



**UPHEAVAL IN CHINA  
A PANDORA'S BOX  
OF TROUBLES**

**Student Demonstrations  
The Reform Program's  
Bitter Harvest**

*by Maud Russell*

Two youthful demonstrators comment —

*The students already have won  
because they have the support  
of 90 percent of the people.  
The greatest climax is yet to  
come.*

*This movement only foreshadows  
larger movements; this one is  
the largest democratic movement  
so far. Even if we do not win  
this time, it will have been  
a productive defeat.*



## UPHEAVAL IN CHINA

### Student Demonstrations

China is in turmoil. There is deep discontent among the people over the adverse fruits of the ten-year-old Reform Program of the Deng Xiao-ping Administration.

Vast student demonstrations took place in April and May 1989. The students were expressing their discontent as they made their demands; they demanded more public participation in the affairs of the country; they demanded a government more in touch with the people; they demanded a free press that would more correctly inform the people about public issues; they demanded the right of free assembly; they demanded a government free of official corruption; they demanded free and open negotiations between the people and the authorities on issues that affect the people.

The students in their planning the demonstrations had wisely calculated the most plausible dates and occasions on which to demonstrate -- dates that would coincide with official and national ceremonies -- occasions on which they could gain the maximum attention and support and at the same time demonstrate their patriotism.

The first date was April 18th when the government officially observed the death of Hu Yaobang. The second date was May 4th when the whole nation observed the 70th anniversary of the famous 1919 May 4th student demonstration in Beijing. The third date was May 15th when the whole nation would be watching the arrival of the Soviet Union leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

The students used the official funeral services for Hu Yaobang as an opportunity to stage a giant demonstration focusing public attention, not on the funeral, but on their demand for democracy. The students said, "Hu Yaobang's funeral is not the reason for this demonstration; it is the excuse." Hu was a former general secretary of the Communist Party, demoted in 1986 by Deng Xiaoping who accused him of failing to stem earlier student demonstrations.

"Several thousands of students marched through the capital in pre-dawn hours today, chanting democratic slogans and singing revolutionary songs as they mourned the ousted Party leader, and called for a more democratic government. The demonstration was the most significant sign of unrest in China since student demonstrations for democracy were crushed more than two years ago. The mourning seemed overshadowed by display of protest." (NYT 4.18.89) "Ten thousand people took over Beijing's central square while several thousand students marched to the Communist Party headquarters, trying to force their way in to see the national leaders, The activities were the culmination of several days of mourning which turned their efforts into a campaign for broad social change." (NYT 4.19.89)

On May 2nd "Thousands of students marched through Shanghai in a first indication that China's pro-democracy movement has spread in a major way to the nation's largest city and economic capital. About 6000 university students took part. In addition to Beijing and Shanghai student demonstrations have occurred in the last two weeks in most other cities in China." (NYT 5.3.89)

The students used various tactics to draw attention to their demands and to enlist the participation of non-student individuals and groups. On April 23rd a number of students in some colleges and universities in Beijing started what they called "an indefinite boycott of classes." Posters were seen on the walls of canteens and lecture halls advocating the boycott. "We boycott classes but we don't boycott studies." It appeared that almost all students in universities in Beijing were honoring the boycott.

Another tactic was the sending of delegations to factories to solicit support from workers.

The tactic of a hunger strike brought support from teachers, doctors, pharmacists, drug manufacturers and humanitarians who otherwise had not participated in the demonstrations.

On May 4th, the 70th anniversary of the 1919 May 4th demonstration, "A defiant and enthusiastic crowd of 100,000 workers and students forced its way through police cordons in Beijing to demonstrate for democracy.

Far East Reporter publisher was living in Peking in 1919. She spent that 1919 May 4<sup>th</sup> day witnessing the anti-feudal, anti-imperialist demonstration against the war-lord government leaders who were resisting change and selling off Chinese rights to foreign powers. Three thousand students led the demonstration. Scattered among the crowd of demonstrators were small groups of ten speakers standing around saw-horses. A speaker would mount and begin telling the people the purpose of the demonstration; he would be pulled down by soldiers and arrested. A second, a third, and so on, a list of speakers would continue the explaining, each arrested in turn. All the jails were soon filled; public buildings became jails; students were leaning out of the windows, shouting "Down With The Rotten Government," "Save Our Country," "Oppose Officials Selling Off Our Country."

That May 4<sup>th</sup> 1919 demonstration was no one-day event. Leaving Peking I went to live in Changsha, in the interior, and there I witnessed the spread of the movement, the National Student Movement. As the 1989 students have used anniversaries of national events, so those early students used every anniversary of an imperialist act to hold demonstrations educating the public about their country. Constant raiding of shops that sold goods from imperialist countries (principally Japan) served to involve the consumer public in the patriotic movement.

That earlier, 1919, demonstration and the demonstrations that followed led to the Mao era and the establishment of the People's China. The 1989 demonstrations, occurring at a more climactic stage, hold the potential for a fresh version of a people's China.

The mid-May four day visit of the leader of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, was to have been a crowning event for the Chinese leaders. Instead, the students' tactic of taking possession of Tiananmen Square and other historic and cultural centers that the Soviet delegation was to visit created an international embarrassment for the Chinese government.

His visit was to begin on the 15<sup>th</sup> of May with a welcoming ceremony on Tiananmen Square; but on the

evening of the 14th 10,000 students began a vigil, preempting the Square, forcing the government to hold the ceremony at the airport. The planned visits to other centers were also preempted by the students. During Mr Gorbachev's visit 150,000 rallied and marched in support of the hunger strike then going on. The size of the demonstration and the wide constituency of the participants completely dimmed the aura of the meeting between the leaders of the two countries.

The students' use of three major historic events in April and May -- Hu Yaobang's death, the 70th anniversary of the 1919 May 4th demonstration and the visit of Gorbachev -- did not end the students' activities.

On May 9th they were joined by organized journalists seeking press freedom. "A petition signed by 1013 journalists from more than 30 news organizations in Beijing was presented to members of the Secretariat of the All China Journalist Association. It demanded a sincere and equal dialogue on press reforms with leading officials in charge of the media in the Party's central committee." As the petition was being handed in about 1000 students from 5 Beijing-based universities and colleges gathered outside the Association building to express their support for the journalists." (China Daily 5.10.89)

On May 17th "A roaring mass of students and workers -- hundreds of thousands of protestors -- marched throughout the capital to Tiananmen Square. For the first time in the current movement, workers outnumbered the student activists. This has swelled the youthful ranks with the mass support that Chinese officials privately say they have dreaded since the first student march on April 17th." (Christian Science Monitor 5.18.89)

There are far, far more workers than students in China and their presence at student demonstrations was a cause for official concern. In the April and early May days workers were seen as supporting the students from the side lines; then, workers were joining as marchers. Then on May 9th journalists became the 1st group of organized workers to join.

