


THE FUNDAMENTAL LINE
AND
THE QUESTION OF UNITY

The Proletarian Line Publications

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It should be read as the Introduction of the document)



Problems of Unification of Communist Revolutionaries

It is often asked: how is that there are so many groups of Communist revolutionaries or otherwise in our country? Can they ever be united? If not, what is the future of Indian Revolution?

There are in general two types of questioners. One category belongs to those who are opponents of Indian revolution. The others are friends and well wishers who are rather confused. The former want to sow seeds of defeatism among the people, well wishers and sympathisers that there cannot be any revolution in India because to them there cannot be revolutionary communist party which can unite revolutionary forces behind it, so as to lead the Indian revolution to success. The press has been publishing information (often fed by the police department) how CPI(ML), once Charu Mazumdar group is divided into a number of groups, sub-groups and individuals in each state. They are called Naxalites also, after the name of Naxalbari (West Bengal), where an armed revolt took place in 1967.

Whatever the nomenclature they may have, the fact of the matter is that they are divided into many pieces. The information provided by the press is by and large correct though some thing may be deleted from and some thing may be added to it. Barring a few exceptions the groups have lost their revolutionary character. They can no more be called revolutionary groups. This is not to say that we deny the existence of revolutionary forces in them. Therefore, most of the groups no more belong to a revolutionary wing representing revolutionary Marxism-Leninism. But then who they are? They are opportunists though they claim to be Marxist-Leninists. It is this opportunism, which has reduced them to pieces. The ruling classes and their propaganda media are interested in depicting this phenomenon as disorganisation of revolutionary forces. Hence the above mentioned propaganda campaign.

But it is only one side of the picture. There are forces, who represent revolutionary Marxism-Leninism and who have been consolidating themselves into an all-India organisation for the last one decade

and more. They are Communist revolutionaries led by late Com T. Nagireddy. Though the comrade is no more, the organisation has extended to major parts of India and it is getting consolidated steadily. We are not bothered if the ruling classes do not recognise this objective reality through its propaganda media. It does so in its class interests. At the same time we do want to emphasise this development, positive, revolutionary and decisive as it is, so that the people may be aware of it. When a revolutionary organisation based on Marxism-Leninism-Mao Ze Tung Thought is developing and advancing, there is no reason, why they should be pessimistic about the future of Indian revolution.

We admit that, inspite of having such an organisation, the problems of unification of revolutionaries still exist. There are revolutionaries, who are yet to be unified in the organisation. Some may say that their number is still big and others may dispute this point. Our assessment is that they are not considerable. Whatever their number and strength may be, they will soon unite with the organisation so that we may form into party, which is the need of the hour for the revolutionary proletariat of our country.

II

The CPI(communist party of India) and CPI(M) Communist Party of India (Marxist) are coming closer and closer and are carrying on common activities on all basic and important questions. Their leaders are talking of their merger also. Soviet leaderships' ceaseless efforts have resulted in this unity. It wants to see that all pro-Soviet forces are united so that Mrs. Indira Gandhi's government is strengthened. We must remember that Mrs. Indira Gandhis' Congress Party is not a homogenous party nor can it be one. It is going to disintegrate sooner or later. Cracks have already started appearing.

CPI(M)'s position is no better. Since it has, under its leadership, Left Front governments in three states and a sizable section of members of

Parliament, some people look towards it as having some future. But its internal and external position does not warrant such a hope. It has its own internal dissensions leading to virtual splits. Its policies are more in tune with Mrs. Indira Gandhi's government, though it often puts up a posture of a serious opposition to it. These virtual splits have their roots in the opportunism of its leadership. Soviet Union and ruling classes have a hand in it.

CPI's role is one of the trusted agents of the Soviet Union, as well as Mrs. Indira Gandhi's government. When its isolation from the people was complete, it took up an opposition posture similar to that of CPI(M), which helped it to come closer to it. This again resulted in its split (Dange faction episode).

All this shows that, even as ruling parties, they are not free from splits. Most important of all is that Soviet Union and ruling classes in India have some thing to do with these splits. This applies not only to these parties, but also to groups of CPI(ML) or Naxalites as they are usually called. Those well-intentioned friends, well-wishers and rank and file of revolutionaries who cherish the desire of our unity should be aware of it.

This is not to say that Soviet Union is playing the same role towards "Naxalites" as it is towards CPI and CPI(M). Since a considerable section of the former are opposed to it, can not play such a role. The ruling classes in our country who are tied to one super power or other or both, are having links with some of the groups. We all know that if a section of CPI(ML) has been pro-Janata, there are strong indications that another is turning towards Congress(I). We will have the occasion to comment about these groups.

To sum up: opportunism is the root cause of splits and it can not be separated from ruling classes and their interests. If there are some who are conscious representatives, there are others who serve their interests objectively because of their opportunism. It has nothing to do with their intentions. Even if some one is "sincere" in his desire for unity, once he is an opportunist, he cannot serve the cause of unity. This is how opportunism and the split among the revolutionaries is inter-linked. As long as there is imperialism opportunism continues to be present in the proletarian revolutionary ranks. This does not mean that we take it for granted and try to co-exist with it. We carry on a relentless struggle against it as a part of the struggle against imperialism and the ruling classes in India.

To turn to the practical side of the subject: we in India had never been a party of an all India character to begin with. There were groups and circles in various parts of the country (Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, Kanpur etc.) which were functioning independently on their own accord. It is due to the consistent efforts of Communist International that all the groups were united into one party, which came into being some time after 1930. (The question of year of formation of communist party is still controversial) Even after the formation of the party there were groups, mostly as remnants of the past, and Bombay was a glaring example where there existed two groups athrough.

Again, the groups came to the surface at the time of the second Congress of the Communist Party of India (1948), and reached their height towards the end of 1950 and the beginning of 1951. It was the period when Telangana armed struggle was going on, transfer of power took place and a congress regime was established at the Centre and states. If we carefully analyse the groupings, we can find that they were in the main directed against Telangana Armed struggle and a basically correct line which was defending it. We can see how ruling classes intervened and created facilities to those who were opposed to the armed struggle and its correct line, to organise disruption in the party and the revolutionary ranks.

Then came the parliamentary period. The groups continued to exist within the frame work of the party. It was not homogeneous at any time. There was no struggle to unify the party. Rather adjustments, patch ups and manipulations were the order of the day.

The split in the CPI leading to formation of CPI(M) (1964) was an important development. CPI(M) came out as a stronger force because CPI's proved revisionism had failed to appeal the ranks, not to speak of providing a correct guidance to them. The CPI(M) leadership, though not homogeneous in its views could put up a show of militancy and revolutionism by criticising CPI's line from a 'left' angle. The developments inside the international Communist movement which led to a split between CPSU and CPC together with other parties had their own role to play in it. Even here the ruling classes took the side of rightist forces i.e. CPI and a section of CPI(M), while the other section was a victim of the repression (large scale arrests of CPI(M) leadership all over India) At this stage, a major part of its top leadership came

out openly with their right opportunism (parliamentary path etc.) which was in no way basically different from that of CPI.

