the northern Soviet ports from April to November. Consequently, only 6 supply convoys, composed of 121 vessels, arrived in the USSR in the course of the year. The equipment, armaments and other supplies sent to the Soviet Union via other routes (via the Persian Gulf and the Pacific) were also delivered in smaller quantities than envisaged in the protocols. The Soviet Union received from the USA during the war a total of 9,600 artillery guns, 7,000 tanks and 14,700 combat planes. It should be noted that most of the hardware delivered was obsolete. As for food, the average annual grain, cereals and flour deliveries from the USA and Canada to the USSR (in terms of grain) were equal to 2.8 per cent of the average annual Soviet harvest during the war.

³ For more details on this see Supplement No. 3, 1985.

AN IMPORTANT FACTOR FOR VICTORY

One of the leading factors for Victory over Nazi Germany was the Soviet socialist economy. The economic system of the Soviet state passed the trials and tribulations of the first, most difficult, 18 months of the war with flying colours. The Soviet rear, despite the extremely unfavourable situation caused by the perfidious Nazi attack, managed to provide the front with everything needed to wage the war and enabled the Soviet Army to have an advantage over the then strongest army of the capitalist world in the volume and quality of its military hardware.

While plotting its aggression against the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany had a much greater economic capability at its disposal than the Soviet Union did. Its industrial base, reinforced by the resources of the occupied European states, exceeded that of the Soviet Union by fifty per cent and even one hundred per cent in some sectors (by 150 per cent in the machine-tool stock and in coal output). And the entire might of this immense military-industrial capacity went into the first strike Nazi Germany inflicted upon the Soviet Union.

Capitalizing upon the element of surprise and its superiority in troops and materiel, the Nazi army managed to advance deep into the USSR. In 1941-1942, it occupied an area inhabited by 45 per cent of the entire Soviet population before the war. The country lost, temporarily, its largest industrial and agricultural regions which accounted for 33 per cent of industrial output, 63 per cent of coal output, 71 per cent of iron output and 58 per cent of steel output; for 47 per cent of croplands and about 45 per cent of the total head of cattle. In those difficult conditions, the CPSU and the Soviet government succeeded in using the advantages of the socialist mode of production and planned economic development, and, relying upon the moral and political unity of the Soviet people, developed measures for quickly reorganizing the country's economy for meeting defence needs. This restructuring was carried out within an exceedingly short period of time—in the second half of 1941 and the first half of 1942. It encompassed every sector of the national economy: industry, transport, agriculture and economic management bodies.

A total of 2,593 industrial enterprises, a large number of research institutes and laboratories, over 10 million people, were evacuated from the western front-line areas of the USSR to the east where deep in the rear plants and factories were resited and quickly made operational; new industrial facilities were built there, too. All told, 2,250 major industrial enterprises were built and commissioned in the eastern regions. Despite the temporary loss of the main grain-producing regions, the USSR carried out the task of supplying the

army and the people with food without outside aid, by drawing upon its own resources. By mid-1942 the USSR had created a smoothly-running military economy which made it possible to provide the country with everything necessary to prosecute the war and to organize the mass production of armaments and other equipment for the front.

Over 8,200 combat planes, 4,800 tanks and self-propelled assault guns, and 72,500 artillery guns and mortars were produced from July to December, 1941. The respective figures for 1942 were: 21,700, 24,400, and 357,100; for 1943: 29,900, 24,100, and 199,700. During the same period Germany produced: in 1941, 26,300 field artillery pieces and mortars, 3,800 tanks and self-propelled assault guns, 8,400 combat planes; in 1942, the respective figures were: 50,300; 6,200; 11,600. The respective figures for 1943 were: 96,700; 10,700; 19,300.

By the end of 1942 the balance of the main types of military hardware between the armies of the USSR and nazi Germany had changed in favour of the Soviet Armed Forces. In 1943, the Soviet forces' superiority in armaments became indisputable. New types of armaments and combat equipment accounted for the following per cent of the total output: small-arms—42.3 per cent; artillery pieces—83 per cent; tanks—over 80 per cent and Air Force—67 per cent.

