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By Maud Russell



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**The Joint Communique
Why Peking Welcomed Nixon**

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THE "WHY?"
OF
PRESIDENT NIXON'S TRIP TO PEKING

INTRODUCTION

On July 15th 1971 President Nixon startled the world by his announcement that he was going to Peking. From then on the question has been "Why?". "Why has Mr Nixon made an approach to the People's Republic of China?" - "Why this apparent change in the two-decade-old anti-China policy?"

Three important political stages suggest the answer. The first stage is the background situation as it had developed by 1971. The second stage is the sharpening of the political relationship by Mr Nixon's meeting with the Chinese authorities in Peking. The third stage is the current continuing political fall-out in Asia following Washington's "new" China policy.

THE BACKGROUND STAGE

There was evidence of the existence of a political climate in the United States favorable to Mr Nixon's initiating a "new" China policy. In April 1971 an American ping pong team, attending an international table tennis tournament in Japan, accepted an invitation to visit China. This was immediately followed by open, public acceptances of invitations to China by many American individuals and groups.

The wide coverage in the American news media - television, radio, newspapers, magazines - of these visits and of the reports by these American visitors revealed that there was among the American people a latent disapproval of Washington's anti-China policy and an underlying feeling of friendship for the Chinese people (later confirmed and accentuated by the public's response to the April 1972 American tour of the Chinese ping pong team).

Mr Nixon hinted that he too would like to visit China, either during or after his term of office, either as a private citizen or as president. The Chinese obliged by inviting him; he accepted, not as a private citizen but as President of the United States.

Wrote the New York Times editorially, "President Nixon's decision to seek a dialogue with Peking would not have been made if a substantial portion of the American public had not already been prepared to accept such a dramatic turn-about". (2/26/72) This was no tourist trip but a major political move. The "why?" of this decision runs much deeper than any mere popularly accepted trip to China.

There were world-wide political trends that played a major role in the decision to make a new approach to the China question. An article by James Reston in the New York Times of September ninth 1971 serves as an indication of the background of developments that have forced the Nixon Administration to take a new stance on the issue of relationship with China. Four paragraphs from Reston's article are pertinent:

"The clearest trend among the nations today is toward some kind of world order none of them can define, but in the words of the old song, 'they don't know where they're going, but they're on their way'.

"Officials all across the world are talking vaguely about coming changes and about what they regard as a greater willingness on the part of the major powers to adjust to the new realities and limitations of military, political and economic power.

"The nations are in movement toward some new relationships. That at least is the theme this reporter has been

hearing from thoughtful officials and other observers of world affairs on a long journey from Washington to Tokyo, Peking and London.

"Nobody is saying that we are on the verge of a new world order, but the idea seems to be getting around that even the most influential nations can not always do what they would like to do.."

This, then, is a part of the pressure in which the Administration found itself; powerful as the United States is, it could no longer "do what it would like to do" in relation to China.

Washington's anti-China policy had been a failure. For years Washington had tried to act as if China was not there; then they tried to act as if China was an "isolated" fact. As the Christian Science Monitor wrote in April 1971:

"Since 1949 the United States has continued to predict that in due time Mao Tse-tung's China would just go away. Well, it didn't go away. With every passing year the regime in Peking has further consolidated its hold on the country. So the policy of non-recognition has been a failure."(4/25/71)

And the New York Times on October 5th 1971 observed:

"The fact (is) that the United States and other countries have finally faced up to the giant reality represented by Communist China."(Editorial NYT)

By 1971 it was evident that all aspects of Washington's anti-China policy had failed: non-recognition, no trade, isolate China, oppose seating the People's Republic of China in the United

Nations. The policy to hurt, if not destroy, the new China had failed.

Moreover, viewed retrospectively, Washington's anti-China policy had, in the long run, actually benefited the newly emerging socialist China.

The non-recognition policy benefited China. This policy involved prohibiting Americans from visiting China. Thus China was freed from the problems and troubles of dealing with infiltration of American subversive agents that the CIA and the State Department could have recruited from among the tens of thousands of Americans who had lived or worked in pre-1949 China.

The Washington policy of "no-trade" with China benefited China. Early in 1950 China had indicated a desire for trade with the United States as the most highly developed industrial power. Washington refused. This meant, for one thing, that China diversified her foreign trade relations, and did not become in any degree dependent on trade with a powerful capitalist economy. For another thing, it meant that China proceeded to carry out a policy of self-reliance, resulting in her own development of her resources and in the bringing out of the creative and inventive power of her own people.

And, since the Cultural Revolution of 1966-68, an added aspect of how the United States' refusal to trade with China actually benefited China has become apparent; among the precepts of the revisionist faction in China against which the Cultural Revolution was directed were such ideas as "a slow-down in the process of socialization," "a mixing of capitalist methods with socialist methods," "a compromise with imperialist countries,". Had Washington at that earlier period allowed trade with China this revisionist faction would have been more deeply entrenched in the economic life of China and more difficult to discredit and dislodge. Thus lack of economic ties with capitalist United States made easier China's advance on the socialist path.

Washington's policy of trying to "isolate" China also benefited China. First, in the economic field: Washington's major allies such as Britain, France, West Germany and Japan took advantage of non-competition with American trade rivals in the China market, to establish mutually beneficial, long-range trade relations with China. There was wide-spread refusal on the part of dozens and dozens of nations to go along with Washington's embargo of trade with China - as evidenced by their attendance at China's semi-annual Trade Fair at Kwangtung (Canton). In 1959 2500 businessmen from 35 countries attended; by the fall of 1971 there were 10,000 business-men from 90 countries in attendance; the potential market of China drew these business interests to a steady trade relationship with China, a relationship eased for them by the lack of having to compete with American traders. In the fall of 1971 dozens of American business interests sought, in vain, for an invitation to the Trade Fair. China, not the seemingly powerful United States, had the say, buttressed by her world-wide already established trade relationships. Wrote the New York Times. "It now appears certain that Communist China is a major element in the establishment of world market prices." (7/20/71)

In the political field too, Washington's attempt to "isolate" China benefited China - diminishing Washington's pressure on China. United States major allies did not buckle under U S anti-China policy. Britain early recognized the People's Republic of China, France followed, and by 1971 there was a tide of nations turning toward China. The Christian Science Monitor wrote, "Far from running out of steam the parade of nations moving toward recognition of China seems to continue unabated." (11/9/70) The New York Times noted, editorially, "The list of member nations of the United Nations seeking contact with Peking (is) growing almost every day." (5/6/71) "China has formed relations with all four members of the American-supported Central Treaty Organization which included Great Britain and Pakistan. Turkey is also a member." (NYT 8/18/71) The Monitor wrote "President Nixon's visit to Peking will give impetus

to the rapidly improving position of the People's Republic of China in Latin America."(8/30/71)

Washington's policy of opposing the seating of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations, looked at now, really benefited China. Had the People's Republic of China been seated in 1950, as she rightly should have been, she would have come in as a politically, economically and militarily weak member, under the tutelage of a strong nation, the Soviet Union. But, as Chou Kuan-hua, said in his maiden speech at the United Nations -

"It has been proven by fact that we, the Chinese nation, are fully capable of standing on our own feet in the family of nations."(NYT 11/16/71)

In the intervening years - 1949---1971 - China both proved her viability as a modern nation and also took her seat as a recognized major fact and factor on the world scene. The rejoicing in the United Nations over China's being voted her rightful seat was a demonstration of the failure of Washington's policy and of China's recognized status. Today one of the four positions of Under General Secretary of the United Nations is held by a citizen of the People's Republic of China, on equal footing with the other three Under Secretaries who come from the United States, Soviet Union and Argentina.

So, there was pressure on the United States to change its China policy. There were "new realities and limitations."

Mr Reston in his article of September 9th 1971 wrote about "the greater willingness on the part of the major powers to adjust to the "new realities and limitations" - the more correct phrasing - the more correct fact - is "the greater necessity" "to adjust". This necessity was a major pressure that led Mr. Nixon to initiate a "new" policy toward the People's Republic of China, beginning with a trip

to Peking. Of course this planned trip to China did not come out of the blue. "Covertly the United States sought to reopen the ambassadorial exchanges at Warsaw, broken off earlier by Peking. From the partial lifting of restrictions on trade and travel in July 1969, in termination of the Taiwan Straits patrol by the U S 7th Fleet in December of the same year, Peking received a series of signals which showed that the Nixon Administration had begun a systematic abandonment of past policy." (Ailen Whiting, NYT 2/27/72).

Mr Nixon was being forced by "new realities" to adjust, to admit that there were "limitations" to what he could do in relation to China. Straws in the wind warned him that his strongest ally in the Far East, Japan, was moving toward China.

"In January 1971 Premier Sato offered to open up talks with China on the possibility of normalizing relations. He said, 'Japan has no diplomacy unless we come to grips with China policy'." (C S M Editorial 7/24/71) And a whole month before Mr Nixon got around to it, Premier Sato had referred to China correctly as "The People's Republic of China." This was followed, within a week of Nixon's divulging of his planned visit China, by Premier Sato's expressing "willingness to go to China to discuss normalization of relationships including diplomatic recognition," thus going beyond Mr Nixon's expressed expectations. The Sato Government was being forced to issue statements about relations with China that in fact conflicted with its actual policy; it was under persistent pressure from other political parties and from business interests to normalize relations with China, economically and politically.

