

The Loss in China and The Revolutionary Legacy Of Mao Tsetung



Speech by Bob Avakian, Chairman
of the Central Committee of the
Revolutionary Communist Party, USA
ON THE MAO TSETUNG
MEMORIAL MEETINGS 1978

\$ 5

RCP Publications, Chicago 1978

The Loss in China and The Revolutionary Legacy Of Mao Tsetung

**Speech by Bob Avakian, Chairman
of the Central Committee of the
Revolutionary Communist Party, USA**

**Delivered at the MAO TSETUNG
MEMORIAL MEETINGS 1978**

Publisher's Note

This book consists of the major presentations at the Mao Tsetung Memorial Meetings which were held in New York City and in the San Francisco Bay Area on September 9 and 10, 1978, respectively. The meetings, sponsored by the Revolutionary Communist Party, USA and the Mao Tsetung Memorial Committee, were attended by a total of around 2300 people. These programs were held on the second anniversary of the death of Mao Tsetung at which time the RCP made public for the first time its analysis of the reactionary October 1976 coup in China and its implications and lessons for the revolutionary movement worldwide. At each meeting Bob Avakian, Chairman of the Central Committee of the RCP, USA, gave a major address, "The Loss in China and the Revolutionary Legacy of Mao Tsetung." This speech is reprinted here in full, with some slight changes made—and one footnote added—by Comrade Avakian in preparing the text for publication. Also reprinted here is the transcribed text of the Question and Answer period at the West Coast program and the opening statement made at each meeting by a leading member of the Central Committee.

Published and distributed by
RCP Publications
P.O. Box 3486
Merchandise Mart
Chicago, IL 60654

*First Printing: September 1978
Second Printing: November 1979*

Contents

Opening Statement

*Delivered at the separate meetings by
Bill Klingel
Joanne Psihountas
Leading members of the
Central Committee, RCP, USA 1*

The Loss in China and the
Revolutionary Legacy of
Mao Tsetung

*Speech by Bob Avakian,
Chairman of the Central Committee,
RCP, USA 9*

Questions and Answers 127

MAO TSETUNG MEMORIAL MEETINGS 1978

***Hold high the banner of Mao Tsetung's
immortal contributions and the
achievements and lessons of the
Cultural Revolution!***

***Hail the heroic efforts of the Four
who fought to uphold Mao's line
and proletarian rule in China!***

***Revisionists are revisionists and must
not be supported; revolutionaries are
revolutionaries and must be supported!***

Opening Statement

**Delivered at the Separate Meetings by
Bill Klingel
Joanne Psihountas
Leading members of the
Central Committee, RCP, USA**

On this second anniversary of the death of Mao Tsetung, the Revolutionary Communist Party and the Mao Tsetung Memorial Committees have called this meeting together not only to pay tribute to the greatest revolutionary of our time, but to put into practice one of Mao's behests. As Mao said in 1965: "If China's leadership is usurped by revisionists in the future, the Marxist-Leninists of all countries should resolutely expose and fight them and help the working class and the masses of China to combat such revisionism."

Hardly anyone can deny that there have been monumental changes in the People's Republic of China over the last two years. The rulers of this country with delight are praising the Chinese leadership for coming to their senses and implementing liberal reforms and "practical" policies. Even Hua Kuo-feng and Teng Hsiao-

ping don't really try to hide it. Reactionaries and opportunists everywhere are rejoicing over the end of the "wild and turbulent" Mao years.

But, for these years the People's Republic of China was the backbone of revolutionary struggle the world over. And further China was a beacon light to all those who sought a brighter future for mankind. She was a source of aid and support to struggles on every continent. The Chinese revolution did what the defenders of bourgeois rule always claim is impossible. The masses rose up and ended centuries of feudal barbarism and decades of plunder and aggression by "civilized" imperialism. A New China, a Socialist China was being forged on the ashes of the old and literally the whole world watched in amazement as the Chinese masses broke with all convention and tradition and took a China of backwardness and suffering and turned her into a vanguard of humanity.

With this New China came new conditions, new problems and new challenges. And it is in meeting these new challenges where the Chinese revolution and the contributions of Mao Tsetung stand out the most. Socialism had suffered a great defeat in the mid-'50s—there was no longer anything revolutionary about the Soviet Union—yet it had been the first country under working class rule; the bearings of revolutionary and progressive-minded people around the world were, to say the least, thrown off.

It would have been easy to just go along with Khrushchev's phoney "we can out-produce you" communism. But the Chinese Party led by Mao

together with the Party of Labour of Albania headed by Enver Hoxha were at the forefront of those who recognized this sham for what it was and refused to capitulate. The lessons of Soviet betrayal were summed up—of course through fierce struggle—and applied in China. The result was the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the most class conscious revolutionary mass movement history had ever seen.

The Cultural Revolution was a Red storm that not only swept China, but gave new vigor to the class struggle throughout the world. "The Working Class Must Exercise Leadership in Everything" became its battle cry and down came those who would try to set the clock back and turn the successes of the Chinese masses into their own personal capital. The masses, led by Mao, vigorously took on the scars left from the old society that were the soil giving bloom to capitalist relations. New forms emerged that challenged the set methods that were in reality holding back the revolution. The Cultural Revolution actually thrust forward the shoots of the communist future.

But the Cultural Revolution and the Chinese revolution as a whole is being reversed. Today the world-wide struggle is at a crossroads just as it was at the time of the working class' defeat in the Soviet Union. Summing up what has happened in China is the most pressing and important question facing revolutionaries around the globe.

Not only are open reactionaries making hay and trying to spread defeatism through the events in China, but so-called communists are

trying to brand what is currently going on as the path of the future. But that is a fatal mistake. If one accommodates oneself to revisionism in China, or fails to correctly sum up why it has triumphed, one cannot make revolution in his own country. How could we presume to seek to advance society forward if we set our sights no higher than the time-worn capitalist aspirations of the current Chinese leadership? And the reversal in China entails the turning on its head of all the rich history of proletarian struggle—of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tsetung Thought.



The decisiveness of a correct orientation toward the events in China can be shown by how Khrushchev's coup in the Soviet Union was the condition for the final deterioration of the first communist party in this country, as well as for the majority of parties around the world. It was also part of the conditions for the pessimistic abandonment of revolutionary aspirations by thousands who incorrectly summed up the Soviet betrayal as proof that man's exploitation by man could never be eliminated.


Today we have many serious questions to go into and discuss. Among them are why we feel that there can be no question as to the reactionary character of Hua Kuo-feng, Teng Hsiao-ping and the rest of *their* gang. What are some of the reasons that this tremendous setback took place? How does it affect the international situation, the developments toward war and the prospects of revolution in the world? And what are the lessons we can and must draw from this temporary but heavy defeat in order to continue and

strengthen the revolutionary struggle?

Our Party has studied and, as many people know, struggled fiercely over this question since the coup in China took place almost two years ago. But we also had the greatest assistance in reaching our conclusions from the great teachings of Mao on continuing the class struggle under socialism and from the invaluable contributions of the Four, Wang Hung-wen, Chang Chun-chiao, Chiang Ching and Yao Wen-yuan who were steadfast and firm in the struggle to defend the gains of the Chinese revolution, not only for the Chinese masses but for the workers and oppressed of the world.

Mao Tsetung Memorial meetings in New York City (left) and the San Francisco Bay Area (below) on September 9 and 10, 1978, respectively.





The Loss in China and the Revolutionary Legacy of Mao Tsetung

Speech by Bob Avakian, Chairman of
the Central Committee of the
Revolutionary Communist Party, USA

On September 9, 1976 Mao Tsetung, the greatest Marxist, the greatest revolutionary, of our time, died. This was a loss impossible to measure to the international proletariat and the people of the world. It was mourned by the masses of Chinese people and millions of others on every continent.

When Mao died, however, there *were* some who were overjoyed—imperialists and other reactionaries, including the social-imperialist (socialist in words, imperialist in deeds) rulers of the Soviet Union and other renegades to the revolutionary cause of the working class. This

*Comrade Avakian
delivering the main address in New York.*

certainly included the revisionists in China itself who shortly after Mao's death seized power from the working class through a reactionary armed *coup d'etat*.

Down to his last breath Mao Tsetung continued to lead the Chinese people in revolutionary struggle. Even on his deathbed he did not waver or falter but stood firm, refusing to back down in the face of bitter attacks from those who today, with naked hypocrisy, claim to be his successors. Mao refused, as he always had before, to sell out the revolutionary cause of the proletariat, and continued to put principle above illusory and false unity. This is yet another testimony to the vision and staunchness of this great revolutionary leader of the working class and oppressed people of the world.

When Mao died the masses of Chinese people were in the midst of yet another soul-stirring and decisive battle. With the support and guidance of Mao they were fighting to beat back the counter-revolutionary offensive of Teng Hsiao-ping and others in top leadership of the Communist Party itself who were whipping up a large-scale wind to reverse the great victories and achievements the Chinese people had won, especially in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution beginning in 1966, through their own revolutionary struggle and with the leadership of Mao Tsetung. This latest battle raging in 1976 was not an academic debate over how to evaluate the unprecedented events and results of the Cultural Revolution but a life and death struggle over which class would rule China, the proletariat or the bourgeoisie, and

which road it would follow, the revolutionary road of socialism or the counter-revolutionary road of restoring the old society with all its misery for the masses.

The intensity of this struggle was highlighted on April 5, 1976—only five months before Mao's death—when the counter-revolutionaries staged a large-scale riot in Tien An Men, the main square in the capital of Peking. They directly attacked Mao and those in Party leadership who stood firmly with him, and they praised Chou En-lai (who had died only a few months earlier) and loudly declared their support of Teng Hsiao-ping's aggressive attacks on Mao's line and policies and Teng's attempts to carry out Chou's phony "modernization" program and reverse the Chinese revolution. Overturning and burning cars, threatening that "no one in the Central Committee" can "put this situation under control," they wailed in grotesque fashion: "Devils howl as we pour out our grief, we weep but the wolves laugh. We spill our blood in memory of the hero [Chou En-lai]; raising our brows we unsheathe our swords. China is no longer the China of yore, and the people are no longer wrapped in sheer ignorance; gone for good is Chin Shih Huang's feudal society [meaning the rule of the working class under Mao's leadership]." This reactionary riot was put down by the people's militia and security and People's Liberation Army forces, and the arrogance of these "heroes" was punctured then and there. But of course the counter-revolutionaries did not give up, and they had powerful backing and leadership—with Teng

as their most upfront champion, despite being removed from his posts after this riot, and others still nestling in the top ranks of the Party as their behind-the-scenes instigators and commanders as well.

Thus when Mao died on September 9, 1976 the Chinese people not only lost the man who had been their helmsman during 55 years of struggle, but suffered a great blow in the immediate battle. Crucial parts of the statement on the death of Mao Tsetung by the leading bodies of the Chinese Party and government, reflecting the actual political behests of Mao himself and the aspirations of the masses of Chinese people and the genuine communist leaders at their forefront, urgently called for carrying forward the revolution based on Mao's line:

We must carry on the cause left behind by Chairman Mao and persist in taking class struggle as the key link, keep to the Party's basic line and persevere in continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat. . . .

We must carry on the cause left behind by Chairman Mao and consolidate the great unity of the people of all nationalities under the leadership of the working class and based on the worker-peasant alliance, deepen the criticism of Teng Hsiao-ping, continue the struggle to repulse the Right deviationist attempt at reversing correct verdicts, consolidate and develop the victories of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, enthusiastically support the socialist new things, restrict bourgeois right and further consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat in our country. We should continue to unfold the three great revolutionary movements

of class struggle, the struggle for production and scientific experiment, build our country independently and with the initiative in our own hands, through self-reliance, hard struggle, diligence and thrift, and go all out, aim high and achieve greater, faster, better and more economical results in building socialism.

But things were clearly coming to a head, with the forces of the bourgeoisie, especially in the Party itself, preparing their move to grab power and trample on the cause left behind by Mao and all those who continued to fight for it. Hua Kuo-feng, who on the strength of the Rightists, the bourgeoisie, in the Party had been appointed Premier of the government and first vice-chairman of the Communist Party, was already indicating his treacherous intention to go against the orientation laid down for the struggle and the basic principles of Mao's line. Opposed to him and the bourgeoisie he represented were the so-called "gang of four"—and the masses of Chinese people, including the masses of Party members. These four courageous leaders, who stood firmly with the people in the storms of this battle, were mobilizing mass struggle and leading mass criticism against the revisionists—communists in word and capitalists in deeds—and their line for restoring capitalism. In this way the Four were laying the foundation for exposing and defeating those like Hua who were attempting to reverse the correct direction of the struggle and aim their fire at the masses and their revolutionary leaders.

On October 6, 1976, less than a month after

Mao's death and less than three weeks after the official mourning period for Mao had ended, the revisionists, using the portions of power they had seized from the working class over a period of time, especially in the military, pulled off their *coup*, before the mass struggle could be developed further and strike harder at their positions of power.

And with this act the revisionists rose to power, seizing control of the Communist Party and the state. Their arrest of the Four and their close followers marked the decisive turning point and a fundamental change, beginning the process of suppressing genuine revolutionaries and the masses, reversing the entire revolution and restoring capitalism.

Quickly, outrageous lies, fantastic tales and low-life personal vilification poured out of the official agencies against the Four. This was itself an exposure of those who have seized power and the bankruptcy of their line and political program, for they could not answer the line of the Four—and Mao—politically but instead had to create a whirlwind of confusion and attempt to fan subjectivism. At that time there was some confusion among revolutionaries around the world—and no doubt in China itself—caused by the avalanche of “charges” against the Four and Hua Kuo-feng’s claims to be Mao’s successor. But since then it has become more and more obvious that those who now rule China are attacking and reversing everything Mao stood for and fought for. And now they are beginning to launch open attacks on Mao, first through

“friendly sources” in places like Hong Kong and “unofficial” comments by leading revisionists who say that yes Mao was good, but we have to “smash the myth that Mao could never make mistakes.” Echoes of Liu Shao-chi, a revisionist knocked down from his throne at the start of the Cultural Revolution, who once declared that “Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Chairman Mao have all made many mistakes.” No one, of course, can be free from any mistakes, but what is meant here is not mistakes—it is an all-out attack on the whole line. In particular initiating and leading the Cultural Revolution, in which the Chinese masses rose up to prevent the revisionists from seizing power and restoring capitalism—this was a great “mistake” that Mao made, according to the revisionists now ruling China. In reality Mao’s real “mistake” in their eyes was being a *communist*, a thoroughgoing revolutionary, instead of a self-seeking representative of the bourgeoisie like themselves!

Mao consistently put forward communism, completely turning the world upside down (or rightside up), eliminating all class distinctions and all exploitation and oppression as the lofty aim to strive for and the historical mission of the proletariat. He called on and led the working people to raise their sights, to pay attention to and master the cardinal questions in society and the affairs of state, to determine the whole direction of society and transform the whole world. These revisionists replace genuine communism with “goulash communism”; they say the working people cannot think beyond the question of

where their next meal is coming from, that they are only concerned about meat and potatoes. They proclaim a new "historic mission"—capitalist restoration under the signboard of "modernization," in whose achievement the role of the working people is to put their nose to the grindstone and labor like beasts of burden lured with the promise of more grain. Leave politics and the running of society to the "experts," the "wise men," and the bigshots in general—this is their message for the masses of people. Mao constantly stressed political consciousness as the motivating factor; they snarl about "reward and punishment," trying to intimidate and induce the masses to break their backs for these tyrants.

Mao said revolution must guide production, politics must be in command and that mass movements are the main thing to rely on not only in political struggle but in production and scientific experiment and advancement. They insist on production first and above all else, relying on "efficient management"—like in the capitalist countries—not controlled and supervised by the masses but by colorless bureaucrats barking orders. And, in fact, despite their flimsy denials, they put profit in command.

Mao said the lowly are most intelligent, the elite are most ignorant. They unleash intellectual aristocrats, lording it over the masses and enviously aping their counterparts in the capitalist countries.

Mao called for narrowing and restricting the inequalities and social distinctions left over from

the old, exploiting society. They say such things are fine, and one-sidedly promote and expand them without restriction.

Mao declared that "The proletariat must exercise all-around dictatorship over the bourgeoisie in the superstructure, including all spheres of culture." They promote and restore to the stage all manner of decadent bourgeois, even feudal, junk and uncritically import and build up imperialist "models"—returning things once again to the kind of situation that existed before the Cultural Revolution, when Mao was moved to remark about the Ministry of Culture: "If it refuses to change, it should be renamed the Ministry of Emperors, Kings, Generals and Ministers, the Ministry of Talents and Beauties or the Ministry of Foreign Mummies."

Mao said that "education must serve proletarian politics and be combined with productive labor," and that "our educational policy must enable everyone who receives an education to develop morally, intellectually and physically and become a worker with both socialist consciousness and culture." And Mao led in transforming education through the Cultural Revolution so that it really conformed to these principles and did not foster an intellectual elite as it had before the Cultural Revolution. Those in power now have reversed the whole orientation for education, reinstated a "tracking system" (in fact we might say they have put into effect a Chinese "Bakke decision"); gearing education for "talents," sending them to "special schools," divorcing education once again from proletarian

politics and productive labor, while the masses get "vocational training" at most—after all this is the most "efficient" way to do things—just like here in the good old USA! Now they are even begging and planning to send as many as 10,000 youth—no doubt the very special "talents"—to schools in the imperialist countries, where they will not only study natural science, engineering, etc., according to bourgeois methods, but so-called "social science" and "political science" as well. What better way to train bourgeois successors!

Mao insisted on self-reliance in developing the economy and on making use of small and medium-sized enterprises as well as large ones, and of backward as well as advanced technology in order to bring about independent, proportional and planned *socialist* development, not "development" that is distorted and dependent on foreign capital. They lust after the big, the big, the big, the modern, the modern and the modern, adopting the policies of selling out the country's resources to get advanced technology and even now inviting foreign capital in to "jointly" exploit the resources—and the people—of the country.

Mao said people, not weapons, are decisive in warfare and that while it was necessary to have the most modern weapons possible, this must not be done in such a way as to distort the economy and bring about dependence on others, especially imperialists. He emphasized again and again that reliance must be on the masses, armed politically as well as with guns, and not on

technology, in war. They act on the bankrupt principle that weapons, not people are decisive—as for example in Teng Hsiao-ping's remark of recent years that a "modern war" is a "war of steel," that steel is decisive in determining the outcome of war today. This is exactly the same kind of line that Mao had to repeatedly and relentlessly struggle against years earlier in the Chinese revolution, in opposition to those who said that China was bound to be subjugated by Japan, and then by the U.S. imperialist-backed Kuomintang, because they had far superior technology and more modern weapons. And those revisionists ruling in China have not even learned the lesson that was forcefully taught to those imperialists, especially of the "advanced United States," whom they so slavishly tail after and want to depend on. Ask *them* about Indochina and whether superior technology or a politically motivated people fighting for a just cause is decisive in warfare!

Mao built a people's army to fight a people's war; and he insisted that this must still be the basic policy. They are creating a bourgeois army, restoring ranks and even importing the appropriate *uniforms*—as well as models of stratification—from bourgeois armies.

Mao constantly reminded the masses of their proletarian internationalist duties to support the struggles of the oppressed peoples and nations and the revolutionary movement of the working class worldwide—repeatedly recalling Marx' famous statement that only by emancipating all mankind can the proletariat emancipate itself; he

led them in opposing great power chauvinism and in preventing it from taking hold in China itself. Today the traitors who rule China have stabbed the People's Socialist Republic of Albania in the back—acting just like Khrushchev did toward China (and Albania), pulling out technicians, blueprints and other assistance (giving incidentally a glimpse not only of their relations with others but of the kind of bourgeois economic relations they are rapidly instituting in China itself). Meanwhile they reverse Mao's well-known and decisive denunciation and exposure of Yugoslavia and Tito as revisionist, saying that Yugoslavia is a model of socialism—for them it is certainly a model, of how to carry out capitalism under the signboard of socialism. And in general they try to act the bully in relations with those they regard as weak while at the same time they capitulate to and collaborate for bourgeois aims with imperialists and reactionaries hated and scorned by the masses of people the world over. And they preach that it is the main task of revolutionaries in every country not to fight for revolution there and support it worldwide, but simply to defend China and support its "modernization."