When the leadership of CPI(M) embraced right opportunism of a new variety the only alternative left for the communist revolutionaries was to break away from CPI(M) and form themselves into a party. Though there was a breakup in 1967, no party in the real sense of the term was formed. (The breakup continues even today; a party CPI(ML) was formed and was broken up within one year i.e. 1969-70)

These are the facts known to every one who is in touch with Communist movement in our country. The point to be remembered here is that the ruling classes have been intervening in the party affairs to create splits and dissensions and that opportunism has always been a handmaid to them in carrying out this task. The experience of CPI and CP:(M) has proved it.

IV

The case with the CPI(ML) is slightly different from this, not in the sense that the ruling classes left it to its fate not intervening in its affairs. It is different in the sense that "left" opportunism and individual terrorism was the basis for the split. Since they have departed from Marxism-Leninism and adopted opportunism, their split did not stop with the formation of one group or a party. But a number of groups some of whom called themselves parties though with the same name of CPI(ML) came into existence. It is in this context that the question is being asked: why is it that so many groups are existing in our Country without forming themselves into a party?

A straight forward answer to this question can be that the same opportunism which has split them from communist revolutionaries has in turn split the CPI(ML) into so many groups and sub-groups. They are adopting variety of forms of opportunism, to remain as separate groups. Does it mean that Communist revolutionaries are different from CPI(ML) groups? Yes. They are different from one another. While the former has a mass revolutionary line, the latter has none. This is the basic difference. Does it also mean that the said groups do not contain any communist revolutionaries or trends of mass revolutionary line? Yes, they do contain. Once such forces were considerable and now they are dwindling. A recent report published by the press at the instance of the police authorities gives a broad indication of number of ML groups in various states. We should be clear in our mind that communist revolutionaries

are not included in these groups. It is good that they are excluded from them. (Some of them claim that they are guided by Marxism-Leninism-Mao Ze Tung Thought; and this is the common point if it means anything) A considerable section of the people who inspite of being in touch with the politics are not in a position to differentiate between the two. As such they often confuse one with the other.

One cannot be a revolutionary simply because he claims to be so. To be a revolutionary, one must be a revolutionary not only in words but also in deeds. The latter is the most important factor to decide the question. The same is the case with a group. It is quite possible that there are a few revolutionaries in some groups not knowing that the groups are not revolutionary or have ceased to become revolutionary. It is because, a group may be revolutionary to begin with but it can cease to be one in course of time and degenerate itself into non-revolutionary and counter-revolutionary.

Such groups present the same picture in relation to Marxism-Leninism-Mao Ze Tung Thought. There was a time when CPI(ML) leadership and its groups were vociferous about it, while the communist revolutionaries worked out their programme and practice as usual. The former's practice had nothing in common with their claims. This situation continues even today. Some of their claims were genuine to begin with, but they have ceased to be so in course of time. They have become right opportunists or remained as phrase-mongers. There are others who were opposed to "left" adventurism and individual terrorism to the extent they could understand it. There are some others who have realised their mistakes which were of a serious nature and are trying to overcome them. They are the forces who are joining communist revolutionaries or who are yet to join. Barring them, the rest have proved to be a condemned stuff, which have no positive role to play in the revolution, as a proletarian revolutionary vanguard. This seems to be a harsh remark. But we cannot help because it is true.

V

It is not possible to comment on the policies and practices of each and every group whose number crosses one digit figure. We can broadly divide them into two categories just as we have done earlier. Firstly, there are those, who still believe that individual terrorism (assassination) and "money actions" (rajoities) as correct and revolutionary. They are practicing these activities for the last one decade

and the practice still continues. Apart from being opposed to Marxism-Leninism (the earlier experience (1970) has proved conclusively that it has disorganised and disrupted the revolutionary movement and the organisation. It is obvious that it could not stand the onslaught of the authorities, with all its retrogressive consequences. The serious point to note about these groups is that they have not learnt anything from these negative experiences even after one decade. Therefore, we can safely say that they are incorrigibles. Latest experience shows that most of them have degenerated into professional murderers and docots who are acting as mercenaries to those who can employ them (including ruling parties and cliques).

Secondly; there are those, who have taken a swing towards right opportunism and began to serve one section of the ruling classes or the other. The CPI (ML), which had split into two groups (one led by SN Singh and the other by Chandra Pulla Reddy), had their own links with the respective sections of classes. If SN Singh linked himself with the Janata section, (eversince the JP movement in 1975) there are indications that the other is trying to establish links with Congress I), the present ruling party. The repressive measures taken by the authorities against some of their rank and file should not blind anyone to this fact.

There are some who advocate united Front or united action with CPI(M) and its left Front minus CPI. Their main contention is that it has a mass following with a number of revolutionaries in its rank and file. It is basically wrong. We adopt a united Front policy not to win over or steal away the following of the partners of the United Front. If some of them come over to us, it will be as a result of our correct line. The most important aspect of our united policy is to unite all revolutionary forces against the enemy or enemies of the revolution. They are imperialism and feudalism including Soviet social imperialism. Every one knows that CPI(M) is the ardent supporter and defender of Soviet Union. As a party in power in three states, it has no opposition role to play against imperialism (Multinationals) and feudalism (land lords). Therefore their contention of forming a United Front with CPI(M), in any form, is untenable and has nothing in common with Marxist-Leninist understanding of United Front. It is another variety of right opportunism.

Then there are others who are busy finding points of agreement, which are mostly non-contro-

verial. For example, acceptance of Marxism—Leninism Mao Ze Dung Thought is not at all a problem to most of the groups. But when it comes to its application to the practice of Indian revolution, every thing becomes controversial. Since they are unable to solve the controversies, they won't touch them. In the same way, they agree among themselves that there is what is known as comprador bourgeoisie in India, but they have no agreement on its relation with imperialism. They agree that there is feudalism and semi-feudalism in India, but they have no agreement on the extent of feudal and capitalist relations in our country. Thus they are either avoiding to take up the differences, or by-passing them with an implied understanding that they can not resolve them. Such groups have some organisational adjustment to come together, whose essence is: to carry on common activities on issue to issue to the extent they are in agreement while everyone pursues his own line. A joint meeting to condemn Soviet imperialist action on Afghanistan, may be cited as an example.

Such meetings, if held, do bring together concerned groups or their parts and enable them to adopt a resolution, or issue a statement which is acceptable to all. Experience has shown that they are diluted so as to miss the main point, which is necessary to demarcate themselves as communist revolutionaries. Such joint meetings have not produced better results than those composed of other parties (Janata etc). Of course, the concerned groups may be in touch with one another and exchange information as and when they require. They hope to expedite the process of unification by using such methods. The point is, whether they understand it or not, they can narrow down their differences by compromising with the fundamentals of Marxism—Leninism and its application to the practice of Indian revolution ie; by departing from correct general line. To have a correct understanding and practice of the general line (Fundamental line, a fierce struggle is indispensable in all fields i. e. ideological, political and organisational.

There are certain groups, who uphold Mao Ze Dung Thought, at the same time openly denounce the line followed by the present CPC leadership, as being revisionist. The policies adopted by CPC leadership have always been controversial subjects inside the Indian Communist movement. There have been strong and influential sections who have been opposing them to the detriment of the cause of Indian revolution. No wonder that the present

opposition has also joined their band wagon. Having reservations and differences with this or that aspect of the CPC's policy is one thing. They can be resolved in the normal course. But to denounce it as revisionist and branding it as super power is another thing. Once they degenerate to this level, they can only play into the hands of the enemies of Indian revolution. As a result, they renounce its cause and cease to be revolutionaries.