"The United Nations decision to seat Peking had already triggered political fireworks in Japan; within hours of the United Nations move Opposition parties demanded Sato's resignation. The decisive Peking victory in the United Nations had also caught the ruling Liberal Democratic Party without immediate tactics and thrown it off balance." (CSM 10/28/71)

Influential Japanese politicians and statesmen were taking stands and actions relative to China that not only were putting pressures on Sato's government but were also putting up warning signals to Washington that Japan's role as a collaborator with the United States on China policy could no longer be taken for granted.

"The former Defense Minister Nakasone, in September 1971 put forward three stages for normalization of relations - 1) recognition of the People's Republic of China as the legitimate government of China, 2) allocate a seat in the United Nations to the People's Republic of China, 3) acknowledge that Taiwan is a part of China. He said, 'It is stupid to antagonize Peking' and, referring to the United States, 'Japan should not become enamoured with any one particular country'." (NYT 9/13/71)

In October 1971 a delegation of 19 Japanese including 6 members of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, 6 of the Socialist Party, 4 of the Komeita Party, and 3 of the Democratic Socialist Party visited China. The delegation was headed by a former Foreign Minister, Fujiyama. They issued a joint statement: 1) that relations should be stabilized at the earliest possible date, 2) that Tokyo should drop relations with Taiwan, 3) that the peace treaty between Japan and Nationalist China should be abrogated, 4) that the United States should withdraw their forces stationed in foreign countries, that the United States must dismantle bases abroad, especially in Indo-China and other areas of the Far East. (From NYT 10/4/71) In October the Mayor of Tokyo, Minobe, announced that he was going to visit China. (Los Angeles Times 10/9/71)

Wrote the New York Times on October 21st 1971: "Premier Sato is under seige from all sides. Political attacks on him began to intensify today (October 20th) in a special session of the Parliament; members of the Opposition rose one after another to demand his resignation particularly focusing on Mr Sato's China policy..."

Economically as well as politically there were indications that Japan was moving toward working out its own independent China policy. In July, within the week that Mr Nixon had announced his intention to go to China, the New York Times reported that several Japanese companies had cancelled their participation in an economic conference with the Chinese Nationalists and the South Koreans, set for the end of July; that five of the six Japanese shipping companies regularizing servicing Taiwan ports had withdrawn from the Taiwan trade on July 22nd; the Times concluded: "A more independent diplomacy in Japan may have accelerated the move toward China." (7/23/71)

In November the Times reported, "A delegation of Japanese businessmen began discussion today (November 15th) with authorities in Peking in an intensifying effort to build the foundations for a long-term expansion of Japanese exports to China. The mission included some of the most powerful men of the Establishment here in Tokyo. The mission is the most prestigious that has gone to Peking since President Nixon's announcement on July 15th of his proposed trip to China." (NYT 11/16/71)

Canham in the Monitor wrote, "Japan is still quivering from the Nixon shocks...The Japanese nation has come to an important turning point in its post-war history. United States, the benevolent uncle, and Japan the dutiful adolescent, are no more." (CSM 11/20/71)

So we see Washington's major ally in the Far East in the process of reappraising its relationship with China, both politically and economically, moving toward an independent policy - thus limiting Washington's political and economic power, particularly in relation to the People's Republic of China. How dependable, as an American political base in Asia, is Japan?

What was happening in Japan was happening in some degree in countries all over Asia. "Mr Nixon's surprise policy reversal of recent months raises doubts whether he will stay on course. Japan is not the only country wondering whether Mr Nixon's secret negotiations with Peking will lead him next year to abandon Taipei and leave them holding the bag." (NYT editorial 9/19/71)

"The Nixon Administration overtures to Peking and prospect of a presidential visit have set off a series of political shifts in countries all around China from North Korea to Burma. The changes in Asian countries range from moves by some to improve relations with China to more subtle modifications in rhetoric and attitude.

"The most dramatic example is in Korea where competing regimes in the North and South have begun the first direct negotiations on a quasi-official level, prompted directly by the new communications between Washington and Peking." (NYT 10/24/71)

"There is an awareness in Seoul that with the Nixon doctrine of disengagement from the political tensions in the Asian region there will be increased need for Asian nations to stand on their own feet---politically and economically." (CSM 8/19/71)

"The South Koreans must think of their own interests in the changing Asian context. Sources familiar with the South Korean diplomatic planning said that in the emerging political realities in Asia, Seoul does not wish to find itself isolated from China and North Korea. Consequently, they said late last month South Korea sent assurances to Peking, through the Canadian Government, that Seoul is not planning military alliance with Japan, even if American forces are ultimately withdrawn from South Korea. Qualified sources said that as a result of the new U S policy toward China the Seoul Government was actually revising its own policies and has already been making quiet diplomatic overtures to Peking as well as to North Korea." (NYT 9/2/71)

The quasi-official talks going on between North and South Korea are nominally concerned with the reuniting of families and reestablishing of communications. But the New York Times observed, "The efforts are more political than humanitarian." (10/15/71)

Earlier The Times had reported, "Seoul's reported overtures to North Korea were emphasized by Foreign Minister Kim Kong Shik who said, at a conference, that trade, travel and cultural exchanges between North and South might ensue if the two nations reached an agreement on establishing communications or reunion of families." (NYT 8/27/71)

These Asian moves away from Washington's pressures - by Japan, a United States collaborator and by South Korea, an American satellite - are a part of a process going on in many Asian states, forcing the Nixon Administration to "adjust to the new realities and limitations."

In May 1971 the New York Times reported that Cambodia - the Government of Lon Nol - "has quietly shelved consideration of a proposal by Nationalist China that the two governments establish embassies, and has delayed sending a permanent diplomatic mission to Taipei." (NYT 5/8/71) Representatives from Bangkok say there have been some contacts between Thailand and Chinese officials, through third parties, that they regard as favorable. (NYT 5/26/72) "The Philippines, now exploring closer commercial and cultural ties with Peking, have just begun an over-all view of their China policies." (CSM 6/5/71) "China has recently played host to trade delegations from the Philippines and Malaysia." (NYT 5/2/71).

"Malaysian officials point out that Malaysia broke her past policy of hostility to China last fall." (NYT 5/26/71) In May "a 19-man Malay mission went to Peking, headed by the Deputy Chairman of the Malay Rubber Exchange, a quasi-official body. ...A concrete realization of Premier Abdul Rayah's diplomatic initiative toward Peking" was the shipp-

ing of 2650 tons of rubber to China." (NYT 7/26/71) Incidentally, Malaysia's decision to sell rubber to China was reported as a reaction to Washington's plan to dump rubber from its stocks on the world market, thus harming the Malay rubber market.

Burma too was in the process of reestablishing relations with China. "In Rangoon the Chinese ambassador has been energetically cultivating friendly relations with Burma." (NYT 5/29/71) In August General Ne Win has just returned from a visit to China, the first since the breaking of relations in 1967." (NYT 8/18/71)

"India reportedly has taken the initiative in trying to improve relations with China. According to official sources New Delhi has sounded Peking on restoring relations to the ambassadorial level." (NYT 9/16/71) "India is working to improve its relation with Peking." (CSM 9/16/71) "India has recently indicated its interest in improving relations with China." (Wall Street Journal) "Relations between New Delhi and Washington have deteriorated seriously in the last few months....The rupture seems basic, bitter and deep and unlikely to be smoothed over easily." (NYT 9/6/71)

Washington was feeling the pressures of these reappraisals and changing policies among the established regimes of many Asian countries - regimes which Washington has counted on as basically on its side. Nixon was now being forced to face the new realities which are limiting what he could do about China - facing the necessity of at least trying to adjust.

In addition, during the twenty-odd years of Washington's anti-China policy basic changes -- not mere shifts in established government regimes--were in process in Asia. This immense area was seething with liberation movements and with the building of socialist societies. Mongolia, China, North Korea, North Vietnam had come into existence as socialist states. For all these movements - liberation and

·socialist - China had become a bulwark against the old, a pattern for the new.

As Chao Kuan-hua, in his maiden speech at the United Nations said -

"We the Chinese people, defying tight imperialist blockades and withstanding pressures from the West, have built our country into a socialist state, with initial prosperity, by maintaining independence and keeping the initiative in our own hands - and through self-reliance."(NYT 11/16/71)

In the Spring of 1970 there was the formation of the Summit Conference of the Indo-Chinese Peoples - a fraternal front of the liberation forces of the peoples of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, backed by China, North Vietnam and North Korea. Compare this with the "backing" the United States had - the weak cooperation of corrupt puppet regimes in South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Thailand. New power relationships were already at work in Southeast Asia, limiting Washington's China policy.

In Africa too there was a Summit Conference in the fall of 1970 - the Lusaka Summit Conference of the Non-Aligned Nations - 54 of them, mainly African and Asian, held in Lusaka, Zambia. The Conference gave priority to the effort to seat the People's Republic of China in the United Nations. The New York Times wrote: "The countries' prospects are brighter at the United Nations, some of them say privately, because if Peking is seated it will mean that the United Nations will no longer be dominated by the Soviet Union and the United States, and thus, they say, the big powers will be more inclined to listen to their voices." (9/29/71) China in its world relations increasingly limiting the United States!

So, one part of the answer to the "Why?" of Mr Nixon's move toward a changing relation with the People's Republic of China was this background situation Washington was facing in 1971.