They have completely betrayed the cause left behind by Mao Tsetung. Reversing and trampling on Mao's line and his great revolutionary Thought serves only the bourgeoisie and leads only to taking the capitalist road. Mao Tsetung Thought represents the development and enrichment of Marxism-Leninism, the revolutionary science of the proletariat. To oppose and attack

it either outright or while hypocritically upholding it in words, is to oppose the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat and its highest advance so far, as realized in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, led by Mao's revolutionary line. To call this pathbreaking achievement of the working class a "disaster"—which in fact the curs and swine in power in Peking now do—is to not only reverse the correct verdict on it, but to reverse the revolution as a whole.

In short, where Mao led the masses in exercising and consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat and continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat to prevent capitalist restoration and continue the advance toward communism, the revisionists reigning in China now give all-around "liberation" to counter-revolutionaries (recently they have even politically liberated 100,000 who were classified as counter-revolutionaries, going as far back as the 1950s) and have instituted a fascist bourgeois dictatorship over the masses to carry out the restoration of capitalism.

How and why did this setback in China occur? It is, of course, not possible to provide a complete answer here and now, but it is possible to grasp the essence of this problem and develop a beginning understanding which can serve as a basis for further understanding.

First, it is necessary to briefly summarize the character and historical development of the Chinese revolution in order to understand both the historical as well as the present day material, political, cultural and ideological conditions that

set the stage for the last struggle waged by Mao against revisionism as well as the specific conditions that enabled the revisionists to triumph in the short run.

New-Democratic Revolution

Old China, before the liberation of 1949, was a semi-feudal, semi-colonial country. That means that it was dominated and carved up by various imperialist powers and was only independent in name, while at the same time, especially in the vast countryside, feudal exploitation of the peasants by the landlord class remained the dominant economic relation, although some capitalism had developed in the cities and to a certain extent in the countryside. Hence the immediate question for the masses of people, in order to win their emancipation, was how to overthrow imperialism and feudalism as well as the big capitalists who controlled the state (the bureaucrat-capitalists) and who acted as the economic and political agents of the imperialists. Imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism were, as Mao put it, three big mountains weighing on the Chinese people.

How could they be thrown off? And how, upon achieving this, could the struggle be continued, so that the masses of people really achieved complete emancipation and were not enslaved by new exploiters?

In October 1917 the Russian workers and peasants overthrew the landlords and capitalists and established the world's first socialist state. This had tremendous repercussions throughout the

world, including in China. At that time Mao was active in the revolutionary movement in China, but he and the movement as a whole still lacked a clear guiding ideology. But, as Mao was to sum up later, "The salvos of the October Revolution brought us Marxism-Leninism."

Mao applied this revolutionary theory of the working class to the concrete situation in China. It was necessary and possible to achieve a socialist society in China, but not directly and immediately, Mao saw. First it was necessary to carry out a revolutionary struggle against imperialism and feudalism (and bureaucrat-capitalism). This was a bourgeois-democratic revolution, in which the main force would be the peasantry, whose struggle for land must be integrated with the anti-imperialist liberation struggle. But unlike old bourgeois-democratic revolutions, which were led by the bourgeoisie and led to capitalism, this struggle could and must be led by the proletariat in order to be thoroughgoing and to pave the way for the socialist revolution.

This was then a *new-democratic* revolution, in which it was necessary to ally even with certain sections of the capitalists—in particular those sections of the smaller capitalists who were held down and restricted in their development by imperialism and feudalism and therefore would join in the struggle against them to some degree. In other words, this struggle was not against capitalism itself, but against imperialism and feudalism and big capital tied in with them.

Mao also analyzed that because China was

carved up by different imperialists, and the various reactionaries were agents of these different imperialists, and because the imperialists and domestic despots had their strongholds in the cities, it was necessary and possible to take up revolutionary warfare as the main form of the struggle from the very beginning and to build base areas in the countryside from which to expand in waves in mobile and guerrilla warfare to gradually enlarge the territory and forces of the liberation army and then finally defeat the enemy in large-scale battles and liberate the whole country.

This necessity for armed struggle from the start and for the revolution to be based in the countryside was denied by some in top leadership of the Communist Party, from the time of its founding in 1921 until 1927, when the reactionary butcher Chiang Kai-shek turned on his erstwhile allies in the Communist Party and massacred thousands of Party members and other workers in a number of major cities, where the workers were rising up.

Following this disaster, Mao led workers and peasants in establishing the first revolutionary base areas, in some mountains called Ching kang, and began the process that would eventually sweep away the imperialists and their domestic allies and agents with the mighty force of hundreds of millions of people. Through more than 20 years of war: in a ten-year civil war against the reactionary forces of Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang; then, temporarily in a united front with this same Kuomintang against Japan,

which had invaded China and was attempting to reduce it to an outright colony of Japan in the 1930s; and then, after victory in the protracted anti-Japanese war, in a three-year war of liberation against Chiang and his U.S.-imperialist backers—through these more than 20 years of revolutionary warfare, the Communist Party and the armed forces under its leadership won ever broader support of the masses from whom they were drawn and in whose interests they fought, and grew in strength and numbers and finally succeeded in liberating China.

Chiang Kai-shek, who had tried to seize the fruits of victory of the anti-Japanese war, which the masses of Chinese people had sown and harvested in blood, was driven into the sea, fleeing to the island province of Taiwan under the protection of U.S. imperialism. In 1949, on October 1, in the capital of Peking, Mao proclaimed the founding of the People's Republic of China. "The Chinese people," he declared, "have stood up." This was a tremendous victory not only for the Chinese people but for the working class and the oppressed peoples worldwide.

Socialist or Capitalist Road?

But, as noted before, this revolution was a bourgeois-democratic one, though of a new type, led by the proletariat and its Communist Party. In overthrowing imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism it prepared the ground for socialism, but it also removed the obstacles to the development of domestic capitalism.

And immediately upon victory in this new-

democratic revolution (even as victory was clearly approaching) a fierce struggle developed, not only within the broad united front of forces fighting against Chiang Kai-shek but within the Communist Party itself, over which road to take—the socialist or capitalist road? On the eve of victory Mao called attention to the even greater struggle that would lie ahead: “To win country-wide victory is only the first step in a long march of ten thousand *li*,” he said.

The transition from the democratic stage to the socialist stage of the revolution would not and could not be accomplished without tremendous struggle. The main task immediately upon winning country-wide victory, Mao said, must be production and construction. Why? Because otherwise political power could not be consolidated and the advance to socialism would of course also be impossible. The economy must be rehabilitated after years of ravaging war, production must be restored; in many places it had greatly stagnated or even virtually come to a standstill. If this was not done, Mao said bluntly, “we shall be unable to maintain our political power, we shall be unable to stand on our feet, we shall fail.”*

*Even in this period, of course, Mao did not divorce the question of developing China's economy from the class struggle, including the international class struggle. The next year, 1950, in the situation of large-scale U.S. aggression against Korea, the Chinese people set an inspiring example in giving extensive internationalist aid to the Korean people's war of resistance, even though this obviously meant diverting significant manpower and resources from the task of immediately rehabilitating China's economy.

But right away there was a fierce struggle **within** the Communist Party itself, the leading **force** within the state, over which road to take in **developing** the economy. There was opposition to **taking** the socialist road from two directions, **two** different positions. There were those who **insisted** that the economy could only be developed **by** getting “assistance” from the developed **countries**, including the United States, even **though** it had been the backer of Chiang Kai-shek and was still intent on strangling and **dominating** China.

Here it is significant to note that the U.S. **government** has recently released a memorandum kept secret for almost 30 years, detailing **how** Chou En-lai was said to have made a secret **overture** to the U.S. government through a third **party**, saying he (Chou) represented a “liberal” **faction** within the Chinese Communist Party **that** wanted to be “independent” of the Soviet **Union** and requesting U.S. aid to develop the **economy**, which Chou reportedly saw on the **brink** of collapse. This, as reported, was to have **taken** place around June 1 of 1949—in other **words**, when it was clear that the victory over **Chiang Kai-shek**, and U.S. imperialism behind **him**, was certain and imminent.

If true, and this is consistent with other **policies** of Chou's which will show up later, such an **overture** constituted a despicable attempt to **capitulate** and sell out the Chinese revolution at **this** historic juncture. Apparently, Chou En-lai **wanted** to be “China's Tito” even then. And it is **certain** that not only within the camp of opposi-

tion to Chiang Kai-shek, but within the Communist Party itself, there were those who continued even then to push for a policy of allying with and depending on—working out a deal with—U.S. imperialism, believing that on its own, and even with assistance from the Soviet Union, China could not develop its economy.

During this period Mao repeatedly blasted at this lackey mentality. And he made clear that China must ally itself with the anti-imperialist camp headed by the Soviet Union, which then was a socialist country, not an imperialist one. Relying on the masses of Chinese people and first and foremost the working class, and with the support of the working class of the countries of the world and chiefly the support of the Soviet Union, Mao said in March 1949, "the speed of China's economic construction will not be very slow, but may be fairly fast." "There is absolutely no ground for pessimism about China's economic resurgence," he emphatically stated in opposition to those who really could not believe that China's economy could be developed and initial prosperity achieved unless it modeled itself after and depended on the capitalist countries of the West. Such people, Mao pointed out, were like the bourgeois-democrats of the turn of the century who always looked to the imperialist West and its model of "modernization" for China's salvation. In opposition to this Mao made clear that China would and must take the socialist road—"only socialism can save China," as he was to repeatedly insist in opposition to the bourgeois-democrats and revisionists.

On the other hand, there were those in top leadership of the Communist Party who wanted to ally with the Soviet Union but who insisted on doing things exactly the way they had been done there, regardless of China's concrete conditions (this was a long-standing problem in the Chinese revolution and the Chinese Communist Party). Liu Shao-chi was one of these. He continued to insist that agricultural collectivization could only be carried out on the basis of mechanization, which had been the proclaimed Soviet policy. But of course, Liu also argued that China could not self-reliantly develop the industry to provide such mechanization, so there was nothing to do but give capitalism free rein for a long period of time until the economy had in this way become more developed. For this reason even "exploitation is a merit," he said.

Thus while Liu did not say he was against developing the socialist sector of the economy—in fact he said the opposite—still his policies of allowing capitalism to develop without real restriction, and for a long time, in both town and countryside, was in fact a policy for strangling the socialist sector and bringing about the triumph of capitalism over socialism.

Both forms of opposition to the socialist road were vigorously opposed by Mao. Both shared the common view of seeing the democratic stage of the revolution existing for a very long time—which could only mean the bourgeois side would win out, capitalism not socialism would result. And both were based on the notion that Chinese economic development was too back-

ward, its technology not developed enough, to allow the transition to socialism in the near future; in short, both were based on the "theory of the productive forces," which exaggerates the role of technology and greatly underrates the role of people in developing the forces of production and the economy.

In opposition to both of these wrong and reactionary positions, Mao led the hundreds of millions of Chinese peasants who had been freed from the shackles of feudalism to wage further struggle and make a further advance, carrying out the step by step collectivization of land and instruments of production in the countryside. And he led in strengthening the socialist state sector in industry and in step by step eliminating capitalist ownership there, while defeating the resistance and sabotage of bourgeois forces who attempted to disrupt and prevent socialist transformation of ownership.

Here arises a problem, a contradiction, that will be faced by every working class once it seizes power, even in a country with more advanced technology. The old regime has been overthrown, but how, while destroying the old world, do you construct the new—in other words, how to actually carry out economic construction *and* do it in such a way as to keep to the socialist road, developing the new economic and social relations and the ideology, culture (and so on) to serve them. This was a particularly acute problem in China, given the backwardness of the economy, the whole legacy of imperialist domination combined with feudal stagnation and the necessity of

passing through the democratic stage of the revolution and then going over, immediately upon victory in this stage, to the socialist revolution.

There was a certain need to rely on intellectuals, technically trained "experts," even people with experience in management—all of whom had been trained in the old society and according to its ideology and methods and who enjoyed a great deal of privilege over the mass of working people. It was necessary to make use of, even to a certain degree rely on such people, especially at the very first, because the masses of people had been maintained in illiteracy, because the division of labor of the old society had barred them from this kind of knowledge and because even the members and leaders of the Communist Party were not experienced in various aspects of economic construction, though they had acquired experience in some important areas, especially farm and local, small-scale industrial enterprises.

But this necessity of relying to some degree on intellectuals strengthened the influence of these people, whose outlook was still largely bourgeois, and strengthened tendencies within the Communist Party itself toward accommodation with the bourgeoisie. Large numbers of intellectuals were recruited into the Party and this, too, strengthened bourgeois influences and even bourgeois forces within the Party and in society as a whole.

Mao recognized the necessity of uniting with and utilizing many intellectuals, but he also insisted that they must be remolded in their thinking and must take part in productive labor

and political struggle together with the masses. They must not be allowed to sit in ivory towers, collecting mildew on their backsides—and on their brains. Otherwise they would turn into a force for reaction and a dangerous one at that, because of their strategic positions and influence.

This became a particularly sharp concern after the events in Hungary, where numbers of intellectuals formed a powerful social base for reactionary revolts against the socialist government in 1956. Further, while Mao advocated the recruitment of the politically advanced intellectuals, those who took up the stand and outlook of the working class, into the Party, he put stress on recruiting more advanced working people into the Party and making them its backbone.

As opposed to this, however, there were top Party leaders, such as Liu Shao-chi, who resisted the policy of remolding while uniting with and utilizing the intellectuals and who wanted to blur the distinctions between working people and intellectuals in Party recruitment policies.

Another top leader who took basically the same approach was Chou En-lai, who seized on certain sectarian errors in dealing with the intellectuals to push the policy of catering to them and their "ambition for advancement." Don't take up their time with politics but provide them with higher pay and more benefits and privileges, and recruit larger numbers of them, especially "high ranking" intellectuals, into the Party—this was Chou's policy. And along with this he downgraded the need for and difficulties

in remolding them ideologically. This was a line Chou would repeatedly push, in opposition to Mao's, and very vigorously so especially after the first few years of the Cultural Revolution.

Mao went along with some, but certainly not all, of these steps to utilize the intellectuals, especially toward the mid-'50s, when China was coming into sharp conflict with the Soviet Union and the need to quickly train and utilize large numbers of Chinese intellectuals was becoming more urgent to decrease dependence on the Soviets.

But Mao continued to warn that many intellectuals resisted remolding, that the die-hard Rightists among them were determined to have a trial of strength with the proletariat and the Communist Party and that this would be an intense and perhaps a protracted struggle. The Party must lead the intellectuals and professional work, Mao insisted, and not the other way around, as Chou and others were putting forward.

By 1956 two developments of great significance had taken place in the socialist countries. In China through fierce struggle and tremendous upsurges of the masses, especially in the countryside where the great majority of people live, socialist ownership had in the main been established. On the farms this took the form not of state ownership but collective ownership by large groups of peasants. In the cities, particularly in larger industry, it took the form of state ownership in the main. All this represented a great victory for the working class over the bourgeoisie, for socialism over capitalism, in the basic

sphere of ownership.

But at the same time there was a significant, if (historically speaking) temporary setback for socialism: revisionists in the Soviet Union, headed by Khrushchev, seized power from the working class and began the process of restoring capitalism there. This was bound to have a great effect on every other socialist country as well as on the international communist movement as a whole—and China was certainly no exception. Much of China's economic development up to that point, especially in industry, had involved Soviet assistance, providing equipment, technicians, designs, etc.

Already by this time Mao had been summing up the experience of the Soviets in building socialism, including some negative lessons even from the period when the Soviet Union was under Stalin's leadership and was taking the socialist, not the capitalist, road. With both these lessons, as well as China's concrete conditions, in mind, Mao had begun to forge some different policies and models of development for China's socialist construction than those that had been applied in the Soviet Union. Stalin, Mao summed up, had put too much emphasis on heavy industry, one-sidedly giving it priority over light industry and agriculture; he had also one-sidedly stressed centralized control without allowing enough local initiative under centralized planning and guidance; further he had continued to apply the policies of one-man management, reliance on specialists and experts, raising technique above politics; and he had extensively applied piece-

work policies with regard to workers' wages, while also allowing the intellectuals, managers, technicians, etc., incomes far larger than those of the rank and file manual workers.

With the revisionist takeover in the Soviet Union, contradictions between China and the USSR became antagonistic. And this also brought leaders within the Chinese Communist Party who continued to insist on following the Soviet model and depending on the Soviet Union into antagonistic conflict with Mao and the revolutionaries in Party leadership, with the Party as a whole and the masses of Chinese people.

Great Leap Forward

This blew up into a very sharp struggle in 1958, the year when the Great Leap Forward spread like a prairie fire throughout China, particularly again in the countryside. This was another tremendous upsurge of the masses, taking matters more fully into their own hands; smelting steel in their "backyards"—that is, in small, local mills—even in the countryside; building other local plants to serve agriculture and the rural areas; establishing throughout the countryside People's Communes, collective farms larger in size and with a higher degree of public ownership; and just generally shattering convention, relying on their own efforts for achieving many technical innovations, making further strides in mastering management and so on.

For the revisionists and many conservative forces within the Communist Party itself this was really too much—they thought the world

was coming to an end—and it was true that for some of the die-hards their world of privilege and bureaucratic regulation was coming to an end! And in general this whole thing went directly against the grain of the crusty bureaucrats, the high-falutin intellectuals and Party leaders who were turning conservative, wanted to “settle down,” conduct “orderly business”—and “feather their own nests.”

Many of these people wanted the kind of “socialism” that was then being developed in the Soviet Union under the rule of the revisionists—in other words, capitalism under the socialist signboard. But these people, having no belief in the ability of the masses to transform society and nature, looked at China’s relative backwardness and insisted that it could only “trail behind” others “at a snail’s pace,” and that it had to depend not only on the USSR but even on the West for technology. In this latter point they found some agreement with others in leadership of the Party and government who wanted to take a different path than the Soviets but hankered after the advanced technology and the “sophisticated” and “efficient” ways of doing things in the imperialist West.

These revisionists completely opposed, and the conservative forces at best wavered at key points, and at worst outright attacked, the whole Great Leap Forward. But Mao and other revolutionaries in Party leadership wholeheartedly and resolutely sided with the masses and supported the mass upsurge. In the midst of this upsurge Mao summed up its great lessons, and in opposi-

tion to the revisionists he formulated the general line for building socialism in China: “going all out, aiming high and achieving greater, faster, better and more economical results in building socialism.” It was a call and guideline for the masses of working people to continue to challenge and break through convention and rely on their own efforts and conscious activism to remold society and the people and conquer nature.

The next year all this erupted into a showdown within the leadership of the Communist Party, between those who stood with and those who threw themselves against this revolutionary advance. At a Central Committee meeting, after listening to the bitter attacks of the revisionists, who held sway for several weeks of this long meeting, Mao responded. Answering their whinings that things were in a mess and out of hand, Mao declared: “the chaos caused was on a grand scale, and I take responsibility!” Whenever there was a revolutionary upsurge there would inevitably be some disorder and even excesses, Mao said, but without this there could be no advance.

He reminded them of the Paris Commune, the first, short-lived workers’ government, established during Marx’ time in 1871. Did Marx look at it from the narrow point of view of immediate results, Mao demanded, or did he recognize its sweeping and historic importance? Mao said: “When the Paris Commune rose up he [Marx] supported it, although he reckoned that it would fail. When he realized it was the first proletarian dictatorship, he thought it would be a good thing even if it only lasted three months. If we assess it

from an economic point of view, it was not worth while," Mao concluded sarcastically. The lasting value of the People's Communes and the Great Leap Forward in China would be the fact that the masses had risen up and broken off material and mental shackles and created new ways of building socialism—their energy and enthusiasm for socialism had been unleashed and nothing could be more powerful, nor in the longer run, bring greater results in building socialism than this. And this would remain true, even if the Great Leap Forward and the People's Communes should fail in the short run. Besides, he pointed out, they would not fail, but would survive and be strengthened.

The result of this struggle was that finally, after being under fierce attack from many on the Central Committee while a number of others wavered for a while, Mao's line and the revolutionary forces he headed on the Central Committee won out. But, as noted, they won out only through the most fierce struggle. And this struggle was far from over.

Rightist Counter-Attack

In the next few years, with the Soviets suddenly pulling out their aid, leaving many projects unfinished, and with severe droughts and other natural calamities, the bourgeois forces in society and within the Party were strengthened. They seized on all this to launch a counter-attack and actually succeeded in gaining the initiative and upper hand in many spheres. They put the clamps on the mass movements and new crea-

tions, especially of the peasants—while promoting big, large-scale agricultural projects which concentrated overwhelmingly on better land and big equipment and left untapped less favorable land and locally produced machinery, etc.