On May 18th China Daily reported that more than a million people from all walks of life spontaneously

demonstrated yesterday in support of some 3000 fasting students in Tiananmen Square. The demonstrators included journalists, factory workers, high school students, bank clerks as well as non-combat officers of the People's Liberation Army, social and natural scientists. Students from Tienjin and Shanghai were among the hunger strikers. The strikers were protesting what they described as "false charges against demonstrations." They said their's was a patriotic and democratic movement, not "a disorder" as deemed by the authorities.

"On May 17th more than a million Chinese took to the streets in Beijing in an extraordinary outpouring of support for more democracy. The protests, amounting almost to a general strike, greatly increased the pressure on the government to sacrifice one or more top officials and speed political liberation. The crowds took control of the capital and often demanding the resignation of Deng Xiaoping and Prime Minister Li Peng. The demonstrators had little to say about the Soviet leader whose visit continued to be disrupted by the protests. The demonstration was the realization of one of the government's worst nightmares -- organized workers' participation in what begun as student protests. Furthermore, the workers included not only auto mechanics and railroad employees, but also staff members of some of China's most respected and sensitive institutions.

"Among the thousands of 'work units' that paraded were organized groups representing pillars of the establishment like the People's Liberation Army, the Foreign Ministry, the Central People's Broadcasting Station, People's Daily, and even the cadre school of the Communist Party central committee. Most of the marchers were young people.

"'Dump Li Peng! Dump Li Peng!' shouted employees of government affiliated Chinese Academy of Social Sciences to roars of support from the crowd." (NYTimes 5.18.89)

By the 19th of May support of the hunger strike in Beijing had spread to cities across the country. In Shanghai more than 200,000 college students and citizens demonstrated in spite of heavy rain. In Hanhzhou more than 100,000 people marched. In Xian more than 100,000

people broke through police lines to join students. In Tianjin nearly all the teachers in Nankai and Tianjin Universities joined a mass march. In Wuhan, Hubei Province, over 5000 students organized a sit-in in front of the provincial government building. In Hefei, capital of Anhui Province, nearly 10,000 students marched, joined by teachers, journalists and writers. In Shenzhen, one of the special economic zones, more than 5000 students demonstrated. There were no reports of violence in any of the demonstrations. (From China Daily 5.19.89)

On the morning of May 20th the Government called troops into the capital and imposed martial law in parts of Beijing to crack down on China's growing democracy movement.. "We must adopt firm and resolute measures to end the turmoil swiftly" Prime Minister Li Peng said in a speech broadcast shortly after midnight.

Tens of thousands of people rushed out of their homes to block troops from reaching student demonstrators in the central square. There were no troops in Tiananmen Square by midmorning and no one interfered with the swelling crowd which by mid-morning had grown to about 200,000 workers and students. Citizens rendered major streets useless by blocking them with bicycles and highway dividers so troops could not pass. It was not clear to what extent the government would be able to count on the loyalty of the troops and the police. Chinese who were close to the military said that the commanding officer of the 38th army in the near-by city of Baoding refused an order from Mr Deng to move troops to the capital. Troops from the 27th Army in near-by province of Hubei were summoned instead, several Chinese said. (From the NYTimes 5.20.89)

Martial law and the authorities' threat to use troops did not stop nor lessen the students' activities nor the support and participation of the public.

When a small convoy of military trucks rolled through eastern Beijing on the early morning of the 20th several hundreds of students immediately dashed toward the convoy and the soldiers found themselves surrounded by Beijing residents who showered them



with questions about why they wanted to suppress a democratic movement. Residents tried to block soldiers not only with their bodies but also with persuasion.

The harshness of Li Peng's speech announcing the martial law and the troop movement seems to have galvanized much of Beijing's population to support the student democracy movement.

Writes the NYTimes "As the capital ends its 3rd day of martial law Beijing is finding itself crippled by shortages and disruption of its services.. Only student rule seems to have averted total collapse. That Beijing is operating at all is thanks largely to student organizers who have taken over many of the responsibilities of government in the areas of the capital that they control." (5.23.89)

Demonstrations continue. "Some one million people took to the streets of Beijing yesterday in the biggest demonstration since the imposition of martial law. The overwhelming majority of the slogans were directed against the chief leader of the State Council. Other slogans included 'Withdraw the troops And Lift Martial Law' and 'Safeguard the Constitution And Guarantee Human Rights'." (5.24.89) "On the 28th about 100,000 people on foot and on bicycles streamed through the capital to demand more democracy and the resignation of Prime Minister Li Peng. The demonstrators paraded along five different routes to maximize their exposure to the city's residents."(NYT 5.29.89)

In what had appeared as a victory for the authorities student leaders on the 27th, called for an end of their two weeks occupation of Tiananmen Square. But on the 29th thousands of university students reversed that earlier position and resolved to maintain pressure on the government by continuing their round-the-clock occupation of the Square.

"In an emotional scene at the Square late on Monday night (29th) a crowd of nearly 100,000 workers and students cheered the arrival of a 27-foot sculpture modeled after the Statue of Liberty, made by local art students. It is called the Goddess of Democracy and Freedom." (NY Times 5.30.89)

On the night of May 29th the authorities arrested three leaders of a newly formed labor union. Concerned over their fate there were demonstrations on the 30th, and again on the 31st when 2000 students and workers protested in front of the Public Security Ministry. The three were released. The release suggested that the government might be apprehensive about the reaction if it arrests leaders of the democracy movement, commented the NYTimes.

Hundreds of students jostled with the police outside the Public Security Bureau on the evening of June first as they protested the slapping and detaining of a Japanese journalist who was photographing the crowd outside the Bureau. They were also protesting the beating of two students.

The nature of the support the students have been receiving from the public has changed. In the beginning it was side-walk approval and support by their presence. Increasingly it has become active participation in the struggle.