The Indian ruling classes have been consistently opposing the development of a genuine revolutionary movement, and a party, guided by Marxism—Leninism—Mao Ze Tung Thought. Presently they are trying to use the pseudo-revolutionary forces to confuse the revolutionary ranks and the people and vainly hope to stem the onward march of communist revolutionaries to form a Party. But their negative role has basically exhausted and the building of the party and the revolutionary movement is going ahead.

VI

It is a fact that two or more groups are getting united either by way of some adjustments (Coordination Committee etc), or merger, which is more an exception than a rule. At the same time new groups are emerging; and the present groups are splitting into two or more sub-groups how ever small they may be. The net result is that every ounce of unity is resulting in two or more ounces of disruption. Therefore there is no evidence to show that they are taking a direction towards unification. It may, be either due to personal differences or differences on major and minor issues. We will have the occasion to comment on some important issues soon, on which we have not yet commented.

One can ask why is it that they can not resolve these differences within the framework of a loose or centralised organisation. It is they who have to answer this question and not we. Because Communist revolutionaries are able to unite and resolve their differences within the framework of one organisation. That one or two sections could not remain with us even after merger indicates only that our relations with them reached an antagonistic stage.

It is not out of place to mention some of the experiences we had while uniting with other groups. The Unity Centre of Communist Revolutionaries of India (ML) was formed in 1975 as a result of the merger of three groups i.e. (i) Andhra Communist Committee (Revolutionaries), (ii) North Zone Comami-

tee and its associates in North Bengal etc. (iii) CCR of West Bengal. We did not face much difficulty in reaching a common understanding on the programme and path of Indian revolution, though we found differences of a secondary nature even at the discussion stage. NZC (North Zone Committee) had its documents other than Programme and path. They contained some non-controversial points together with some others which were remnants of Charu Mazumdar's "left" opportunism. When pointed out the leadership accepted their mistakes partially and reconciled itself by saying that the rest of the points are not so important as to characterise them as fundamental differences. We were confident that they could be resolved in course of time through discussions and common practice.

But the leadership of other group had its own understanding and practice of achieving unity. In politics, they adopted a policy of reconciliation and wait for a better opportunity to introduce their own politics which were time-serving. In organisational affairs, they practiced manipulations and such other methods which have no place in the party of revolutionary proletariat. They have manifested them even before the Unity Centre was formed and the relations were in the discussion stage. For example: they inflated their strength, by forming units in various states which were composed of their contacts who could be characterised as sympathisers (Bombay) There were some others (Punjab) who were notorious, for their murders and dacoities and who left CPI(ML), for careerist purposes without opposing its line in any way what so ever.

We had no occasion to check up such habitual mal-practices because we never expected that they could belong to this category. We had this experience with Charu Mazumdar's group earlier. But we never imagined that these groups have inherited them so magnificently! They tried to create dissensions between Andhra Comrades and those of CCR in West Bengal. They have developed parallel organisation of their own which could be their substitute to the Unity Centre, which was to be formed according to our arrangement. This was double dealing, pure and simple.

One can ask: why have you united with them when this was the situation? Because we were confident that we can fight them out and eliminate such tendencies in course of time through normal channels. (internal discussions and struggles). We also did not want to break down the unity efforts when they have gone more than halfway. In view of this we preferred

to unite and face the problems as and when they come to the surface.

It has been our experience that the leadership of the groups and ranks at various levels are not one and the same. While the leaders (above mentioned) were past-masters in the art of manipulation etc. were subdued and were often carried away by what their leaders said. A few of them were critical and assertive to a certain extent, but the information at their disposal was scanty, inaccurate and often misleading. Their experience was insufficient to carry internal struggle. Yet there were dissensions, differences and factions inside this group. They came to the surface only afterwards.

Building the party of the proletariat and a revolutionary movement led by it is one of the most difficult tasks, which we are facing even today, not to speak of the time when the unity efforts with this group were being made. Their understanding of the party is conspiratorial. Obviously their practice coincided with it. Their understanding of the revolutionary movement was one of slogan mongering and their practice (if any) was reformist and humanitarian. These were the negative features and wrong trends in the leadership as well as a section of the rank and file. Side by side, there was a revolutionary force which was in search of a correct line and practice. It could realise the real face of the leadership in course of time. It has grown into a strong force, capable of influencing the course of events. It is now a part of Communist revolutionaries and their Unity Centre. We can now safely say that there is a section of the leadership in this group which is incorrigible and out of commission as far as revolution is concerned. There are some who are yet to realise the folly of remaining with in the organisational frame work of rival centre. Their cases can be considered on the basis of their merits, if the occasion so demands.

While we were having talks with these groups, we had come into contact with some others mainly one from Punjab. Talks with this group have revealed some more problems we had to face. The Punjab group was not so much opposed to unity with North Zone group as such, but was firmly opposed to unite with its Punjab section which, as it claimed, was composed of anti-social elements (murderers and dacoits). Otherwise they were ready to unite without any reservations. Subsequent events proved that their claims were correct.

West Bengal presented a complicated picture from the very beginning. We had a long standing

contact with a group (CCR), which was composed of heterogeneous elements. All of them had accepted the general line, some having their own reservations. If we leave them aside, the rest were genuine communist revolutionaries, with their own limitations in understanding and practice. They were the comrades who upheld our general line ever since 1969. The other groups came within our reach only after CM's line had ended in a fiasco, and his party CPI(ML) had broken into pieces. The leaders and individuals who came into our contact were unanimous that CM's line was wrong. But they had no confidence, not even the minimum among themselves, which could enable them to hold unity talks (here we are not touching the subject of general line and its importance in such talks). Each one has a list of charges against other, mostly of an organisational nature. Those who have been close associates of Charu Majumdar were questioned about their integrity. Most of them wanted that the talks should be kept secret from others. Was it possible to achieve unity with such an understanding and practice?

We had to work for unity under these conditions. The Unity Centre was formed with the three groups, which were mentioned above while efforts were continued to unite with other groups.

VII

The experiences we had with the groups already merged bore a different character than what we had earlier. A section of the rank and file together with a certain level of leadership was honest and hardworking. Some among them were closely connected with mass movement or movements. But most of them had no understanding or wrong understanding and practice towards building of the party and mass revolutionary movement. Besides this, a section of the leadership had no Communist convictions in the general line itself. They attempted to charge it surreptitiously, according to the needs of other groups with whom they wanted to carry on unity talks. They opposed unity with those groups, whom they suspected that they would not form a factional bloc to oppose the General line and its defenders. Finally, they attempted to usurp the leadership and the party organisation by taking advantage of certain unforeseen developments.

To some extent these are the experiences of extreme nature. At the same time they were there and we can not write them off as an exception. Because the talks with others fared no better though they were of

different nature and most of the groups were outside the organisation, which enabled them to act freely on their own.

There was a group (Kerala) which had a long-standing contact with us. We have helped it to consolidate its position to the extent it was possible. At one stage the leadership expressed its readiness to merge with the Unity Centre (on the eve of Emergency). Subsequently it has backed out from the agreement and wanted relations in the form of "Consultative Committee", which we evolved to maintain relations with those who had fundamental differences with us. The group in the main was a break away section from CPI(M). In spite of repeated discussions and agreements, they clung to their CPI(M) politics and practices. As such they were more a liability than an asset. Genuine Communist revolutionaries kept themselves away from the unity centre as long as they were associated with us. Now that they are outside our periphery, we are able to develop our own organisation on correct foundations.