It should be noted here that the economic struggle between the Soviet Union and nazi Germany and her satellites was waged in a situation where, all through the war, Germany produced more basic industrial items than the USSR. In 1940-1944, her industry outperformed Soviet industry by 80 per cent in energy production, by 380 per cent in coal production and by 160 per cent in steel production. And yet, the Soviet Union eventually outpaced Germany in the production of armaments. Throughout the war the Soviet munitions industries produced a total of 834,000 artillery pieces and mortars, 102,800 tanks and self-propelled assault guns and 112,100 combat planes. From September, 1939—April, 1945, Germany produced 398,700 artillery pieces and mortars, 46,300 tanks and assault guns and 89,500 combat planes. This shows the great efficiency of the socialist economy.

* * *

The Soviet Union's victory over the shock force of world imperialism—nazi Germany—was prepared by our country's entire historical development and by the objective potential of the socialist social system. It demonstrated the superiority of socialism over capitalism, and of socialist ideology over the misanthropic ideology of imperialism and fascism.

From *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya*, No. 1, 1985 *

“TO PROFESS OR NOT TO PROFESS ANY RELIGION IS A PERSONAL MATTER FOR EVERY CITIZEN IN THE USSR”

If you, Mr. Salem, want to have first-hand information from the basic documents and original sources about the Soviet state and the Communist Party's approach to religion in our country, I will cite two quotations.

One is from the draft Programme of the party adopted shortly after the October revolution. The founder of our state, V. I. Lenin, thus formulated our task: to “consistently effect the real emancipation of the working people from religious prejudices, doing so by means of propaganda and by raising the political consciousness of the masses but carefully avoiding anything that may hurt the feelings of the religious section of the population.”

The other quotation is from Article 52 of the Soviet Constitution which states that “citizens of the USSR are guaranteed freedom of conscience, that is, the right to profess or not to profess any religion, and to conduct religious worship or atheist-

ic propaganda. Incitement of hostility or hatred on religious grounds is prohibited. In the USSR, the church is separated from the state, and the school from the church.”

And so, on the one hand, there is a consistent operation of the principle of freedom of conscience, complete freedom for every believer to choose any religious confession he wishes and to take part in religious rites and ceremonies but, on the other hand, there is freedom to express one's atheistic convictions.

You should not confuse the question of the CPSU's attitude to religion as ideology with the attitude of the Soviet state to its citizens' rights and, in particular, their religious beliefs and affiliations to religious associations. In the USSR, there are over 20,000 Orthodox and Catholic churches, synagogues, Lutheran churches, Old Believers' temples, mosques, Buddhist monasteries, prayer houses of Evangelical Christian Baptists, and so on. The Soviet govern-

Mr. Salem's letter is published on p. 2.

ment does not obstruct their religious activity and, in particular, does not interfere with the publication of religious literature—the Bible, the Koran, journals, prayer books, calendars, theological works. Religious organizations run 18 higher and secondary ecclesiastical educational establishments training ministers of the church. They make cult items—icons, candles, church utensils. The church funds, which are made up from voluntary donations by believers, are not taxed.

One of the conditions ensuring freedom of conscience is the separation of the church from the state. This means that the church has no right to interfere in the affairs of the state. At the same time, the state and its agencies protect the law-abiding activities of religious organizations and guarantee their freedom to carry out religious rites. Moreover, the interference with people's freedom to carry out religious rites, if these do not violate law and order and are not accompanied by encroachments on the rights of other citizens, is penalized under Article 143 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (corrective labour for up to six months). Similar provisions are contained in the criminal codes of other Union Republics. The provision of the USSR Constitution that "incitement of hostility or hatred on religious grounds is prohibited" is likewise a safeguard for the rights of the individual.

All citizens of the Soviet Union, says Article 34 of the Soviet Constitution, "are equal before the law, without distinction of origin, social or property status, race or nationality, sex, education, language, attitude to religion..." The attitude to religion does not prevent any citizen from enjoying the political, social, economic, cultural, civil and personal rights and freedoms provided by law. None of the documents issued to Soviet citizens—birth and marriage certificates, passports, labour service records and so on, contain entries on profession of religion. As you can see, Mr. Salem, this is a further guarantee of freedom of religious worship. And one more important thing: the Soviet state abolished the system of state-church relations established by the laws of the former Russian Empire. These laws put the Orthodox Church in a dominant position and contributed to the conversion of believers of other denominations to the Orthodox church.

Now let us look at freedom of conscience in the capitalist world. Here are a few examples. Freedom of conscience is incompatible with compulsion to participate in religious ceremonies. However, the constitutions of 32 bourgeois countries make occupation of high posts in the state conditional on the swearing of a religious oath. In several states of the USA atheists are prohibited to occupy important offices and testify in court. The laws of many Western coun-

tries, which recognize only church weddings as valid and refer divorce cases to the jurisdiction of church courts of law, compel atheists to abide by religious norms in their private lives.