As the authorities ordered troops to the outskirts of Beijing, residents poured out of their homes to both talk persuasively with the soldiers and to use their bodies to block the movement of military equipment and personnel. This participating action continues. On June 3rd "Tens of thousands of Beijing students and workers surged onto the streets early this morning to turn back more than 2000 unarmed troops who were marching toward Tiananmen Square. It was the biggest outpouring of citizen support for the demonstrating students in more than a week. Students and local residents were convinced that the army troops planned to clear Tiananmen Square." (NYT 6.3.89) This was no citizens' exuberant flag-waving presence at a demonstration; it was personal commitment to democracy, at a possible cost of their lives.

The authorities' efforts to stop demonstrations included an attempt to preempt the May 4th anniversary celebrations by an early-announced prepared official program for the occasion; attempts to appease the students by praise, suggesting that the students' aims coincided with those of the government; negotiations with the students but including officially appointed students; the visit of two top officials to the Square to urge the students to end the demonstrations; the imposition of martial law; the threatening gesture of bringing troops to the outskirts of Beijing: by an officially-arranged counter demonstration -- several thousand marchers; including peasants, walking carefully in neat rows (!) and carrying banners reading "We Are Against Chaos." And the cutting off water supply to the students occupying the Square and sabotage of their loud-speaker and telephone services. The government had been hoping that the students would become bored and go home.

In every attempt they failed to stop the demonstrations. On the contrary, the authorities efforts have increased the size, spread, intensity and quality of the demonstrations; they have opened the way to the expression of demands that far exceeded the relatively mild student demands; they have served to give the public added proof of the insensitivity of the government; they have called forth potentially revolutionary, rather than reform, demands and action.

At midnight on the third of June the authorities gave an ominous warning to the public of what was about to come. The extraordinary announcement on television that Saturday night ordered the citizens to "stay at home to protect your lives." In particular, the announcement ordered people to stay off the streets and away from Tiananmen Square.

On Sunday morning, the 4th of June, the ominous warning was carried out. Military forces retook the center of Beijing. Troops fired on the pleading and resisting crowds of citizens. Hospitals began receiving the wounded and the dying.

The authorities' fierce attack on the Chinese people continues -- as does the unceasing resistance of a discontented people.

## UPHEAVAL IN CHINA

### The Reform Program's Bitter Harvest

The April-May student demonstrations took place near the end of the first ten years of the Reform Program. This program, beginning to move China away from a socialist economy, had produced a bitter harvest, causing widespread public discontent.

### The Policies of the Reform Program

The major policies of the Reform Program have been: the Responsibility System, the dissolution of the People's Communes, Deng Xiaoping's "Get Rich" slogan, the introduction of capitalist institutions, the inviting of capitalist investment and participation in China's economy, the "one country, two systems" policy, population control, a mixed economic structure with growing privatization, the initiation of the process of adding capitalist Hong Kong to China's economy, a retrenchment policy, an austerity policy.

### The Bitter Harvest of the Reform Program

These post-1978 Reform Program policies are creating a bitter economic and social harvest, the most glaring of which are official corruption, widening crime, inflation, arable land shrinkage, unemployment, a migrant population, an overheated industrial growth, shortage of energy and production materials, price fluctuations, shoddy consumer goods, irrational consumer spending, the low priority of education, population growth, the drive for money replacing a public sense of social responsibility, income disparity, public confusion and uncertainty about the future.

### Evaluations of the Bitter Harvest

Beginning late in 1988 and intensifying in 1989 both non-Chinese observers and responsible Chinese have been evaluating the fruits of the Reform Program. The Far Eastern Economic Review, in a long series of articles, characterizes its evaluation as "The Reformers Reap A Bitter Harvest."

This bitter harvest that the reformers are reaping is altering the nature of China's economy--a rapid distancing from the economy of pre-1978 socialist China -- and adversely affecting the daily living conditions of the mass of the people.

### Evaluations In The Foreign Press

The foreign press began late in 1988 to evaluate the state of China's economy.

The New York Times (10.28.88) reported that "The General Secretary of the Communist Party, Zhao Ziyang, had issued a long and vigorous explanation of the government's economic retrenchment policy, revealing the alarm with which China's leaders view the country's apparent economic disorder. China's economy has been rocked by soaring inflation -- as high as 30% in some cities -- that provoked panic buying and bank runs by consumers in August and September."

In early March 1989 Far Eastern Economic Review observed: "With a feeble central government, a dying ideology and other much weakened institutions of authority, China's society is drifting in search of a new sense of orientation. Faced with drastic changes in demand, employment, industry and agriculture, China's existing system has had difficulty in adjusting. Reforms aimed at dealing with the new situation meanwhile have been ineffective."

The Christian Science Monitor detailed some of the dismal fruits of the Reform Program. "China's leadership, having set the economy adrift between a command and a market system, is confronting a destructive, inflationary cycle that economists say is impossible to control-- a 20-30% annual inflation. The inflation is unprecedented in China's communist history. It has sparked widespread public discontent and forced Beijing to stall critical market-oriented reforms.

The Monitor continues: "Price rises caused real incomes of more than a third of China's city dwellers to fall last year. The Central Government has relinquished sweeping powers over investment, taxation and finance to provincial authorities and enterprises. These newly empowered local forces strongly oppose the drive to cool an expansion bringing them unprecedented profits.

"Official statistics indicate that the blunt tools Beijing is employing in the retrenchment are producing stagnation. Strategic State-run industries are stagnating, showing only 1.85% growth last month. Controls on bank lending introduced last September have cooled overheated industrial growth from 20% in 1988 to 8% in January. Bottlenecks created by severe shortages of State-controlled goods are worsening as the output of coal, electricity, steel, transport, grain and cotton drops sharply.

"Meanwhile production of consumer goods continues to soar, as regionally-controlled regional industries continue to grow at the breakneck pace of 18% a year. Beijing also lacks power to restrain consumption, another source of inflation. Premier Li last year called for a 20% cut in outlays for cars, banquets, video recorders, and other consumption by institutions. Instead, spending rose 20%." (3.20.89)

Early in 1989 Far Eastern Economic Review reported: "After six months of austerity the economy is in a precarious shape. Industrial growth is falling, credit has become tighter and investment demand has eased slightly. There has been a rapid rise in rural unemployment. Unofficial money-market dealings have boomed. Inflation at 27% in February remains high." (4.6.89)

Foreign media observations about China's current economy thus reflect what is being expressed by Chinese individuals, organizations, leaders of the Communist Party & Government and the Chinese media.