There was another group (P.C.R.C. Punjab) which merged in the Unity Centre during the Emergency period. It was composed of a leadership and rank and file against whom we have nothing to say. They have expressed their agreement with the general line which includes proletarian internationalism. But they could not uphold it when faced with fast changing national and international situation. Its merger was just a formal one. It kept itself segregated from the Unity Centre although. As a result, it had no proletarian orientation either for its organisation or the mass movement with which it was connected. It had failed to rectify itself by utilising its presence in the Unity Centre. They could not reconcile themselves with it and now it is a separate group, acting as another rival Centre!

There were some who were close associates of Charu Majumdar in all respects about what he said and did against Marxism-Leninism-Mao Ze Dong Thought. They claimed that wisdom has dawned upon them when there was a criticism from international leadership (1970). They expressed their basic agreement with our general line with some reservations which were not explicit, it appeared to us at one stage, that they want to stall the emergence of an all-India organisation till they had the initiative in their hands. Obviously, their efforts ended in a failure. Now one of them is out to organise an all-India group with its own line, which in our opinion is right opportunist.

We had contacts with another group (U P and Bihar) since 1975. It had its reservations about the composition of the Unity Centre, especially it was opposed to NZC leadership. We continued our contacts and discussions. At one stage it appeared that the group was about to merge with the Centre, because the differences we had seemed to be of a secondary nature. But the leadership had chosen a different path. One fine morning we were informed that they had formed an all-India organisation of their own. Yet we did not abandon our efforts.

There were some feelers and offers for unity talks by those, who had either broken away from us in earlier periods or those with whom, we have nothing in common. Preparedness for a basic change in their politics and practices is necessary to open unity talks with them.

There are those, who indulge in never ending discussion mostly of an academic character. In spite of our best efforts, nothing useful could come out of them. Most of them do not know that there are a good number of communist revolutionaries who are organised in major part of our Country leading mass revolutionary movements. Those who depend on the information supplied by the authorities through press and material released by concerned groups cannot do better because they do not know the real side of the picture.

There have always been splits in CPI(M) ever since 1968. Not all of them have proved to be revolutionaries. They are essentially of the same politics as that of CPI(M), though they may differ on some policy matters. Their differences with the leadership is mainly of an organisational nature. Whatever the name of these may be, they cannot be characterised as genuine revolutionary forces. In a number of cases, the dissidents inside the CPI(M) are of the same category.

These are negative aspects of the experiences which we had during this period. We can add some more. But they are not different in nature than those we mentioned here. Though we do not rule out a change in a section of these groups, they are in no way useful as forces of unity in the revolutionary ranks, as long as they do not take a basic departure from the past. It is possible for the genuine elements because they can realise the correctness of our line in the course of fast changing national situation.

VIII

There is a positive side to our experience which we had during a decade of unity efforts. This tells us that the revolutionaries are not a spent force; that they can unite to form a single party; that they can build a party of revolutionary proletariat and the mass revolutionary movement led by it. It is wrong to say that there were no efforts and no unity in this direction.

We have re-united with those who left us during earlier period (1968-69), because of the strong influence of "left"-opportunism and individual terrorism of Charu Majumdar variety (Srikakulam). We could re-unite with a section of comrades connected with former North Zone Committee etc. which is a separate group altogether. We could re-unite with a section of CCR (West Bengal) and unify some other sections and groups into our fold. We could unify Communist revolutionaries in Orissa into our fold. Most of them were once connected with CPI(ML). We could unite a section of them in Kerala and more are likely to join, sooner or later. Communist revolutionaries are working in Maharashtra as well. A section of communist revolutionaries from CPI(M) have joined the Unity Centre. One may like it or not, we are fairly a strong force in Andhra and no amount of false propaganda can hide this fact. They are not mere contacts for periodical discussions which have no end in sight as is the case with others. Theirs are not "Committees" which meet now and then, adopt some resolutions and statements and disperse (Some time they meet only not to meet again).

The Unity Centre is now an all India organisation in the real sense of the term having its branches in considerable parts of our country. All of them, without an exception, are functioning units. They are all connected with one or other mass movements i.e. students, working class, peasantry, democratic rights etc. A struggle is going on to put an end to the legacies of the past (right opportunism and "left" adventurism) with successful results. The cadres are trained in building the party of the revolutionary mass movement under its hegemony. Efforts are going on to expand the organisation and extend the mass movement. India being a vast multinational country such an effort assumes more importance than anything.

This in brief is the situation inside the camp of communist revolutionaries. It shows that there is something more to be achieved by way of unity and

we will have it. But it does not show that unity is impossible. Those who say it is impossible, do not understand the significance of the unity which is fast developing. Emergence of a party of revolutionary proletariat is certainly not a thing of distant future; it is a reality which is in the offing.

Therefore the present cluster of groups formed out of CPI(ML) does not represent the genuine nature of the disunity among the communist revolutionaries. These groups are there and they will continue for some time to come. They are survivals of "left" adventurism and right opportunism with whom they were associated in the past. They have departed from Marxism-Leninism in course of time and reached a point of no return. As a result they have kept themselves outside the purview of communist revolutionaries. If a nomenclature denoting an association with the CPI(ML) were to infuse a proletarian revolutionary character, in a group or party, the CP and CPI(M) can as well become Marxist-Leninist. But we don't recognise them as such.

What then is the force, which binds us together in a common organisation i.e. Unity Centre? Of course it is the correct general line (Fundamental line). The line is correct not only in words but in deeds as well. It has the experience of a decade of its practice, which has proved that the line is basically correct. Other groups could not provide such a line and practice. This does not mean that some of them do not have even a semblance of it. They are having it and are trying to move in a correct direction. It is a positive and welcome development, which strengthens the forces of unity.

Our line includes not only the programme and path but also a general line for building the party and the revolutionary movement at every phase of advancing revolution. It helps us in upholding the line by carrying on a struggle against right and "left" opportunism. We did it successfully and we are continuing it. Such a practice is leading towards the development of a party and the mass movement in the face of their uneven development.

The proletarian internationalism is an inseparable part of our line, and we are practising it. Supporting one party or the other, opposing the two, and sitting on the fence has nothing in common with it. While ours is based on communist convictions, others observe it formally or as a time serving device.

We admit that the progress towards unity appears to be slow. It is inevitable in the given situation. The

devastation and the set back which the revolutionary movement has faced due to Charu Majumdar's Left adventurism was so serious that there has been a demoralisation and frustration among the revolutionary ranks and the people who are not able to see any immediate future for the revolution: The authorities played their own role to create such a situation by resorting to fascist repression in which massacres of the people and the revolutionaries was the order of the day. Yet they could have survived and advanced inspite of such a repression, had they adopted a correct line. Due to the practice of their wrong line, we are faced with a situation in which there are retrogressive after affects of a serious nature. Discussions and deliberations can not over come them though they too help to a limited extent. Emergence of mass revolutionary movement born out of the practice of a correct line plays a decisive role in overcoming the difficulty and instills confidence among the people. Experience tells us that the progress of such a movement is slow to begin with. It is reflected in the unification also, But when once the organisation gets stabilised and the movement advances, the process of unification gets expedited. The present situation is such that the movement led by the Uny Centre is advancing. So also the process of unification.