In industry they adopted a set of regulations which put profit and bureaucratic control in command. They shut down many local, small-scale plants—"not practical," "unprofitable" they declared. They insisted on cutting back the time workers spent in political study and struggle and instituted all kinds of restrictive rules and regulations that shackled their initiative and treated them like work horses. Bonuses and piece-work, which had been cut back and even eliminated in some places because they divided the workers, narrowed their outlook and posed obstacles to technical innovation and the development of *socialist* production, were restored and expanded on a wide scale.

All this was necessary, the revisionists and conservative bureaucrats would say, to "restore order" and deal with economic difficulties. Political line and "academic" or "theoretical-abstract" distinctions did not matter now, just getting results right away in production. It was at this point that Teng Hsiao-ping made his infamous statement—"it does not matter if a cat is a white cat or a black cat as long as it catches mice"—in other words, any methods that boost production right now are all right, and it doesn't matter if they serve socialism or capitalism.

At that time there was a certain coalescing of different groups of revisionist forces and conser-

vative bureaucrats and administrators. So we find that not only Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping but also Chou En-lai, as well as some other people who are in top leadership today, were involved in formulating these "regulations" for industry. It's necessary to get down to "practical matters," they said, and any "chaos" is far too dangerous now. The uniting of such forces, despite real differences, around such a line would be of great significance again, during Mao's last great battle and in the revisionist takeover 15 years later—in the sharp struggle in the years 1973-76, culminating in the revisionist coup of October 1976.

In response to the anger of the workers at that time (the early 1960s) over the repressive and restrictive rules and regulations and the tyranny of officials acting like overlords in general, the masses were told: you should be grateful for the "benevolence" of the Party, without the Party where would you be now, you should just obey the Party without questioning, put your muscle to the wheel and your head down and push hard. One worker who was interviewed later said of this period that she "was so mad it made me sick, but I couldn't fight back. All I knew was to say that, yes, we were a lot better off than before liberation."

At the same time the revisionists had control of crucial parts of the superstructure, some of which they had controlled all along and others of which they had made more recent big inroads into. To build up support for their policies within the Party they expanded the income and pay dif-

ferentials among Party cadre (that is, full-time Party officials). This was a policy carried to great excess in the mid and late-'50s, despite the great displeasure and opposition of Mao. It had been cut back on during the height of the Great Leap upsurge (during this time Mao supported an article by Chang Chun-chiao, one of the so-called "gang of four," which severely criticized the seeking after money and privilege that had become widespread among Party cadre).

Two key areas controlled by the revisionists were culture and education, both crucial in creating public opinion and in instilling ideology and values of one kind or another. Despite Mao's insistence that education should serve proletarian politics and be combined with productive labor and that it must develop workers with both socialist consciousness and culture, the educational system basically did just the opposite. It was set up to favor the children of the old exploiting classes and the sons and daughters of Party officials and to train an elite that neither knew how to work with its hands nor carry on political struggle, and that was incapable of combining book learning with practical activity.

Even when the children of working people got into college, they were transformed into aristocratic snobs by the training they received. A common expression among the peasants about those from their ranks who went to college was: "First year a country bumpkin; second year an urban 'dandy'; and third year won't give Mom and Pop the time of day."

Culture continued to present as models the

representatives of the old exploiting classes and new elites and to promote bourgeois, even feudal values. This was why Mao talked about its being a Ministry of Emperors, Generals, Ministers, Talents and Beauties—and of course, Foreign Mummies, because those controlling culture regarded imperialist “culture” as far superior to anything that could be produced in New China, especially by the *working class*!

At the same time the revisionists controlled important parts of the security agencies and other vital levers of power.

Mao saw that public opinion and conditions generally were being prepared for a revisionist takeover and capitalist restoration. He launched a counter-attack, concentrating then in the superstructure, especially culture. Beginning in 1963 Mao's wife and close comrade, Chiang Ching, along with Chang Chun-chiao, played a leading part in challenging the hold the revisionists had on culture and in initiating a big struggle to revolutionize literature and art, to make them conform to and serve the building of socialism and the revolutionary struggles of the working people, which were put on center stage, replacing the landlords, emperors, generals, ghosts and monsters—and the domestic as well as foreign mummies.

Shortly before this, in 1962, Mao, summing up the experience of the Soviet Union as well as the struggle in China itself, had made the historic analysis that: Socialist society covers a considerably long historical period. Throughout this historical period, there are classes, class contradic-

tions and class struggle, there is the struggle between the socialist road and the capitalist road, there is the danger of capitalist restoration as well as the threat of aggression by imperialism. Never forget classes and class struggle, Mao declared then, arming the masses and revolutionaries in the Party to take on the revisionists who were insisting that “the class struggle is dying out,” in order to disarm the masses politically and weaken their ability to resist revisionism and capitalist restoration.

Beginning the Cultural Revolution

Finally, in 1965, after preparing revolutionary public opinion, including the first big steps in revolutionizing the crucial sphere of culture, Mao made a direct counter-attack politically. This, too, centered in the area of culture, but was by no means of merely “artistic” or “academic” concern. The revisionists had written and staged a play which, set in the past, rather nakedly attacked Mao (by historical analogy) for his policies in the Great Leap Forward and in particular for knocking down the former Defense Minister, one Peng Teh-huai, who had led the assault on Mao and the Great Leap at the 1959 Central Committee meeting.

Under Mao's direction, Yao Wen-yuan, another of the so-called “gang of four,” wrote a scathing attack on this play, exposing its reactionary nature and counter-revolutionary purpose. This article, as Mao was to say, was the signal for the unprecedented mass political movement that was to sweep across China the next year, 1966. This

was the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

This mass movement was unleashed and led by Mao against Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping and other top leaders who were on the verge of gaining complete control and restoring capitalism, of taking China down the same road as the Soviet Union—and in fact taking it into the arms of the Soviet revisionists. These people may have had certain conflicts, and in some cases may have even sharply clashed, with Soviet leaders, but these were in the nature of bourgeois nationalist conflicts of interests and bourgeois rivalry.

And despite this, these people looked to the Soviet Union as the model of what “socialism” should be, and there was nothing for China to do but follow the Soviets and become dependent on them. This, of course, did not rule out capitulation to the U.S. imperialists, which in fact is what the Soviets were mainly doing at that time—for example refusing to give any real aid to the Vietnamese people in their national liberation war against U.S. imperialism.

Such people, with Liu and Teng as their top leaders, were then the immediate and greatest danger to the revolution and socialism in China. Previous struggles have failed to budge them or thoroughly defeat their entrenched power and determined treachery. Only mass upheaval can accomplish this. This is how Mao sizes up the situation.

But the struggle against these Soviet-style revisionists temporarily and conditionally unites different forces, which are later to come into open antagonism. Right here I want to focus on two of

these forces—on the one hand, the genuine Left, led by Mao, and on the other hand those sections of the Party and state leadership who have become or are becoming a bourgeois stratum divorced from and living off the masses but who want to oppose Soviet domination (though they might favor some “cooling out” of the struggle with the Soviets)—and in fact, already at that time want to ally with the U.S. and the West. (I will speak about Lin Piao’s forces shortly.)

This latter group, whose ultimate representative is Chou En-lai, go along with the Cultural Revolution after a fashion—and only after fierce struggle by Mao, who is to say that most of them disagreed with him at the start and that at times he was a minority of one among these veteran leaders. It is an understatement to say that this group is never very enthusiastic about the Cultural Revolution, for it goes against their grain, and after all many of the specific policies of the Soviet-style revisionists that are under attack are ones they have basic agreement with and inclination toward, as came out sharply in the years just before the Cultural Revolution. They will try to limit, stifle and at times outright attempt to put a stop to the Cultural Revolution (as they did in early 1967).

This is exactly why Mao sees the need to bring new forces forward into top leadership. Much of the “old guard” will go along only with great reservation, haltingly and grudgingly. So Mao passes over most of these people in forming a leading group to carry forward the Cultural Revolution. He brings forward Chang Chun-chiao,

who had acted like high and mighty, haughty overlords toward the "common rabble." Many of the Party leaders seized on these excesses to attempt to bring a halt to the whole thing, but as he always had, Mao stood firmly with the mass revolutionary movement and took the stand he had taken 40 years earlier, in upholding the peasant uprisings that gave birth to the Red Army—it is not terrible, it is fine; there are bound to be excesses, for if excesses are not committed in righting a wrong, then the wrong cannot be righted.

Against those who wailed that the situation now was more intolerable than it had ever been—even at the height of the Great Leap Forward—Mao declared that "the situation of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in the whole country is excellent, not just good; the entire situation is better than any time before." Never before had so many people been aroused to struggle over the basic political questions of society and to determine the correct from the incorrect line, to block the capitalist road and advance along the socialist road!

The mass upsurge of the Cultural Revolution succeeded in shattering the bourgeois headquarters of Liu Shao-chi, and seized back portions of power usurped by these revisionists. This was a great victory. But there were more long-term results as well. Through this process revolutionary transformations were carried out and carried forward in both the economic relations of society and the superstructure of politics, culture, ideology and administrative institu-

tions. In every sphere of society the masses asserted and increased their mastery—from management in the factories and farms, to education, health work and other areas, which were changed from top to bottom to reflect and serve the interests of the masses and their revolutionary struggle.

Let's take education—consistently a focus of sharp class struggle. Through the Cultural Revolution worker-propaganda teams were sent to play a leading role in the universities. Exams, curricula and teaching methods were changed to link theory with practice and combine study with productive labor and to put politics in command. All high school graduates went to the farms, factories or military, and enrollment in college was based mainly on recommendations from one's fellow workers, again, with politics—devotion to the revolution—in command.

Beyond particular innovations, the thinking of tens, perhaps hundreds, of millions of people was further revolutionized. The study of Marxist theory was promoted broadly among the people and ideological struggle was actively fostered on all levels. Working people lifted their heads and sights even higher, leaving no sphere of society as the exclusive province of "experts," and paying attention to affairs of state and the running of society in a way never previously achieved anywhere. Masses learned in the swirl and tenseness of struggle what they could never learn from books alone or through the "regular functioning" of society, even socialist society.

During this period mass rallies were repeated-

ly held in China in support of the struggles of the peoples of the world against imperialism and reaction, including the struggle of Black people, and others, in this country. And tremendous sacrifices were made, through conscious determination, by the Chinese people in support of the world revolution.

All this struck deep and powerful blows at the remnants, the "birth marks" and the inequalities left over from the old exploiting society, economic, political, social, cultural and ideological. It inspired and gave great encouragement to revolutionary people everywhere, but it horrified and struck terror into the hearts of reactionaries in every country, including the political mummies inside and outside the Party in China.

One incident highlights this and concentrates the difference between the proletarian and the bourgeois world outlook. In Shanghai, during the high tide of the mass upsurge, the capitalist-roaders attempted to divert the workers' struggle and divide their ranks by saying—you're right, you've been mistreated and to show our good faith we're giving you bonuses and back pay. After tremendous struggle in the workers' ranks, they were led to return the money. They said, when we got the money we forgot about state power, when we got the bonuses we forgot about revolution. We don't want this stinking bribe, we want state power and we want to make revolution! Today in China this is no doubt condemned as a hideous example of the evil "ultra-leftism" of the "gang of five."

Mao said that the Cultural Revolution was

"absolutely necessary and most timely for consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat, preventing capitalist restoration and building socialism." Why was it "absolutely necessary"? Because, as Mao pointed out, previous struggles against revisionists at the top level of the Party had been able to beat them back and result in the removal of some from office, but had not enabled the broad masses of people to themselves determine the correct from the incorrect line and defeat the revisionists through their own struggle. Therefore, if in the future capitalist-roaders were to capture the leadership of the Party and state and suppress the revolutionaries, the masses would be in a passive position politically.

Further, struggle at the top could not succeed in shaking the bureaucracy out of its hardened conservative shell. It could not significantly challenge the strong tendency for many cadres to take to the bourgeois style of life and a bourgeois political line.

Early in the course of the Cultural Revolution, in February 1967, Mao explained all this: "In the past we waged struggles in the rural areas, in factories, in the cultural field, and we carried out the socialist education movement. But all this failed to solve the problem because we did not find a form, a method, to arouse the broad masses to expose our dark aspect openly, in an all-round way and from below." That form, that method, was the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

But, of course, the Cultural Revolution could not solve the problem entirely and for all time. Mao himself stressed this many times, pointing

out in 1968, for example, that "We have won great victory. But the defeated class will still struggle. These people are still around and this class still exists. Therefore we cannot speak of final victory. Not even for decades." And in 1969 he predicted that "Probably another revolution will have to be carried out after several years." How correct and far-sighted!

Lin Piao

Here we must talk about another prominent figure in the Cultural Revolution—Lin Piao. He was known as Mao Tsetung's "closest comrade in arms" during the first, stormiest years of the Cultural Revolution, and at the Ninth Congress of the Communist Party in 1969 he managed to get himself officially named Mao's successor. But already at that time he had come into sharp opposition to Mao and the Cultural Revolution, and he would soon after that "jump out" in an all-out attack. Actually Mao had warned of this in a letter to Chiang Ching as early as 1966, when he said—referring directly to Lin Piao—that great disorder leads to great order and so it would be every few years; monsters and demons were bound to jump out and make a grab for power, such was their class nature.

But how did Lin Piao, a renowned general during the revolutionary wars of the new-democratic period and the constant companion of Mao in public from 1966-1971, how did he end up a traitor, even attempting to assassinate Mao? How did he get as high up as he did and why did he fall?

Lin replaced Peng Teh-huai as Defense Minis-

ter after the latter was dismissed from office following the major struggle in 1959. During the following years, leading up to the Cultural Revolution, while no doubt carrying out certain careerist aims and opportunist lines, overall Lin played an important role in carrying out the socialist education movement in the military. Before it appeared in society as a whole, the "little red book" of quotations from Mao was used widely in the armed forces (except it had a blue cover then). Lin carried out rectification of the line of Peng Teh-huai who had opposed Mao's military theory and strategy and wanted to build a "modern" army, relying on advanced technology, and modeled after the Soviet army, with strict ranks and discipline and professionalism, not politics, in command—just like the "modernization" of the armed forces being carried out in China today!

During this period Lin Piao was against the Soviets, at least in their role as collaborators with U.S. imperialism. It is important to note here that by this time—that is, by the mid-'60s—Chou En-lai and some other top leaders associated with him, such as (then) foreign minister Chen Yi and Yeh Chien-ying, a crucial figure in the October 1976 coup, had already concluded that the U.S. was weak and declining and no longer a real danger to China and should be worked with against the Soviet Union, which they saw even then as the main danger to China.

Mao did not then agree with this position—it was not correct to say the Soviets were *militarily* a greater danger to China than the U.S. at that

time. But he did feel that the pro-Soviet revisionists in China itself—Liu Shao-chi & Co.—posed the greatest immediate danger *within China*, and recognized that it was necessary to break the backbone of these people.

Here we see clearly the interconnection between the class struggle internally and that internationally. Socialist states that have so far existed have existed in the situation where they are surrounded by imperialist and reactionary states. This poses a serious problem and real danger—and this is especially so in a country like China with its legacy of colonialism and backwardness and the tendency of bourgeois forces in the country to capitulate to imperialism. Overall and in general, the internal situation is the basis for change, it is the class struggle within the country that is the basis for either advance or setback, depending on the outcome of that struggle; but the external situation acts as a significant condition for change—it can react in a major way upon and seriously influence the internal class struggle.

In launching the Cultural Revolution Mao had made a serious analysis of the international situation and the two superpowers in particular, the U.S. and the USSR. He saw that the U.S., getting heavily involved in Vietnam and tied down by the liberation forces there, was not in a position to attack China—and there was not a serious danger that it would extend the Vietnam war to China. As for the Soviets, while they were carrying out the all-around restoration of capitalism, they had not really “gotten on their feet” as

an imperialist power, they were mainly colluding with U.S. imperialism and only secondarily contending with it at that time.

Overall, Mao summed up, the U.S. remained the main enemy of the people of the world and most powerful imperialist power, and it was not capable of launching a big attack on China. So not only was the Cultural Revolution absolutely necessary in some form or other, it was also possible to carry it out in the form of large-scale mass struggle and to risk the chaos and disorder that was bound to accompany this.

Returning to Lin Piao in this regard, he welcomed the chaos, upheaval and the overthrow of certain revisionists—at first and for his own political purposes. He opposed those who would turn China into a Soviet-style country and a Soviet dependency right then, though he did not oppose Soviet revisionism in a thorough way. And it seems that he mainly wanted to get people like Chou En-lai and those associated with him who were erroneously saying that the Soviets were the main danger—to China, since China was all these people really cared about, being essentially bourgeois-democrats and not proletarian revolutionaries and proletarian internationalists.

But Mao did not agree to overthrowing these people, like foreign minister Chen Yi, who held this line of “Soviet main danger” even then. And certainly he did not agree to overthrowing Chou En-lai, because any attempt to do that would unite many powerful forces against the Cultural Revolution and lead to defeat. Mao’s position was that Chen Yi certainly should be criti-

cized—he had made many Rightist errors, even serious ones—and even Chou En-lai could be criticized. But they must not be overthrown.

Why were people like Liu and Teng the targets and the most immediate threat to the revolution then? Because the Soviet Union was still not thoroughly exposed, especially the fact that capitalism had actually been restored there, and to some degree at least it could still be argued, even in China, that the USSR was after all a socialist country. The U.S., on the other hand, was obviously identified as imperialist by everyone in China and it was still taking a completely hostile stance toward China. Thus a line of capitulating to U.S. imperialism could not be fully developed and have great influence in the Chinese Communist Party at that time—again it should be recalled that historically and down to the present day the bourgeoisie in China, because it is not capable of standing up to the imperialists, will end up capitulating to one or the other imperialist power.

Lin Piao's Rightism

Especially as Lin Piao saw his efforts to get people like Chou would not succeed, he turned against all the turmoil. He wanted to use the People's Liberation Army to enforce order. He started talking about production as the main task, not revolution. This is in 1967-68. Mao's response is: all right, the army should play a role, an important one, but mainly as a *political* force, not a military force to put down the mass movement.

This political role for the army was important

then because the Party apparatus, which had been controlled in large part by Liu Shao-chi's forces and in general was heavily infested with a network of patronage and bureaucratic arrangements, had to be shaken up from top to bottom. Therefore the army, which had gone through political preparation, so to speak, during the years leading up to the Cultural Revolution, could for a time play something of the role of a leading political force—though it could not replace the Party as the leading organization on any long-term basis. So Mao issues a directive that the army should support the broad masses of the Left.

By this time Lin Piao's positions on many questions are very similar to those of Chou En-lai and the forces he represents. That is, they share the outlook of preserving order and paying attention to production above all else, keeping a lid on the mass upheavals. And they regard the transformations achieved through the Cultural Revolution—the “new things” as they come to be called—with disdain and suspicion. At a certain point, in 1967, Lin and Chou's forces even take the same position on cooling out the Cultural Revolution in the North of China, both fearing that the Soviets will take advantage of this—Mao and the Left are opposed to this, seeing that it will pour cold water on the mass movement as a whole.

Leading up to the 9th Party Congress in 1969, Lin makes clear his Rightist position—throwing his support to a draft report for the Congress that says that production is the main task, argu-

ing that there is no more need to wage class struggle, because, Lin claims, revisionism has been thoroughly defeated. As summed up four years later at the 10th Congress, Lin's argument that production, not the class struggle, was then the main task—the line *openly broadcast now*—amounted to nothing more than “a refurbished version under new conditions” of the position that Liu Shao-chi and others had pushed almost 15 years earlier—that the principal contradiction in China was between the advanced socialist system and the backward productive forces, so that the main objective must be to develop production. This was correctly labelled “revisionist trash.”

At the same time, by 1969 Lin was already declaring the economy a disaster and making clear his hatred for the “socialist new things” and was peddling the slander that the masses were not concerned with politics, only with food and fuel—the refrain of the bourgeoisie and revisionists everywhere—in essence the line of “goulash communism,” about which more shortly. Once again, on all this Lin has a great deal in common with Chou En-lai.

Clash Over Soviet Danger

But on one decisive point they are in fundamental disagreement. Lin's position is that the Soviets are bad, but after all they are still *socialist*, and a bad socialist country is better than an imperialist one—namely the U.S., which Chou is pushing for alliance with. (It is of significance in this regard that in 1968, in opposition to a direc-

tive given by Mao in 1966 about not sending any more official greetings to the Soviet leaders, Lin Piao sent a message to the Soviet Defense Ministry in connection with a commemoration of the Soviet Red Army.) In fact, Lin's line becomes one of capitulation to the Soviets.