It is significant that these critical Chinese views are published in the Chinese press, thus giving weight to the seriousness with which foreign observers report on the bitter harvest of the Reform Program.

### Evaluations By The Chinese Press and Prominent Chinese Individuals

On January 16th 1989 China Daily reported: Experts at the Chinese Academy of Social Scientists told the China Science News that the Responsibility System faces many problems in agricultural management and production. First, the system is not helpful for water conservation. It is now difficult in rural areas to mobilize

farmers to engage in water conservation projects because they first consider their own gains and losses before they will join collective work. Since 1984 both medium and small scale conservancy projects in most of China's rural areas have been suspended and the capacity of reservoirs is declining as they get silted up.

"Second, it is not beneficial to the agricultural modernization drive; farming machinery is not being bought because there is no shortage of hands and there is a shortage of funds to buy machines,

"Third, the system is unhelpful for the exploitation of natural resources. Mineral resources are being recklessly exploited by specialized rural households."

China Daily continues: The experts also pointed out the social and economic problems arising from the flaws in the rural responsibility system. They think that the gap between the rich and the poor has been dangerously enlarged. This can mainly be seen in the income differences between eastern China and western China, as well as between the coastal areas and the inland areas.

"In addition, contradictions between the planned economy and the commodity economy are on the increase. For example, sugarcane planting areas are not willing to accept the State mandatory plan of sugar cane production because of the low profits involved; so they have turned to growing vegetables and this has resulted in a shortage of sugar.

"Another cause for worry is the fact that clashes between clans in the countryside arise over contracted farm land and other interests." (1.16.89)

In mid-March China Daily wrote: "A report by a group under the China Academy of Sciences said that the near future will not be bright for the dreamers. Beijing's Evening News called the report 'an emergency report for the Year of the Dragon.' It is based on scientific research, said scientist Zhao Lisan. He headed the research group of specialists on economic statistics, systematic analysis, resources evaluation and environmental protection. The group set out two years ago to analyze the country's agricultural conditions but came up with results far beyond the sphere of agriculture. 'We drew

a picture and it surprised us; the picture is rather bleak and perhaps very disheartening to many. But I am afraid it is a true picture,' Zhao said." (3.17.89)

In late March 1989 China Daily gave excerpts from a China Youth News article asking "What is in store for China's agriculture in the coming decade? The article provided a not very optimistic prediction.." Excerpts follow:

"How to produce enough grain to feed the country's more than one billion people is a question that has long haunted China's economic life. Agricultural production still falls far short of adequately feeding the huge population and supplying sufficient materials for industrial development. The exhaustion of soil fertility, motivated by prospects of short-term returns is by far the most critical factor that will undermine farm growth in the coming decade. The problem is compounded by farmers' indiscriminate use of chemical fertilizers. To save work and gain quick returns farmers in many places have almost totally given up using natural fertilizers.

"Another unfavorable factor is the dwindling of arable land. The expanding industry is steadily nibbling away the limited arable land. The government's emphasis on breaking this trend has had little effect.

"Water conservancy facilities in rural areas are falling into disrepair. Since the implementation of the Responsibility System farmers who once were organized have been scattered and are fully occupied with farming on the patches of land contracted to them. Not enough capital and workers can be mobilized to repair the old and build new facilities.

"Farm tools, manual or mechanical, have all been contracted to farmers. Most of the tractors and automobiles are used as transport by the farmers to earn money.

"The already high degree of illiteracy and low degree of technical training is compounded by the fact that large numbers of educated rural youth keep shifting to jobs in township-run factories and service trades in urban areas. Lack of educated and skilled farmers will hold back agricultural development in the future."



Prominent Chinese individuals also critically evaluated the Reform Program.

### Prominent Chinese Individuals Admit A Troubled Economy

A prominent political scientist, Yan Jiaqi, was quoted by Far Eastern Review early in March 1989: "Two or three years ago our goals were clearer, to stimulate the economy, and the market in particular. Everything was going well and people believed the reform would be completed within a few years. But now, with inflation, corruption and other problems the morale of China is very low. They are uncertain about the future. Modernization now seems so far away, maybe another 20 to 30 years.

"China has plunged into pessimism as its social, economic and political problems have multiplied. From housewives to intellectuals there is a feeling that the future is uncertain and difficult. Not long ago China was full of hope that she would join the ranks of medium-income countries." (3.2.89)

An article by Li Jun, Deputy Director of the Research Institute For Restructuring The Economy, was published in the Beijing-based newspaper China Business. Li's article acknowledged that the country's ten year old economic reform had met with serious difficulties. A conspicuous problem was the failure to control growing demand which has caused monthly price rises. Prices were rising faster than the consumers' ability to pay." (From China Daily 3.6.89)

"Professor Li Yining of Beijing University said that "stagflation is likely if the current monetary tightening goes too far while prices continue to rise.

"Dai Yuanchen, noted macroeconomic specialist said stagflation will inevitably occur in the course of controlling inflation since the annual inflation rate is now 10 and 20%.

"Some economists, such as Dong Fureng, are not so pessimistic, but do not rule it out. A recent Economic Daily article by Yan Kalin, said that whether or not stagflation will occur, the possibility that it might should be heeded. In Yan's opinion the possibility is very real." (China Daily 1.17.89)

## Officials At The Highest Level Admit Economic Disorder

Zhao Ziyang, General Secretary of the Communist Party, on September 26th 1988, delivered a policy speech to the Central Committee of the Communist Party. The Ta Kung Pao gave excerpts from the speech:

Zhao said "It is imperative to straighten out the economic order. In recent years China has been unable to check out-of-hand spending on projects built without government planning or budgetary control. Currently people are most dissatisfied with three problems: price hikes, unfair distribution of wealth and corruption in Party and government institutions. Corruption, which is detested by the people, has damaged the image of the Party and government." (11.3.88)

Li Peng, Prime Minister, in March 1989, delivered a two hour speech to the National People's Congress. The New York Times observed: "In tone the speech was very different from the report a year ago. At that time Mr Li called for China to 'put reform at the center of all our undertakings' while today he appeared to believe that the back burner would be more appropriate. The speech appeared to reflect a deep alarm at the economic chaos and unrest that have emerged in the last year or so as the Government lost control over parts of the booming economy." (3.21.89) Two days later the Times added: "Mr Li told the delegates to the Congress that 'there had been shortcomings and mistakes in our guidance' adding 'there was a tendency to be impatient for quick results in economic and social development'." (3.23.89)

## Lower Rank Officials Voice Their Opinions

Security officials addressed the National People's Congress on the question of the rampant social evils which have followed Deng's lavish opening to the West.