Taken as a whole, we communist revolutionaries, are advancing towards unity step by step inspite of there being ups and downs. The major part of this task is over: The rest will be completed soon. The task of further unification continues even after the formation of the party, because as the party and the movement advances, disillusioned revolutionaries all over India will rally behind the newly formed party, thereby strengthening revolutionary forces further and further.

Therefore there is no basis what so ever in characterising the groups associated with CPI(ML) as revolutionary. To do so is wrong. As a corollary, to say that there is no unity among the revolutionary groups is also wrong and baseless. The unity which is developing is of a different kind. It is the unity of communist revolutionaries, consisting of already communist revolutionaries, consisting of already existing groups, rank and file of various groups, and newly developing revolutionary youth. As we see, some political sections are ready to go to the extent of recognising us as one of the groups. They are again committing the same mistake. We are not bothered if some body does not recognise us as a revolutionary group because people are there who know what. Their mistake is in equating us with other groups with whom we have nothing in common.

Ours is a distinct group, developing into a party of the proletariat. It has nothing in common with others. The sooner they realise this, the better.

IX

Certain questions are being asked as if they are important in relation to the unity of the revolutionaries. Whether important or not, we feel it necessary that we clarify our position.

Question One: What is the significance of Naxalbari?

Naxalbari is a village/cluster of villages, where an armed uprising took place in 1967. The event was an indication that situation in the country was ripe for an armed struggle.

It never meant that an armed struggle can be developed without preparing the people for it i.e. without building a mass revolutionary movement, reaching a level wherein it can adopt the form of armed struggle. There was a peasant movement in the Naxalbari area preceding the uprising. Spontaneous uprisings are possible and there have been many in our country when ever there was a revolutionary situation.

Most of the armed struggles and militant struggles in India are remembered with the names of the regions, big or small i.e. Telengana, Tripura, Worli etc.

The words Naxalism, Naxalites are products of the uprising. Naxalism is another name for revolutionism in some sections mostly from petty-bourgeoisie. It is left-adventurism for some others. The word 'Naxalites' is being used for miscellaneous purposes including habitual murderers and dacoits. It is wrong to equate Marxism-Leninism-Mao Ze Tung Thought to Naxalism.

Question two: Was it correct to form communist Party of India(Marxist-Leninist) in May 1967?

It is a fact that the party was formed and we can not deny it. There is nothing wrong if it is treated like any other party of the same category i.e. CPI and CPI M). But to treat it as a party of Marxism Leninism-Mao Ze Tung Thought is wrong. It is a fact that a number of genuine revolutionaries have joined, followed and sacrificed their lives for it. But it could not provide the real content which was necessary for it.

It had come into being to fight a basically correct mass revolutionary line, guided by Marxism-Leninism Mao Ze Tung Thought which was advocated and

practised by Communist Revolutionaries. Its basis was "left" adventurism and individual terrorism from the very beginning. It carried its struggle against the correct line on this basis alone. That it collapsed in no time was the corollary of its wrong line and wrong purpose. To begin with there was something of petty—bourgeois revolutionism. It ended in counter—revolutionary line in no time. The remaining genuine elements have already joined the ranks of communist revolutionaries or on the way for it.

Granting that the leadership was sincere in its belief and practice, objectively its sincerity served a wrong cause of fighting a correct line and playing havoc with Indian Revolution. Sincerity towards a correct line is a must. Sincerity towards a wrong line is always dangerous and more dangerous than insincerity towards it. Personal sincerity has no meaning in politics if it is not linked with correct or wrong line. After all revolution can not be led by saints. It needs revolutionaries who can apply Marxism—Leninism—Mao Ze Tung Thought to the practice of Indian Revolution.

Question three: How is it that the communist revolutionaries claim that their line is correct? Does it not amount to denying the possibility of its being proved as incorrect or denying others being correct?

We assert that ours is a basically correct line. It is also correct to assert that it is so. It means that there is scope for improvement in secondary matters if there is a sound reason for it. We never waited for, nor expected from CPI(ML) and its groups to provide a correct line. In fact we worked out the line long before they appeared on the scene.

Our line is based on the revolutionary experience of the past and present. Our own experience of a decade proved its correctness. Communist revolutionaries work among the masses basing on a correct line with communist convictions. They can't work for a line whose correctness is of a doubtful nature. We can not wait for the revolution to be completed to prove the correctness of our line. We leave it for others who do not want to associate themselves with revolution. Normally the defeatists and the pessimists think in this manner.

Presently, there are those who are associated with various groups of CPI (ML) and some others, who know that the line they followed proved to be wrong. Therefore they could not defend it. At the same time they don't want to accept the correctness of our line, under one pretext or other. It is another

form of fighting a correct line which they were doing earlier. If they join together, there is a remote chance for it - they will do it for this purpose alone. We are confident that they can not succeed where Charu Majumdar has failed.

For those who genuinely ask this question, our answer is; they are entitled to put forward an alternative line which they think to be correct. We are ready to discuss with them and prove that it is wrong. or we will join with them openly for this purpose. There is no difficulty in discussing individual points of difference once there is a unity on fundamental questions.

These are some of the questions which are often being asked.

The Andhra communist Revolutionaries had announced the line regarding the question of unification of the revolutionaries, about 8 years ago through their document "Fundamental Line and the Question of Unity" It was in reply to Chandra Pulla Reddy's line whose essence was organisational manipulation instead of defending the correct line. The line adopted in the document was comprehensive in a given situation and holds good even today. We had a large measure of success in our efforts in this direction. That is how we could build up an organisation of all-India nature together with a mass revolutionary movement.

The equal treatment, as mentioned in the document has led to certain misgivings leading to misusing of the offer. We treat the groups equal, big or small, with whom we enter into discussions. (we did so in the past and we are doing the same now) we do not demand any group to merge in our organisation here and now without having fruitful discussions. At the same, we can not ignore the fact that there is an inequality in relation to the experience, and strength of a genuine organisation and mass revolutionary movement. If we ignore this there is every danger to the correct line itself. Therefore, it has become our bounden duty to convince ourselves about the genuineness of the leadership and its acceptance of the line. A large amount of preparatory work is needed for this purpose.

It is time for the revolutionaries who are outside our periphery to ponder- over their respective attitudes towards unification of revolutionaries. It is time to make up their mind to accept a correct line, join the ranks of communist revolutionaries and to form the party of the revolutionary proletariat. Any further delay is a luxury which the Indian Revolution can not afford.

SUPPLEMENT

Fundamental Line and Question of Unity

[Note: We have circulated this article as long ago as in 1972. We are publishing it here without a foreword. The article appearing elsewhere in the Issue "Problems of unification of Communist Revolutionaries", will serve this purpose. The readers are requested to take note of this.]

We had set out on the task of building an agrarian revolutionary movement leading to armed struggle in Sept 1968. Defending our views on this question, we had to join issue with left and right opportunist groups mainly the "left".

For this purpose we had to issue various documents. These are related in the main to the question of armed struggle. After this discussion no new points are coming forth from our 'Critics'. Hence this document in which we are explaining the basis for unification of communist revolutionaries in India.