"The American move toward reconciliation with The People's Republic of China reflects changed conditions the United States did not create,"

(CSM 3/11/72)

"The tide of world affairs has swept the United States to the point earlier this year when Mr Nixon found it politically and practically profitable to make overtures to the rulers of mainland China. No longer was it sensible to ignore the long-entrenched de facto regime and appear to cling to Chiang's shop-worn claim to represent China." (National Observer 11/2/71)

SECOND STAGE: PRESIDENT NIXON IN PEKING

What a political spectacle! - the president of the world's most powerful imperialist country goes to Peking, the capital of a socialist country, the erst-while object of Washington's most virulent foreign policy! "Mr Nixon began pounding on the door of China" wrote the National Observer (7/17/71) But not even a spokesman, let alone a head of state, of the People's Republic of China, was even knocking at Washington's door. American reactionaries would have preferred to see Peking humbly coming to Washington; instead, Mr Nixon asked for the invitation; Peking granted it; President Nixon traveled to Peking. To liberation forces throughout the world this journey to Peking spoke, not "vaguely" but in strong terms, about the "coming changes" that were facing Washington.

President Kim Il Sung of North Korea probably spoke for the reaction of all liberation forces when he commented on the Nixon visit -

"Nixon's visit to China will not be a march of the victor but the trip of the defeated - and it fully reflects the destiny of United States imperialism, which is like a sun setting in the Western sky. The People's Republic of China, as a reliable pillar of the anti-imperialist revolutionary forces of Asia, is fighting resolutely against the policies of aggression and war of the imperialists headed by the United States of America."

President Nixon was received at the Peking airport with impeccable official courtesy; but it was a subdued welcome - far different from the exuberant welcomes Peking had accorded to tens of smaller countries. "When Mr Nixon arrived and no one came out to see him except officials, the penetrating cold of the wind from the Mongolian plain seemed symbolic." (CSM 2/29/72) "All three networks and some independent stations carried the 10:30 PM arrival of Mr Nixon. Most correspondents were unable to conceal their disappointment with the scope of the welcome - a small delegation, albeit headed by Premier Chou En-lai; no flowers, no banners, no cheering crowds." (NYT 2/22/72) The Times did report, however, that the welcome was "cordial" "polite" "proper" and "sincere" - but it was obvious that China was not falling all over itself to welcome the leader of the imperialist world. This muted welcome was an early indication of the political stance that would essentially characterize this historic meeting in Peking.

The week in Peking included hours of completely off-the-record discussions - President Nixon and Mr Kissinger with Premier Chou En-lai, an hour or so with Chairman Mao Tse-tung, and Secretary of State Rogers with China's Foreign Minister, Chi Peng-fei.

Some tourist travel and entertainment filled other hours, giving the American party, some three hundred of them, glimpses of China's ancient culture, China's modern revolutionary culture, China's countryside - including communes, China's cities and industry, and most of all, China's people. Mr Nixon had provided hundreds of millions of dollars for TV coverage - thus giving viewers in the United States a wider appreciation of the People's Republic of China and serving to dissipate misconceptions and ignorance and also to expose the lies that Washington had for so long inflicted on the American public.

Then there were the banquets with their revealing toasts and the Joint Communique. The toasts and the Joint Communique threw light on this confrontation between socialism and imperialism.

The Joint Communique

This Joint Communique differed from most of the usual communiques issued after representatives have met. There were five introductory paragraphs, giving facts about the participants, the meetings they held, what the American party people did. Then each side - the United States in five paragraphs, the Chinese side in four paragraphs - stated their separate views, with no rebuttal from the opposite side. The Communique concluded with fifteen jointly worked out paragraphs. (See Appendix for the full text).

Surely the Americans who prepared the United States paragraphs must have been tongue-in-cheek as they wrote about such things as "peace" "remove the danger of foreign aggression" "free of outside pressure or intervention" "reduce tensions" "people of Indo-China should be allowed to determine their own destiny."

The Chinese in their paragraphs made not the slightest backing off from their revolutionary stand: "Wherever there is oppression there is resistance. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want revolution - this has become the irresistible trend of history."

The Chinese side stated that it supports the struggle of all oppressed people and nations for freedom and liberation and that people of all countries have the right to choose their social systems according to their own wishes and the right to safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of their own countries and oppose foreign aggression, interference, control and subversion. All foreign troops should be withdrawn to their own countries."

The Chinese made specific - not just generalized - their revolutionary support of oppressed and struggling peoples: "The Chinese side expressed their firm support to the people of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in their efforts for the attainment of their goals and its firm support for the seven-point proposal of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam...and to the Joint Declaration of the Summit Conference of the Indo-Chinese Peoples. It firmly supports the Eight Point program for the peaceful unification of Korea....It firmly opposes the revival and outward expansion of Japanese militarism...and firmly supports the Pakistan Government and people in their struggle to preserve their independence and sovereignty and the people of Jammu and Kashmir in their struggle for the right of self-determination."

On the question of Taiwan "The Chinese reaffirmed its position that the Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States."

The United States, on the question of the status of Taiwan, took a shifty position; whereas "In December Kissinger told newsmen in a briefing in Washington that the United States' view was that the future of Taiwan was something to be settled directly between Taiwan and the mainland," (CSM2/23/72) in the Joint Communiqué it "reaffirmed its interest in a peaceful settlement by the Chinese themselves."

"An interest in" is a weaker statement than the December view. The United States went on: "The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position." What "position"? "that Taiwan is a part of China"? or that both sides "maintain that there is but one China"?

On the issue of withdrawing American military personnel and installations from Taiwan, again the United States took a shifty stand. The United States "will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes." What "area"? Mr Kissinger, in a Shanghai press conference made it specific in discussing American troop removal from Taiwan the term, "in the area", is "a reference to the general area; it is not a reference to any particular part of Asia." And when asked "What conditions in that area would keep American troops in Taiwan?" Mr Kissinger replied, "We are talking about the general state of relationships in Asia and in the world." (NYT2/28/72)

If American withdrawal of its military set-up in Taiwan is dependent on "reducing tension" in the area, then United States military personnel are due for a long stay on Taiwan - judging from United States current continuing and extending of military activities in Vietnam - both North and South. Apparently the United States has no intention whatever to do anything to "diminish tension" in Asia. Quite the opposite.

This United States forked-tongue stance was expressed on April 10th 1972 when Mr Nixon, speaking at ceremonies at the State Department, said that the big powers have a special responsibility to discourage others from mounting attacks on neighbors. The President said that every great power must follow the principle that it should not encourage "directly or indirectly other nations to use force or armed ag-

gression against neighbors." At the very same hour these ceremonies were taking place, "Mr Laird was at the Pentagon asserting that additional American air and naval forces should be sent to Southeast Asia to show 'the determination' of the United States to counter the North Vietnam offensive." (NYT 4/11/72) Where does Washington apply Mr Nixon's "principle" about not using "direct; y or indirectly" "force or armed aggression"? Does that sly word "neighbor" apply to, say Canada? but rule out Southeast Asia?

In the light of the United States record - and continuing record - in Vietnam and Southeast Asia - how hollow - nay, criminally hypocritical - are the words of the United States section of the Joint Communique: "Peace in Asia and peace in the world require efforts both to reduce the immediate tensions and to eliminate the basic causes of conflict." "The United States will work for a just and secure peace, because it fulfills the aspirations of peoples and nations for freedom and progress, because it removes the danger of foreign aggression." "The United States supports individual freedom and social progress for all the peoples of the world free of outside pressure or intervention." "The United States supports the right of the peoples of South Asia to shape their own future in peace, free of military threat, and without having the area become the subject of great power rivalry."!!!!

Pure Nixonesel Pure demagoguery! Pure imperialism! How the Chinese side must have laughed up their political sleeves as the form of the Joint Communique was worked out, each side to "state its own position on issues in a section which it could produce more or less independent of the other" as Mr Kissinger explained in his Shanghai press conference. The form of the Communique almost seems a political trap into which the American side fell - the Chinese side knowing full well how continuing United States military presence and acts in Asia would expose the glaringly hypocritical words of the American side.

The Banquet Toasts

The toasts were of course full of the usual phrases that serve all such occasions and banquets anywhere, any time. But there were deeply significant contrasts between Chou En-lai's toasts and Mr Nixon's. There was political meat in Premier Chou's toasts, stressing always people-to-people relations, while Mr Nixon's toasts were on the level of state to state relations. Chou's toasts were political and revolutionary; Mr Nixon's self-serving, personal and banal.

"As at the airport, there were no invitations to the opening banquet ceremony for the members of the diplomatic corps. This was to emphasize the unilateral and unusual nature of an affair of state between two governments that do not have diplomatic relations. By drawing his subtle distinction between the United States Government and the American people, Premier Chou carefully held to this formula. The central and obvious purpose of the Chinese formula has been to suggest that popular pressures are forcing changes in American policy and that the Chinese can encourage the process by meeting with Mr Nixon without in any way betraying their claims of struggle against American imperialism." (NYT 2/22/72)

Premier Chou En-lai in his initial toast gave a not-too-subtle reminder of Washington's long period of hostile policy; he pointed out that "contacts between our two peoples were suppressed for over twenty years owing to reasons known to all," "meaning" wrote the New York Times, "primarily American support for an independent Taiwan."*

Where Premier Chou En-lai said, "The people and the people alone are the most motive force in the making of world history" Mr Nixon's egotistical emphasis was on the current moment; "The world watches, the world listens, the world waits to see what we will do."* "We"!