China Daily reported: "Security Minister, Wang Fang, told the deputies that despite repeated prohibi-

tions, gambling, prostitution and pornographic publications still exist. The Minister added that cases affecting social stability, such as sabotage by hostile parties from China and abroad, are rising.

"Wen Mingxian, Deputy Director of the Guizhou Provincial Department of Public Security, said the government at all levels should regard the maintenance of social order as important as economic development.

"Mr Wen's views were shared by Governor Wang Chao of Guizhou who said concrete measures must be taken to tackle the problem." (China Daily 3.25.89)

### National People's Congress Deputies Cite Ills Arising From Government Policies

Deputies to the National People's Congress, in March, directed attention to the problems in their localities and aired their opinions about national economic policies. (From China Daily 3.27.89)

"Governor Li Changchun of Liaoning Province, said that so far this year a 30% drop in the total industrial output had been reported and the province's business is running at 75% of capacity due to energy shortages,

"Wu Disheng, Mayor of Shenyang City in Liaoning Province, said "The temptation for quick economic results has its roots in the method of decision-making which lacks a scientific and democratic basis."

"Deputy Wu Yaying, a school teacher from Zhejiang Province, criticized the government for its high-handed economic policies. He contended that "It is extremely improper that the principle to stabilize the economy and prices that was put forward at last year's NPC meeting, at the strong request of the majority of NPC delegates, was replaced by a price reform proposed and decided by a few officials."

"Deputies criticized the central authorities for inspections that over-looked profiteering and tax evasion, for their lack of knowledge of grassroots problems, for the disparities in the distribution of wealth, for lack of consideration of minority peoples, for not seeing the possible consequences of their major policies and for their lack of consistency."

"Sun Qi, a deputy from Liaoning Province, said he felt that the national disasters were not the major reason for the stagnation of China's agricultural sector; there was something wrong with China's agricultural policy. Sun questioned the wisdom of launching an annual 'massive inspection' of prices and tax payments. Annual inspections tend to leave loop-holes for profiteers and tax evaders," he said.

"Wang Quan, a deputy from Hubei Province, said some faulty policies had been implemented as a result of a lack of knowledge about the problems in grassroots areas.

"Zheng Qinghe, a deputy from Jianxi Province, said disparities in distribution of wealth contributed a major threat to the morale of workers.

"Li Gui, a deputy from Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, said that the central government should adopt measures to promote economic development in areas inhabited by ethnic minorities.

"Cheng Guoqiang, a deputy from Zhejiang Province, said he hoped the government would give more consideration to the possible consequences of major policies and practice greater consistency."

### The Public Mood

The public mood too represented an evaluation of the Reform Program -- as expressed in their questions and criticisms, their frustration and perplexity, and even some anger, and their over-all unrest. The public mood was like a pile of sun-heated shavings awaiting a spark. The student demonstrations of 1989 proved to be the spark.

Wrote the Far Eastern Economic Review: "The rapid change of public mood began around the end of 1987 when pork rationing was introduced. Although the move made common sense in dampening demand to allow supply to catch up, the return of ration coupons after years of abundant supply was a powerful symbol to many that something serious was wrong. As shortages spread to vegetables, matches, toilet paper and other daily necessities, society became increasingly restless."  
(3.3.89)

## A Challenged, Divided and Weakened Government

The student movement has grown into a wide, vigorous public challenging of the government and the Party.

"The movement started as a disciplined struggle for clean government and basic liberties. But recently the movement has shown signs of pursuing sharper aims against Communist Party leaders and the autocratic rule of the Party itself. Its goals have grown more extreme as it has tapped the deeper resentment of urban Chinese over the most rampant corruption and highest inflation under communist rule.

"The chanting crowds focused its wrath on Mr Deng. 'Deng Xiaoping Your Time Is Up,' the mob yelled Wednesday in Tiananmen Square as visiting Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev gave an address in the adjoining Great Hall of the People." (Christian Science Monitor 5.19.89)

The defiant student demonstrations attracted an applauding, approving, supporting and, eventually, a joining public. This public used their concern over 3000 fasting students as an opportunity to openly speak to the authorities; they were joining not just as individuals but, in added numbers, as members of organized groups. The authorities' fear -- that workers and peasants (and other elements) -- would take advantage of the students' defiance and engage in political confrontation -- now confronts them as a fact.

There is dissent at the highest level of government. This was evident during the meeting of the National People's Congress in March. Premier Li Peng criticised Zhao Ziyang, the General Secretary of the Communist Party, over reform policies. Then in May dissent was intensified over the question of how to deal with the students; some, including Zhao, wanted a conciliatory approach; others, including Deng, favored a hard-handed approach.

Deng's hard-line was confirmed on May 19th by his removing from power and duties as General Secretary of the Communist party Zhao Ziyang and adding Zhao's functions to those of the Prime Minister, Li Peng. Peng then declared martial law and began moving troops to the outskirts of Beijing. The hard-liners within the central authorities had won a preliminary skirmish.

## THE CENTRAL AUTHORITIES ATTEMPT COUNTER-MEASURES

In 1988 the authorities, faced with the disturbing problems of their Reform Program, initiated two measures to reform the Reform Program: a Retrenchment Policy and an Austerity Program.

### The Retrenchment Policy

In October 1988 the State Council "decided to crack down on the over-heated rush in investment and construction in an attempt to create an effective new industrial structure which meets the needs of social and economic development, said Chen Guangjiang, Deputy Minister of the State Planning Commission. The State will order banks to stop providing loans for projects and will stop providing the projects with necessary raw materials. Chen said that within recent years fixed assets in China had been increasing too rapidly and that the scale of investment had been growing beyond the country's ability to cope with it.

"Chinese Premier, Li Peng, is beginning a nationwide campaign to call an immediate halt to thousands of construction projects including some which are already under way. It has now spread its net to include projects in most fields, productive and non-productive, State-owned and private-owned." (China Daily 10.7.88)

But the clout of the retrenchment campaign is vitiated by the defiance of local authorities and communities.