When the ideologists of the revolutionary bourgeoisie demanded the separation of the church from the state, they said justifiably that without this it is impossible to implement freedom of conscience. But even to this day the separation of the church from the state has not even been formally proclaimed in the majority of capitalist countries, and in other countries it remains on paper. The constitutions of a number of states in the USA qualify religious worship as an obligatory duty of citizens. In 16 states atheistic actions are penalized by fines of 30 to 1,000 dollars or imprisonment for up to three years. The Constitutions of 43 capitalist states denote a particular religion as "national". This is incompatible not only with the principle of freedom of conscience but even with the freedom of religious worship, for this constitutional provision sanctions the unequal status of different religious organizations.

Israel's legislation is highly intolerant. It lays down orthodox Judaism as obligatory for all citizens and does not even recognize any variant of this religion. The followers of reformed and conservative Judaism are therefore compelled to formalize all civil acts according

to the canons of the state religion and not their own religion. Some religious denominations are totally banned in Israel, Moslem religious organizations are constantly persecuted and harassed and mosques are gutted. How can you speak of freedom of conscience under these conditions?

We Marxists believe that the materialist perception of the world is leaving less and less room for religious beliefs as science advances. This process is irreversible. But we are against artificially spurring it on by forcibly spreading atheism of which we are accused.

I hope that the above facts and the information about the state of religion in the USSR have convinced you that there can be absolutely no question of compulsion here in our country. As for your contention about the absence of freedom of conscience in our country, I would like to quote such an authority as Patriarch Pimen, of Moscow and All Russia. Replying to a journalist's question, he said: "I must say with a full sense of responsibility that there has not been a single instance of anyone having been tried or detained for his religious beliefs in the Soviet Union. Moreover, Soviet legislation does not envisage prosecution for 'religious beliefs'. Believing or not believing in God is the private affair of each person in the USSR."

Yours respectfully,
Gennady KOPYAKOV

US MILITARY STRATEGY— AN INSTRUMENT OF AGGRESSIVE POLICY

by Genrich TROFIMENKO

All public debates on strategy conducted in the USA over the past quarter of a century have revolved around several fundamental theoretical concepts, including that of deterrence of the potential enemy, the concept of "mutual deterrence" through the threat of inflicting on the other side unacceptable damage by a retaliatory strike, and the concept of the "sufficiency" of the strategic forces for carrying out the tasks of "deterrence". Neither of these concepts sounds "aggressive". But what really lies behind them?

THE CONCEPT OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Ever since the US first atomic bombs were dropped upon the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, an act which was not dictated by any particular military necessity, the White House and the Pentagon have viewed nuclear weapons, with a colossal destructive force, as a splendid instrument for establishing US world hegemony. The United States started brandishing the atomic stick to intimidate both its "potential enemies" and its good friends in order to have a free hand to establish a Pax Americana.

In the years of the US atomic bomb monopoly and the subsequent preservation of a significant US superiority in the amounts of nuclear explosives and in the delivery vehicles, no one in the White House ever thought of nuclear war as out of the question. On the contrary, the threat of nuclear war, from the position of the US atomic bomb monopoly, became the main instrument the USA used to exert pres-

● Prof. G. TROFIMENKO, D.Sc. (History), Departmental Head, the Institute of US and Canadian Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

sure on the international arena with the aim of securing solutions to outstanding problems and issues that would suit it.

But US statesmen and politicians tried to camouflage their offensive aggressive strategy by a language in which "defence" was (and is) a key word. The term "deterrence" or "nuclear deterrence" has since struck root in the US strategic lexicon. To this day the postulate that the US approach to safeguarding national security is based exclusively on deterrence is axiomatic for the US nuclear doctrine intended for public consumption.

But is that really so?

An analysis of US strategy and actions on the world scene, against the background of specific US military construction programmes, shows that in the span of the past forty years at least four variants of basic strategies substantially differing from one another have been labelled by the word "deterrence".

In the period of the US nuclear monopoly "nuclear deterrence" meant pinning its hopes on a pre-emptive nuclear war. It was used as nuclear blackmail as far as possible, for exerting pressure upon the Soviet Union which did not have nuclear weapons until 1949. This pressure was aimed at transforming and "softening" the Soviet system. Noted US statesmen and politicians did not bother to conceal this.