Now that we are releasing our Draft Programme and the path of Indian Revolution for discussion we are confident that this would prove to be a step forward towards the unity among revolutionaries. We are confident that they will discuss and express their views on them. We will have the occasion to explain our views when we receive their criticism. This discussion will also centre around programmatic and tactical issues.

It is highly important that our party becomes a party of revolutionary practice based on our mass line. Our documents provide necessary guidance for this. We hope that they would

utilize them in full and apply themselves to revolutionary mass work.

1. IMMEDIATE PROGRAMME IS OUR FUNDAMENTAL LINE

When we had broken away from Neo-revisionists, we found that our differences were of a fundamental character. They claimed and still claim to follow Marxism-Leninism (even Breznev clique claims the same), but they refuse to recognise the Thought of Mao to be the Marxism-Leninism of the present era. Consequently they reject the idea that revisionist Soviet leadership has transformed itself into Social imperialism. Obviously it led them to a revisionist understanding of international and national situation in various other issues related to it. Their opposition to foreign policy of C.P.C. their support to social imperialist role of Soviet Union in India etc, emanate from the same revisionism.

We have differences of a programmatic nature. Assessment of the character and role of big bourgeoisie in India is a fundamental question. They reject the idea of its being comprador and attribute some amount of independent role to it. We are opposed to it.

We are firm that Indian big bourgeoisie is comprador, with new forms in the new conditions. Their demagogic opposition, social chauvinism etc, are the result of their revisionism.

On the question of tactical line, we fundamentally differ from them. While we are for people's war path, they are opposed to it. Theirs has been a parliamentary path pure and simple, of course with an addition of revolutionary phrase-mongering.

In view of the above, we have nothing in common with neo-revisionism. On the other hand our differences with them are ideological, programmatic, tactical and what not. All the right deviations in our leadership or ranks have their roots in the neo-revisionist thinking, often couched in revolutionary phrase-mongering. We communist revolutionaries have to fight against 'left' as well as right deviations, to defend Marxism - Leninism-Mao Tse Tung's thought. This is necessary in order that we are able to build revolutionary movement and a revolutionary party, to lead armed struggle and unify revolutionaries in one party.

When we came out of Neo-revisionist party we concentrated our attention towards educating the revolutionary ranks and the people in general on the ideological differences inside the international communist movement as well as Indian Communist movement. We had based on "Nine Comments" and other documents of the CPC for the campaign we conducted. This was all the more necessary because in Andhra, revolutionary trend has a mass base and masses and the rank and file have to be educated in revolutionary ideology and revolutionary politics. (This does not however, mean that we do not have any such mass base in other states). This was correct and it served its purpose.

There is another aspect of our ideological struggle. It is providing a programmatic and tactical line to the revolutionary struggles in general, and agrarian revolutionary movement in particular. It is to fill this gap that we prepared the Immediate Programme, which was subsequently adopted by Andhra convention of communist revolutionaries. It provided: Firstly basic points for a programme of people's democratic revolution (2) A programme for agrarian revolution, applicable to various parts of Andhra Pradesh, to all levels of the movement including land distribution (3) A tactical line which can be used for, from preliminary to advanced stage of the movement, that is armed struggle. Immediate Programme could not cover various aspects of armed struggle when it starts and continues. It should be noted that Srikakulam dist. committee had affiliated itself to Charu Mazumdar's group which subsequently formed CPI(ML)

Armed struggle in Srikakulam had started towards the end of 1968. We had expressed our views regarding this struggle in one of our documents named "On Srikakulam Armed Struggle". While analysing the girijan movement we have pointed out the basic mistakes that the leadership was committing. We are of the opinion that the views contained in the documents are correct and experience has only proved their correctness.

In short, Immediate Programme was a programme of action and programme of revolutionary practice based on our own revolutionary experience. It has transformed us into a party with rudiments of programme and tactical line. This was a big step forward for revolutionaries who were in state of confusion as to what to do and what not to do. With this we were on a more firm ground than before.

A section of comrades took the programme seriously implemented it and organised a powerful agrarian revolutionary movement leading to land distribution. (East Godavari District). It is not a fact that they could not organise guerilla warfare because the Immediate Programme is defective. There are other reasons for it. The comrades concerned have reviewed their experiences and a document dealing with the subject is before the party.

There are another set of comrades who are in a sense more experienced, who know more about theory and who have been holding important positions inside the party. They went into premature armed actions and failed to build an agrarian revolutionary movement on the basis of Immediate Programme. They put forward their own reason for doing so, they have drawn certain conclusions from their so called experience which are right and "left" opportunist in nature. They have circulated a sufficient number of documents which express their views in full.

Important among them was, "A reply of Khammam Area Committee" which was circulated by this group of comrades upto district and area committees as they say. This document which was supposed to have been written in reply to one of our earlier documents contained

formulations which are basically opposed to Immediate Programme. They had not stopped with merely expressing their disagreement with the programme. They had decided to call for a convention, revise the entire Immediate Programme and adopt a new programme which would either be "Left" adventurist or right opportunist or an admixture of the both. The agenda they proposed for the convention revealed this in an unambiguous terms.

We were faced with a situation where in the party was being led into "Leftism" with visible tendencies of right opportunism. We decided to intervene in the situation and issued a document criticising their understanding regarding some of the important problems of ideology, tactics and organisation. We demanded them to implement the Immediate Programme and suggested organisational steps to guarantee the implementation of the same. This document is known as the "Left Deviation within the party".

This group instead of taking steps to rectify the situation and correct their line, moved in a parallel direction. They issued some documents, resolutions and pamphlet, the latter for mass distribution. They fail to discuss and answer the fundamental points we raised and came forward with formulations with right opportunism in nature, similar to those of Neorevisionists. They have clearly shown their determination to revise the programme in the right opportunist direction.

It is intriguing to find that "the Reply of Khammam area committee" and the document on "morals", were not included in the list of the documents they propose to discuss. These are the documents which flared up the differences and this group has openly took a disruptive role by circulating them, implementing some of the formulations they contain. They have done this to mislead the comrades. The harm they did was incalculable. The harmful contents of the documents have been incorporated in their subsequent documents. The anarchic line they took in the document on morals is still being adhered to and is being implemented in full.

In their documents they charge that our criticism of their politics and practice amount to asking them to lay down the arms and that we are "slipping on inclined plane".

They set in motion a section of comrades who have been idle and in-active all the while, who are more of an election minded cadre. They started a campaign, that we are opposed to armed struggle, that we are advocating laying down of arms and that we want to be acquitted there by. Such campaign is being carried on among the people in general and among those comrades who are politically less developed, who cannot judge what is politically wrong and what is right. They approach a different set of comrades with different slogan, who are politically more developed and who, after going through our documents are convinced that we are for a people's armed struggle. They preach them the need for "united work" and explain their offers of unity in spite of differences.

They issued a pamphlet in which they accused us indirectly that we are revisionists of some hue saying that "we do not know how to name them", after mentioning revisionists and neo-revisionists. The pamphlet was distributed in planes and forests of Andhra Pradesh.

They talk to those who do not accept the Immediate Programme with a bit of frankness that it is fact they started premature armed struggle and people are not participating in it. They further say: "we should hold up arms whatever may happen once arms are in our hands."