In the period following the 9th Party Congress all this comes to a head. As late as May 1970 Mao issues a statement in support of the people of the world and the Indochinese peoples in particular against U.S. imperialism and its accomplices—this is probably worded in that way because of the fact that the Vietnamese and Laotians do not regard the Soviets as an enemy, and to name the Soviets as such in the context of a statement stressing support for the Indochinese peoples would no doubt cause complications and sharpen contradictions between China and these other two countries. Interestingly, this May 20, 1970, statement, while issued by Mao, is presented publicly by Lin Piao at a rally.

By this time Mao has begun to sum up some important developments in the international situation. The collusion of the Soviet revisionists with U.S. imperialism has begun to be replaced by contention as the main aspect. Mao's May 20 statement, while giving all-out support to revolutionary struggles throughout the world, also points to the growing danger of world war. The Soviet revisionists, having fully restored capitalism, are pushing out as an imperialist power, taking advantage of the fact that the U.S. is bogged down in Indochina and is being battered and clearly heading for a big defeat but finding it

difficult to pull out. In the last few years the Soviets have invaded Czechoslovakia and made attacks on the Chinese border, threatening war—and, as was later publicly revealed, during this time the Soviets contacted Nixon, indicating their intention to make a strike against China's nuclear installations, but Nixon, fearing a shift in power strongly in favor of the Soviets if this should happen, emphatically objected and the Soviets backed off. During this period the Soviets had made real inroads into the U.S. "sphere of influence," for example in India.

Summing up these developments, Mao, apparently in the summer of 1970, makes the analysis that the Soviet Union has become the main threat to China. Both superpowers must be opposed, the people of the world must fight against both, and against imperialism in general—and the Chinese people must support them in this—but China must make certain adjustments, even compromises and agreements with the West, to deal with the growing Soviet danger to China itself. So Mao gives support to the long-standing push by Chou En-lai to make an "opening to the West." Mao and Chou come into agreement on this, but not for the same reasons and not with the same outlook, perspective and objectives, and there are many disagreements within this general agreement—which will sharpen and become decisive in the succeeding years.

But right then Mao and the Left, including the Four as the main leaders of it, come to agreement with Chou over this and come into sharp conflict with Lin Piao, with whom they have been en-

gaged in sharp struggle, especially over the questions of the internal class struggle, for several years. Lin puts up an all-out fight against this as well as against Mao's continuing moves to curtail the role of the army and reconstitute the Party as the leading political force. This struggle ends with the defeat of Lin Piao politically and culminates in his actual attempt to assassinate Mao—he also intended to knock off Chou—followed by Lin's desperate flight, resulting in his death in a plane crash in the People's Republic of Mongolia in September 1971.

Chou En-lai's forces are thus at the pinnacle of their power, and Chou's line has tremendous influence both as regards the internal situation and the international situation—and the inter-relationship between them. And so the stage is set for what is to become Mao's last great battle, which results, after bitter struggle and the death of both Chou and Mao, in the defeat of the forces representing Mao's revolutionary line and the triumph of revisionism, represented by those who have Chou as their rallying point (and protector while he is alive) and Teng Hsiao-ping as their most aggressive activist.

Last Battle Takes Shape

But how did this last battle take shape and develop?

First, it is impossible to understand this without grasping that Lin Piao's treachery and his final fall had a very traumatic effect in China on all levels, and had tremendous repercussions throughout society. It necessitated important or-

ganizational changes, especially in the military, where many remnant supporters of Lin still had powerful bases.

In particular it required the bringing back of some bitter opponents of Lin—people who had been knocked down in the Cultural Revolution. The most prominent among these was Teng Hsiao-ping.

Chou En-lai strongly insisted on Teng's rehabilitation, which was in line with Chou's overall insistence on rehabilitating cadre cast down in the Cultural Revolution. With some of this Mao agreed, and apparently, he even agreed to Teng's rehabilitation, because of the necessity of cleaning up after the Lin Piao affair. But Mao did not trust Teng and recognized that, despite the promises extracted from him that he would uphold the Cultural Revolution and its achievements and would "never reverse the verdict" on these, Teng could certainly not be counted on to carry out a revolutionary line. How Mao dealt with this problem will be discussed shortly.

But it should be obvious that the Right in the Party had a great deal of strength and initiative at this point. They were building up a powerful "tide" against the Cultural Revolution and Mao's whole line, in the name of opposing Lin Piao, and of preparing against a Soviet attack.

The Left, led by Mao and with the Four as its leading active core, concentrated on digging out the roots of Lin Piao's opportunism. Here an important point stands out: while the Right's strength rests on its positions of authority and the power it holds and on the position of privi-

lege of its social base, the Left, including even a prestigious leader like Mao himself, has power and the freedom to carry out a line and policies reflecting and serving the revolutionary interests of the working class, when and to the extent that the masses themselves are armed politically and ideologically and are aroused to wage political struggle in one form or another.

At that point, in the period right after Lin Piao's fall, the form was mainly mass criticism of Lin's ideological bankruptcy—his idealism, his theory that "geniuses" and not the masses are decisive in making history, that the masses can only rely on condescending saviors and so on—which was exactly the ideological line of Chou En-lai and all bourgeois elements everywhere, including every chieftain of the revisionist line in the Chinese Party.

But the Left was also beginning to wage sharp struggle, with Mao guiding it, to focus on Lin Piao's Rightist nature and Rightist policies—as opposed to the superficial ultra-"left" sloganeering and the ultra-"left" "overthrow all" line that characterized Lin's opportunism at the early stages of the Cultural Revolution. The Left finally prevails in this struggle, leading into the 10th Party Congress, which is held in August 1973.

The line adopted at the 10th Congress was overall a victory for the Left. Mao's line of politics in command and revolution playing the leading role in relation to production is upheld, as is the Cultural Revolution and the "socialist new things." A special point is made of the importance of "going against the tide"—which

clearly meant preparing people for fighting against the onslaughts from the Right.

While the necessity for compromises with the West was pointed to, it was stressed that these compromises cannot be at the expense of revolution and for the purpose of collaborating with imperialism, and the danger of all alliance and no struggle was pointed to as a warning against capitulating to imperialism under the cover of necessary compromises (the opposite error of all struggle and no alliance was also pointed to, but it was clear that the other, the right deviation, was the main one that must be guarded against). Lin Piao's rightism was stressed and his "production first" line was exposed and focused on as the heart of his revisionism. (That Chou En-lai, who fundamentally disagreed with the line of this report, found himself delivering it at the 10th Congress is not shocking or unprecedented. Such reports are not individual acts but represent the product of collective struggle. And remember that Lin Piao also found himself delivering a report to the 9th Congress with which he was in complete disagreement as it turned out—though no one outside the top leadership of the Chinese Communist Party knew it at the time.)

Despite the political victories at the 10th Congress, the revolutionaries did not do so well organizationally. Although Wang Hung-wen, only in his late 30s, was named a Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee and ranked only behind Mao and Chou En-lai in the Party leadership, he would be easy to go around and to attack, especially among veteran cadre, many of whom resen-

ted this young "upstart"—referring to him as a "helicopter" because of his rapid rise in leadership. They thought leadership should be determined by seniority and not class outlook and political line.

None of the others who were top leaders of the Left—leaving aside Mao himself—were named Vice-Chairs and only one other, Chang Chun-chiao, was on the highest standing body, though all of the Four were on the Political Bureau. Overall, the Right, which was not ready to take on Mao in an all-out fight over line, and which was less concerned with struggle over line than with putting its people in place to implement its policies through bureaucratic methods, had the upper hand, organizationally, over the revolutionaries.

Criticize Lin Piao and Confucius

Shortly after the 10th Congress, the "gang of five," headed by Mao, expanded and sharpened up its political struggle against the Rightists by launching a movement of mass study and criticism—the movement to Criticize Lin Piao and Confucius. It turned out that as part of his general idealist bankruptcy—his "geniuses make history" and "condescending savior" mentality—and his overall regressive political line, Lin Piao had even borrowed from Confucius, a reactionary thinker who upheld the slave system in ancient China in opposition to the rising landlord class and the feudal system, and whose doctrines had been promoted for more than 2000 years by reactionaries in China, giving these doctrines tremendous authority as a religious force and

code of behavior shackling the masses of people.

The Criticize Lin Piao and Confucius movement not only struck at the roots of this reactionary philosophy and its enslaving principles—such as, intellectuals are meant to rule over the manual workers, the masses must passively accept their lot for it is not meant to be changed, the son must blindly obey the father and all men their “superiors,” the wife must be silently subordinate to the husband, for women are naturally inferior to men, and so on. This movement also used political and historical analogies to begin a thorough exposure of the revisionists in top leadership of the Party right then and their whole right opportunist program, which was in essence and in most particulars the same as Lin Piao’s and which also drew on Confucianism to lend it weight.

Both Lin Piao and Confucius had attempted to restore the old order, constantly cursing the present and complaining that it was not as good as the past. Both Lin Piao and Confucianists throughout China’s history had preached capitulation to powerful foreign aggressors. This was exactly the program of those in power right then who were taking the capitalist road.

The Chinese people were called on and led to apply historical materialism and Marxism in general to grasp the essence of the current struggle and hit back at the mounting attempt to reverse the revolution and restore capitalism. At the time this campaign was conducted in China—centering around 1974—it was confusing to many (including myself) outside China—and in

some aspects, no doubt, to many inside China, because this struggle was difficult and complex. But looking back on it now it is clear that the whole struggle, the terms of it and the forces involved, was being laid out to the Chinese people.

This was done by analogy, not directly, and this was for two main reasons: (1) the Right was very strong and had a powerful social base, so that even with Mao’s backing it was not possible to go at it directly at that time; and (2) Mao’s approach has always been—and correctly so—to go after the *line* of the opportunists and arm the masses with an understanding of this first, win over those in the opportunist camp who are not die-hards to the extent possible, create splits in their ranks (no doubt Mao hoped he could even win over Chou En-lai), but rely on the masses, politically armed and politically mobilized.

The launching of this campaign to Criticize Lin Piao and Confucius was the first big shot fired back at the Right after the fall of Lin Piao. It was mainly educational in nature and purpose, preparing public opinion for more direct and decisive struggle later—for as Mao explained, it is always necessary for the revolutionaries as well as the reactionaries to create public opinion in order to carry out a struggle for political power. But the revolutionaries can only carry this out by relying on the masses and arming them with a grasp of the fundamental questions of *line* involved and which class outlook and interests different programs represent.

Teng Hsiao-ping was most clearly targeted (by analogy) as the latest modern-day Confucius,

with Chou En-lai behind him. Confucius' attempts to restore the slave system in ancient China, it was pointed out, took the form of "restoring the rights of Chou." This referred historically to the Western Chou Dynasty in China almost 3000 years ago, a slave society. It referred immediately to the whole ideological and political line of Chou En-lai: production above revolution; modernization above class struggle; things before the Cultural Revolution were better than this disastrous situation now; experts not politics must be in command; etc.; all coupled with the copying of, collaboration with and reliance on imperialism—U.S. imperialism in particular at that time, as Chou was using the necessity of certain agreements and compromises to advocate capitulation.

One main slogan of Confucius (which Lin Piao had also picked up on) was "restrain oneself and restore the rites." This was Confucius' advice to the representatives of the slave-owning class—join ranks together to bring back the old order, don't act against the common restorationist interests, but uphold the common program of reaction. In present day terms this referred especially to the fact that among the Rightists in top leadership of the Party there were many differences, but they had fundamental unity on reversing the revolution in China and selling out to imperialism.

"Restrain oneself" as it applied within the ranks of these Rightists meant: don't let our differences overwhelm our common opposition to the revolution and to Mao's revolutionary line, to the Cultural Revolution and its achievements;

don't go off in different directions, putting personal inclination above the "common good"—this will only leave us divided and lead to failure in our "great cause" of restoration.

The "rites" that should be restored, in these reactionaries' view, were precisely the "rites of Chou"—that is, Chou En-lai—reversing the achievements and "verdicts" of the Cultural Revolution and returning to the elitist and bureaucratic ways of doing things that the bourgeois elements and conservative cadre in the Party had always had fundamental unity on and which, in varying degrees, they had succeeded in implementing, especially before the Cultural Revolution.

All this tied in with the policy of "benevolence"—that is, pretending concern for the well-being of the masses and luring them with "material benefits" and personal advancement, promoting individualism, competition and divisions among them, while of course ruthlessly suppressing their initiative and any resistance to the dictates from above.

For a glaring and sickening example of what this means, listen to the following statement by the current Confucian rulers of China, discussing the relation between wages and the performance of workers: "If merits are not rewarded and wrongs not penalized, how can the people be encouraged to advance and how can the four modernizations be brought about?!" How benevolent! (This is from *Peking Review* No. 33, 1978—and this is only one of many such statements. This whole article is an especially glaring

exposure of the reactionary nature of those now ruling China; it is a rich vein of revisionism.)

Another main slogan of Confucius which was attacked and which had direct relation to the struggle then was "revive states that were extinct, restore families that had lost their positions, and call to office those who had fallen into obscurity." This meant restore the old order and its ways, and all those who would uphold it. In the present day it meant rehabilitating unrepentant capitalist-roaders and whipping up the Rightists generally to take revenge on the masses and wipe out the Cultural Revolution—in other words, suppressing the masses and their revolutionary leaders and restoring capitalism.

It is not that the Right was itself raising these Confucian slogans as such, but that the Left was using the analogy of Confucius and his followers to make clear what the actual line and program of the Right was (though it is interesting and significant that since seizing power the revisionists have debunked the criticism of Confucius and taken steps to rehabilitate his good name, because the Confucian tradition is indispensable for installing a reactionary regime in China).

In short, the general line-up at that time was that Teng Hsiao-ping was Confucius, the hatchet man and aggressive restorationist, and it was Chou En-lai's "rites"—his rightist line—that served as the common program around which those opposing the forward march of the revolution could and must unite, despite any differences, which they must "restrain themselves" from asserting right then.

A major part of the Criticize Lin Piao and Confucius campaign was an extensive and intensive examination of the historical struggle between the Legalists and the Confucianists. The Legalists were the representatives of the rising landlord class which overthrew the slave system, defended by Confucius, in ancient China. The period of the transition from slavery to feudalism in China more than 2000 years ago, and the struggle between those who fought to bring about the new society at that time and those who sought to restore the old order, was very useful to examine. It was a long period of transition from one system to another, marked by intense struggle. No other period of Chinese history was characterized by such a clear-cut struggle between the upholders of the old and new orders. While, obviously, the present struggle would be different in many features than that between two exploiting classes in ancient China, this historical period did offer many valuable lessons.

The struggle between the Legalists and the Confucianists was used as a way of drawing attention more sharply to the current struggle in China. All the main issues in this struggle were brought out through the analogy of the battle between the Legalists and Confucianists: on the fronts of education, science and technology, culture and so on. So, too, the danger of capitulation to reactionary foreign enemies and of the need for strong centralized leadership as opposed to local warlordism (still a big problem in the Chinese army) were stressed through this analogy. The Confucian "doctrine of the mean"—

which preached against "going to extremes" and that the masses should be reconciled to their oppression—was sharply criticized as the fore-runner of the revisionist line in China then that "the class struggle is dying out"—so the proletariat should stop waging it against the bourgeoisie.

"Three Worlds" Line— Capitulating to Imperialism

All of this was closely linked to the question of war, to the defense of China and its foreign relations and international line and policies. The Right's line was (and is) that only with modernization and modern weapons can China stand up to the Soviets, and the only way to get modernized and get modern weapons is to cut out all this class struggle, cut out all these political movements and political activity of the masses, cut out even the mass movements for technical and production innovation, and rely on imports, even capital, from the imperialist West and copy their bourgeois methods of management, finance, etc. It is not for no reason that in early 1976 Mao blasted Teng Hsiao-ping for reviving his "white cat, black cat, who cares" line and for making no distinction between Marxism and imperialism!

It should be pointed out here that Teng Hsiao-ping's infamous speech to the United Nations in April, 1974, where he proclaimed his "Three Worlds analysis," lays out as a general model for "Third World" countries the same revisionist program for "modernization" that he was aggressively pushing in China. In that speech he says: "In

many developing countries, the production of raw materials accounts for a considerable proportion of the national economy. If they can take in their own hands the production, use, sale, storage and transport of raw materials and sell them at reasonable prices on the basis of equitable trade relations in exchange for a greater amount of goods needed for the growth of their industrial and agricultural production, they will then be able to resolve step by step the difficulties they are facing and pave the way for an early emergence from poverty and backwardness."

In other words, this is the same as China is now doing in selling out its natural resources to get foreign technology—and now even inviting foreign capital in to "jointly" exploit these resources—and the people. And it should also be pointed out that this whole line was blasted by Mao and the Four as an expression of the comprador, lackey-of-imperialism, philosophy and political program.

Such a program and such an outlook will only lead to dependence on and capitulation to imperialism. If the question of China's ability to resist a Soviet attack is measured in conventional power equations—that is, in bourgeois terms—then the only conclusion will inevitably be, sooner or later, that China cannot stand up to such an attack. There is no way China can possibly match up to the Soviet Union (or catch up to it in the near future) if these are made the terms. China's strength, its ability to resist and finally defeat a Soviet war of aggression, lies in the masses of people, politically aroused and motiva-

ted to fight a people's war, in which to the extent possible modern weapons must be employed but must never be depended on.

As Mao had said 15 years earlier, if we must have the newest weapons before we can fight, then that amounts to disarming ourselves. Mao and the Four stressed the link between the class struggle at home and the struggle against imperialism, and the fact that those who betrayed the revolution in China would capitulate to imperialism. This was a theme that was to be stressed more directly in 1975.

In January 1975, the Fourth National People's Congress (the government congress) was held. In the period between the 10th Party Congress in the summer of 1973 and this People's Congress the Right had been making a big offensive. On the cultural front it had brazenly brought back an only thinly disguised remake of a play that praised Liu Shao-chi's line in opposition to Mao's just before the start of the Cultural Revolution. And, along with promoting other reactionary domestic works, the Right uncritically promoted, and denied the class content and character of, Western bourgeois works.

During this same period the Right is attempting to implement wage policies that run counter to the changes made in the Cultural Revolution. They seek to implement piece-work and extensive use of bonuses, to tighten up discipline over the workers and effect restrictive rules and regulations in the factories. And they are carrying out the restoration of as many capitalist-roaders as they can to key leadership positions, to carry

out their revisionist line on different fronts.

The Left, in addition to leading the anti-Lin Piao and Confucius campaign, is counter-attacking in various fields as well. In education they popularize, as models, students who put politics and participation in productive labor together with the masses above "expertise" and oppose theory divorced from practice—already by 1972 Chou En-lai had spearheaded a move to restore the educational policies criticized and transformed in the Cultural Revolution, and struggle around this intensified in the next few years.

The Left also leads resistance to the "new" wage policies—that is the reviving of the ones criticized and thrown out in the Cultural Revolution. And they lead struggle against the restrictive rules and regulations that are being re-instituted. In Shanghai in 1974, workers on the docks raise the slogan "Be Masters of the Wharf, Not Slaves to Tonnage!" to counter these rules that put production above politics and reduce the workers to workhorses competing for hay. In another plant the workers put up posters and confront the administrative personnel, demanding, "Where are your hammers?"—in other words, why are you not taking part in productive labor? In opposition to and in the face of the resistance of the revisionists, a freighter, made entirely by the workers in China, with all its equipment produced in the same way, makes a round-the-world voyage, which is hailed and held up by the Left as a model of self-reliance against the revisionists' depend-on-imperialism-for-technology position.

The revisionist line of reducing aid to revolutionary struggles is attacked in a major article in the press, under the Four's leadership. And in a speech in April 1974 (the same week as Teng Hsiao-ping's address to the UN), Wang Hung-wen, at a rally in support of the Cambodian liberation war against U.S. imperialism, stresses support for the struggle of the people of the world and says that Mao has recently reminded the Party and people that they must support such struggles and that not to do so would be to betray Marxism.

Fourth People's Congress—1975

The struggle is intensifying on every front going into the Fourth People's Congress in January 1975. This Congress reflects a situation similar to that at the 10th Party Congress—the line adopted represents an overall victory for the Left, but the Right is gaining in organizational strength. Again Chou En-lai finds himself giving a report to whose basic thrust he is opposed, although he gets in part of his line and program. This report not only upholds the Cultural Revolution and the “socialist new things” but says emphatically that reactionaries at home and abroad had said that the Cultural Revolution would certainly disrupt the development of the national economy but the facts have given these reactionaries a strong rebuttal. This rebuttal was actually, of course, aimed at Chou himself and those aligned with him.