In other words, at that time, "deterrence" meant the threat of nuclear attack upon the USSR in the event of "Soviet disobedience" or of it taking some action which ran counter to US interests. A mere 51 days after the victory of the Allied (Soviet and US) forces over Japan in September, 1945 the US Defence Intelligence Agency submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a plan for war against the USSR. It envisaged the destruction of 20 Soviet cities if Washington thought that Soviet aggression in Europe or Asia was imminent or that its scientific progress gave them grounds for thinking that the Soviet Union was capable of attacking the USA or of defending itself from an American attack.

After the USSR had developed its own atomic bomb, "nuclear deterrence" acquired a new content. US leaders began talking about "nuclear retaliation" against the Soviet Union. The official US strategy which was proclaimed after the Eisenhower Republican administration took the office in 1953 came to be known as "massive retaliation".

For what actions, one might ask, was the Soviet Union to be punished with a "massive retaliation"? According to the then Secretary of State, John F. Dulles, and his colleagues a pretext for war could be furnished not only by official Washington's apprehensions

that the USSR was going to attack the USA but also by a victory of guerrillas in the jungles of Malay or a military coup by leftist forces in a Latin American country. For the then, and present-day, Republican leaders believed, and still do, that Moscow was, and is, behind all revolutionary changes in the world. Since the "hand of Moscow" as Washington claimed, was responsible for all such changes, should any change, unfavourable to the USA, occur anywhere in the world, a blow should be struck at the main culprit—the Kremlin. This was the notorious brinkmanship policy—i.e. balancing on the brink of war, as Dulles himself referred to it. But speaking of "retaliation" the US leaders meant delivering a pre-emptive atomic strike on the Soviet Union, "should that be necessary". President Eisenhower noted down in his diary in January 1956 that in order to reduce potential US losses to the minimum the best way was to show initiative and "make a surprise attack upon the Soviets".

Thus, in its second interpretation, US "deterrence" was not a defensive concept designed to prevent a Soviet attack upon the USA under the threat of a retaliatory nuclear strike, but one designed to prevent social changes in the world on the pain of pre-emptive atomic strikes against "the centre of the world revolutionary movement", i.e.—against Moscow. In other words, the strategy labelled "deterrence" was in effect a strategy of intimidating the Soviet Union.

That this kind of intimidation by the USA did not lead to a real nuclear war of aggression was not due to the peacefulness of the then US statesmen, politicians and military strategists but to their more or less realistic assessments of the military balance. In making each such assessment Washington invariably came to the conclusion that the United States was marginally not strong enough to attack the other side with impunity. US strategists believed that all they needed was to slightly augment US military might and then deliver an effective nuclear strike at the USSR. But the US leaders were not one hundred per cent sure that they could attack with impunity.

Finally, with the USSR's development of a nuclear-missile capability which was comparable to that of the USA, the US concept of "deterrence" was given a new, third, interpretation now that the territory of the USA was no longer invulnerable: of convincing the potential enemy of the need to refrain from attacking the other side. And even though the USSR did not intend to attack the USA, this interpretation of "deterrence" meant a substantial shift in the direction of realism which, at long last, brought the US leadership to an understanding of the need for detente in the country's relations with the USSR and to the readiness to conclude and sign a number of agreements and treaties in the sphere of strategic armaments which formalized Soviet-American parity.

It transpired that US policy-makers and strategists were ready to sign agreements acknowledging parity while they believed that, despite their official recognition of the principle of equality in assuring the security of the sides, the USA, in reality, had a certain edge on the USSR.

But once the Soviet Union drew level with the USA in the number of delivery vehicles carrying strategic nuclear warheads and in its real retaliatory strike capacity, US interest in maintaining parity vanished into thin air.

The thesis that by recognizing its parity with the USSR in the sphere of strategic armaments the USA lost its capability for so-called extended deterrence surfaced in the course of further strategic debates in the USA. And what is "extended deterrence"? On closer examination of this term, kicked around by theoreticians of "power politics" in the seventies, it was discovered that it was used to camouflage the position of the United States' unilateral superiority.

Extended deterrence, in the view of US theorists, will not only persuade the main potential enemy to refrain from attacking the USA but will also discourage it from using force in local conflicts. They proceed from the assumption that the other side, aware of being the weaker, will be afraid of the USA, and so the escalation of a conflict to a higher, nuclear, stage would not be to its advantage.