An early April 1989 China Daily editorial noted: "One by-product of the decentralization of power in the management of the economy has been the rise of localism in the past few years." "Provincial leaders increasingly regard themselves as just as experienced as the current leaders and they often won't enforce central policies with which they disagree," (NY Times 11.28.88)

Prime Minister Li Peng said that "resistance from local leaders and 'vested interests' is obstructing the retrenchment drive, which he admitted had fallen far short of the goal since it was launched in September." (Christian Science Monitor 3.21.89)

## The Austerity Program

Far Eastern Economic Review reported: "Peking has used the National People's Congress to send a powerful political signal to local authorities that the Austerity Program is to continue, despite the resistance and painful side-effects produced so far." (4.6.89)

"On March 20th Premier Li Peng told the 2000 members of the National People's Congress to prepare for years of austerity, His speech made it clear that China is heading in a new, uncertain direction. The key question is whether Li or any national leader has the power to rein in an economy that is careening out of control." (Business Week 4.2.89)

"Behind Peking's determined and harsh tone, there is much cynicism over how many of the other tasks outlined by the National People's Congress can be achieved -- and at what price. Sources say Party general secretary, Zhao Ziyang, is quietly backing away from the austerity program, which is unpopular and difficult to implement. After six months of austerity, the economy is in precarious shape, industrial growth is falling, credit has become tighter and investment demands have eased slightly. There has begun a rapid rise in rural unemployment and money-market dealings designed to by-pass the banks' credit squeeze have boomed, while inflation at 27% in February remains high.

"The clampdown on investment has hurt mainly central government-funded capital construction where investment dropped by 1.1% in the first two months of this year, while locally financed projects grew by 32%. Local authorities have been rushing to complete their pet projects before Peking inspection teams arrive to stop them.

"Since September, Peking has used heavy-handed administrative measures, moral appeals and political threats, but has not created new incentives or other mechanisms to support the austerity objectives." (Far Eastern Economic Review 4.6.89)

Thus the current leaders's two measures -- the Retrenchment Policy and the Austerity Program -- are failing to alleviate the bitter harvest of their Reform Program. Rather, they create new evil harvests.

MAJOR NATIONAL POLICIES ADVERSELY AFFECTED  
BY THE REFORM PROGRAM  
EDUCATION LAND USE POPULATION CONTROL

Three major national policies are being affected adversely by the Reform Program. The rank and dignity of China's education is being eroded. Industrial development results in decreasing arable land. A migrant population -- peasants seeking jobs in urban areas-- results in new problems for the population control plan.

China's Crippled Educational System

The leaders of the Reform Program have chosen to spend funds at their disposal for economic advance to the extent of financially crippling the educational system. And millions are being spent on sports facilities for the 1990 Asian Sports Festival to be held in Beijing. And the Reform Program's stress on Deng's "Get Rich" leads millions of children to leave school in order to make money.

According to Ta Kung Pao "The obstacles to education come from three sides: 1) the government in not in a situation to provide sufficient funds; 2) budgetary funds for education are often diverted to serve other purposes, such as offices or hotels, even luxurious hotels; 3) commercialism, which has lured many a parent into ordering their children to quit schooling in exchange for a job to earn the quick buck." (1.19.89)

Far Eastern Economic Review observed: "While much government money has been channeled into building trade centers and providing lavish banquets and cars for top cadres, little has been spent on education, the critics assert. Classes are now held in dilapidated buildings and there are not enough text books to go around." (3.23.89)

"Education has lost some of its prominence in China. A national survey showed that last semester more than 3.78 million primary school pupils and 3.61 million middle school students dropped from school. Many became child labourers. Even at higher educational levels students seem less and less motivated to study. College students are squandering time dating, socializing and doing small businesses." (China Daily 3.16.81)



China Daily writes about the government's niggardly monetary response to the public's demand for more attention being paid to education.

"The public's demand for the government to pay more attention to education is so great that even the latest move by the central government to increase spending on education does not appear to have diffused people's dissatisfaction. The increase was 15.4% more since last year. Li Tiying, State Counsellor and Minister of the State Education Commission, told representatives at the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in Beijing yesterday that the increase was the best the government could manage, though he readily admitted it fell far short of the actual needs." (3.23.89)

"The State has traditionally managed not only the financing but all other aspects of education. China's Reform Program seeks to move the country away from this centralized control." (China Daily 3.23.89)

#### Land Use Seriously Affected By The Reform Program

The Reform Program in its major emphasis on industrial development has seriously affected China's land use practices: 1) arable land, in both urban and rural areas, is used for factories and trade facilities; 2) the government's inattention to land erosion, desertization, water-logging, salinization has further reduced the area of possible arable land; 4) Deng's "Get Rich" slogan is making peasants less interested in farming; 5) there is a vast shortage of grain -- an ominous threat to a rising population, "China's cultivated land area has shrunk at an annual rate of about 500,000 hectares during the past decades and there are no very effective ways to stop it, according to a planning official, Lu Yijuh, head of the Resources & Geology Department under the State Planning Commission. The government's flexible policies have enabled a huge number of surplus farmers to transfer into township industries. When farmers are allowed to compete to make money, some of them changed cultivated lands into fishing ponds, poultry farms or orchards." (from China Daily 3.11.89)

A month later China Daily was again reporting on the land situation-- on factors making agriculture one of the weakest links in China's economy.

"A steadily dwindling amount of arable land, meager investment in agriculture, a swelling population and dilapidated farm facilities have combined to make agriculture one of the weakest links in China's economy. Other serious problems are irrigation and water conservancy systems falling into disrepair and depletion, deterioration of the agricultural environment and shortages of agricultural fertilizers and pesticides.

"Many farmers complain that growing cereal grains is the least profitable trade in agriculture. In addition, some farmers still harbor misgivings about changes in government policies and are very reluctant to invest in farming." (China Daily 4.8.89)

### A Faltering Population-Control Program

The Reform Program is having a serious effect on the government's population-control program. The Reform Program drew millions of peasants to industrial and service jobs in urban areas. "According to a 1988 survey the births of about one million children born to transients were unrecorded. It is clear that birth rates have been grossly underestimated for several years, most probably from 1984 when the modified one-child policy was adopted. The statistics, rough though they are, point to an increasing laxity in the administration and implementation of the birth control programmes. Most importantly, they highlight an increasing tendency, mainly by China's rural population, to violate China's birth control regulations. Most often it is the desire for sons. (Far Eastern Economic Review 3.2.89)

Peasants who want the traditional son or who want children as workers are finding ways to avoid the family planning pressure. Deng Xiaoping's "Get Rich" policy has indeed enriched some peasants; they can violate the family planning regulation and afford to pay the fine; can avoid registering births by bribing the local family-plan officials. Some can move to more remote areas where law enforcement is lax.