Further the report stresses that “Only when we do well in revolution is it possible to do well in

tion”—the exact opposite of the line of Mao and his cohorts that production is more important than revolution and to the extent that revolution matters at all it is measured by how much we do—in the short run—in production. The report also calls for strengthening revolutionary committees on all levels. These leadership bodies, which combined masses of working people with Party cadre and administrative and technical personnel, have now been eliminated on all levels of Chinese society.

Chou Chun-chiao also gives a report to this Congress—whose line he is in agreement with. It stresses the importance not only of continuing to revolutionize the superstructure—politics, culture, ideology, education, etc.—but of continuing to transform the relations of production. It emphasizes that attention must be paid to the actual content and not to the form of ownership and the need to wage the struggle so that leadership in the factories is actually in the hands of Marxists and the masses of workers and not in the hands of revisionists and bourgeoisies.

In this Congress, Mao's call for the proletariat to exercise all-around dictatorship over the superstructure in the superstructure, including all spheres of culture, is written into the government constitution. And so is Mao's line that not only culture but education, health work and scientific work must all serve proletarian politics and be combined with productive labor. More political blows against Teng Hsiao-ping and the “rites of Chou.”

At this Congress Chou En-lai lays out a plan for modernization in two stages to advance China to the front ranks of the world economically by the year 2000. But what is put forward as the main task? Developing the economy, modernization? No—it is “to continue to broaden, deepen and persevere in the movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius” and “in line with the principle of **making the past serve the present**, sum up the historical experience of the struggle between the Confucian and the Legalist schools and of class struggle as a whole, build up a vast Marxist theoretical force in the course of struggle and use Marxism to occupy all spheres in the superstructure.” Hardly the line of Chou, Teng, et al., who are the targets of this movement!

Here it must be stressed that the terms of the struggle between the Left and the Right in the Party were not that the Right was for modernizing the country and the Left was not, and was only concerned with empty ideas and stirring up chaos all the time. This is how the revisionists have presented it, but the fight actually came down concretely over *what kind* of economic development, *guided by what principles*, serving which class and social system?

The Left was, and had always been, greatly concerned with developing the economy. In fact great breakthroughs were being made during this very time and as a result of the achievements of the Cultural Revolution in the very strongholds of the Left. It was in Shanghai that the shipyard workers, defying all reactionary “experts,” domestic and foreign, constructed a

10,000-ton ship on a dry dock made only for a 5,000-ton ship. It was also in Shanghai that a big new generator, truly at advanced world levels, had been recently produced through self-reliance and reliance on the masses, working together with technicians and cadres.

The problem was, in fact, that the Right’s program for “modernization” was not a new, glorious plan at all, but in essence the same old bankrupt program the revisionists in China had repeatedly raised and which Mao had repeatedly led the masses in rejecting and repudiating—because it could only lead to lop-sided “development,” class polarization, dependence on imperialism and the restoration of capitalism. That this is what the Right’s “historic four modernizations” really mean can be clearly seen, among other things, by the way in which the Chinese rulers have lavishly and slavishly praised the “development of the national economy” and the “marvelous economic resurgence” since World War 2 in the so-called “Second World”—that is, imperialist and capitalist countries (this came out in a recent series of articles in the Chinese press).

Chou and his cohorts want in 1975 to get modernization adopted as the new “historical mission” of the proletariat in China and to have production declared the central task, as they have done after Mao died and they pulled off their coup. But, while Mao is still alive, and the Four, with his backing, still in leading positions, the Right cannot get over with this revisionism. Instead, included in the report to the Fourth Peo-

ple's Congress is only the general statement that modernization is an important task on the economic front, along with a general plan for carrying out this modernization by the year 2000.

As I said, however, the Right does make gains, especially organizationally. Teng Hsiao-ping is named first Vice-Premier, ahead of Chang Chun-chiao, and in effect replacing the ailing Chou as the acting Premier. Teng is also made Chief of Staff of the military (with Yeh Chien-ying acting as Defense Minister), while Chang Chun-chiao is named chief political officer of the military. Obviously the struggle is sharpening further on every level.

Mao himself did not attend the Fourth People's Congress, though his health would have permitted a brief appearance. But Mao did not approve of the developments that were taking place around the Congress, including the growing organizational strength of the Right, despite the overall correct line of the Congress, which Mao clearly did support and obviously had to fight to get adopted. In particular, while the Right did not succeed in making "modernization" the main goal and central task right then, they were obviously whipping up a big wind around this.

Mao does not lend his support to this, he makes no statements at this crucial time about how modernization is a glorious task—let alone the central task—he only makes a general call for "pushing the national economy forward" (in fact, even in laying out the plan for modernization by the year 2000, Chou En-lai has to reach

back 11 years for a statement by Mao backing this—there is no recent statement).

Mao's Response— Dictatorship of the Proletariat Campaign

Instead of emphasizing modernization, Mao, at this very time, on the eve of the Fourth People's Congress, while giving support to the continuing criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius and the summation of the experience of the struggle between the Legalists and Confucianists, issues some new directives for studying the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat and combating and preventing revisionism. This is another counter-attack against the Right.

Mao raises the question, *Why* did Lenin speak of exercising dictatorship over the bourgeoisie?, and says that this must be understood by the masses of people and that lack of understanding on this will lead to revisionism. What Mao was stressing and made clear in this directive was the fact that, although in China the ownership system had changed and was in the main socialist, in many other important respects China was not much different than a capitalist country. That is, there were different wage grades, the commodity system was still practiced and there were many inequalities left over from capitalism. "Bourgeois rights," such as the "right" to a higher position based on more skill or knowledge, the "right" to more pay for a greater quantity or quality of work—and even to a certain extent the "right" to own means of production privately—had not been eliminated. Such things, Mao said,

could only be restricted and not completely eliminated for some time. But they must be restricted and not expanded, or the growth of capitalism and the bourgeoisie would be fed and the danger of capitalist restoration strengthened. Further, Mao said, because of all these survivals of the old exploiting society, if revisionists—people like Lin Piao—should come to power, it would be quite easy for them to rig up the capitalist system.

Here Mao was pointing to both a long-term problem and an immediate danger. And he followed the issuance of these directives by firing two big shots against the Right—two articles written and signed by members of the so-called “gang of four”—Yao Wen-yuan and Chang Chun-chiao. These articles went into the questions Mao had raised in more detail and depth and made clear what some of the crucial terms of the struggle were then and the fact that it was sharpening. These articles explained the material and social basis for the bourgeoisie to be constantly regenerated in socialist society and for it to be concentrated at the top levels of the Communist Party itself. They attacked straight up the policies of the revisionists of expanding rather than narrowing differences and inequalities still existing in socialist society and showed how this is a crucial part of the revisionists’ program for mobilizing a social base for the restoration of capitalism.

In a real sense, the struggle on many different fronts was concentrated in the question: which do you give first place to—class struggle or pro-

duction, fighting against revisionism and the bourgeoisie or “modernization”? Again, Mao and the Four did not say—take your pick, either class struggle or modernization. Modernization was important but economic growth cannot be raised above politics and above the question of developing the economy along *which road*. A number of countries in the world had a higher growth rate than China, but that did not make them *socialist*—nor (with their present social system) could they achieve balanced, all-around growth that would be in the interests of the people and not of exploiters. Only genuine socialism could do that.

Politics, the class struggle, must take precedence over modernization or “modernization” will mean taking the capitalist road—and will actually lead to distorted “development” and ultimately stagnation. Mao and the Four repeatedly drew attention to this question—pointing to the experience of the Soviet Union, where the satellites went up to the sky and the red flag fell to the ground, as evidence of the fact that economic development carried out under the signboard of “socialism” is not necessarily and “automatically” socialist. It is only so if it is guided by a correct line which unleashes and relies on the conscious activism of the masses in production as in everything else, and consciously goes up against and breaks through bourgeois convention and force of habit.

In the fall of 1975 Hua Kuo-feng made a speech at a national conference on agriculture. He clearly lined up with the “modernization first” bunch.

While mentioning Mao's most important directives on the dictatorship of the proletariat and combatting and preventing revisionism, he deliberately tore the guts out of them, leaving out Mao's warning that if people like Lin Piao came to power it would be quite easy for them to restore capitalism, which gave these directives their life and death character right then.

Hua's speech gives off a lot of talk about mechanizing farming but, despite some "revolutionary" window dressing, takes the wrong side on the crucial question of *by what means*, relying on who and what, according to which line and with what in command? In general Hua Kuo-feng has distinguished himself by making a lot of empty talk about revolution and making a show of upholding Mao's line, but always in a way to act as a cover for the same revisionist junk—"modernization" as the new "historic mission," "everything for modernization" and so on. This is the character of his 1975 speech—and of every speech he has made since then.

Beneath the surface—and often not too far—is always the essential line of relying on specialists and experts, keeping politics and class struggle subordinate to production, rigorously adopting capitalist-style management and knocking aside anything that gets in the way of capitalist "efficiency." (For a clear example of this people can look at a major speech by Hua in *Peking Review* #30, 1978.) And in fact Hua's grand schemes for agriculture are falling on their face, while private plots, private trading and so on are being stimulated and encouraged, while whole areas of agri-

culture, as well as industry, are being distorted to produce for the most profitable export.

Returning to the situation in mid and late 1975, the Right is yet again stepping up its attacks and now blatantly challenging Mao's line and calling for the overthrow of the firmest supporters of Mao's line, led by the Four. This takes shape in three documents—dubbed "poisonous weeds" by the Left—which flagrantly call for wholesale reversal of the achievements of the Cultural Revolution and a return to revisionist policies struck down since the start of the Cultural Revolution.

A Showdown Is Brewing

Mao responds in August 1975 by calling for study of a historical Chinese novel, *Water Margin*, whose main character is someone from the landlord class who is driven to join peasant rebels (somewhat like Robin Hood perhaps) but ends up capitulating to the Emperor and attacking the genuine rebels on behalf of the Emperor. But this is not an academic exercise; the merit of this book, Mao says, lies precisely in that it will help the people to recognize capitulationists, people who join the revolution but are not thoroughgoing revolutionaries and finally end up as traitors. Teng Hsiao-ping, and Chou En-lai behind him, are being targeted again, but now the ante is up: Mao is saying that there are traitors in our ranks and it's time to uncover them and strike them down.

A few months later the battle on the educational front erupted into a mass debate. Mao himself

initiated this debate after receiving letters from university officials in Peking who bitterly complained that the new educational policies were wrecking education and holding back economic development and so on. Mao sent these letters to the students and staff of the university (Tsinghua) and called for them to take up struggle around this. Mao not only stood with those students and staff who rose to defend the educational transformations but recognized and made clear that this battle in the educational field was a decisive part of the overall class struggle going on then. "The question involved in Tsinghua," Mao insisted, "is not an isolated question, but a reflection of the current two-line struggle." The Four, and apparently Chang Chun-chiao in particular, threw themselves actively into this struggle, carrying out Mao's line and supporting those fighting to uphold the educational "new things."

The Left, whose main strength does not lie in struggles at the top for position but in the movement of the masses, steps up the struggle to criticize the "unrepentant capitalist-roader" (Teng) and beat back the Right deviationist wind he has been most aggressive in whipping up to "reverse the verdicts" of the Cultural Revolution.

Mao issues a statement blasting Teng for trying to misuse Mao's own directives to support Teng's line that order and stability to ensure "production above everything" is the "key link." Class struggle is the key link, Mao shoots back, and everything hinges on it. Along with this Mao publicly blasts Teng and the whole Right deviationist wind, emphatically stating

that "reversing correct verdicts goes against the will of the people." Teng, Mao says bluntly, does not know anything about Marxism-Leninism, he never talks about the key link of class struggle, he is trying to reverse correct verdicts and he represents the bourgeoisie.

During this open struggle against "that unrepentant capitalist-roader," Mao makes the statement that there are people in the Party who before, when the task was carrying out the collectivization of agriculture, were against that, and now, when it comes to criticizing bourgeois right, they are against that, too. Then he goes on to say, "You are making the socialist revolution, and yet don't know where the bourgeoisie is. It is right in the Communist Party—those in power taking the capitalist road. The capitalist-roaders are still on the capitalist road."

This was not only an exposure of Teng Hsiao-ping and others like him, but an extremely important analysis of two related questions: the analysis of the bourgeoisie in the socialist period and where its core and commanders will be—within the Communist Party itself, especially at its top levels; and the phenomenon, of great significance in China, of people—again, especially top Party leaders—who were revolutionaries in the bourgeois-democratic stage but fail to advance and instead become counter-revolutionaries, capitalist-roaders, in the socialist stage, especially the farther the socialist revolution advances and the deeper it strikes at the vestiges and inequalities left over from the old society.

Mao's analysis of the bourgeoisie in the Party

was based on the understanding that in socialist society, where the party plays the leading role in everything and there are no private owners of the means of production of any real significance, control over the means of production and the allocation of distribution will be concentrated as the power of political leadership, especially at the highest levels of the party. If those who hold such leadership practice a revisionist line, treat the workers as mere labor power, expand rather than narrow differences, divorce themselves from the masses and productive labor and rely on bureaucratic methods, they will become bourgeois and transform their relationship with those they lead into exploitative relationships. In this way, capitalism can and does develop within the collective form, and this happens in certain economic units even while the state is still in the hands of the proletariat and the economy is still socialist. If this is not resolutely and effectively struggled against, those taking the capitalist road will grow in strength and numbers, expand the areas under their control and eventually succeed in seizing power in the Party and society as a whole and carry out all-around capitalist restoration.

This is what Mao was beginning to speak to as early as 1964, when he said that the main target had become those in authority taking the capitalist road—as opposed to bourgeois elements outside the Party. Putting it in simple terms in 1976, in speaking particularly of veteran leaders who failed to advance after the new-democratic revolution, and treated their positions of authori-

ty as capital, Mao explained: they have become high officials and want to protect the interests of high officials. And this means they have become the bourgeoisie right inside the Communist Party itself. This analysis, and the call to the masses to ferret out and strike down these people, hit the revisionists dead on the head.

Tien An Men Riot

They hit back with a fury, as evidenced by the April 5 counter-revolutionary riot in Tien An Men Square—which I referred to at the start of this talk. The Right staged this incident not with the aim of seizing power right then and there, but to make clear to their social base and followers throughout the country that they were not lying down just because Teng and the Right deviationist wind had been brought under attack. Further, they wanted to, and did, force organizational steps to be taken.

As a result of the riot, Teng was officially removed from his leadership posts (though the Right succeeded in keeping him in the Party) and Hua Kuo-feng was named Premier and First Vice-Chairman of the Party. Not a bad deal for the Right—they could always restore Teng to power (as they have of course) and they got the official stamp on Hua as at least nominal head of the Party (behind Mao) and of the state. That these changes were made while the struggle, in its open all-out form, was still in its early stages, was a definite advantage to the Right, because this had some effect of shortcircuiting the mass political struggle, through which the masses

would grasp more deeply the issues involved and the role of different forces.

Meanwhile the Right also used the tactic of stirring up disruptions and an "ultra-left" current of anarchy and attacking everything and everyone to discredit and disorient the struggle and the masses. This was a trick often used by the capitalist-roaders when they came under fire, and in a speech to leading cadres in June 1976, Chang Chun-chiao spoke to this problem and called for vigilance against this kind of tactic and for keeping the fire on Teng and those who had united with him in whipping up the Right deviationist wind.

Shortly after this, devastating earthquakes struck China, killing many people and causing widespread damage. This, of course, was seized on by the Right for at least three purposes: (1) to play down the political struggle against Teng and the Right deviationist wind—after all how can that take precedence over human suffering they argue, with their typical Confucian "benevolence"; (2) to build up the image of Hua and other Rightists as benevolent leaders paying attention to the people's needs, in opposition to the Left which insists on "empty talk" about revolution even at a time like this; and (3) to make shifts in the army and troop deployments. Under the cover of the army's assistance in relief work, the Right gets its military forces strategically deployed to seal off Peking and prepare for a coup (Mao is clearly dying by this time).

The Left responds by calling for the linking of the struggle against Teng with the earthquake

relief work, pointing out that only by repudiating the bourgeois line of "look out for number one," and "what's in it for me?" which Teng has been promoting, and only by bringing into play the communist spirit of self-sacrifice for the good of society, can the relief work be carried out correctly and most effectively.

Not long after the earthquakes Mao dies. The Left and the Right both make preparations for the inevitable showdown. The Right's strength lies in the military and in the confusion and anxiety among many cadres and masses. The Left's strength, as always, lies in politically arming and mobilizing the masses and to some degree, militarily speaking, in the people's militia—they have been able to make little inroads into most of the army itself. The Left calls for continuing and stepping up the struggle against the Right deviationist wind, with Teng as the main target. But, as we know, this is cut short—within a month after Mao's death the Right pulls off the coup it has been carefully planning for.

The Right had to move when it did because its top leaders were all involved in the Right deviationist attempt to reverse correct verdicts, and they could not hide the dirt on their hands for too long. If the struggle against this "wind" is allowed to continue and deepen, they will come under heavy fire, the masses will increasingly recognize their treacherous role and they will be in a much weaker position, both inside the Party and in society as a whole.

That the Four were not "completely isolated" even at the top levels of the Party, as the revi-

sionists have claimed after pulling off their coup, and that the line of the Four—and Mao—had both strong support among the masses and some, if in many cases not staunch, backing from middle forces in the Party leadership, is indicated by the nature of the statement on Mao's death by the leading bodies of the Party and state, from which I read earlier.

Shortly before the coup, the Political Bureau meets to discuss the question of succession to leadership, but is stalemated. Then the Right moves, seizing the Four, Mao Yuan-hsin (Mao's nephew, entrusted by Mao to manage his affairs during the last year and more of Mao's life) and other close supporters of the Four. The middle forces and vacillating elements in the Party leadership are presented with a *fait accompli* and the Right consolidates its power.

The most die-hard elements of the Right would have moved even if, for some reason, Hua Kuo-feng hesitated or was unwilling at the decisive hour. But they preferred to do it with Hua to preserve the image of orderly succession and to make use for the time being of the mantle of Mao, who had been able to oust Teng, temporarily, but had found himself having to give personal endorsement to Hua's appointment.

Hua served the Right well. He rose—or, I should say, sunk—to the occasion, and so the coup was pulled off with Hua to all appearances at the helm. And so, through military *coup d'état*, the Right seized power and began realizing its fond dream of bringing an end to "the era of Chin Shih Huang"—that is, an end to the lead-

ership of Mao's revolutionary line and Thought and to the dictatorship of the proletariat in China. . . for the time being.

Struggle Against—and Among— The Revisionists

Here a few words should be said about continuing struggle and conflict in China since the coup.

First, as to resistance by the masses, there was immediately such resistance in Shanghai, where sections of the militia battled the army. Beyond that, for several months afterwards there were sporadic uprisings, included armed uprisings—in which in some cases arms were stolen from army headquarters, Party offices were raided and so on, and in a few cases sections of the army even went over to the side of the rebels. These uprisings took place in several provinces, at key railway junctures and at other places.

While these uprisings were put down—though sometimes areas could not be "secured" for several months—resistance has continued in other forms. There are reports of underground organization and there seems almost certainly to be an underground press. Further, there has been struggle in the factories, including strikes, in the universities and other institutions against the wiping out of the achievements of the Cultural Revolution and the imposing of restrictive rules and regulations, bourgeois management policies, revisionist educational and cultural policies, etc. This has taken different forms—including the putting up of posters denouncing these "new" policies—even some saying that what is happen-

ing in China is the same thing that happened in the Soviet Union after Stalin died.

Very little of this openly takes the form of support for the Four, since that obviously will bring swift and vicious repression. But much of it takes the general form of fighting to uphold Mao's line and some the specific form of upholding the achievements of the Cultural Revolution. There have been repeated statements by the revisionist rulers that there is resistance and also foot-dragging on various levels in carrying out the so-called "campaign" against the "gang of five" (oh, I mean "four," they haven't quite yet started openly calling it "gang of five"). Some of these official statements no doubt reflect and are part of factional fighting among the revisionist usurpers themselves, but not all of them are.

Overall, however, it must be said that, despite undeniable resistance of various kinds, the revisionists have consolidated their usurpation of power and the revolutionaries and masses of people now face a very difficult situation. But, as it becomes more and more clear that this regime in power is making an all-out attack on Mao and all he stood for and fought for, the resistance is bound to grow, despite the difficulties. The revolutionaries and the masses in China have the legacy of Mao, they have Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tsetung Thought and, because of this and the heroic battle put up by the Four, the lines and issues involved will be more and more consciously grasped by the large numbers of class conscious working people and others who stand for revolution and they will develop the ways to

carry out not just resistance but eventually the revolutionary overthrow of the fascist bourgeois dictatorship imposed on them now.