Thus, the fourth, and, so far, the last interpretation of the concept of "deterrence" is effectively a return to the original aggressive-offensive interpretation, to the policy of "intimidating" the other side.

In the above context, one should also assess the approach Washington has adopted to the definition of the "sufficiency" of the US strategic nuclear forces.

PROBLEM OF "SUFFICIENCY"

In the period when the United States' leadership, in a changed strategic situation, was obliged to interpret "deterrence" as not coercion or intimidation but as "dissuading" of the potential enemy from attacking the USA and as a warning against such an attack, the US military and civilian theoreticians had to decide what forces would be sufficient for the purpose.

The first conclusive answer to this question was furnished by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations (1961-1968). He held that in "deterring" the poten-

tial enemy the USA should proceed from the possibility of surviving an attack and inflicting upon the enemy unacceptable damage in a retaliatory attack. According to calculations made by McNamara and his Pentagon team, in order to achieve this one-fifth to one-quarter of the potential enemy's population would have to be exterminated and half of his industrial capability would have to be wiped out.

With respect to the Soviet Union, McNamara claimed, 400 nuclear warheads, each with a yield of one megaton, would suffice. In order to be able to carry out a retaliatory attack, said McNamara, considering the growth of the Soviet strategic offensive forces in accordance with the variant that would be the worst for the USA (a "greater than expected threat"), and the possibility of the Soviet Union's deployment of an anti-missile defence system, the USA should have about 2,500 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles in firing position. By 1968 the build-up of the US strategic delivery vehicles had reached the level of around 2,400 units and has not substantially changed since then. Does this mean that the US military establishment has been guided by McNamara's criteria of "sufficiency" and has given up the former tendency of continuously increasing the number of targets on the territory of the USSR and, consequently, of increasing the number of warheads needed to hit them, and of delivery vehicles?

This question can only be answered in the negative. Indeed, the Pentagon has stopped increasing the number of strategic delivery vehicles. But this was not because it was guided by McNamara's theory but because, on his initiative, it began to deploy multiple-warhead strategic systems. For instance, the Minuteman-2 missile carrying one warhead was replaced by the Minuteman-3 carrying three independently targetable re-entry vehicles of greater accuracy; the Polaris-A-3 submarine-launched ballistic missile carrying three warheads, not independently targetable, was replaced by Poseidon submarine-launched ballistic missiles each carrying 14 independently targetable re-entry vehicles. Two outdated missiles installed on strategic bombers have been replaced by up to twenty SRAM attack air-to-surface missiles. This resulted in a situation where, instead of about 3,500 strategic nuclear warheads which the USA possessed in the first half of the sixties, the strategic forces of the USA already had a minimum of 15,000 warheads in the early eighties.

Pentagon officials claim that since the late sixties they have discarded 8,000 nuclear warheads. If this was so, then at some time in the said twenty-year span the US strategic forces had more than 15,000 warheads (apparently due to the nuclear bombs designed for bombers), which were phased out because of their physical deterioration and obsolescence. Much greater homing accuracy allows

the number of warheads and their average yields to be reduced without lowering the preset "sufficiency" parameters. But in the USA, the number of strategic nuclear warheads did not decrease over the said period; on the contrary, it more than quadrupled.

Thus, despite McNamara's public talk on the corresponding numerical criteria of "sufficiency" for a devastating retaliatory attack, neither he nor his successors, were guided by the criteria of sufficiency.

The point here is that although the stated strategy of the USA envisaged a retaliatory strike against the USSR, in actual fact the United States intended to put its strategic forces to other uses—for offensive action.

In step with the levelling out of the strategic capabilities of the USA and the USSR, Washington policy-makers have been relinquishing their retaliatory strike concept and inclining more towards delivering the first disarming strike at the other side's strategic forces.

It should be noted here that the USA has never really adhered to the position of a retaliatory strike. It has been reiterated for propaganda purposes only. In reality, as the Pentagon admitted later, the US strategic forces were targeted not only at cities and industrial facilities but also at the armed forces of the USSR and its allies.

Does the USA hope to get out of a situation marked by the sides' equal deterrence? Yes, it does. It has been striving to eliminate the parity formalized in the Soviet-US SALT-2 Treaty (which was not ratified by the United States, first of all because it reflected the real-life military-strategic parity between the USA and the USSR) and to win superiority. This is precisely why the number of objects on the territory of the USSR upon which the US strategic forces are targeted now stands at 40,000. As mentioned earlier, R. McNamara determined the number of targets essential for "deterrence" under the threat of a retaliatory strike to be 400, i.e. the number of targets has been increased 100-fold!