Of late they have started another campaign that the Immediate programme is an adventurist document and the activities of the party before and after the convention are permeated with adventurism.

They also proposed orally through one of their comrades to withdraw documents from "both sides" as a first step towards unity.

These are some of the important manifestations of their veils and activities. They clearly show that they have diverted the points of controversy from peoples armed struggle versus

armed actions without people to armed struggle or not to mislead the party and people and tried to insinuate them against us. It is they who 'slipped in the inclined plane' by abandoning mass line. Then differentiated approach in the campaign, their appeal for unity and principled inner party struggle are more of a tactical nature than a sincere effort because it is combined with lies, slanders, threats and black mails.

We emphatically state that there is no basis either in our documents or in our own activities to suggest that we are for laying down arms. Our sole purpose of criticism and the steps we have taken to implement the party line is to transform the present armed actions, which are devoid of agrarian revolutionary programme and people's participation into a revolutionary movement leading to armed struggle basing on Immediate Programme.

In order to shield their anti-party line and anti-party activities, they are diverting the discussions and resorting to anti-party methods of disruption. We are determined to fight them back and defend the party's revolutionary line contained in the Immediate Programme.

We are of opinion that the Immediate Programme is fundamental line on which there cannot be any compromise. In fact we have prepared a draft programme, a tactical line basing on the Immediate Programme and we are releasing them for discussion. It is not the numbers, but the correctness of the line that matters for us. If a group of comrades want to change the present line either through a convention or through a plenum it is for them to decide. We will not be a party to such conventions or plenums and to their discussions. If they insist on taking such a step they will be considered as one of the so many groups existing all over India with their own programmes and tactical lines. We will decide our attitude towards this group in accordance with the programme and tactical line they adopt and implement.

Therefore a principled unity presupposes unity on the basis of Immediate Programme. Once this basis is accepted, the other aspects can be considered and decided upon. Any other conception of unity is an opportunist one. We do not permit any threats, blackmails, lies and slanders as a substitute to political arguments. That this group has already resorted to such measures goes only to show that the ground on which they stand is a slippery one. A principled inner party and an ideological struggle is incompatible with such cheap and time serving steps.

It is significant to note that those who never implemented the programme are the most vociferous in opposing it. And those who implemented it are the strongest supporters of it.

However, in view of the experience and the criticism levelled against it we want to make the following formal corrections in the "Immediate Programme".

1) The time limit suggested for implementation of various items in the programme should be removed. Firstly because it is wrong on our part to declare the date-time of implementation of our revolutionary programme as the enemy comes to know of it in advance. Secondly, it is a permanent document explaining our agrarian revolutionary programme and tactical line. In view of the un-evenness of the mass movements the document has to be used in future also to develop agrarian revolutionary movements in various parts of Andhra Pradesh and in other parts of India.

2) The foreign capital that the people's democratic state will confiscate be in all its forms and not limited to any specific one. In the same way we are for abolition of landlordism as a class. We do not want that targets of revolution should be only big landlordism. Differentiation between big and small landlords will be a tactical question. How we deal with the question is a matter to be considered in the given circumstances.

3) It is more correct to use peoples democracy instead of New Democracy as the former is used as a more accurate word.

All this does not mean that we are accepting the criticism that the document is revisionist or left adventurist. Acceptance of such criticism amounts to renunciation of role of agrarian revolution and need for building an agrarian revolutionary movement. Hence we reject the criticism as fundamentally wrong and as departure from Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-Tung's Thought.

The said defects in the document did not come in the way of comrades who have sincerely implemented it. The very fact that they could successfully implement it to develop agrarian revolutionary movement conclusively proves that the Immediate Programme is fundamentally correct.

We think that the stand we have taken on various issues in our document, "Left"-deviation with in the party" is fundamentally correct. Here we will limit ourselves to the new issues which they raised in their documents.

Let us proceed with the discussion of the points these comrades have raised.

II. PARTISAN WARFARE AS A FORM OF PARTIAL STRUGGLE

We are surprised at the way in which a document is introduced into our discussions. C.P. group has included it in the list of the documents which are supposed to be meant for discussions. They are silent about everything that has to be said about it.

It is a fact that there is one such document. It is about 20 years old as its date line suggests. It was known as "Kishan Document". Though it represented the official tactical line of the party for some time it was never implemented. It was never discussed even by the leading cadres. A major part of the leadership of the period also did not know that such a document existed.

As far as we are concerned we reject the whole document because it is fundamentally opposed to the path of people's war. Hence we do not deem it necessary either to defend the document in toto or in parts. If go into the document, the C. P. group's understanding of the partisan warfare does not even coincide with

that of the document or part they quote. It does not touch the fringe of that mass approach the quotation contains.

The document replies to the question when and how to begin partisan warfare in the following lines :-

".....in a big and topographically suitable area, when the peasant movement has risen to the level of seizure of land, the question as to how to effect that seizure and how to defend the land so seized will become a burning live question. The party is of the opinion that partisan warfare in such a situation undertaken on the basis of genuine mass peasant movement and the firm unity, under the leadership of the party of the peasant masses, especially the most oppressed and exploited strata, combined with other forms of struggle such as social boycott of landlords, mass peasant struggle agricultural workers strike, can if correctly conducted and led, has arousing and galvanising effect on the peasant masses in all areas and raise their own struggles to a higher level".

This para stresses the need for a peasant revolutionary movement, leading to seizure of the land for starting a partisan war. Organising the peasantry, raising their consciousness has been given prominent place. It also stresses the need for other forms of struggle while carrying on armed struggle for land. C. P. group shuts its eyes to this important aspect of the document it mentions.

The said document deals with the subject of partisan warfare as a form of partial struggle. The C. P. group is said to have interest over this point only. The point is dealt in the form of a question and an answer which is as follows :

"Question : Have we to take up partisan struggle only when the peasant struggle for partial demands reaches the stage of land distribution and establishing village peasant committees? Or can we take it up when the movement is still in the stage of struggle for partial demands is for example rent reduction.

Answer : The partial struggle has also stages. It starts with small demands. Let us say reduction of rent. It is not yet a partisan struggle

If the enemy refuses to grant the demands and the peasant is eager to win it by force then the partisan struggle can start. True it is not the struggle for seizure of land but only reduction of rent. Still it will be a partisan struggle.

Hence it does not depend on us. If the masses are ready and eager, we should assist them".

We do not find the last sentence in the given quotation of the C.P. group which is of some significance. We will explain this point later.

A cryptic question and a cryptic answer as mentioned in the quotation can never resolve any of the problems arising out of this subject. Can the armed actions of the groups of the militants during partial struggles be equated to the partisan warfare? Are partial struggles for increase in wages and anti-feudal struggles one and the same? Do the partial struggles provide the necessary organisation, level of consciousness and continuity of the mass action to carry on partisan warfare? These are the basic questions though they appear to be secondary. Neither the question nor the answer tries to go into them. Obviously, the questioner does not know anything about these points.

To come to the last sentence which the C.P. group deliberately omits. After advocating partisan warfare as a form of partial struggle the answer says:

..... it does not depend on us. If the masses are ready and eager we should assist them". Here there is a mass approach to the issue. The readiness and the eagerness of the masses mentioned here denotes embryonic form of organisation and consciousness which is enough for armed actions but not for partisan warfare.