*NYT 2/22/72

Then Mr Nixon ingratiatingly quoted from a poem by Mao Tse-tung -

*So many deeds cry out to be done,
And always urgently;
The world rolls on,
Time presses.
Ten thousand years are too long,
Seize the day, seize the hour!*

多少事，
從來急；
天地轉，
光陰迫。
一萬年太久，
只爭朝夕。

But Mr Nixon did not go on to quote the punch lines of Mao's poem -

*The Four Seas are rising,
clouds and waters raging,
The Five Continents are rocking,
wind and thunder roaring.
Away with all pests!
Our force is irresistible.*

四海翻騰雲水怒，
五洲震盪風雷激。
要掃除一切害人蟲，
全無敵。

On the eve of his departure from Peking Mr Nixon hosted a banquet for his Chinese hosts. "A cordial but relatively strained banquet closed the major phase of President Nixon's meetings with Premier Chou En-lai in Peking on February 25th.....With none of the enthusiasm of their opening night feast the Premier and the President traded toasts...Whatever the reason, these toasts and the atmosphere in which they were delivered lacked the air of promise and relaxation of an otherwise identical gathering of the same nine hundred Chinese and American guests.After delivering their remarks the President and the Premier decorously circled their round head table to touch the glasses of the ten members of the opposition delegation. A few more people from nearby tables came over to repeat the routine but there

was none of the abandon and extended table-hopping of the first night. Weariness or the tension of the secret talks or simply of the reality of the gulf that remains between the two countries appear to have had their effect... There seemed to be some loss of flavor that night, even in the banquet food, although the dishes by the Chinese staff of the Great Hall were intriguing in name and appearance - bean sprouts and pigeon egg soup, three delicacies (sea slugs, shrimp balls and chicken) with egg white, duck cubes in spiced sauce, vegetable macedoine, sweet and sour mandarin fish and walnut cream soup, among hors d'oeuvres, assorted pastries, dumplings and fruit." (NYT 2/26/72)

At this final Peking banquet the sharp differing political stance and the differing approaches to relations between the United States and China were evidenced by the respective toasts which "implied diverging objectives."*

"The President said nothing he had not said before setting foot on Chinese soil five days ago and he said it less than on the first night in Peking.... Mr Nixon seized the symbolism of the Great Wall asserting that the meetings 'have begun the long process of removing' the wall between our two countries..." He self-servingly pointed out that it had been "'possible for the story of this historic visit to be read, seen and heard by more people all over the world than on any previous occasion in history'." He had hypocritical words about "'common interests, common hopes, the hope that each of us has to build a new world order'." He pointed out the name of his plane "Spirit of '76" to end his toast by a quotation from George Washington

"'Observe good faith and justice toward all nations. Cultivate peace and harmony with all'."

It was a long, banal, platitudinous, self-serving and hypocritical toast - characteristically imperialist.

*All quotes from NYT 2/26/72

"Mr Chou was even briefer" wrote the New York Times, and listed Mr Nixon's 635-word toast and Mr Chou's 270-word toast.

Premier Chou was explicit in his recognition that the Nixon trip involved no compromising on the basic nature of the two societies. "There exist great differences in principle between our two sides," the Premier said. "Through earnest and frank discussions a clearer knowledge of each other's positions and stands has been gained." He was banking on the strength 'of the people' the Premier said, in feeling optimistic about the long-run evolution of history. He knew that the Chinese and American peoples wanted more understanding and friendship and normal state relations, and the Chinese Government, he promised, will work toward that goal. He said nothing about the United States Government."

As one listened and watched on television the Premier's words - and the expression on his face - seemed almost a stinging finale to the discussions China had had with its imperialist guest:

"The times are advancing and the world changes. We are deeply convinced that the strength of the people is powerful and that whatever zig zags and reverses there will be in the development of history, the general trend of the world is definitely toward light and not darkness."

The gulf remains. No visit to China by a President of the United States changes the fact that the fundamental struggle between imperialism and socialism goes on. The visit accelerated the struggle - providing added exposure of the caliber of imperialist thinking and helping sharpen understanding among the peoples of the world.

THIRD STAGE: POLITICAL FALL-OUT IN ASIA

WORRIES WASHINGTON

In General

Washington sees the necessity of assuring and assuaging its Asian allies and friends. In the year or so before Mr Nixon announced his intention to visit China there already was evidence of uneasiness about the dependability of the United States among its allies, collaborators, puppets and client regimes in Asia. And there were indications these "friends" were becoming concerned about what they might be losing in not having relations with their great Asian neighbor, the People's Republic of China. This uneasiness and concern were not diminished by Mr Nixon's meeting in Peking.

"Shortly before President Nixon left for Peking the State Department announced that some leading members of the President's entourage would brief Japan and eight other Asian allies as soon as the China visit ended." (NYT editorial 2/24/72) So, immediately after the Nixon party flew home from Shanghai the Under Secretary of State, Marshall Green and party left on a trip to eleven Asian countries to explain the Joint Communique.

Mr Green, in an article in the New York Times, written after he returned, wrote, "Following the President's recent trip to Peking, where I accompanied him, the President asked that I visit thirteen countries of Asia to underline, in his name, the high value which we place on our relationship with all our allies and friends in Asia and our commitment to them." (NYT 4/15/72) (The original plan had been to visit nine countries; this plan was increased to eleven; but after the trip began Cambodia and Laos expressed unhappiness because they had been "neglected" so they were included in the itinerary hence the "thirteen countries.")

As Mr Green visited each country on his schedule he was met with the suspicion that there must have been discussion about their country that was not dis-

closed in the Joint Communique. "Problems facing the Presidential envoys is the widening belief in Asia that there were secret agreements or understandings in Peking that were left out of the Communique." (NYT 2/29/72) There was also concern about the dependability of United States support. "America's Pacific allies from Indonesia to Japan continue to be somewhat uncertain whether they can count on United States defense commitment if it should become inconvenient to carry out." (CSM 3/11/72) "Allies of the United States are clearly perplexed over what their relationship with China should be now that the years of cooperation with containment have apparently come to an end." (NYT 2/29/72) "There appeared to be great uncertainty in Asia over the passage in the United States-Chinese Communist Communique deal with Taiwan and there is uncertainty whether the United States has loosened commitment to defend the Nationalist Government there." (NYT 2/29/72)

In Specific Countries

The two Asian allies of the United States most likely to be immediately and seriously affected by the Washington-Peking dialogue are Japan and Taiwan. Japan is the major ally of the United States in the Far East; and Taiwan, the most strongly backed and used puppet, was the most detailed subject of the Joint Communique.

Japan. Mr Green had an especially delicate task to carry out in Tokyo. Japan was already feeling resentment over Mr Nixon's failure to inform Tokyo of his intended Peking visit and over Nixon's unilateral economic policies. Now, the sending of Mr Green, rather than a visit by the President, or even by Mr Kissinger, seemed an added affront.

"The Japanese Government, fearful of being undermined by President Nixon's visit to China, reacted last night (February 27th) with almost visible relief to the limited concrete achievements set out in the Communique...However, this morning (February 28th) the highly critical Japanese press spoke of 'betrayal' by the United States and assail-

ed Premier Sato for having left himself be outstripped by Washington in forming ties with Peking....Foreign Minister Takeo Fukuda said that the President's visit would serve as a lubricant for Japan to normalize her relations with China...Although gratified that the United States did not make the great leap forward in its relations with China, some officials expressed concern that there might be undeclared secret agreements affecting their country."(NYT2/28/72)

"Mr Green told the Japanese Government that Mr Nixon had made no secret deals during his visit to China. Also, Mr Nixon had sent Mr Sato a personal letter reassuring him that Japan remains a key ally of the United States. The letter was apparently intended to calm any Japanese fear of being undermined by the expanding contacts between the United States and China." (NYT 2/29/72)

"According to Foreign Ministry sources Mr Green told Fukuda that the United States had maintained in Peking that it would retain its military and other commitments to its allies...Mr Green was reported to have said that part of the talks in Peking had been devoted to 'historical and philosophical discussions and that the personal exchanges envisioned between China and the United States would take time to develop because of the language and other factors. According to the reports Mr Green assured Mr Fukuda that the American delegation had refused to accept China's charges of a revival of Japanese militarism." (NYT 2/29/71)

Albeit that there were these relatively mild first reactions to the visit, the reverberations were by no means over. "Japanese Government sources say that the shock waves of the Nixon visit and consequent Communique are still reverberating."(CSM3/30/72) The Secretary General of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party warned that the effect of the Chinese-American talks on the Hapanese people must not be underestimated.(CSM 3/18/72) "The President's visit to China caused considerable apprehension in Japan and visible irritation among Japanese leaders." (CSM 3/30/72)

"China is the biggest issue in Japanese politics and Mr Sato and his political successors are judged in terms of their ability to come to terms with Japan's historic rival. President Nixon without a word of consultation has updated them all." (NYT 4/15/72) Japan has been - and is - going through intense political struggles over the issue of relations with the People's Republic of China. Pro-American Premier Sato has been under fire for his sticking to collaboration with the United States on the question of Taiwan and recognition of China; Mr Nixon's visit is putting ammunition into the hands of the opposition parties and even individuals in Sato's own party. "The Japanese Government has been forced by Nixon's visit to China to redefine its position on the future of Taiwan and it is having trouble....The Government is in no position to speak about Taiwan's legal status since it renounced 'all right, title and claim' to Taiwan and the Pescadores under the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951. However the Government can fully understand the claim of the People's Republic of China that Taiwan is a part of its territory in the light of the circumstances in which China has been admitted to the United Nations and other developments. The Communiqué which said that the question of Taiwan should be settled peaceably by the Chinese themselves was interpreted in the Japanese press as weakening the American commitment to an independent Taiwan." (NYT3/6/72)

"In Japan Mr Green is presumably seeking to bolster Mr Sato who is coming under increasing attack for clinging too long to Taiwan at the expense of improving relations with Peking. Mr Sato, a deeply conservative politician, cooperated for years with American efforts to keep Nationalists in the United Nations and keep the Peking Government out." (NYT3/29/72) "The confusion here (in Tokyo) is that the White House has shifted the terms of the Japanese alliance to its own advantage and invited Japan to take it or leave it." (NYT 4/15/72) "Today the Mutual Security Treaty with the United States is under criticism as needless and indeed provocative toward China." (NYT3/15/72)

Even after Mr Green's return from his Asian tour Washington appeared to be making an effort to smooth relations with Japan. On March 29th "It was announced by the State Department that Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's advisor on National Security, will fly to Tokyo on April 15th for three days official discussion with Japanese leaders." The White House spokesman Ziegler "insisted that the visit was not related to Mr Nixon's trip to China. At the same time, however, officials in Washington acknowledged that there was nothing to be lost and perhaps more to be gained by sending Mr Kissinger to give the Japanese further assurance that no secret deal had been made in Peking at their expense."(NYT 3/30/72) Another exhibition of Washington's forked-tongue!