This tendency towards increasing first-strike—or counterforce—capability is supplemented by the plans for establishing, simultaneously, a large-scale space-based anti-missile system which, according to the designs of the current US leaders, would make short work of the Soviet retaliatory strike forces which would survive a US nuclear attack.

All this shows that the concept of "deterrence", in its latest interpretation, is not a defensive one but is a reversion to the original concept whereby the USA seeks to intimidate the potential enemy

by the threat of a pre-emptive strike and to gain a free hand in the employment of all types of armed forces and weapons at different levels.

MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION

In order to give a theoretical basis to US strategy, which US civilian strategists describe as "purely defensive", they have devised and launched the concept of mutual assured destruction (MAD). According to this concept the United States needs strategic nuclear forces to persuade the enemy not to strike a nuclear blow for, in any eventuality, the US will be able to retaliate. The USA has stated on a number of occasions that if the Soviet Union adopted the same position of deterring a US nuclear attack by the threat of inflicting upon the USA unacceptable damage mutual deterrence would be reached. This would, allegedly, be a major contribution to the promotion of strategic stability. The Soviet Union has never put forward such a concept. But it is obvious that parity in the field of strategic capabilities is conducive to peace rather than war. To live in a situation characterized by a balance of fear is not the best choice, but still parity of some sort is better for the stability of the situation than none at all.

But the main point is that in the sixties, early and mid-seventies there was no real parity between the USSR and the USA in strategic armaments, despite the SALT-I Treaty which was then already in force. Therefore, under those conditions, the abstract theorizing of US authors about MAD served, in reality, to cover up the actual superiority of the USA.

The situation had changed by the close of the seventies when Soviet strategic forces did indeed draw level with the US strategic forces in their combat capabilities. The concept of MAD which had until then been hypothetical became an objective reality. And this was formalized by the SALT-II Treaty which registered the essential parity between the strategic forces of the USSR and the USA. It would seem that the possibility had arisen then of passing over from the balance of fear to its gradual reduction, with the strict observance of the principle of equality and equal security. But instead of further pursuing the path of limiting and reducing strategic armaments, the USA took a step in a totally different direction. The Reagan Administration has been trying to restore the US superiority in the military field so as to be able to fight a victorious nuclear war. The Soviet leadership has clearly stated on several occasions that the USSR will not permit this and that our country has the capability to keep this pledge. This has been confirmed by tens and hundreds of noted experts, including US ones.

But the main thing is that the well-sounding thesis put forth by US theorists about the desirability of MAD for stabilizing the strategic balance has proved to be sheer demagoguery, designed to mislead the public by showing it that the USA harbours no aggressive schemes. While publicly advertizing MAD as "ideally stabilizing" strategic confrontation they have been planning a devastating attack upon the USSR which would make it impossible for our country to deliver an effective retaliatory strike against the USA. But the moment the USSR developed a tangible capability to deliver a devastating retaliatory strike and, moreover, the moment this state of affairs was registered in the SALT-2 Treaty, MAD (and the Treaty which formalized it) immediately lost their attraction to many policy-makers and strategists in the USA. But for propaganda purposes they have been alleging that the concept of MAD was rejected . . . by the Soviet Union. This is the height of hypocrisy!

Was it the USSR that scrapped the SALT-2 Treaty formalizing the concept of MAD at the level of complete parity? Is it the Soviet Union that has been seeking to abrogate the Treaty on limiting the anti-missile defence systems which broke the endless chain of competition between offensive and defensive systems and which slowed down the pace of deployment of offensive weaponry? Top Soviet leaders declare that our country is satisfied with the military-strategic balance that has evolved between the USSR and the USA, between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO, and that it does not seek superiority. And, finally, it is the Soviet Union that has pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Should Washington match this pledge and agree to freeze, together with the USSR, the existing strategic armaments at the present level of parity (for the SALT-2 Treaty formalizing parity is still in force, de facto) the real-life situation of MAD, which the USA says it seeks to maintain, would be a starting off point for a movement towards ending military competition between the two world systems.

*"SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya", No. 1, 1985**

SOVIET YOUTH: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

The struggle to win the hearts and minds of the younger generation has become particularly acute in contemporary society. And this is understandable, for youth is the future of our society.