We can be confident in the scientific prediction of Mao himself—who, despite what the revisionists may say, did, after all, know something about China and its history of struggle—that, as he wrote to Comrade Chiang Ching in 1966, "If the Rightists stage an anti-Communist coup d'état in China, I am sure they will know no peace either and their rule will most probably be short-lived because it will not be tolerated by the revolutionaries, who represent the interests of the people making up more than 90 percent of the population."

There is also, of course, sharp conflict within the ruling clique. Much has been reported about a struggle between Teng and Hua. There is very likely a good deal of truth to this. In a certain sense, Hua is an impediment to people like Teng, because Hua wants to and has to try to keep certain trappings of Mao's line to justify his own authority and position. Teng has no such need at all, and in fact wants to openly and in an all-around way attack Mao and Mao's line, not merely trample on it while pretending to uphold it, like Hua. (Here I should say that Hua has a real disadvantage—after all if you're going to serve goulash, it is much better to serve it hot than lukewarm!)

There are also conflicts of interest among different leaders and cadre at various levels. There are those who were knocked down during the Cultural Revolution, those who stayed in their

positions but were severely criticized and still others (like Hua himself) who did not really support the Cultural Revolution but benefited from it—rose in position, when some higher-ranking cadre were stripped of their posts or demoted. Given that a revisionist line is in command and self-interest is the openly promoted motivation, all this is bound to lead to a great deal of bourgeois rivalry.

As discussed before, there are and have been many political conflicts within the general camp of the Right for some time, and these are undoubtedly growing and intensifying. One important difference is that, while they all agree on the need to beg for advanced technology, even capital, from the West, and to wreck the economy's foundation to get it, there are conflicts over what stance to take towards the Soviets. Some want to make "concessions" to them—this showed up, for example, at the end of 1975 when some Soviet helicopter pilots captured in China earlier were released with an apology (Teng was thought then to be responsible for this). Others among the Right want to make fewer such concessions—at this time.

It will be more and more difficult for the revisionists to "restrain themselves" and remain united around one common program—"the rites of Chou"—especially since the Four and Mao are gone and the more so as the grandiose plans for "modernization" bear bitter fruit and they meet more resistance. Such conflicts among this ruling bourgeoisie are, on the whole, a good thing, providing some turmoil for the revolutionaries to

make use of.

Causes of the Reversal

Finally I would like to speak to the causes of the reversal in China and to its lessons. Here, at this time, it is not possible to make any kind of thorough analysis of this, but some basic points can and should be touched on.

First, as a foundation, there is the question of the nature of socialist society itself and the contradictions that characterize it and determine its development. This—and in particular those remnants of the old society that still exist under socialism and determine that there will be classes, class struggle and the danger of capitalist restoration—is what Mao drew sharp attention to, especially through the Cultural Revolution and most specifically in the last few years of his life, in his last great battle.

Here it would be useful to very briefly review some history of the communist movement and the socialist countries in this regard. In the past, particularly in the experience of the Soviet Union, even under Stalin's leadership, there was a certain tendency to view the nature of socialist society metaphysically—that is, one-sidedly, in a static way and without recognizing or correctly analyzing the nature and role of the basic contradictions in socialist society.

This expressed itself in the view that once the old ruling class is overthrown, the problem is relatively simple: the task is to develop the productive forces, which, given that you have public ownership, will, according to this view, always

take place on a socialist basis so long as this ownership is safeguarded and obvious capitalist forms and principles are suppressed. In line with this, Stalin applied such things as one-man management, reliance on technicians and experts, and other methods of management, and wage policies, not that much different than capitalism. It was not sufficiently realized that continual transformation of the actual relations between people in production—for example between mental and manual workers—and restriction of differences in income, were crucial within any given stage of ownership in order to continue advancing on the socialist road and resist capitalist restoration.

Stalin certainly upheld the dictatorship of the proletariat, but here again there was some metaphysics: after socialist transformation of ownership was carried out, Stalin erroneously said that there were no longer any antagonistic classes in the Soviet Union. Yes, there were counter-revolutionaries, but they could be relatively easily identified and dealt with at the top—they will be people openly attacking socialism and the Soviet Union, sabotaging production and planning, etc. And they will be readily identifiable as remnants of the old exploiting classes and/or agents of foreign capital. In fact at this time, while upholding the dictatorship of the proletariat, Stalin said it was only necessary in the Soviet Union because of the existence of capitalism and the bourgeoisie *internationally*. This was a very serious mistake.

In short, the problem of capitalism in the collec-

tive form, of the bourgeoisie arising from *within* the contradictions of socialist society itself, was not really realized. For example, Stalin ridiculed people who raised the problem that even intellectuals, technicians, etc., trained out of the ranks of the working class tended to become divorced from the workers and to adopt bureaucratic ways and a bourgeois style of life. And while Stalin ruthlessly fought against bureaucratism, he did not sufficiently make a class analysis of this problem and mobilize the masses to struggle against it, tending to use instead bureaucratic methods himself to combat bureaucratism.

Mao summed up this error and the negative experience of capitalist restoration in the Soviet Union after Stalin died, as well as the positive experience of the dictatorship of the proletariat and socialist construction under Stalin. On this basis, and by analyzing the struggle in China itself, Mao developed the great theory and basic line of continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat. Let's briefly examine this.

In all socialist countries so far, ownership has not reached the stage of being completely socialized—that is, ownership by all of society. Instead there are both state forms and, especially in the countryside, collective forms of ownership. Even in regard to the state-owned enterprises (and farms) there is some independent accounting at the enterprise level and commodity relations between them, as well as on an extensive scale between the collective farms and the state. "Bourgeois right"—that is, aspects of bourgeois and commodity relations—is not even complete-

ly eliminated in ownership.

This has real consequences, especially in the countryside, and provides the basis for polarization to develop. Different land is more or less fertile, different people have different skill and ability in labor, and so on. In a country like China all this remained very pronounced. Thus, restricting "bourgeois right" in exchange and the sphere of operation of commodity relations is an extremely important question; otherwise, even on the basis of collective ownership, adherence to the plan, etc., polarization will take place, with the richer collectives tending to get richer, the poor poorer. This is why calls for all-out competition, raising productivity and output, etc., without taking all this into consideration, can stimulate *capitalist* development, polarization and the emergence of rich peasant elements, linked with technicians, farm managers and so on as a rural bourgeoisie.

It is necessary to consciously go against the spontaneous pull of the small producer mentality. The masses of peasants certainly can be led to take the socialist road, but an incorrect line that promotes bourgeois competition can also have appeal in the short run and certainly can find a strong base of support among more well-off peasants as well as among some specialists, managers, etc. This happened in the USSR after Khrushchev rose to power. And the same kind of thing can happen in regard to relations within and between state-owned enterprises.

Mao analyzed how these contradictions constantly give rise to the bourgeoisie and how the main danger comes from bourgeois headquarters

that will repeatedly form in the Party itself to defend and expand these differences and inequalities and to protect and unleash a social base of more privileged strata. Building socialism and going on to communism, Mao showed, requires and depends on unceasing class struggle against the bourgeoisie, especially the capitalist-roads within the Party, and every few years there will be a major struggle for power between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, with the main target of the proletariat being the bourgeoisie within the Party that is attempting to seize power to carry out capitalist restoration. The revolutionaries can only succeed in this struggle by politically arming, mobilizing and relying on the masses. The dictatorship of the proletariat is and can only be dictatorship by the masses, led by the Party; it is not and cannot be dictatorship by the Party, and still less by a handful of leaders alone.

In formulating and emphasizing all this and leading the masses on this path, Mao went up against not only convention and the force of habit in general, but, so to speak, "conventional wisdom" and "force of habit" within the communist movement itself. To break with convention, to break down differences, to unleash the masses and rely on them, to increase their conscious mastery over society, is not always—and often is not—the most "efficient" way to do things and certainly not the most "orderly." The Great Leap Forward in China was an outstanding example of this.

Mao got many of his old comrades and other

leading people to go along with some of the pathbreaking policies and movements, including the Great Leap Forward. But as these ran into inevitable difficulties and involved inevitable excesses, and especially as these changes dug at the foundations of privilege, many turned against them and turned on Mao for leading them. This came to a sharp point at the start of the Cultural Revolution, when Mao was only able, through sharp struggle, to get barely a majority of the Central Committee to go along. This problem is generally linked to the conservative tendencies that arise when people are in positions of power—Mao often commented, for example, that after the winning of nationwide political power in 1949 all kinds of conservative and bourgeois tendencies were fostered among leading cadre. And this was further complicated and intensified by the particularities of China—where the remaining backwardness increases the pull to put short-term results in developing the economy above revolution.

To take this approach, however, can only lead back to capitalism, because spontaneity is not with you; as Marx and Engels said in the *Communist Manifesto*, the communist revolution requires the radical rupture not only with traditional property relations but with traditional ideas as well, and one is not possible without the other. Socialism can only be built, and the advance to communism achieved, by developing, unleashing and relying on the *conscious activism* of the masses. Socialism cannot be built by relying on computers to plan, as the Chinese revi-

sionists, like their Soviet counterparts before them, are now advocating.

Bourgeois-Democrats

In China there was the further particularity that the struggle passed through a long stage of bourgeois-democratic revolution, though of a new type, led by the proletariat and the Communist Party. Inevitably there was a tendency to identify the bourgeois-democratic program at that stage with the ideology of the Party—though this was combated by Mao and others. Thus, as noted before, the phenomenon of people, in particular leading Party members, who were revolutionaries in the new-democratic stage but did not make a radical rupture with bourgeois ideology, and went from being bourgeois-democrats to capitalist-roaders—this was a big phenomenon in the Chinese revolution, as Mao stressed many times.

Again, all this came to a head with the Cultural Revolution. Mao kept trying to win over his old comrades. He got some to go along, and more than a few to go along for a while. But, especially with the Lin Piao affair, the growing Soviet threat and certain economic difficulties, most of these people turned against the Cultural Revolution and its achievements. Especially recognizing this problem, Mao put a lot of stress on training revolutionary successors, both at the highest level of the Party—with the Four as the leading core—and on all levels, especially among the masses on the basic level. And despite the temporary reversal in China, this effort will bear fruit in the

future, because, especially through the Cultural Revolution, literally tens of millions of people had their class consciousness raised to a degree unprecedented in the history of socialism.

The Cultural Revolution was a leap forward for the international working class, it was not a gimmick. But it was itself a completely "new thing" in the history of socialism and therefore was bound to encounter difficulties, incur new problems and engender new contradictions—and meet stiff resistance. Mao insisted, even after the Lin Piao affair and in the face of the Soviet danger, that the Cultural Revolution and its gains must be upheld and carried forward, though not through the form of mass upheaval characteristic of its first years. More and more old leaders and some new upstarts who had risen to positions of authority and taken to the bourgeois style of life, as Mao said, sharply opposed this. They raised its problems, shortcomings and even the resistance they were whipping up to it, in an attempt to kill it and reverse the whole direction of society. In the last few years the focal point of the struggle was exactly how to evaluate and what stand to take toward the Cultural Revolution and the breakthroughs and transformations it had brought about. To uphold and build on these achievements, to continue the revolution, or to "return to the beaten track," which experience has shown is the well-worn path leading back to capitalism?

Not only the Lin Piao affair and the Soviet threat to China but certain setbacks in the international struggle and some successes by the So-

viets in infiltrating, subverting and turning to their own ends revolutionary struggles in certain areas—this too strengthened the Right in China. They seized on it as an excuse not to support revolutionary struggles and to rely instead on U.S. imperialism and its bloc, which in turn actually strengthened the Soviets with regard to revolutionary movements—and so a kind of vicious circle effect operated. The Right would again seize on this in a circular argument to say—see, we can't rely on the masses in other countries—nor in China itself—we have to rely on imperialists and reactionary heads of state in the "Third World" and bourgeois and petty bourgeois elements in our own country to stand up to the Soviet danger. All this has much to do with why the Right was so strong and why it won the last round.

Immediate Causes

But, as far as can be determined now, what were the immediate causes of this defeat?

First, in answering this, I want to speak to what we regard as a seriously erroneous approach: to say that, since they lost, the Four, and Mao, must have made serious mistakes and that's the main thing to look for. Of course, we should investigate and sum up what errors the revolutionaries may have made, but the attitude that "if they lost they must have made serious mistakes" is in fact just pragmatism and assumes that if they had done everything right, they could not have possibly lost. As opposed to this, Mao himself pointed out that in social

struggles often the forces of the advanced class suffer defeat not because their ideas are incorrect but because in the balance of forces at the time they are not as powerful as the reactionaries and so they are temporarily defeated, though they are bound to triumph in the long run.

In other words, continuing the revolution means just that, it means a class struggle. The Cultural *Revolution* was exactly that—a class struggle against tremendously powerful forces of reactionary opposition, most importantly a powerful bourgeois headquarters in the Party. In a class struggle, there is and can be no guarantee that you will win every battle, even every major battle—or else it's not really a struggle, it's all settled.

It is quite interesting that some people seize on this defeat to say that Mao's line and the Cultural Revolution must be basically flawed—this amounts to saying that because Mao is proven correct and farsighted, in saying the danger of capitalist restoration is real and will be for a long time, then this proves that he was wrong and must have made serious errors! No, the Cultural Revolution was indeed absolutely necessary and most timely as Mao said, but as he also said there is still the danger of defeat and there will be for some time. One victory, even a monumental one, does not change that or lessen the danger.

On the other hand, there is legitimately the question of why the proletariat lost power and the bourgeoisie triumphed in China.

It is important to grasp that, essentially from the time that Lin Piao completely turned traitor,

the Left was on the defensive and though it fought back and gained some initiative, especially as things came to a head toward the end, it was still largely fighting uphill. Why? There are several factors we can identify now.

One is that the whole Lin Piao affair and its traumatic effects made it much more difficult to carry out political movements and revolutionization in the military. There were hardly any 3 in 1 combinations—leading bodies of rank and file soldiers, officers and Party members—actually implemented in the armed forces, for example. And, especially in recent years, the practice—which Mao insisted on as of great importance—of officers operating for periods of time as regular rank and file soldiers, was not widely applied or was made a meaningless formality. These are obviously decisive points, for the army still exists as something of a “special armed body” even in socialist countries, and if it becomes divorced from the masses and under the command of an incorrect line and revisionist leadership then, in effect, its guns are in the hands of the bourgeoisie and not the proletariat. And this will be true regardless of whether the army is called the “People's Liberation Army,” the “Red Army” or what have you. This is exactly what ended up happening in the People's Liberation Army in China.

This was linked to the question of the growing Soviet threat, which also greatly increased the difficulty of carrying out revolutionization in the military. It strengthened the tendencies toward “professionalism,” toward making weapons, not

people, decisive, and toward stiff resistance to any "disruptions" within the armed forces which politics would cause.

Struggle Over International Line

Here we must talk again about the international situation and the struggle within the Chinese Party around this. The position of the Right was and is clear: it is the same as we see being implemented now in all its glory. The single task is to defend China and develop it into a modernized power. The danger to China comes from the Soviet Union, so for that reason—and because it has the most advanced technology—we must ally with and depend upon U.S. imperialism and its bloc, including every imperialist and reactionary force in the world that is opposed for any reason whatsoever to the Soviet Union. (As noted before, there are some within the general camp of the Right who want to "patch things up" with the Soviet Union, and the tendency to capitulate to the Soviets will grow, but at present at least that is not the dominant tendency.)

Along with this general line goes the attempt to make China the "superpower of the Third World," an economic and military power able to push its weight around among the less developed countries. In this view, of course, support for revolutionary struggles of the people is not only not necessary, but dangerous and harmful, unless such struggles are directed at and tend to weaken the Soviets and/or unless this Chinese bourgeoisie can gain influence in a particular movement and use it for its own ends. Otherwise,

support for revolutionary struggles will only do harm, messing up relations and upsetting the moves to collaborate with the reactionary forces and governments against which these movements are directed.

Since the time of the fall of Lin Piao and the ascendancy of Chou En-lai, this increasingly became the dominant line overall and, as I said, is in full force now that Mao and the Four cannot offer opposition to it—note in this regard that Hua Kuo-feng's report to the 11th Party Congress in 1977 makes a special point of saying that "revolution cannot be exported" and that China will not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, which is obviously aimed at reassuring the imperialists and the reactionaries in the "Third World" that, despite certain unavoidable revolutionary rhetoric at times, the Chinese rulers will do nothing to aid the people in rising up against these imperialists and other reactionaries.

But what was the opposition of Mao and the Four to this, what was their line on this question? As stated earlier, they agreed to the "opening to the West," but not with the same outlook and objectives as Chou En-lai. Especially with the growing Soviet threat, a realistic assessment did have to be made of the factors in the world influencing developments toward both world war and revolution. It was a plain fact that revolution in the imperialist countries could not be counted on as an immediate prospect, and therefore certain tactical adjustments were necessary. It was correct to identify the Soviet Union as the

main danger to China and to make use of contradictions on that basis, to put the Soviets in a more difficult position to attack China. But at the same time, support must still be given to revolutionary struggles—this is why, apparently in early 1974, Mao again emphasized that not to support the people in such struggles would be to betray Marxism and why, later that year, a major article by the Left included an attack on the revisionist line of reducing aid to revolutionary struggles.

What was the position of the Left specifically with regard to the “Three Worlds” line and the analysis of the Soviet Union as the “main enemy” of the people of the world? First, on the “Three Worlds,” it seems that Mao did make certain statements about “three worlds,” to describe general groupings of countries, but it was only after Mao died that this was elevated to the level of a great strategic theory and line for the international proletariat. And it is also not insignificant that the state Constitution adopted in 1975, while Mao and the Four were around, in discussing China’s role internationally stresses proletarian internationalism and support for the struggles of oppressed nations and peoples and does not mention the “Three Worlds,” while the recent Constitution, adopted after Mao and the Four are out of the picture, makes the “Three Worlds” line the *basis* for “proletarian internationalism” and relations with others in the world.

Further, we are told by the rulers in China today that the Four “cursed” the “Three Worlds”

theory. What all this means, it seems, is that the Four, and Mao, saw this “Three Worlds” analysis as having some tactical value in the immediate period but certainly did not see it as a substitute for class analysis and revolutionary struggle and did not agree that the ruling classes of the “third world” and “second world” and the U.S. should be supported against the people’s struggles.

As for the question of the Soviet Union, Mao and the Four did present the Soviet Union as the “most dangerous source of war” as well as the main danger to China itself. Their analysis of the Soviet Union was similar to that made by Stalin and the Comintern of the fascist imperialist states in the mid-1930s, which were then declared the main enemy. Our Party has criticisms of this line of Stalin and the Comintern, and similarly we do not agree with this kind of analysis that Mao and the Four seemed to be making of the Soviet Union today, but we do not regard either of these positions as revisionist like that of the current rulers in China today.

Hua, Teng, et al., tell us that the Four, “hoisting a most ‘revolutionary’ banner, . . . opposed China’s support to the third world, opposed China’s effort to unite with all forces that can be united, and opposed our dealing blows at the most dangerous enemy.” This can only be taken to mean that the Four—and Mao—fought against the line that in the name of the “Three Worlds” and opposition to Soviet social-imperialism no support should be given to people in the “third world” and “second world” who were struggling

against governments that opposed the Soviet Union.

Mao and the Four also waged sharp struggle against the line that everything, including the class struggle in China, should be subordinated to China's military preparation and defense against the Soviet Union. It is only since Mao's death and the coup that statements like that in *Peking Review* #28 of this year could be broadcast: "To achieve China's modernization at top speed and to continuously strengthen its national defence are the most important and most reliable guarantees that the revolutionary movement of the masses in all countries will in the long run defeat the main enemies of the people throughout the world—the two superpowers." (This is from a statement by a Paraguayan group, quoted in the *Peking Review*.)

In particular, as touched on before, Mao and the Four sharply struggled against the line that the way to deal with the Soviet threat was to "cool out"—that is, suppress—the class struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie at home and to bank everything on "modernization" carried out in a "tranquil" atmosphere. Instead, they pointed out, carrying forward the internal class struggle was the key link with regard to the defense of the country as well, because only a mass mobilization of the people on the basis of a revolutionary line could lead to ultimate victory in a war of resistance, and this could never happen with revisionism in command and the bourgeoisie in power. In line with this, they pointed out that those who preached the dying

out of class struggle at home would actually attack the revolution and would also capitulate to imperialism—this was a major point made in connection with the criticism of the novel *Water Margin* mentioned earlier.