The Christian Science Monitor asked "Just how bad are the American-Japanese relations which United States presidential advisor Henry Kissinger is coming to Tokyo to mend...and will Kissinger succeed in his mending?"(CSM 3/31/72)

Then came another United States move which affronted Japan. On April 14th, the day before Mr Kissinger was due in Japan "The postponement of Henry A Kissinger's visit to Japan." This "has disappointed officials here" (Tokyo) which "seems another instance of the United States growing indifference to its Asian ally. The abrupt United States policy shifts on China and trade, accomplished, the Japanese feel, at their expense, have left this country perplexed and restless....The question is, What is Japan likely to do is this feeling of isolation persists and gathering force. Some analysts put the question more starkly: how far can the United States push or embarrass Japan?....The choices for Japan seem limited. However she is casting her foreign policy net wider to dilute the importance of her symbolic relations with the United States." (NYT 4/15/72) Another postponement of Mr Kissinger's trip to Japan was made in May!

In addition to the international and domestic political pressure on Japan to "dilute the importance of her relationship with the United States" there is the domestic economic pressure.

"Business men are putting their intense pressure on Japan's business-oriented governing Liberal Democratic Party to come to terms with the Chinese, in view of Japan's extensive trade, and the prospect of future American competition."(NYT 3/26/72)

"A spokesman for Premier Sato, Noboru Takeshite, the chief Cabinet Secretary, said that business and other private contacts continue between China and Japan had already produced 'considerable results' and he expressed hope that government-level dialogue would begin soon. 'The distance between Washington and Peking is now shorter than that between Tokyo and Peking. But Japan is now in a better position to close that distance'." (NYT 2/28/72)

As Mr Sulzberger of the New York Times writes: "Today Japan is on the verge of becoming more obviously independent in the expression of its policy ...For the first time since 1945 Japanese governments will have to take major decisions founded upon purely national interests and benefitting them from a central position triangulated between Russia, China and America."(4/16/72)

"Foreign Minister Takeo Fukuda said that the President's visit could serve as a lubricant for Japan to normalize her relation with China," as reported in the New York Times of February 26th '72. So it is quite possible that Mr Nixon's visit to China has helped shove Japan toward an independent foreign policy.

Taiwan "Mr Green's discussions in Taiwan were among the longest held anywhere; Vice-Premier Chiang Ching-kuo, President Chiang's son and apparent heir, was among the participants." (CSM 3/17/72)

"For Nationalist China President Nixon's presence on the mainland has been like a long, enforced roller-coaster ride. Once the President arrived in Peking there was nothing for anyone here in Taipei to do but sit tight and wait. Throughout the visit the main government line - that President Nixon would not sell out Taiwan - was constantly reiterated." (CSM 2/28/72)

"Last week's visit here (Taipei) of U S Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Green appears to have calmed fears and given government realists the assurances they needed about the island's future. After he left, officials seemed visibly more relaxed. Talk about a secret deal made in Peking faded. The overall feeling among officials seems to be that the United States defense commitment is still strong; that as long as that pledge holds Taiwan can learn to live with an ambiguous U S Taiwan policy - or to put it another way, a more neutral United States China policy." (CSM 3/7/72)

"The words" in the Communique 'The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China, the US does not challenge that position' caused dismay on Taiwan." (NYT 3/7/72) On the question of Taiwan's status the formal American security commitment to Taiwan was embodied in the 1955 mutual defense treaty. "But State Department lawyers say that the treaty has no implications about the sovereignty of Taiwan." (NYT 3/6/72)

But the officially expressed reaction to Mr Nixon's approach to the People's Republic of China may not represent all the thinking on Taiwan.

"The reaction to the new U S China policy disclosed a clear split in Taiwan's leadership. On the one hand, it elicited the traditional 'back to the mainland' rhetoric from those surrounding Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. At the same time, the realists running the government, such as Premier Yen Chia-kan, Foreign Minister Chow Shu-kai and even Vice-Premier Chiang Ching-kuo (President Chiang's son) seemed more preoccupied with the practical effects the new policy could have than with ideology. These men wanted clarification on concrete problems raised by the Communiqué; had a time-table for American troop withdrawal from Taiwan been set? Was the U S really acknowledging Peking's claim to Taiwan?

"Once Mr Green gave them these assurances their main concern was U S trade relations with Taiwan. Mr Yen spent most of his time with Mr Green talking about this. These leaders are concerned that the spotlight on Taiwan will discourage foreign investment in Taiwan. They also are worried about an economic offensive mounted against them by Peking. Thus, they were extremely appreciative of Mr Green's departure statement that stressed American companies still find Taiwan a good place to invest, and the US Export-Import Bank will continue its support.

"These men know that economics is the key to Taiwan's future. Only two days after Mr Green's departure the government issued an unusual statement publicly stating that it will relax restrictions against imports from Communist countries and encouraging investment from countries that have no diplomatic relations with Taiwan." (CSM 3/7/72)

Taipei is facing the fact that "There is a new somewhat diminishing relation between the United States and Taiwan." (CSM 3/11/72) And they are already acting accordingly. "The Taipei Government has hinted that it will try and set up diplomatic ties with Communist countries not hostile to the Nationalist Chinese. The hint came from Foreign

Minister S K Chou...The Vice-chairman of the Council for International Economic Cooperation, Walter Fei, left two days ago on a two-week exploratory visit to Europe. His main mission is to sound out the East European Communists on the possibility of trade. He will seek out countries like Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany... Taipei seems confident of finding enough Communist countries to trade with, to be profitable - from a business point of view as well as political..."(CSM Asian News Service 3/15/72)

On its part too the United States is lessening one aspect of its economic relationship with Taiwan. "One of the immediate effects on Taiwan of the Nixon-Chou talks is the end of Rest and Recreation for American servicemen in Taiwan. From April first Taiwan will no longer be an official vacation spot for American servicemen...Since November 1965 Taiwan has been one of the most popular recreation centers for the pleasure-seeking soldiers from Vietnam. In the six years up to last December 200,000 American servicemen visited Taiwan....They spent an estimated \$50,000,000."(CSM Asia News Service 3/23/72)

"The United States did not seek nor' did it create this diminishing relationship but it emerged gradually from events which it was not in the power of the United States to control."(CSM Asia News Service 3/11/72)

Other Asian Countries. In his visits to the authorities in the various Asian regimes Mr Green had to give assurances of "no deals behind their backs", "continued United States support", and that the visit to Peking was in the interest of peace.

"Assessments of Washington's post-Peking effort to reassure Asian allies are mixed. State Department officials themselves say...they are pleasantly surprised by the results of the whirlwind 13-countries-in-20-days Asian trip by Marshall Green.. Mr Green has indicated publicly that in terms of easing Asian fears, the mission has been 'entirely successful.' Observers outside the Government and some of Mr Green's hosts themselves tend to be more reserved in their assessment....Doubts are apt to linger among the allies whether they have really been told everything." (CSM 3/17/72)

Some details on the responses to Mr Green's visit show much questioning among these "friends and allies" of Washington. South Korean leaders let the Korean press know that they doubt they know everything that went on behind the scenes in Peking...Seoul is taking a cautious attitude and appears to feel that their interests have not been compromised yet by the American-Chinese rapprochement...In essence Seoul repeated the pre--Communique calm view expressed by President Park Chung Hee warning against any 'illusory fantasy' about a new era of peace after the visit of Marshall Green.