The outlook for young people is different under socialism and capitalism. In a society where the means of production are privately owned the most basic problem with which young people are faced is the one of finding a job. In a number of Western countries young people constitute up to 40 per cent of the unemployed, their number running into millions. The issue of professional training and education for the rising generation is also most acute.

Together with the lack of prospects for young people in the "adult" world there is another evil of the society of "free enterprise"—the spiritual crisis,

the depreciation of traditional social and moral ideals.¹

Under socialism the picture is quite different. For the first time in history, questions relating to the rising generation are being tackled in a society which is developing on a planned basis. The socialist state not only shows concern for the young, but has real opportunities to direct and regulate the social processes which are crucial for the development of their abilities and cultivation of their demands. The rights of Soviet youth, as of all Soviet citizens, are confirmed in the Constitution and are ensured by a whole system of guarantees—juridical, economic, political and social.

¹ Further information on this will be found in H. Diligensky's article *The Youth of the West: Hard Quests* published in issue No. 7 of the journal for 1985.

In a bid to gloss over the differences in the position of youth under socialism and capitalism, the Western media distorts socialist reality and puts forward all kinds of "arguments" which serve to mislead large numbers of people. The false arguments of bourgeois propaganda concerning Soviet youth are exposed in Vladimir Yegorov's book.² The author answers the questions which are most often asked by young foreigners visiting the Soviet Union and questions to be found in numerous letters addressed to the Soviet media.

One of the oldest and most tenacious theses of Western falsifiers is "the ideological conflict between fathers and sons in the USSR". Is it true? Of course not. For in its essence an ideological conflict cannot be a conflict between people of different ages. The differentiation of social forces develops in relation to class and not along age lines.

The real problem lies elsewhere. Young people today enjoy a greater degree of autonomy in relation to adults than at any other time in the past. Social status and prestige no longer depend on age. Today too, in principle, a more experienced person will guide a less experienced

² V. Yegorov. *Soviet Youth (Questions and Answers)*. Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1985, published in English, French, Spanish and other languages.

person. But experience is now determined not only by age but just as much by education, knowledge and abilities. At work a young engineer may be in charge of his own father and colleagues of his father's generation. The same may happen in science. A pupil often moves ahead of his teacher in knowledge and social prestige. In everyday life, in the family, young people are also more independent and are free from their parents' wardship. Under socialism, relations between fathers and children are more equal than they were in the past.

Soviet youth, just as youth in other socialist countries, is continuing the cause of their fathers. The existence of a common final goal—the building of communism—creates an ideological link between the different generations, from the professional revolutionaries of the past to those building the new society today.

Another "argument" is often used in the West: "Komsomol is dependent on the CPSU". Bourgeois ideologists compare this with the "independence" of youth organizations in the West. What can be said about this?

Any political party, V. Yegorov writes, quite naturally strives to win over young people so that they will share its convictions and adopt the aims set in its programme. The Komsomol and the CPSU are united by common ideology, aims and tasks. At the same time, Kom-

somol is an independent social organization with its own organizational structure, apparatus, budget, material and technical basis and press. It is also juridically independent of both state and economic organs and social organizations of the USSR, and it develops international cooperation independently.

As for the "independence" of youth organizations in the West, one thing can be said for certain: they are in fact linked with bourgeois, socialist, clerical or communist parties and work under their guidance. This is the usual practice.

Bourgeois ideologists try to denigrate young people in the Soviet Union, declaring that they "go to the construction sites in Siberia for the sake of money". But they do not, of course, have the facts to prove this. They rely on the long-standing device of imperialist propaganda: stubbornly repeat a patent lie and someone will believe it.

The author cites objective facts to prove this. Sociologists in Leningrad presented young people going to Siberian construction sites with a questionnaire on which there was the question: "Why are you going to a Siberian construction site?" The following answers were received (several reasons could be given at once): "I want to be with my friends (the collective)"—95.7 per cent, "I want to be

useful to society"—92.2 per cent, "I want to see my country, to visit new places"—90.5 per cent, "I want to test myself in hard conditions"—76.6 per cent, "I want to make money"—67.9 per cent. This shows that moral and civic motives prevail among the causes impelling young people to go to construction sites in Siberia where they must work under severe climatic conditions.

A new variant on this theme has recently appeared in the West. It is being asserted that there is no "youth anti-war and anti-missile movement" in the USSR. This has been pulled out of thin air, for there are simply no facts to prove it. The real facts are given in the book.