Here Mao had summed up some negative experience from the Soviet Union, leading up to and during World War 2. In the years just before the war Stalin subordinated everything to building up the economic basis for defeating a German invasion. And while crucial victories were won in smashing Nazi agents in the Soviet Union, the class struggle was one-sidedly centered on this. During the war itself, the Soviet army was reconstituted along essentially bourgeois lines. Thus, although the Soviet Union under Stalin's leadership wrote a glorious chapter in history in defeating Germany and in so doing contributed greatly to the international struggle, to a certain extent some of the policies of Stalin in preparing for and carrying out the war unnecessarily weakened the Soviet proletariat in the decisive class struggle within the Soviet Union that followed the war.

Determined to learn from this, Mao insisted that the all-around class struggle against the bourgeoisie in China must continue to take precedence over economic development, even—and especially—in the face of the Soviet threat. And further he recognized that for China, which has a much weaker industrial base than the Soviet Union in the early 1930s, to attempt to base defense on the kind of industrialization policies applied by Stalin in the '30s would actually make

China more vulnerable to subjugation.

On the whole, then, the line that Mao—and the Four—fought for in regard to the question of handling the contradiction between defending China on the one hand, and carrying forward the revolution at home and supporting revolutionary struggle worldwide on the other, was correct. But in dealing with this extremely complex and difficult question, they did make certain errors, in particular that of adopting an analysis of the Soviet Union as the most dangerous source of war, on a basis similar to that on which Stalin declared the fascist states the main enemy during the late 1930s. This error to a certain extent strengthened the revisionists in China, who were—and are—arguing that the Soviet danger to China justifies and requires writing off revolution at home and abroad. This sort of error by revolutionaries has, as pointed out, existed in the international communist movement, going back to the 1930s, and there is a real need to more thoroughly sum it up and criticize it in order to avoid it in the future.

In general, the principal thing with regard to the international situation and its reaction upon the class struggle in China was the fact that the objective situation internationally strengthened the revisionists. Secondarily, errors by the revolutionaries added to the strength of the revisionists.

One of the main ways in which the international situation restricted the freedom of the revolutionaries and the masses, and gave a certain advantage to the Right, was the fact that the increasing danger of world war and of a

Soviet attack on China made it impossible to carry out the class struggle in the last few years through the same kind of mass upheaval that characterized the start of the Cultural Revolution. Thus, although major mass mobilization was required to defeat the revisionists, it had to be somewhat restricted. The revisionists not only seized on the need for relative stability to argue for putting a lid on the class struggle of the proletariat altogether, they also stirred up disruptions themselves and then pointed to these as further proof of the need to impose bourgeois order, cracking down and blaming the Left for the problems.

The Bureaucracy, Intellectuals, etc.

In addition to the immediate international situation, there was a long-term contradiction that asserted itself very sharply in the context of the immediate situation. That is the existence in socialist society of whole strata of bureaucrats, intellectuals, technicians, managerial personnel, etc., whose *spontaneous tendency* is very strongly to become conservative and to want to protect their relatively privileged positions. These forces, especially, fear upheaval and mass struggle, both because it upsets their “regular routine” and “best laid plans” and because they often come in for sharp criticism—and have some of their privileges undermined—when the masses go into motion politically and hit back at bureaucratic practices and abuses and bourgeois tendencies generally. Thus, among these strata, under certain conditions, many can be mobilized by the revisionists

as a social base against the proletariat.

To handle this contradiction and win over the large part of these people, it is necessary to make a class analysis of socialist society in order to clearly distinguish the bourgeoisie under socialism from these essentially petty bourgeois strata. And it is necessary on the basis of such an analysis to adopt concrete policies that enable the proletariat to unite with, utilize and transform these strata.

This is a long-term problem under socialism. You cannot simply overthrow the whole bureaucracy and send every intellectual full time to the factories and fields. And even if you did that, you would just have to put new people in the same positions—and face the same problem once again. The existence of such strata in socialist society is rooted in the material conditions and contradictions of socialism, including remnants of the old division of labor, the difference between mental and manual labor and so on.

In both theory and practice Mao and the Left in China had made important strides in dealing with this problem. They had seriously undertaken the question of analyzing the classes in socialist society—and China in particular. And in practice they had broken new ground in dealing with these contradictions, in narrowing differences and restricting inequalities to the greatest degree possible in accordance with both the material and ideological conditions, and in transforming the world outlook of many intellectuals.

The Cultural Revolution itself and the “new things” forged through it represented a great

stride in dealing with this problem. It had the effect of administering a massive political “shock” to cadre, intellectuals and others who were tending to follow the revisionist line. It made further breakthroughs in narrowing differences, as workers who remained workers were trained as technicians and the masses of workers took part in supervising management, in movements for technical innovation, in study of theory and criticism of revisionism, while “full time” managers, technicians, intellectuals, etc., took part in productive labor as well as political struggle and study together with the masses.

But, of course, this contradiction cannot be overcome in a short time and the Cultural Revolution could not resolve it completely. And, with the zigzag struggles of the last few years, especially following the fall of Lin Piao, with the growing Soviet threat, and with the revisionists “protecting them” and whipping up resentment against the mass movement, a number among these strata tired of all the struggle and turmoil and turned against the revolutionary forces. This also happened among some of the less conscious masses, but it was a marked phenomenon among the intellectuals and especially pronounced among many cadre who, as Chang Chun-chiao said in a speech in the midst of the anti-Teng struggle, feared that the mass movement “might fall on their own heads” and they might “have their official hats revolutionized away”—that is, they feared the criticism of the masses.

Role of Disasters

Had the last battle continued longer, perhaps had the earthquakes not hit then, and especially had Mao lived longer, the mass movement would have gathered more momentum and gained more strength, not only drawing in and solidifying more of the basic masses but, on the strength of this, winning over more of the intellectuals, cadre, etc. But with the Right very strong and immediately strengthened and emboldened by these natural and political disasters—the earthquakes and the death of Mao—they were able to pull off their coup and mobilize a base of support for it. In the final analysis, of course, the class struggle does not hinge on such things as natural disasters and the death of one individual, no matter how great a role he or she may play, but in the short run any particular battle, even a major one, may actually come to hinge on such things.

In particular, Mao's death was obviously an event long-awaited by the revisionists and was immediately a big blow for them and against the Left. This last round of struggle was another major showdown between the proletariat in power and the bourgeoisie seeking to restore capitalism, and in particular between the masses and the proletarian headquarters in the Party on the one hand and the bourgeois headquarters in the Party and the social base it mobilized on the other. Since it was a real class struggle and not a mere academic exercise or bureaucratic shuffling, it was life and death and could be won or lost. Losing its great helmsman in the midst of

this struggle was bound to seriously cripple the proletariat, and the revisionists did not hesitate to strike the finishing blow at that point.

The Class Struggle and Mao's Methods

Some have raised the question: especially since Mao knew he was dying, why didn't he prepare better for this, and in particular why didn't he just throw Teng Hsiao-ping out of the Party, cut off a few heads and settle the question? This completely fails to recognize what was just stressed—that this was a real class struggle, with real and powerful social forces involved, on both sides. First of all, Mao did not have the freedom to just throw Teng out and knock off a few heads; as emphasized several times before, the real freedom of the revolutionaries lies in the conscious struggle of the masses. Without that, revisionism is indeed bound to triumph.

And, related to this, even if Mao could have utilized his personal prestige to get rid of Teng Hsiao-ping or even several Teng Hsiao-pings, it would be very dangerous to depend on that. What happens then after Mao is gone and new Teng Hsiao-pings arise, as they inevitably will—who then will have the prestige and authority to get rid of them? And how will the masses be able to determine if the good guys are getting rid of the bad guys or *vice versa*—after all Chou En-lai, Teng Hsiao-ping and a number of other top leaders of the Right have great prestige among certain sections of society and even among sections of the basic masses.

Mao was by no means "lenient" toward coun-

ter-revolutionaries, he was ruthless toward them, but he was also ruthlessly scientific. As he had summed up as early as 1967, only by arousing the masses to deal with this problem in an all-around way and from below could the means be developed to solve it, and if battles might be lost and a temporary setback suffered, then at least, as compared to the Soviet Union, the masses will be in a far stronger position politically to grasp what has happened and why, to sum it up and develop the methods of struggle and the new leadership necessary to fight against and finally overturn this defeat.

Some people say, in essence: What's the problem, you have state power, why should it be so difficult, just smash the enemy and keep moving on. But who is "you" who has state power? "You" divides into two: there are two classes inside the Party and inevitably bourgeois headquarters will repeatedly gather their forces and jump out for a trial of strength with the proletariat.

Mao was wrong to allow this, some say. But he did not "allow" it—or "disallow" it. It is an objective law, independent of Mao's will—or *anyone else's*, for that matter. It stems from the contradictions of socialist society and of the Party as the leading force in that society. It is rooted in the material (and ideological) conditions of socialism and will remain in force throughout the socialist period, until the material and ideological conditions for communism have been achieved. This does not mean that the proletariat simply "accepts" the existence and actions of the bourgeoisie in the Party. Revolutionaries must identify

and fight against the capitalist-roaders and fight to maintain the proletarian character and leading role of the Party. But this cannot change the fact that the capitalist-roaders will constantly emerge and repeatedly form bourgeois headquarters in the Party, particularly at its top levels. This kind of struggle has gone on and will continue to go on in every Marxist-Leninist party; the great thing about the experience of the Chinese Communist Party is that, exactly because of Mao's line and leadership, the terms of these struggles can be grasped broadly and the appropriate lessons drawn from them.

Mao summed up this law and developed the basic means for dealing with it. The result was the basic line of continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the Cultural Revolution. The Cultural Revolution was indeed absolutely necessary and most timely, and it has universal significance. But it was also the first time that something like this had been done, and it is not surprising and should not be demoralizing or disorienting to revolutionaries if, after initial great victories, it was reversed. The experience of the Cultural Revolution, like everything else, must be summed up, but this can only be correctly done by upholding it and drawing lessons from the struggle on this basis. And it can only be correctly done by upholding and applying Marxism-Leninism, *Mao Tsetung Thought*, and *never* by denying or downgrading Mao's immortal contributions.

The Cultural Revolution was the highest pinnacle yet achieved by the proletariat. The pro-

letarian movement, like everything else in the world, develops in spirals, and since the proletariat is the rising class, it is bound to advance, through this spiral, from the lower to the higher level. The material conditions and the laws of society dictate that socialism and ultimately communism are inevitable, and no setbacks can change that historical inevitability. In the last 100 years or so, from the Paris Commune to the Soviet Union to socialist China and the Cultural Revolution, the proletariat has continued to ascend to still greater heights and win still greater victories, despite temporary setbacks and reversals. As Mao Tsetung said: "The future is bright; the road is tortuous."

Today's Situation, Mao's Legacy

Today, huge storms are gathering, the basic contradictions in the world are sharpening. The factors for both world war and revolution are growing. In our Party's view, if revolution in the two superpowers does not prevent world war, then the contention between the superpowers will lead to world war—very likely within the next ten years. What must be done, then?

We must always work for revolution, even when the prospects for revolution may not be immediately apparent. We must unite with and lead the masses of people in waging struggle now against this imperialist system and all of its evils and in every way it oppresses the people, but in today's struggles we must always work to prepare the masses and the revolutionary ranks to seize the time when the conditions for revolution

do develop in the future. We must be prepared for dramatic and sudden changes in the situation so as not to lose our bearings or miss the opportunity, whether it comes sooner or later. We must fight in unity with the working class and oppressed peoples of the world and especially oppose our own ruling class, U.S. imperialism's attempts to dominate, exploit and oppress other nations and peoples, while also exposing and opposing Soviet social-imperialism and its agents and front-men. We must build struggle against war preparations, but if war breaks out—and this is quite likely to happen before a revolutionary situation develops—then we must work to turn that imperialist war into something else in this country—a war of the masses against the imperialists and for revolution and socialism, for this is the only war that will be in their interests. War, like the other evils of imperialism, can only be eliminated with the elimination of imperialism and all reactionary class forces; the possibility of war can only be ended with the ending of classes and the achievement of communism. This is a serious matter and must be undertaken seriously. To do that we must firmly base ourselves on the fundamental interests of the working class and the broad masses here and worldwide and the long-term goals of the revolution, not on temporary and superficial phenomena and narrow, partial and immediate "results." We must have a scientific, not a utopian or subjective, method and approach.

None of this, needless to say, will be easy. It is never easy to take and remain on the revolution-

ary road. But all easy roads lead only backward; we must determine to take the hard, high road of revolution.

In this we can draw great inspiration and illumination from Mao Tsetung and his revolutionary legacy and from the example of those who fought to uphold his line and proletarian rule in China. Correctly understanding and summing up the unprecedented achievements as well as the setback of the Chinese revolution, refusing to embrace revisionism and capitulate to reaction or turn from the forward direction, deepening our grasp of the immortal contributions of Mao Tsetung and his enrichment of the science of Marxism-Leninism and applying this to the situation before us—this is the road which, however tortuous, leads to the bright future. In this way, and only in this way, in the trials and upheavals ahead can we become tempered, transform difficulty into opportunity, adversity into advance. There is much to be done—and a world to win!

With all this in mind, I would like to end with the same words with which I concluded a speech at a memorial for Mao Tsetung two years ago, at the time of his death, and less than a month before the counter-revolutionary coup:

“Yes, [even where socialism has been achieved] there can be temporary setbacks. Until these differences—between mental and manual work, between the more backward countryside and the more developed cities, between the workers in the cities and the working people in the countryside, until these differences and wage dif-

ferentials—until those things are eliminated; until the political consciousness, knowledge and skill of people in society are raised to a whole new level, and knowledge and skills cannot be monopolized by individuals or small groups of people; until we get society to the point where goods can be produced quickly in great abundance and only a small amount of time has to be spent in producing the basic things that people need to live and providing for further development, and a great part of the time can be spent in education and culture and raising the political consciousness and the grasp of the masses of people of the science that can show them how to change the world; until all that has been accomplished, yes, the possibility of a new class of exploiters arising and turning things back does exist. But it is not inevitable.

“What is inevitable is that people will continue to fight back against their oppression and exploitation, that this system of capitalism is not here to stay, or eternal... and that the very development of capitalism... has drawn together as capitalism’s gravedigger a mighty army [of the working class]. . . .

“So when they raise the question, who will be Mao Tsetung’s successors, the working class is ready with its answer: *We* will be Mao Tsetung’s successors, in our millions and hundreds of millions, and we will continue the cause for which he fought and in which he led us and to which he devoted his entire life, until that great goal of eliminating exploitation and oppression and achieving communism has finally been achieved. *This*

is the greatest tribute that we can pay to Mao Tsetung, and it's a cause which the working class today and our children and our children's children and theirs beyond them will carry forward."

Questions and Answers

What role did the masses have besides carrying banners and following Mao? You make it out like Mao was everything, the real hero. How could a handful of revisionists stage a coup d'etat if the masses are the makers of history?

Well, it seems to me that what we had in China, as I tried to say, was a real class struggle, with different forces. The masses are not simply one undifferentiated whole. There are different class forces and different strata in socialist society, some of them occupying a more privileged position, and some of them tending to support the kind of thing that's gone on in China unless the kind of mass movement can be developed that can win over many of them.

I think the key thing to get out of this question is the role of leaders. Because there seems to be a kind of a thread running through this question, that by putting so much emphasis on leading people we are denying the role of the masses. But

(Slightly edited from the transcript of answers given by Comrade Avakian during the question period at the West Coast meeting.)

what I tried to say throughout was, first of all, that all these struggles between leading people are inevitably a reflection and a concentration of the class struggle going on in society as a whole, between different class forces.

But all class forces have their leaders who formulate the lines and programs that represent them and lead them in struggling around their own interests. This is true in this country and it's true in every country and will be as long as there are classes and as long as there are political parties and different social formations that lead masses or different groups in struggle. Well, naturally a lot of this comes down on the role of individuals because they are the ones formulating and championing different lines and programs. But, does it make any difference to the masses and what role do they play?

When the masses in Shanghai, for example, put up a poster saying "Be masters of the wharf, not slaves to tonnage," the masses of workers are playing a very direct role. They *are* being led by revolutionary forces and mobilized around a revolutionary line. They are not doing it simply on their own, spontaneously, and we know that spontaneously the masses cannot on their own carry the struggle forward to its final goal, that they do require leadership. On the other hand that leadership, if it is to be real leadership, and revolutionary leadership, has to concentrate and sum up their real interests and demands and their real aspirations, and by applying science project the *real* road forward for them, and not illusory roads which might in the short run seem

to offer some temporary gains but in the long run can only hold back the development of society and can only go against their own interests.

So naturally the role of leaders is going to be a great one, but two things should be stressed. One, the struggle between leading people is a struggle between classes, it's a reflection and concentration of that. And two, different classes and leaders of different classes have different methods for carrying out this struggle. For example, as I said several times, the method of the Right was to try to grab hold of organizational positions and to unleash a social base of more privileged people. Whereas the leaders of the Left—the proletarians, the revolutionaries in leadership—their strength, their power, could only lie in mobilizing, politically arming and activating the masses themselves to carry out the struggle. These things that I'm describing, these line struggles over what kind of rules and regulations to have in factories, over what kind of policies to have in education, all these things were not just battled out in articles back and forth, but these reflected and concentrated and gave direction to *very* intense struggle that was going on throughout *all* these institutions, where the masses were carrying out very sharp struggle.

Interestingly this question came up in China itself during the height of the struggle against Teng Hsiao-ping. In a speech that he gave, Chang Chun-chiao said, some people say this struggle is only a desire for power. He said, we told this to Mao Tsetung and Mao Tsetung said, "What is desire for power? The proletariat has

the proletarian desire for power and will never share a bit of its acquired power with the bourgeoisie. What is the bourgeoisie's desire for power? It is that they will never give a bit to the proletariat. We have learned it from them, but we learned it better." Mao also said, "Tell them our power is given by the workers, peasants and soldiers, is given by the broad masses of people who occupy more than ninety per cent of the populace. The Communist Party will, for the existence of this political power, exercise dictatorship over those who oppose [our] seizing power, never wavering."

Let's get to the second part of the question: "How can a handful of revisionists stage a *coup d'état* if the masses are the makers of history?" Well, the same question could be asked: If the masses are the makers of history, how is it that capitalism survives anywhere in the world today? Obviously it does, and we have to face up to that fact. That does not change the fact that in the long run capitalism is a doomed system and that it will be the masses themselves who will rise up and wipe it off the face of the earth. But in the short run the capitalists—not the working class—still control most of the world. The strength of international capital, the way in which the international situation affects the situation in particular socialist countries—all this has great reaction upon the situation in the socialist countries. There can be difficulties and setbacks in carrying forward the class struggle in a particular country. Especially, as I said, if the army comes under the leadership of bourgeois elements, in the

short run it is possible for the revisionists to pull off a coup. If that were not the case, then things indeed would be very simple. All we'd have to do is go around and say, "The masses are the makers of history," and there could not possibly be any setbacks or reversals, and socialism was bound to happen the day before yesterday. Unfortunately it's not that simple.

The fact that the masses are the makers of history does not deny the fact that in their struggles there can be reversals and setbacks, and certainly does not deny the fact that they need revolutionary leadership, which points out to them what they *cannot* see on their own and spontaneously, their real revolutionary interests, and which on that basis leads them forward in conscious struggle to transform the world themselves.

And since it is as I said a conscious struggle, and since the bourgeoisie exists and has real power and real material strength in China and even more so internationally, it could in the short run pull off a coup despite the fact that strategically and historically speaking the masses remain the makers of history and remain in fact the soil and roots out of which the revolutionary leaders themselves develop. But, in turn, those leaders do react upon and have a great role in the struggle at certain points.

What is your opinion on the recent Albanian Party letter to China and its comments about unprincipled struggle and the factional character of the Cultural Revolution and its remarks about Mao's policy of "let a hundred flowers blossom"?

We consider Albania to be a socialist country. In the dispute with the present rulers of China over the stopping of Chinese aid to Albania we believe the entire responsibility lies with the present revisionist rulers of China and their great power chauvinism. But we strongly disagree with the whole thrust of this letter from the Albanian Party which was sent in late July to the Chinese Party.

We disagree with the letter first of all because it does not clearly draw any distinction—does not draw any clear distinction—between the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party under Mao Tsetung and the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and the way it has acted toward Albania, which is fundamentally different, since the revisionist coup in October of 1976. This is one fundamental point.

In fact the letter and its whole thrust goes against the very statements that the Albanians themselves made in praise of the Cultural Revolution and in praise of Mao Tsetung's leadership as late as 1973 and even, in somewhat more muted form but in clear form, as late as November 1976.