"Officials told the Korean press that Mr Green repeated America's strong support of the Republic of Korea (and continued military assistance) and assured the Koreans that no secret deals were made in China." (CSM 3/10/72)

"Some politicians here in Seoul were suspicious that there must have been broader discussion of Korea than was disclosed in the Joint Communique. Foreign Minister Kim Yong Shik, commenting on the Communique, told newsmen, 'We welcome the American support of our position on the Korean problem, opposing Communist China.'" NYT 2/29/72)

In South Vietnam "The initial reaction to the Communiqué issued last night was cautious; officials were suspicious and anxious to learn if the Americans had made any concessions to the Chinese not covered in the Communiqué.... A spokesman at the Presidential Palace said, 'We are studying the Communiqué and we may have something to say about it in a few days.' Their initial reaction to the Communiqué is reliably reported to be one of cautious relief, since it was clear that the Chinese had not budged from their position of supporting the North Vietnamese and Vietcong's terms for a settlement. But the United States did not mention 'close ties with and support for' the Republic of Vietnam as it did for the Republic of Korea, and, in different terms for Japan." (NYT 2/28/72)

"Mr Green said that he had assured the South Vietnam leaders that American policy toward Vietnam had not been affected by President Nixon's trip to China. He had conveyed Mr Nixon's assurances that American policy toward South Vietnam was still to follow the policy of Vietnamization and to seek a negotiated end to the war at the Paris peace talks. During his two day stay Green reportedly delivered a letter from Mr Nixon to Mr Thieu; American and South Vietnam officials refused to discuss the contents but they said it offered further reassurances that Mr Nixon had not made any secret deals in Peking. Officials in Saigon who had worried that the real purpose behind Mr Nixon's visit to China was to negotiate a compromise settlement to the Vietnam war appeared to relax.." (NYT 3/8/72)

Arriving in Cambodia "in a statement issued at the Phnompenh airport Mr Green said he told the Cambodians that the United States would continue to support the Cambodian Government's resistance to Communist attacks. He said he told them that the United States was interested in a settlement in which the armed forces of all the Indo-Chinese states will remain within their national frontiers." (NYT A/P 3/1 72)

"General Sisowath Sirik Matak, Premier of Cambodia, said that Mr Green had assured him that Mr Nixon's talks in Peking in no way affected the Cambodian situation. 'We will continue to receive United States aid and all the guarantees that we would desire to have' the General said in a statement released on March 8th."(NYT A/P 3/9/72)

In Malaysia Mr Green said he had assured leaders there that the United States is "fully prepared to render all appropriate encouragement and assistance in efforts of nations in this area to deal with issues and problems on the basis of regional cooperation. He said that he had emphasized to Premier Abdul Razak that while the United States seeks a better understanding with China, at the same time it is determined to remain a Pacific Power."(NYT A/P 3/11/72)

Mr Green spent two hours with Premier Souvanna Phouma of Laos. "The official Laotian press agency meanwhile said in a somewhat reserved editorial that President Nixon had had a 'semi-success' in Peking and it asked 'the big powers who rule this world' to 'take into account the realities of Laos'. The press agency's editorial asked the big powers 'not to forget that the Indochinese problem is not a totality' because Laos has 'only one' government which is 'recognized by all the countries of both West and East as proved by the existence in Vietienne of all the major diplomatic representatives'." (NYT Agency French Press 3/8/72) In a written statement read to the press before he took off for Bangkok Mr Green said, 'In our conversations I emphasized that there had been no change in our determination to stand by our friends as a result of the Peking visit. I stressed in my talk with the Prime Minister that the United States continues to support Laotian neutrality as provided for in the Geneva Accords of 1962.'"(NYT Reuters 3/8/72)

In the Philippines Mr Green held a two-hour briefing for President Marcos and his aides. Mr Marcos was told by Mr Green 'Nothing that has happened in the last few weeks would affect the close relations between the Philippines and the United States. Mr Green reiterated a pledge to comply with the treaty obligations with the Philippines. He stated in the strongest possible terms that there was no plan on the part of the United States to withdraw from Asia." (NT 3/5/72) "In Manila, Mr Green, quoting President Nixon, said that the bilateral treaties with Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and the Philippines remained 'the touchstones of regional stability'," (NYT A/P 3/7/72)

Mr Green assured Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore that the United States-Chinese meeting should continue to lessening tensions in East and Southeast Asia." (NYT 3/12/72)

In Thailand "On March sixth Marshall Green met for ninety minutes discussion with Premier Thonon Kittikahorn and his associates, but declined to comment on their discussion, saying he would issue a statement before leaving the next day.....He was also to brief the United States ambassadors to Cambodia, Laos and Burma during his stay in Thailand." (NYT A/P 3/9/72) Earlier in Shanghai "American officials insisted that the United States would maintain the defense commitment to Thailand that exists under the Mutual Defense Treaty." (NYT2/28/72)

In Australia Mr Green described President Nixon's visit to China as an opening for peace; he told newsmen 'I feel it is an opening for peace but we must however remain on our guard and must continue to support our friends and allies'." (NYT Reuters 3/14/72) "Mr Green also met with General Jesus Vargas..Secretary General of SEATO while in Thailand/"(NYT A/P 3/9/72) Sulzberger of the New Times wrote: "Both CENTO and SEATO, the main multinational alliances, are dead." (NYT 3/22/72)

In a newspaper report on his tour among Asian "friends and allies" of Washington Mr Green wrote, "I believe I helped in assuring Asian leaders that our seeking a closer relationship with the People's Republic of China will not be at the expense of their nations...What I found in effect to be the deepest concern was the conviction that they continue to be faced with undiminished threats to their security..... that their capacities to become stronger and more self-reliant still depend significantly on United States aid...In the countries of Indochina this aid is essential to their survival."(NYT 4/18/72)

"Leaders"- "security" - "dependence on the United States" - "threats": it is obvious that Mr Green's "they" is not the people but the current "leaders" of Washington's puppet and client Asian regimes. It is obvious whose "security" is faced with "threats": it is not the people's interests that are threatened, but the interests of the leaders of these regimes. And it is obvious that the threat comes, not from any Asian neighbor, but rather from the inside - from the domestic policies and international ties of these leaders and from domestic popular unrest. And it is obvious from the experience of China and North Korea that the "capacities to become strong and self-reliant" would be enhanced if American imperialism would clear out. It is especially obvious that only through all-out liberation struggles can United States imperialism be forced out.

It was Washington's "allies and friends"- the puppet, client and collaborationist "leaders" that Mr Green visited. This tour was a chore performed for American imperialism. He went to bolster these "leaders" assuring them that they can continue to count on the same kind of client relationship with and support from Washington. He made it explicit that Washington is not withdrawing from Asia, that the United States military presence will remain. Mr Nixon's May 8th 1972 announcement of the mining of North Vietnam ports implements Mr Green's message to these Asian allies.

But "reassurances aside, there is no getting around the fact that the old United States containment policy has changed and this is bound to have repercussions for the allies." (CSM 3/17/72)

On March sixth 1972 the New York Times reported "Washington is full of specialists in government and in private institutions who seem to agree that the following strategic shifts are likely to occur in the area as a consequences of the new relationship between Washington and Peking"-

- 1) "As the influence of the United States diminishes that of China will increase commensurably. China's political impact is expected to be vast even if her economic influence remains second to that of Japan."

An indication of this increasing status of China in the area followed immediately after the issuing of the Joint Communique. In Australia Prime Minister William McMahon said today that Australia would test China to see whether she would be prepared to move toward normal relations without making Taiwan a stumbling block." (NYT 2/28/72) Then on March 7th the Times reported that "Prime Minister McMahon has declared that Australia will seek to broaden relations with mainland China through a new diplomatic mission to be established in Hongkong."

"A report in the Manila Times said today that negotiations were under way between the Philippines and China on the possibility of diplomatic recognition...that the Philippine delegate to the United Nations had been meeting with the Chinese delegates there." (NYT Reuters 2/27/72) "Philippine President Marcus has appointed a Cabinet Committee to prepare the country for eventual disengagement from Taipei and for possible recognition of the People's Republic of China." (CSM 3/17/72) "Senator Laurel of the Philippine Senate was commissioned by the Philippine Senate president Pyat to make an observation tour of China." (CSM Asia New Service 3/10/72) "Philippine

Senator Salvador H Laurel and Mrs Laurel arrived in Peking on March 14th." (Hsinhua News Agency 3/20/72)

The Times article goes on about the "strategic shifts" -

- 2) "One consequence may be a new assertion of loyalty to the mainland among the powerful over-seas Chinese communities."

The beginning of a changing loyalty on the part of Chinese abroad was already apparent. Wrote the Monitor - "There are numerous over-seas Chinese, for example, whose loyalty to Taiwan may shift." (3/17/72) Wrote the New York Times - "News of President Nixon's arrival in China was given a prominent position in all the Taipei afternoon newspapers and was mentioned briefly by Taiwan's three television networks. (2/22/72) "Every one seemed fascinated by the details of the trip. People learned more about everyday life on the mainland in one week of newspaper coverage than they had in twenty years of Nationalist propaganda - and found much to be proud of - the cleanliness and lack of corruption, for example. Some observers feel that this growing admiration could be dangerous for the Nationalist government. It might soften the people's fear of mainland domination and play into the new propaganda offensive of the People's Republic; this new campaign revives the old promise of autonomy if Taiwan were to rejoin the mainland." (CSM 2/23/72) "Many former supporters of Taiwan independence have changed their tune. Survival is the most important thing, not whether one is Taiwanese or Chinese. The deep-seated fear of the mainland could change. The seeds of nationalism have been sown in Taiwan. After going through the Nationalist school system young people consider themselves more Chinese than Taiwanese. Annoyance with the United States could grow. A more attractive image of mainland China could emerge." (CSM 3/7/72)

And in Thailand "Circulation of the five

major Chinese newspaper here in Bangkok jumped dramatically during the Peking parley. Street vendors waited patiently on side-walks outside newspaper offices at edition time to read from the newspapers pasted on the walls... The Chinese-language newspapers, for the first time allowed to publish pictures of Chinese leaders, did so with gusto. One middle-aged woman who left Shanghai twenty two years ago said, 'I am here in Thailand. My head is oriental, but my blood is Chinese.' This woman reflects the attitude of many who followed the Nixon visit with excitement and pride. The sudden exposure of China to news coverage had rekindled memories of home, family, traditions and childhood. Thailand has three million Chinese."(CSM 3/4/72)

The Times article continues about the "strategic shifts" -

- 3) "The trend among Southeast Asian nations toward neutralism will accelerate."