2.5 million young people took part in the Peace March of Soviet youth in 1982. Over 20 million young men and women sent postcards to NATO headquarters demanding a halt to the arms race. Several million people put their signatures to postcards addressed to NATO headquarters in connection with the deployment of American first-strike nuclear missiles in Western Europe. In many Soviet towns young people demonstrated in support of peace. The biggest action was the 800,000 strong youth protest demonstration in Moscow. The ideological sword-bearers of capitalism have closed their eyes to this.

The argument of Western propagandists that Soviet youth

organizations cooperate abroad only with Communists does not hold water at all. In fact, they maintain contacts with more than 1,350 international, regional and national youth and student organizations in 140 coun-

tries. And these do not include only young Communists.

Readers will find answers to many other questions touching on different aspects of the life of Soviet youth in the book.

Gennady GRIGORIEV

BOOKSHELF ● BOOKSHELF ● BOOKSHELF ● BOOKSHELF ● BOOKSHELF

Bikkenin N. SOCIALIST IDEOLOGY. Progress Publishers, Moscow, 204 pp

The author reviews the system of attitudes and ideas which reflects the relationship of the members of socialist society to each other and to the world around them. He traces the emergence of scientific socialism with its unity of theory and practice, and describes how the ideas of Marx, Engels and Lenin became reality thanks to the concerted effort of society led by the Communist Party.

Frolov I. GLOBAL PROBLEMS AND THE FUTURE OF MANKIND. Progress Publishers, Moscow, 256 pp

The author of this monograph is a Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, specialising in the philosophical problems of civilisation. He gives a scientific analysis of the social, ecological and demographic problems that will face humanity at the turn of the third millennium. Alternative approaches to these problems are considered from a Marxist viewpoint. A special chapter is devoted to public health services and the all-round and harmonious development of man in conditions of scientific, technological and social progress.

Borodin V. **INDUSTRIALISATION IN THE USSR: A PROGRAMME FOR THE WORKING PEOPLE.** Progress Publishers, Moscow, 82 pp

The socialist economy is a great example for the developing countries, faced with the problem of creating their own, independent economies. In the false bourgeois view of history, Soviet industrialisation was carried out at the expense of the peasantry. The author dispells these theories by indicating the true aims, directions and methods of socialist industrialisation. Through industrialisation, in fact, it was possible to reconstruct agriculture and ease the peasants' lot, rescuing them from poverty.

THE CULTURAL LIFE OF THE SOVIET WORKER: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY. Progress Publishers, Moscow, 208 pp

The Cultural Life of the Soviet Worker, the product of many years of sociological research on industrial workers, was written by the scholars from the Urals Research Centre of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

Drawing upon a significant amount of empirical data, the authors reveal the different aspects of the varied cultural life of the working class in the Urals—the major economic region of the Soviet Union.

PERIODICALS FEATURED IN THIS ISSUE:

Izvestia
(*News*)

— a daily newspaper published by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, founded March, 1917, circulation 6.5 million.

Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya
(*World Economy and International Relations*)

— a monthly journal of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences, founded 1957, circulation about 30 thousand.

Rabochy klass i sovremenny mir
(*The Working Class and the World Today*)

— a bimonthly journal of the Institute of the International Working Class Movement of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, founded 1971, circulation 10 thousand.

SShA: ekonomika, politika, ideologiya
(*USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology*)

— a monthly scientific and socio-political journal of the Institute of US and Canadian Studies under the USSR Academy of Sciences, founded 1970, circulation 35 thousand.

PUBLISHING HOUSES WHOSE BOOKS ARE FEATURED IN THIS ISSUE:

Mysl
(*Thought*)

— state publishing house in Moscow, puts out literature on philosophy, economics, history and geography, about 300 books in a total printing of 15 million yearly.

ПРИЛОЖЕНИЕ № 4 К ЖУРНАЛУ
«СОЦИАЛИЗМ: ТЕОРИЯ И ПРАКТИКА»
№ 7, 1985 г.

на английском языке

0-35

The Soviet monthly digest **SOCIALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE** and supplements to this journal are digests of the political and theoretical press featuring the vital problems of Marxist-Leninist theory, the practice of socialist and communist construction, the peoples' struggle for peace, democracy and socialism, and worldwide ideological struggle.

All inquiries should be addressed to
SOCIALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE
7 Bolshaya Pochtovaya Street,
107082, Moscow, USSR
or to the Information Department of the
Soviet Embassy.