"According to New China News Agency couples are moving to towns and cities on provincial borders because law enforcement tends to be lax in border areas. Many already have from 3 to 8 children and tend to stay in their temporary home until the desired child is born, invariably male."

China thus faces the possibility of a population well in excess of the planned 1.1 billion.

## THE REFORM PROGRAM'S EVIL IMPACT ON THE DAILY LIFE OF THE PEOPLE

Not only are major national policies adversely affected by the Reform Program; the daily life of the people feels the adverse impact of the Program. Few escape the high and changing prices, the grain shortage, inflation, shoddy consumer goods, poor phone service, poor handling of sewage.

Official corruption, rampant crime, unemployment, production shortages, resurgent venereal disease, wealth disparities -- all these, in one way or another, have their negative impact on the lives of individuals.

### High Prices Grain Shortages Inflation

"Last year hundreds of demonstrations and petition drives took place, triggered by complaints over rising prices." (China Daily 3.25.89) "With prices changing every day people feel life has become riskier and unpredictable." (FEER 3.2.89) "The Chinese man or woman on the street has 34.5 kilograms less of grain than he or she did 4 years ago." (China Daily 3.29.89) "Prices scarcely rose during the first three decades of communist rule. The main worry (now) is inflation which at last count was officially running at 27%. Inflation is an unexpected affront to a society where prices scarcely rose during the first three decades of communist rule." (NYTimes 4.6.89)

The steep rise in inflation from 7.3% in 1987 to 18.5% in 1988 made difficult the lives of pensioners, fixed-salary workers, academics and others whose work places are unprofitable and pay no bonuses.

## Shoddy Consumer Goods

"Thousands of Chinese consumers have accused domestic commercial enterprises and individual business people of dumping shoddy goods all over the market. Most were complaining about the poor quality of refrigerators, colour television sets and other big electrical appliances. Some accused factories and enterprises of ignoring the interests of consumers in their desire to make money." (China Daily 3.15.89) A nationwide check on shoddy production included 10 products singled out for particular attention. These included fertilizers, beer, electric fans, washing powder, milk powder. A spot check of 50 products manufactured by 8886 enterprises found that about 40% of ten products were substandard. The substandard products included tape recorders, asbestos, pig and poultry food." (Ta Kung Pao 2.2.89)

"China's telecommunications facilities are far from adequate, according to a report in Sunday's People's Daily. The report said that only 30% of urban calls can be put through and only 20% of long distance calls." (China Daily 3.21.89) "Beijing is facing serious problems in getting rid of sewage from its public toilets." (China Daily 3.22.89)

## Rampant Corruption and Crime

Official corruption is rampant in the highest level of government and Party. The Reform Program, boosted by Deng's "get rich" urging, has spawned a degrading public morality, all the way down to the street hawker.

One of the evils of the Reform Program has been government organizations which set up companies to make personal profits for the organization's heads. China Daily reported: "At the end of 1988 China had 8,054 companies conducting commercial activities and undertaking government functions at the same time. By March, Liu Minxu, Deputy Director of the State Administration for Industry and Commerce, was reporting that 14,099 such enterprises had been found in the 15 provinces checked by the end of last year." (3.7.89)

"Lin Zhun, Vice-President of the Supreme People's Court, said that China's economic disorder is evident in the rampant speculation, especially by a number of enterprises, institutions, government bodies and organizations." (China Daily 3.17.89)

Opening to the outside world, a key factor in the Reform Program, has opened the door not only to technological information, trade and foreign investment in China, but also to economic crime. In January 1989 China Daily reported: "Yu Lei, Vice-Minister of Public Security, in an interview with China Daily yesterday, said China experienced a sharp increase in crime last year, particularly in the larger cities and in areas open to the outside world. Yu said there were 827,000 crimes reported during 1988, 45.1% more than the previous year. Serious crimes totalled 203,000, an increase of 66.7%.

"Yu noted crimes associated with overseas gangs increased in China during the year. They included trafficking in narcotics, smuggling of gold and relics, counterfeiting of currency, credit cards and passports. There are now more opportunities for theft, robbery and fraud. This is especially so in cities and towns on railway routes and in the open areas of the coastal provinces." (1.24.89)

Far Eastern Economic Review reported: "Now a new anti-corruption campaign has been initiated. On January 16th the official People's Daily published the minutes of 30 December meeting of the Secretariat of the Party Central Committee (which) declared the fact that the year-old anti-corruption campaign had failed, and a new measure to attack bureaucratic corruption was proposed. Specifically Zhao called for a nation-wide network of corruption-reporting centers. The public should be encouraged to report criminal activities and new organs should be set up where needed.

"This many believe will prove counter-productive. Rather than reducing the number of officials with administrative control over business dealings, the scheme would add even more layers of government supervision and thus enlarge the body of officials who must somehow be bribed if businesses are to get things done in the present economic environment. (3.2.89)

## Production Shortages

China's economy is, in some measure, stymied by production shortages. An early power shortage hobbled production. The transport system lacks the means to adequately deliver raw materials to producers and to distribute finished goods to consumers.

An editorial in China Daily described the situation: "The supply of energy, transportation services and production materials has deteriorated in the first three months of this year." (3.20.89)

Far Eastern Economic Review gave details: As light manufacturing booms, demand for energy, transport and materials intensified, but supply remains low. The power industry's output dropped from 3.8% of the nation's total industry in 1981 to 3.1% in 1987, Transport facilities were also stretched to the limit. In the 9 years to 1987, railway and road lengths grew by a dismal annual average of 0.88% and 1.10% respectively, compared to a 9.49% annual increase in the volume of cargo handled. Growth of infrastructure has lagged behind because no one wants to invest in projects that have low yield, a long investment period, irrationally low prices and heavy capital commitment. Since 1984's hyper-industrial growth, shortages have worsened." (3.2.89)

China Daily reported about the inefficient distribution system. "China's farmers are crying out for plastic sheeting to protect their crops, while factories in some parts of the country have enormous stockpiles of it." (3.17.89)