Now, on the question of any unprincipled and factional character of the Cultural Revolution,

I think I spoke to that at length. The point here is—and it's a point that will be faced and is faced by every Party in power—that the growth of revisionists, the growth of people in the Party who adopt the bourgeois way of looking at the world and of doing things, their growing strength and influence in the Party, is what made necessary, and what will continue to make necessary, things like the Cultural Revolution.

It is not because Mao decided to become lenient or allow factions or undisciplined behavior that all this has happened since October of 1976. It's just the opposite way around. The Cultural Revolution was *necessary* because the bourgeoisie had gained tremendous strength in the Party, and if the masses themselves were not aroused, as Mao said, to expose the dark aspect of the Party and the socialist state openly and from below and to struggle against it, then China would have been "silently" and "peacefully" taken down the capitalist road right at that time. And this is one of the tremendous achievements of the Cultural Revolution, that it not only beat that back but provided, as Mao said, a form and a method.

Now any form and any method, no matter how great its achievements, cannot be perfect when it first comes into being, and it has to undergo a process of growth and development. But it certainly can and must be upheld. Generally I think that what runs through a certain kind of attitude and gets reflected in the Albanian letter is the kind of thinking, which can only be described as metaphysical and idealist, that somehow fac-

tions develop in the party because somebody, I guess Mao, is too liberal and allows this to happen—instead of the materialist and dialectical understanding that especially in socialist society factions develop in the party because of different class forces that operate within the party and that will continue to operate within the party.

Of course, Mao said that there were three basic principles for how Party members ought to act. They should practice Marxism and not revisionism, they should be for unity and not for splits, and they should be open and aboveboard and not go in for intrigues and conspiracy. And of course the revolutionaries uphold these things. But can we expect that the bourgeoisie and capitalist-roaders within the party are going to practice Marxism, and not revisionism? Can we expect that they are going to unite and not split? Can we expect that, knowing that their line cannot stand up in an open political struggle, they're going to be open and aboveboard and they're not going to go in for intrigues and conspiracy? This is extremely naive and foolish. I think that this is what lies behind a view that Mao somehow caused the whole thing because he allowed for struggle, because he saw that struggle was necessary to root out these people. This is putting the cart before the horse and reversing cause and effect and will end you up only in a very confused, and one might even say dangerous, situation.

Frankly, I find it kind of ironic. We went around putting up these posters for the Mao Tsetung Memorial all over the country—more

than a hundred thousand—and there were these little tinhorn petty reactionaries that followed us around, and sometimes they put things up that said, “Mao Tsetung, Butcher of 26,300,000 people,” which is apparently a figure they got by adding up all the people that died in China since Mao was born. But in any case, it has always been the line of the reactionaries that Mao was brutal, and that he suppressed and killed people wantonly and so on and so forth.

In fact, the name of the ancient Chinese emperor who unified China, Chin Shih Huang, was used to refer to Mao, especially by Mao's enemies, because Chin Shih Huang brutally suppressed the reactionaries of his time. He took all the books of the Confucian scholars and burned them in a public place and buried alive Confucian scholars.

This is the way the reactionaries always referred to Mao, as being a very brutal tyrant and so on. Mao had a response to them, as I said earlier. He told them: Look, we learned dictatorship from the reactionary classes, but we learned it better. Only one difference—ours is dictatorship in the interest of the great majority, not of exploiters, and in the interest of eventually eliminating classes, not of upholding minority class rule. But Mao said if you want to say that we are too brutal and you want to compare me to Chin Shih Huang, well I have only this to say: Chin Shih Huang only buried 4600 Confucian scholars, we've done far better than that.

Here Mao's point was not one of being blood-thirsty, but that all previous classes that came to

power—whether it was the feudal class replacing the slaveowning class or what have you—all these classes were not able to thoroughly suppress the class that they had overthrown and the system that they had replaced because after all they were exploiters themselves and couldn't rely on and mobilize the masses. And this again is the key to everything that Mao did—exercising dictatorship over the reactionaries and suppressing them, Mao said, depends on politically arming, mobilizing and relying on the masses. And that's what Mao did, and never in the world was he lenient against counter-revolutionaries.

As for the question of "let a hundred flowers blossom," that's a very long discussion. It had both some immediate purposes and some longer term purposes. Mao put this forward, first of all, as a policy with regard to science and the arts, which was to let one hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend. He was very specific that within this contending and blossoming certain criteria had to be adhered to: namely you had to uphold socialism, the leading role of the Party and so on. He didn't say any old idea goes and capitalism is as good as socialism. He was not, after all, Teng Hsiao-ping.

But, in 1957 when he issued this policy, there was also an immediate problem that Mao was trying to deal with, and I think on the whole dealt with quite well. And that is that in Hungary, Poland and other places, both because the reactionaries were stirring up trouble, but *also* because of bureaucratic errors and defects in the parties and states in those countries, there

were pretty widespread revolts against the socialist state. It is not sufficient to say that it was all simply due to the reactionaries.

Mao posed the question, why were the reactionaries able to find a certain hearing, a certain following, a certain social base among even sections of the masses? And he said we have to single out and deal with two different kinds of contradictions: 1) between the people and the reactionaries, or the people and the enemy, which are antagonistic and have to be dealt with by dictatorship, by antagonistic means, and 2) those contradictions that arise among the broad masses which are not antagonistic and have to be dealt with by non-antagonistic methods, through struggle, through political discussion, through argumentation, through battling out what is right and wrong and not through arms or through exercising dictatorship by one clique over another.

And in this I think Mao was quite correct, and handled the situation quite well. Although in 1957 the rightists from the bourgeoisie did jump out and have a trial of strength with the proletariat, they were not able to create the kind of situation that occurred in Hungary and some other countries. They were relatively quickly put down with the broad support of the masses as a whole. And I think this was due to Mao's correct policies.

You see, one other thing that Mao was also doing was drawing out the counter-revolutionaries at that time. One of the things that Mao understood was that you can push these things

underground, but if they're underground they're going to come out in one form or another. At that particular time, his feeling was that since the counter-revolutionaries want to attack us, the best thing to do is to let them come out, openly attack us so that we can arm the masses with what their real program is, show how they favor the restoration of the old order, and therefore mobilize the masses to strike them down. And that's exactly what was done, and that's why those people were *not* able to make the same kind of trouble on such a scale and draw on as many of the masses as they were in Hungary and other countries.

So this was both a longer term policy with regard to the arts and sciences, but also there were some particular tactical considerations that Mao was acutely dealing with at that time. In general, however, and throughout, Mao *always* insisted that there were certain criteria that had to be met. But what he was saying was we can't just hammer always on the same theme, the same idea, the same two people, the same two flowers and one brocade and so on and so forth; we have to allow for creativity. But it has to be *guided* by a proletarian line, and *bourgeois* ideas and *reactionary* things do have to be dictated against and driven off the stage, as in fact Mao and the Four led in doing.

If the revisionist coup was, as you claim, not due to the errors of the Left, does this mean that given the material basis for the Right to whip up such a wind, given the balance of class forces, that revisionism in China, this temporary setback, was basically inevitable?

No. But I think it was a real class struggle, there were real things that influenced it. Inevitable means bound to happen. It was not bound to happen, if certain things had gone other ways, this particular battle might have gone another way. I pointed to a couple of things that happened all in rapid succession, such as earthquakes, and Mao's death in particular, which didn't help. Now even with those things there are many other factors in this particular battle which I'm sure we don't understand, but it would be wrong to say that it was inevitable. On the other hand I think it's an even greater danger, as far as what exists out there generally among people trying to sum this up, to think the opposite—that really there wasn't much real danger and that if the proletarian forces had just done everything right they would have been quite easily able to put down the Right.

No, I think both of those are wrong. It was not inevitable. The Right was powerful, they engaged in a trial of strength, and due to a number of factors, some of which we can identify now and some of which we have to study more and some of which we may *never* be able to completely identify, they were able to carry the day in that particular battle. That doesn't mean that it was

inevitable, however. I think everyone here who's been involved in any kind of struggle knows that you go into these struggles and some you win and some you lose. You can look back and sum up your errors and sum up the objective reasons why you won or lost, and what advances you made and what setbacks you suffered. Still, you can see from your own experience in those battles that it's wrong to say—at least in *some* cases—that you were inevitably going to lose. This *may* be the case in certain battles. Marx predicted rather easily or quickly that the Paris Commune was almost certainly going to lose in 1871. He still supported it, as Mao pointed out, because he was not a narrow thinker and an economist. But nevertheless he was able to see in advance that, owing to the objective conditions and the strength of the contending forces, the proletariat was likely to lose. I think it was not possible to predict this with such certainty in this latest battle, but it did turn out that way and we should go deeper in summing up the reasons why.

Why does China maintain hostility to the Soviet Union? Since they are both revisionist, why not reconcile?

That's an argument that I'm sure is being made very forcefully by some leaders in China right now. But, after all revisionists are revisionists and revolutionaries are revolutionaries; the bourgeoisie is the bourgeoisie and the proletariat is the proletariat. If those were both

countries ruled by revolutionary forces and ruled by the proletariat, then there would be no reason for them to be at odds. But one of the things we know about the bourgeoisie and its whole mode of existence—its way of anarchy, competition, rivalry and so on—is that bourgeoisies don't tend to get along. And this is something that we have to understand: They tend to have conflicting interests, they tend to want to grab up the same areas, and this can be seen by comparing any bourgeoisies in the world.

After all, the same question might be asked, since the U.S. and the Soviets are both bourgeois, why don't they make up? But you see it's not quite that simple, because the bourgeoisie is driven by certain laws. Now there is the historical tendency in China, which in the past was not an imperialist country, but rather a country dominated by imperialism and held back by feudalism, there *is* a tendency for its bourgeoisie to go under the wing of and capitulate to one or the other imperialism. Right now, that's mainly taking the form of capitulating to and depending on the West, but it is quite possible in the future that will be replaced by a policy of capitulating to the Soviets. This will grow, especially as these grand plans of standing up to the Soviets and fighting them tank for tank, if actually implemented, prove to be a disaster, as in fact they will. So I think we have to understand that bourgeoisies tend to have rivalries, and the rivalry between the bourgeoisie ruling in China and that in the Soviet Union is in the nature of bourgeois national conflicts.

However, given the historical weakness of China under the old system, its historical tendency to be dominated by imperialism, there still might be a tendency for revisionists in China representing the bourgeoisie there and being incapable of standing up on bourgeois terms to the Soviet Union, to capitulate to it in the future. And they certainly could find a lot of ideological trapping for that because many of the policies, as well as the basic outlook of course, are the same. It's very difficult to conceive how they would write a book in China now about how the Soviet Union has restored capitalism, since it would be actually describing the things presently going on in China itself.

Why do you uphold Stalin as a great Marxist-Leninist even though he, as does Hua today, pushed the dying-out-of-class-struggle line?

I think this has to do with the question of things developing in spirals. That is, Stalin made a number of errors, but they were exactly that. They were errors owing largely to the fact that Stalin, in leading the Soviet Union, was taking on a completely unprecedented task. This was the first socialist country. It was the first state (leaving aside the Paris Commune that did not last very long, and was not really a socialist state). It was the first country where the working class took the reins of power and embarked on the course of completely remaking society.

That was very likely to give rise to many errors, and in Stalin's case it did. Some of these we

can attribute to the objective conditions and to the fact that there was no historical precedent. Some of them can be attributed to errors in Stalin's method. But nevertheless, insofar as Stalin recognized, and to a large degree he did, attempts to restore capitalism—insofar as he recognized attempts to reverse the whole process of building socialism in the Soviet Union—he resolutely opposed that and resolutely suppressed those who tried to do it. Therefore Stalin should be upheld.

However, as I said, history develops in spirals. To go back and repeat what has been summed up before as erroneous, is not simply to make the same error, but is in fact to practice revisionism. Hua Kuo-feng's policies are much worse than Stalin's *ever* were. But for Hua Kuo-feng even to promote some policies today that are in some way similar to Stalin's is not the same thing as for Stalin to have done them then. In Stalin's time things were not known better. To do those things didn't mean *consciously rejecting* what had been learned and summed up and therefore consciously taking the counter-revolutionary road. For Hua Kuo-feng to repeat certain erroneous policies today means exactly that.

Why did Revolution [the organ of the Central Committee of the Revolutionary Communist Party] say that Chou En-lai was a revolutionary all his life when he died? In other words, why did you write an article praising Chou En-lai in January of 1976 when Chou En-lai died?

I would say that there were two basic reasons for that. One is that there was a certain amount of ignorance on the part of the Party as a whole. Second, as I think is known to many people, there was a very sharp struggle going back a number of years within our Party over the question of China and how to evaluate it. Although that had not then come to a head, since the revisionists had not pulled off their coup in China, still there were coming more and more clearly out of China different lines and different tendencies representing different class forces. And this was reflected inside our own Party, with people representing different kinds of tendencies and political programs and generally being more or less supportive of different people in China. So that, for example, people who wanted to push a line of forget about revolution here and just go for the most narrow things in our own Party also looked to people like Chou En-lai, in their own words, as a "model communist."

I think on the other hand, at that time the Party as a whole, including those of us who did not support the revisionist coup in China and who continue to support revolutionaries and revolutionary struggle there, was not as clear then, obviously, as we are now about the events in China.

The struggle in China was coming to a head at that point, the role of Chou En-lai was not very clear to us, we had not thoroughly studied it, we were hopeful that in fact Chou En-lai was playing a good role in that struggle because it would mean that the revolutionary forces were a lot stronger. Some of us were quite upset and worried when Mao did not in fact make any statements in support of Chou En-lai. He did not even make an appearance at the place where Chou En-lai's body was lying in state (incidentally in a hospital, which as I said was a very strange and low-key way for him to be commemorated). Mao did nothing during all that time to indicate any support or that he stood with Chou En-lai in the struggle that was obviously sharpening up. All this was disturbing and thought-provoking to us, but at that time we did not have in the Party an understanding of the role of Chou En-lai, we did not have unity around that, we did not understand that he was in fact the main backer of the revisionists who have now pulled off the coup in China. Given that lack of knowledge about this, *not* to have said anything in favor of Chou En-lai when he was in fact being commemorated by the Chinese Party would have been making a very strong statement without a sufficient basis. Therefore we praised him and upheld him as was done in China.

Now at this time, we obviously have to repudiate that statement and we have to say that in the future, in regard to struggles in other countries and other parties, we have to try to be more vigilant and try to understand better the

different forces. But, at the same time, it should be realized that no one (I'm sure this was true of many people in China and certainly was true of us) is going to *fully* understand the role especially of particular *individuals* in a struggle. We did follow closely the line struggle in China, we had a rather clear understanding and put our support clearly to the revolutionary line in China. That line, it has become very clear, was supported and championed by the Four along with Mao. We opposed the *line* that we now understand to have been championed not only by Teng Hsiao-ping, who we had strong feelings about at that time, but also by Chou En-lai.

On the *line* questions, which is what you can get your hands on most fully and bite your teeth into, we took I think a clear position and studied and paid attention to those closely. But the role of particular individuals is not always immediately so evident as the role of different lines. And when it became apparent to us that Chou En-lai had played the role he did, then we struggled within our Party to reverse our stand on what his role had been and to arm our own members and others with a correct understanding of it, and will certainly continue to do so. I think that's the method that people have to take toward these extremely complex problems.

The present rulers claim that the Four were opposing the "Theory of the Three Worlds." Do you think that on foreign policy the Four completely opposed this theory or not? Is there any indication of who were the instigators of the foreign policy of siding with the junta in Chile, Marcos in the Philippines and in general the governments in power in most countries?

Well, I'll try to answer it as best as I can. I think on the question of the Three Worlds, did they completely oppose it? No, I don't think—from what I've been able to read and what our Party has been able to determine—that they *completely* opposed it. As I think I said in my remarks, they regarded it as having some tactical value, but they certainly did oppose the whole thrust and what the Three Worlds thing stands for as it's being applied by the revisionist rulers of China now and as it stands in the world today. Theirs is the whole line of selling out revolution, capitulating to imperialism and going down on your knees to every reactionary and two-bit puppet that comes along in the service of U.S. imperialism. I think the Four were very definitely opposed to that, and I think that's what it means when the present leadership says that they cursed the Three Worlds and opposed uniting everybody that could be united against the Soviet Union.

As for who was responsible for the policies concerning the junta in Chile and Marcos in the Philippines, I would say that in general the line that would lead to those things and who was

responsible for it was most definitely Chou En-lai and the people represented by him. Here I would like to speak to a question that was not raised, but I'll raise it. In the early 1970s we put out (that is, the Revolutionary Union, which was the forerunner and the main group in forming our Party, the Revolutionary Communist Party, put out) a pamphlet which explained Chinese foreign policy on a number of questions. This included for example Bangladesh, where the Chinese position at that time was highly unpopular among many people, although I believe it was in the main correct. However, there were some things which were upheld and defended in that pamphlet which I believe our Party is going to have to review in light of everything that we've learned and what's gone on to see whether or not they were part of a whole general right-wing trend and a whole revisionist tendency that was taking hold, although not fully triumphant yet, in the Chinese foreign policy.

In particular some things were done in relation to Sri Lanka (Ceylon), where there was an upsurge of students and some other people that was put down by the government. Now whether or not that particular upsurge should have been supported is one thing, but the fact that Chou En-lai felt it was necessary to send a telegram of congratulations to the government of Madame Bandaranaike that put down this movement is something that I *don't* think revolutionaries could approve of or support. And I think that in general this policy of throwing out revolution and doing anything to get along with such lead-

ers like Pinochet in Chile and Marcos in the Philippines is definitely the policy of the people in power now and it's laid out very clearly and blatantly by Teng Hsiao-ping. After all his line is wipe out revolution in China. His line is that "economic development" is what matters and not politics and not revolutionary struggle; therefore of course he will apply that line not only in China but to the world as a whole.

One thing about Teng Hsiao-ping's speech in 1974 at the U.N. that's very significant and should be noted here is that at the end he puts on this whole song and dance about how in the future if China should become a superpower everybody should oppose it. This is a surefire tip-off that that is what he was up to. That's like the thief crying, "there's no stolen goods here!" But, anyway, during that speech Teng Hsiao-ping says: What is a superpower? He says if capitalism is restored in a big socialist country it will become a superpower. Now, as our Party has pointed out, this was actually wishful thinking on Teng Hsiao-ping's part. He was hoping that if he was able to restore capitalism in China it would become a superpower and it could push its way around in the world. I think that Teng Hsiao-ping in particular and the people in power there now in general are responsible for this cynical line of paying no attention to the struggle of the masses and of promoting this idea of China as the kingpin of the third world in order to make certain economic deals and to push their weight around. After all, if they're going to push their weight around with their *socialist* former

ally Albania, how are they going to treat any other countries any better than that? And I think the main blame for that definitely has to be laid at their doorstep and exposed for the rotten stinking reaction that it is.


Why did Mao meet with Nixon and Ford?

I think that the answer to that is fairly simple, that again it was part of this general policy which Mao came to support of doing a certain amount of meeting with and coming to certain agreement with people in the West, as part of the general analysis that Mao had made that the Soviet Union had become the main danger to China and that therefore certain dealings were necessary with the West in order to keep the Soviet Union off balance and to keep general turmoil so it would be more difficult for the Soviets to attack China—this was behind Mao's meeting with Nixon and also with Ford.

I also feel it should be strongly stated that Mao Tsetung continued, and in this I feel fully confident, and those who stood with him continued to stand by the statement that Mao made in 1946, at a time when the Soviet Union was doing similar things coming off of World War 2. That is, the Soviet Union was continuing to have certain agreements, making certain compromises and making certain arrangements with France, England, the United States and so on. And at that time Mao very emphatically opposed those in the communist movement who said that because the Soviet Union was doing that,

therefore people all over the world and even in China should lay down their arms, give up their struggle and *also* make compromises and concessions and in fact capitulate to the imperialists like Britain, the United States and France. The people, Mao said, should continue to carry forward their revolutionary struggle in accordance with their own conditions. And this I believe is the firm and resolute stand and support by Mao and the Four and others who stood with him in support of the revolutionary struggle of people in China and throughout the world.

**RCP
Publications
September 1978**



This new book contains in full the original internal documents of the sharp struggle within the Revolutionary Communist Party, USA—a struggle to uphold Mao's revolutionary line and the Four who heroically fought for it against the revisionist line of the capitalist roaders.

An appendix documents the related struggle over the Party's line on making revolution in the U.S.

501 pages, \$4.95

Prepay all orders to: RCP Publications
Box 3486 Merchandise Mart, Chicago, IL 60654
Bulk Rates Available