"Meeting in the Malaysian capital of Kuala Lumpur last November, the foreign ministers of the member states of the Association of Southeastern Asian Nations" in "their communique set 'neutralization' of the region as a major long-term goal." (NYT 3/6/72)

The last "strategic shift" listed was that

- 4) "Reliance on regional defense and economic grouping, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, will increase but without the direct participation of the great powers as in the case of SEATO. The big powers would be called upon for support but not for direct involvement."

The visits to Asian capitals following the Peking meeting were not to the peoples of Asia but

to Washington's "friends and allies" - that is, to the restless, questioning and suspicious leaders of collaborating, client and puppet regimes. The "tensions" of which the United States seeks a "lessening" are "the new realities and limitations" (Reston) in Asia to which Washington now must of necessity (not "willingness" as Mr Reston phrased it) adjust. Mr Green's tour was a part of the process of adjusting.

CONCLUSION

Some good, of course, comes out of the historic meeting between the President of the United States and the authorities in the People's Republic of China. As the Joint Communiqué stated: "Both sides agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding between the two peoples. To this end they discussed specific areas in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which people-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial. Each side undertook to facilitate the further development of such contacts and exchanges...Both sides view bilateral trade as another area from which mutual benefit can be derived and agree that economic relations based on equality and mutual benefit are in the interest of the two countries. They agreed to facilitate the progressive development of trade between their two countries."

Already the process of people-to-people contacts is in progress. Americans, as individuals and in groups, are visiting China as guests of Chinese individuals and organizations. The Chinese table tennis team has been traveling in the United States, drawing tens of thousands of friendly Americans who are responding to "friendship first, competition second." Thousands have begun to enjoy the playful pandas in the Washington zoo. Some American trade interests are attending, for the first time, the Trade Fair in Kwangtung (Canton). The United Nations

Mission of the People's Republic of China works and resides in New York, constantly described in the American press in cordial and friendly terms. An increasing interest in Chinese medicine, especially acupuncture, is widely expressed by Americans.

The developments that led Mr Nixon to make his historic move, the highlighting and sharpening, during the Peking meetings, of the nature of the relationship between the two societies, the follow-up visits to Asian regimes - these show all the world the "WHY" of President Nixon's China trip - why a change, an adjustment in Washington's China policy became a necessity.

The meeting of the high representatives of the two Governments in Peking and the continuing contact in Paris in no degree lessen the reality or the intensity of the confrontation and struggle between imperialism and socialism. "Neither Peking nor Washington has altered its substantial position in any way as a result of increased contacts" wrote the New York Times in an editorial on October ninth 1971.

"They reviewed the international situation in which important changes and great upheavels are taking place" asserted the Joint Communiqué.

The confrontation was well expressed by Chou En-lai -

"The whole world is in the midst of a great upheavel, and the situation is excellent."*

(*NYT 8/21/71)

Joint Communique

The Chinese and U.S. sides reached agreement on a joint communique on February 27, 1972 in Shanghai. Full text of the communique is as follows:

PRESIDENT Richard Nixon of the United States of America visited the People's Republic of China at the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China from February 21 to February 28, 1972. Accompanying the President were Mrs. Nixon, U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers, Assistant to the President Dr. Henry Kissinger, and other American officials.

President Nixon met with Chairman Mao Tsetung of the Communist Party of China on February 21. The two leaders had a serious and frank exchange of views on Sino-U.S. relations and world affairs.

During the visit, extensive, earnest and frank discussions were held between President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai on the normalization of relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, as well as on other matters of interest to both sides. In addition, Secretary of State William Rogers and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei held talks in the same spirit.

President Nixon and his party visited Peking and viewed cultural, industrial and agricultural sites, and they also toured Hangchow and Shanghai where, continuing discussions with Chinese leaders, they viewed similar places of interest.

The leaders of the People's Republic of China and the United States of America found it beneficial to have this opportunity, after so many years without contact, to present candidly to one another their views on a variety of issues. They reviewed the international situation in which important changes and great upheavals are taking place and expounded their respective positions and attitudes.

The Chinese side stated: Wherever there is oppression, there is resistance. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want revolution — this has become the irresistible trend of history. All nations, big or small, should be equal; big nations should not bully the small and strong nations should not bully the weak. China will never be a superpower and it opposes hegemony and power politics of any kind. The Chinese side stated that it firmly supports the struggles of all the oppressed people and nations for freedom and liberation and that the people of all countries have the right to choose their social systems according to their own wishes and the right to safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of their own countries and oppose foreign aggression, interference, control and subversion. All foreign troops should be withdrawn to their own countries. The Chinese side expressed its firm support to the peoples of Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia in their efforts for the attainment of their goal and its firm support to the seven-point proposal of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam and the elaboration of February this year on the two key problems in the proposal, and to the Joint Declaration of the Summit Conference of the Indochinese Peoples. It firmly supports the eight-point program for the peaceful unification of Korea put forward by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on April 12, 1971, and the stand for the abolition of the "U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea". It firmly opposes the revival and outward expansion of Japanese militarism and firmly supports the Japanese people's desire to build an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan. It firmly maintains that India and Pakistan should, in accordance with the United Nations resolutions on the India-Pakistan question, immediately withdraw all their forces to their respective territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir and firmly supports the Pakistan Government and people in their struggle to preserve their independence and sovereignty and the people of Jammu and Kashmir in their struggle for the right of self-determination.

The U.S. side stated: Peace in Asia and peace in the world requires efforts both to reduce immediate tensions and to eliminate the basic causes of conflict. The United States will work for a just and secure peace: just, because it fulfills the aspirations of peo-

ples and nations for freedom and progress; secure, because it removes the danger of foreign aggression. The United States supports individual freedom and social progress for all the peoples of the world, free of outside pressure or intervention. The United States believes that the effort to reduce tensions is served by improving communication between countries that have different ideologies so as to lessen the risks of confrontation through accident, miscalculation or misunderstanding. Countries should treat each other with mutual respect and be willing to compete peacefully, letting performance be the ultimate judge. No country should claim infallibility and each country should be prepared to re-examine its own attitudes for the common good. The United States stressed that the peoples of Indochina should be allowed to determine their destiny without outside intervention; its constant primary objective has been a negotiated solution; the eight-point proposal put forward by the Republic of Viet Nam and the United States on January 27, 1972 represents a basis for the attainment of that objective; in the absence of a negotiated settlement the United States envisages the ultimate withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the region consistent with the aim of self-determination for each country of Indochina. The United States will maintain its close ties with and support for the Republic of Korea; the United States will support efforts of the Republic of Korea to seek a relaxation of tension and increased communication in the Korean peninsula. The United States places the highest value on its friendly relations with Japan; it will continue to develop the existing close bonds. Consistent with the United Nations Security Council Resolution of December 21, 1971, the United States favors the continuation of the ceasefire between India and Pakistan and the withdrawal of all military forces to within their own territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir; the United States supports the right of the peoples of South Asia to shape their own future in peace, free of military threat, and without having the area become the subject of great power rivalry.

There are essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states,

non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. International disputes should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use or threat of force. The United States and the People's Republic of China are prepared to apply these principles to their mutual relations.

With these principles of international relations in mind the two sides stated that:

— progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the United States is in the interests of all countries;

— both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict;

— neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony; and

— neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.

Both sides are of the view that it would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for any major country to collude with another against other countries, or for major countries to divide up the world into spheres of interest.

The two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between China and the United States. The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: The Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of "one China, one Taiwan", "one China, two governments", "two Chinas", an "independent Taiwan" or advocate that "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined".

The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.

The two sides agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding between the two peoples. To this end, they discussed specific areas in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which people-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial. Each side undertakes to facilitate the further development of such contacts and exchanges.

Both sides view bilateral trade as another area from which mutual benefit can be derived, and agreed that economic relations based on equality and mutual benefit are in the interest of the peoples of the two countries. They agree to facilitate the progressive development of trade between their two countries.

The two sides agreed that they will stay in contact through various channels, including the sending of a senior U.S. representative to Peking from time to time for concrete consultations to further the normalization of relations between the two countries and continue to exchange views on issues of common interest.

The two sides expressed the hope that the gains achieved during this visit would open up new prospects for the relations between the two countries. They believe that the normalization of relations between the two countries is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the world.

President Nixon, Mrs. Nixon and the American party expressed their appreciation for the gracious hospitality shown them by the Government and people of the People's Republic of China.

February 28, 1972

THE "WHY?"
OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S
WELCOME
TO PRESIDENT NIXON

If the Administration had ever entertained any idea that a visit to China by the President would water-down China's socialist, revolutionary and anti-imperialist stance, the Nixon party and the world are finding out otherwise.

As the Nixon party arrived in Peking they were greeted by a huge billboard. "The giant billboard stood through the arrival and departure at the Peking airport, stoically proclaiming -

'Make trouble, fail;
Make trouble again;
Fail again
Until their doom.
This is the nature
Of all imperialists
And reactionaries of the world.
This is the Marxist law
And they will never go against it.'*

This arrival greeting, the subdued "correct but only modest welcome,"* "gracious hospitality but no tribute"; Premier Chou's toasts, the statements in the Chinese side of the Joint Communique were each continuous signals to the imperialist guests that they were dealing with a socialist host. "Apparently the Chinese understood Mr Nixon's political desire for exposure at home in this election year."**

Why, then, did the People's Republic of China respond to President Nixon's desire to go to China?