The New York Times observed: "China is facing a severe energy crisis. Power cuts have hit factories, hospitals and households nationwide, official reports said today. Newspapers said that even the homes of senior politicians had been blacked out by power cuts recently, for the first time since the Chinese revolution forty years ago. The crisis is made worse by a black market in fuel and overloaded transfer links from coal fields to industrial cities, the report said." (4.11.89)

## A Huge Unemployed Floating Population

The Reform Program's official policy of cutting down the scale of capital investment and curbing an overheated industrial growth has created vast unemployment. Overheated construction in the cities drew millions of rural residents to urban areas. China Daily reported: "There are now more than 10 million such workers in the cities, according to Planning Department Director, Peng Mao, of the Ministry of Labor. He pointed out that 4 million urban workers were also looking for work." (3.23.89)

"The rural workers having benefitted from industrial jobs and city life are unwilling to go back to farms. However, farming is not profitable; peasant labourers are far too numerous -- by more than a hundred million hands -- as economic statistics show." (China Daily 3.5.89)

The Chinese people are beginning to reassess the Reform Program as it affects their daily living conditions. The euphoria over the improved standard of living generated by the introduction ten years ago, of the Reform Program, is giving way to worry, grumbling, bitterness protests and questioning of the Deng administration's reform policies.

The New York Times described the situation: "Reform initially meant a color television, a red bicycle and pork for dinner. Now many people worry that it means bribes, high prices and even lay-offs. Inflation and corruption along with fear of unemployment and resentment of the newly wealthy seem to be fostering reassessment among Chinese farmers and workers about the benefits of sweeping economic change." (4.6.89)

"I think the Chinese people have lost their enthusiasm for the reforms, in the sense that unlike in the early 80s, now they aren't talking about how to make sacrifice for the reforms," said Joseph Y S Cheng, a China scholar at Chinese University in Hong Kong, "They are mostly asking this question: What's in the reforms for me?" (NYTimes 4.6.89)

## THE RESURGENCE OF RESPECT FOR MAO ZEDONG

While it did not verbally surface in the current demonstrations, a public rebirth of remembrance of and respect for Mao Zedong is recurring.

The Christian Science Monitor observed: "Chairman Mao, once worshipped as 'The Great Helmsman' is inspiring renewed veneration in China. a decade after his utopian dogma and radical policies were disavowed by pragmatic leader, Deng Xiaoping.

"Around the country Chinese are again wearing Mao badges from the 60s and 70s, hanging portraits of Mao, burning joss sticks before Mao's memorial tablets, singing Mao's anthem 'The East Is Red' and reciting ditties glorifying the Mao era. 'Mao Zedong was fine; a dime was worth a dime. Deng Xiaoping may be okay; but a dollar's worth a dime today'.

"Grassroots support for Mao has surged along with popular discontent over inflation, income inequalities, crime and corruption that are accompanying Mr Deng's market-oriented economic reforms.

"Declining moral standards stir sentimental longing for Mao's puritanical rule. They feel insecure. They resent the hooligans, corruption and lack of social order. 'So they cherish the Mao period,' explained Song Tingmang, a cabinet official. Shao Dasheng, a sociologist at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, said 'The image of Mao as a great leader has influence today. We cannot deny that'." (4.11.89)

The giant portrait of Mao Zedong facing Tiananmen Square was defaced on May 23rd by 3 men who splattered paint across his face. Reported the NY Times: "If the purpose of the action was to encourage contempt for Mao, the opposite seemed to happen. The demonstrators were furious. Said a 36 year-old driver 'Chairman Mao was our saviour and without him there would be no new China'. In the late evening the vandalized portrait of Mao was replaced by a new one as a crowd of about 20,000 people cheered. The government reported telephone calls from the area residents, urging severe punishment for those who defaced the portrait." (5.24.89)



## FAR EAST REPORTER PERSPECTIVE

Hundreds of thousands of Chinese students and millions of non-students who joined all across the land in demands for democracy and civil rights, seeking open negotiations with the authorities and protesting rampant corruption--those April-May 1989 days recalled the revolutionary demands made seventy years earlier on May 4th 1919 in Beijing in a demonstration led by 3000 students.

That 1919 demonstration initiated an immediate nation-wide patriotic movement that eventually eliminated a war-lord government and led to the establishment in 1949 of a new China -- the People's China.

The 1989 students made no revolutionary demands, no demands that envisaged a change of government. The demands themselves presented no basic threat to the Deng Xiaoping administration. A New York Times correspondent in Beijing talked with marching students. "In private students expressed no interest in socialism or communism; instead they favored whatever will make China strong and rich." Deng's very words!

It was not the students' demands that frightened the authorities. The Reform Program could easily adjust to complying with those demands. It was the masses -- taking advantage of the students' persistent defiance of the authorities and their remarkable skills in organizing, managing and continuing the demonstrations -- who joined the students in daring to openly face the authorities, letting them know that they too had reasons to make demands on the government.

There were revolutionary germs in this participation of the masses -- not only in their joining in the marching and in their giving side-walk approval and support, but more profoundly in their day and night vigils protesting martial law and blocking soldiers from entering the center of Beijing. This in itself was revolutionary action.

Another revolutionary germ is the message this mass participation sends to the authorities from the people suffering the bitter harvest of the Reform Program: People can dare to face the authorities; people can organize; people can defy local bans; people can immobilize police and soldiers ordered to curb protests. Beneath all this revolutionary potential is the memory and experience of the mass political rallies that created and characterized the People's China.

The response of the current leaders to the people's demands and discontent is reform -- reform of some details of the Reform Program. But the people are losing confidence in the government and the Party. They see the repeated official attempts at reform of the Reform peter out, unimplemented or discarded, with no improvement in their lot.

A China specialist in the State Department told US News and World Report: "There is no doubt that the current situation is a crisis. It is a clear manifestation of great differences between the leadership and what many, many people want." (5.8.89)

Reform will not solve China's crisis, will not end the people's discontent. But as China approaches a climactic stage, the alternative to reform -- revolution -- is begining to emerge. The masses will eventually have their say.

A young demonstrator, a Chinese artist, grasps the significance of the movement: "The students already have won, because they have the support from 90% of the people. And the greatest climax is yet to come."

Another young 27-year old, who resigned from the Communist Party to protest its resistance to the democracy movement, has a longer view: "This movement only foreshadows larger movements. This one is the largest democratic movement so far; even if we don't win this time, it will have been a productive defeat."

In the 1930s a Long March led to the establishment, in 1949, of the People's China. Now, some fifty years later, a new Long March of the Chinese people is under way.

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