China's allowing Mr Nixon massive television coverage presented to millions (Americans, overseas

NYT *2/27/72 ** 2/22/72

Chinese and others) who were previously hostile, uninformed or misinformed a picture that they could see for themselves direct from China. No longer could Washington and Taipei get away with certain lies about mainland China. Nixon may have gained a temporary advantage but the American and Chinese people received basic gains. Moreover, the political effects planned by the TV coverage of Mr Nixon's calculated arrivals - in Peking and then a week later, in Washington - at evening prime-time hours have already considerably faded. Mr Nixon's "peace" stunt has largely been blotted out by Washington's continuing and intensifying war actions in Vietnam.

China's astuteness in allowing the Nixon spectacular can hardly be over-estimated!

This confrontation between the representatives of two opposing systems, two world views, demonstrates and furthered the application of a basic principle of socialist China. Whether it is a civil war, or domestic political dissidents, or a threatening unfriendly neighbor, or the representatives of an opposing ideology China uses - flexibly - both peaceful means and defense against aggression to advance its revolutionary, anti-imperialist, pro-peace goal.

There is historic precedent for the application of the principle of using negotiations in confrontation with an enemy.

During the bitter civil war between Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese people "Mao went to Chungking for peace negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek. Because the Chinese Communist Party and the broad masses of the Chinese people firmly opposed Chiang Kai-shek's civil war plot and because United States imperialism still had to pay some heed to world-wide democratic public opinion, which unanimously condemned his policy of civil war and dictatorship, Chiang sent three telegrams to Comrade Mao Tse-tung on August 14, 20 and 23, 1941 inviting him to Chungking for peace negotiations; and for the same purpose Patrick J Hurley, then United States Ambassador to Kuomintang China, came to Yanan

on August 27th. The Communist Party of China decided to send Comrades Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai and Wang Jo-fei to Chungking for peace negotiations with the Kuomintang in order to make every possible effort for peace; and also, in the process of struggling for peace, to show United States imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek in their true colors and so unite and educate the masses of the people....

"Although the negotiations resulted only in the publication of 'The Summary of Conversations Between the Representatives of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China' (also known as the 'October 10th Agreement') they were never-the-less successful in that politically they enabled the Chinese Communist Party to gain the initiative to a great extent and put the Kuomintang in a passive position.

"The Summary of Conversations was signed by representatives of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China on October 10th 1941. In the Summary Chiang Kai-shek had to feign agreement with 'the basic policy of peace and national construction' put forward by the Communist Party and accept 'long-term cooperation on the basis of peace, democracy, solidarity and unity...resolute avoidance of civil war and the building of a new China, independent, free, prosperous and powerful' and 'democratization of political life, nationalization of troops'(the uniting of the troops of the Kuomintang Army and the People's Liberation Army in one national army...ed) 'and equality and legality of political parties as ways and means absolutely essential for achieving peace and national construction.' He also had to agree to bring the Kuomintang's political tutelage to a speedy conclusion, convene a political consultative conference, 'guarantee freedom of person, belief, speech, the press, assembly and association....release political prisoners, actively carry out local self-government and conduct general elections from the lower level upward'."

Reactionaries and imperialists are pressured into agreeing to negotiate with socialist countries by

world-wide public opinion which condemns their actions and because of international and domestic realities and limitations over which they have no control but which force them to adjust their policies.

Writing about the Chungking negotiations, Mao asked, "Why have they negotiated? Why have they concluded the October 10th Agreement? In this world things are complicated and are decided by many factors. We should look at the problems from different aspects, not from just one. In Chungking some people think Chiang Kai-shek is unreliable, and deceitful and that negotiations with him can lead nowhere....I told them that what they said was justified and well-founded. The Kuomintang and the Communist Party are sure to fail in their negotiations, sure to start fighting and sure to break with each other. But that is only one aspect of the matter. Another aspect is that many factors are bound to make Chiang Kai-shek have many misgivings. Among these factors the three main ones are the might of the Liberated Areas, the opposition to the civil war by the people in the Great Rear Area, and the international situation....

"Our work in the Liberated Areas has already influenced all China and the whole world..., Chiang Kai-shek has to be a little bit realistic. He was realistic in inviting us and we were realistic in going to negotiate with him. As a result of the negotiations the Kuomintang has accepted the general policy of peace and unity. That's fine. If the Kuomintang launches civil war again it will put itself in the wrong in the eyes of the whole nation and the whole world and we shall have all the more reason to smash its attacks by a war of self-defence.

"Now that the October 10th Agreement has been concluded our task is to uphold the Agreement, to demand that the Kuomintang honor it and to continue to strive for peace. If they fight we will wipe them out completely.

"Peace will not come unless we strike hard blows at the reactionaries. We must recognize difficulties,

analyze them and combat them. There are no straight roads in the world; we must be prepared to travel a road that twists and turns and not try to get things done on the cheap. It must not be imagined that one fine morning all the reactionaries will go down on their knees of their own accord. In a word, while the prospects are bright, the road has twists and turns. There are still many difficulties ahead which we must not overlook. By uniting with the entire people in a common effort we can certainly overcome all difficulties and win victory." (All quotes about the Chungking Negotiations are from Vol 4 Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung April 1961)

What Mao wrote about the October 10th Agreement of 1941 describing negotiations between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang Government holds true for the Joint Communiqué of 1972 between The People's Republic of China and the Government of the United States.

Mao went on. "The agreements reached are still only on paper. Words on paper are not equivalent to reality. Facts have shown that a very great effort must still be made before they can be turned into reality. The Kuomintang is still negotiating with us on the one hand, and vigorously attacking the Liberated Areas on the other hand....Why does the Kuomintang mobilize so many troops to attack us? Because long ago it made up its mind to wipe out the people's forces, to wipe us out. Best of all, it would like to wipe us out quickly or, failing that, to worsen our situation and improve its own. Peace though written into the Agreement has not in fact been realized." (Mao Selected Works Vol 4 April '61)

An integral part - the essential part - of the continuing struggle against imperialism is the politicizing of the thinking of the people. China has so used the Joint Communiqué of 1972. It was printed in full in the People's Daily on Monday, the 28th of February and immediately put to work in "a nation-wide study discussion of the Joint Communiqué which is being held through twice-weekly political

study classes arranged by neighborhood committees all over China. The study groups took time off from studying the classic works of Marx, Lenin and Mao to discuss the Joint Communique from its political and historical aspects." (Burchett Guardian 3/15/72)

Confrontation - such as the negotiations between the imperialist President of the United States and the socialist authorities in China - far from being a form of compromise with an enemy can be one of the most powerful revolutionary tools.


Confrontation in negotiations can serve to put the enemy "on the spot" exposing his true colors and nature. It can serve to bring the factors in the struggle between imperialism and socialism more fully and sharply up-to-date.

Most important of all, confrontation in negotiations between leaders of imperialism and socialism can serve to increase the understanding and raise the political consciousness of the people who are the force that changes history.

Nixon and all imperialists will fail. The peoples of the world, including the Americans, will win.

July 1972

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
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
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*So many deeds cry out to be done,
And always urgently;
The world rolls on,
Time presses.
Ten thousand years are too long,
Seize the day, seize the hour!*

*The Four Seas are rising,
clouds and waters raging,
The Five Continents are rocking,
wind and thunder roaring.
Away with all pests!
Our force is irresistible.*


*—from a poem by
Mao Tse-tung*



多少事，
從來急；
天地轉，
光陰迫。
一萬年太久，
只爭朝夕。

四海翻騰雲水怒，
五洲震盪風雷激。
要掃除一切害人蟲，
全無敵。

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Advice to Oneself

*Without the cold and desolation of winter
There could not be the warmth and splendor
of spring.
Calamity has tempered and hardened me
And turned my mind to steel.*

Ho Chi Minh

From The Song of the Fighters

*They rob us of our land and put it under their
ploughs,
They raze our homes and build military
outposts.
Crying will not dissipate our anger,
Imploring pity will not open the way to
salvation.*

*Guns and bombs are not our way of life,
We have never been friends of war;
But they have come armed to the teeth.
Shall we resign ourselves to slavery? Never!*

*Night after night under the palm trees,
Our land stirs, our people prepare for attack.
Our fighters' eyes shine in the darkness,
Watch the stars embrace the immense vault
of heaven.*

*Forward we march singing passionately
Of our beloved land. Our blood and bones
shall be the ramparts!*

Thanh Hai

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THREE CHINESE FOLKSONGS

*There's no Jade Emperor in heaven,
No Dragon King on earth.
We are the Jade Emperor,
We are the Dragon King.
We order the three mountains and five peaks:
"Make way! Here we come!"*

ii

*The red sun on our shoulders,
The white clouds underfoot,
Our commune is planting new land,
Our hands make ladders to heaven,
Our work songs bring the mountains tumbling down;*

*Not even Lu Pan, master craftsman of old times,
Father of builders, can compare with us.
We fasten a crystal girdle around our fields,
Flowing ribbons around our hills,
To make our land more beautiful.*

iii

*When we sing our hill-songs to the sky
The east is red with a rising sun . . .
We sing to the stars and we sing to the moon,
We sing till this earth is a paradise.
You ask how we're going to climb up to heaven?
Our Chairman and Party will show us the way.*

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