We are not opposed to armed actions in accordance with readiness and eagerness of the masses during partial struggles. In fact we have been advocating such militant type of organisations of partial struggles. Our documents "Lay Foundations for a struggle-oriented mass movement" and Immediate Programme contain for-

mulation to meet the requirements of the situation. In our subsequent documents we explained our position in unequivocal terms. But the point of controversy is whether such militant and armed actions are to be called partisan warfare? or partisan warfare is to be organised to conduct a partial struggle?

We are unaware of the partial struggles where militant and armed actions are characterised as partisan warfare. Where as we have ample experience to show that if properly and correctly conducted, all anti-landlord struggles will reach the level of land seizure in short time And that is the time to start a partisan warfare.

We are firmly of the opinion that certain armed actions themselves do not constitute partisan warfare. On the otherhand it has an ideology, programme, organisation and mass character. It has strategic and tactical principles militarily. Mao dealt the subject in all its aspects. Instead of taking up the position in accordance with Map's directives C. P. group has departed from them and reduced them to armed actions. All this is going on in the name of scissored and trimmed quotation from a document which we reject.

It is also a dishonest and cunning step on the part of the C.P. group to delete the last sentence in the answer which is its basis, though the word 'eager' is found in the earlier part. Here the answer clearly says that it is the consciousness and organisation of the masses expressed in the form of 'readiness and 'eager' ness that should decide the question but not the pressure of police nor the desire of the party leadership.

Subsequently they changed this; formulation into "armed struggle to resist the police repression" without reference to the level of consciousness of masses. In practice it has degenerated into assassination of individuals.

Thus the C.P. group while claiming that their line is in accordance with "Kishan Document" departs even from it in all its aspects.

Now we will deal with some aspects of experiences of armed struggle and agrarian revolutionary movement in Telangana upto 1951.

III. SOME ASPECTS OF ARMED STRUGGLE IN TELANGANA.

The C.P. group while defending its so called line of armed struggle as a form of partial struggle tries to bring in the experiences of Telangana armed struggle in support of its arguments. But there is no basis for it. This group rather distorts the experiences to prove its wrong contention. This is what it says:-

"Telangana struggle has also proved this. People become ready for land distribution only after armed struggle has begun against forced labour (vetti, Begari) grain-lending (Nagu), grain levy and atrocities of landlord against Razakars after people gained confidence in the struggle of resistance.

A document on the experiences of Telangana armed struggle sent by jail leaders has this. "In Hyderabad State, post war upsurge has started with peasants resisting against, forced grain collection and governments armed police and they continued struggle."

The above sentences are clear. Even in Telangana armed struggle has started on partial demands and people became ready for land distribution in the process of its development alone".

(Reject - P.17)

In some other document it says that "Telangana armed struggle has no theoretical foundation".

Everyone knows that old and new revisionists are distorting the experiences of Telangana armed struggle to suit their present policies. The C.P. group is also doing the same. The above quotation clearly shows that this group has understood nothing about the content of and various phases in Telangana revolutionary movement and armed struggle. It seems to us that they are not prepared to understand the subject. The way they quoted the document and commented on it proves the same.

Neither the document nor the actual experiences regarding Telangana armed struggle show that armed struggle (as we understand it

in the classical senses) has been a form of struggle for partial demands. Nor the land distribution took place at an advanced stage of armed struggle. The quotation they suggest also does not prove their contention.

It is during Telangana armed struggle that the Andhra Committee has brought forward the subject of path of Indian Revolution for inner-party discussion. Basing on the experiences of Telangana armed struggle, it advocated that Chinese path i.e., people's war is applicable to India as much as to China.

While dealing with the experiences of Telangana armed struggle it, is necessary that we should correctly find out the relation between favourable and unfavourable factors existing at the time of the struggle (1946-51) and now. It will help to resolve one more controversy we come across in one of the documents.

Now let us go into the experiences of Telangana.

1. EARLY DAYS OF TELANGANA

Telangana was Telugu speaking part of former Hyderabad State where autocracy was in power. There was feudalism (Jagirdari), feudal landlordism (System of Deshmukami and Tenancy) rampant through out the state. There was neither a political party, a genuine mass organisation much less a revolutionary party and movement prior to 1940. Even the liberal national movement that existed in the so called British India was not seen in the State. This shows the weakness of liberal nationalism.

A communist unit began to function in Telangana by 1940, as a result of merger of three currents existing at the time. First is the national current which was disillusioned by Gandhism; the second was a group of petty bourgeoisie intellectuals of the city with nationalist and socialist ideas. Both these groups were influenced by the Nehru brand of socialism. A third current emerged from the students which was in the main revolutionary. The national trend had been right opportunist from the very beginning; the city petty bourgeoisie intellectuals turned into reformist, trade unionists where as

the revolutionary trend led the revolutionary movement which took a zig-zag path.

The party was illegal. It was decided to work among the masses through mass organisations. Early revolutionaries built a good fighting trade union movement in spite of the repressive conditions in those days. In order to work among the peasants, revolutionaries decided to work in an organisation called 'Andhra Maha Saba'. It was a formal one dominated by liberal elements. The programme was moderate with a demand for implementing the then existing laws which were in the main on paper only. The forms of struggle were legal though everything was illegal according to the law.

Those elements who limited their activity to legal work could obviously do nothing. But the revolutionary elements reached the masses, studied their problems and campaigned for the line they adopted. This led to clashes between the people and landlords with government assisting the latter. The issues were forced labour and Tenancy in the main.

As a reflection of this class struggle there was a clash in the Andhra Maha Sabha between the left wing led by the revolutionaries on the one hand and the liberals representing land lords interests on the other. An ideological struggle took shape between the two forces, between Marxism-Leninism and Gandhism, resulting in the defeat of Gandhism as far as Andhra Maha Sabha is concerned. Therefore it is wrong to say that there has been no ideological foundation for Telangana armed struggle. It was there even in early days.

It was in 1944 when Communists were in full control of Andhra Maha Sabha, they led an anti-feudal struggle in Janagam taluka of then Nalgonda District. Peasantry having experience and confidence in anti-landlord struggles on the issues of Begari and Tenancy were drawn into bigger struggles which were deeper and broader in sweep. This struggle covered about 40 villages with a wide range of anti-feudal problems. A militant type of mass mobilisation (demonstrations, public meeting) was enough to do away with some aspects of feudal exploitation (forced

labour and landlord atrocities) at least temporarily. Side by side with these issues land question came upon the surface of the movement. Peasant after peasant came forward and demanded land from the landlord which once belonged to them. How to restore the land was the problem before the party and Andhra Maha Sabha. Legal means were of no use. Party was not ready to adopt revolutionary means to seize lands in accordance with the then existing line. Such was the situation when Lembada peasants of Mundrai were ready to seize lands evicted and dispossessed by landlords. The party leadership was neither clear nor prepared for such a revolutionary step. Therefore there was no seizure for the present.

This point is significant for us because it took about two to three months for the peasants to realise the need for seizure of lands ever since they started organised struggle. This is the shortest possible time and certainly not a long time (2) No arms, not even sticks were used during these three months. The people depended on the organised strength in the form of public meetings, demonstrations to keep the landlord on the defensive. Of course, anti-feudal unity was the main source of the strength they possessed. In certain cases, a certain section of the poor peasantry and agriculture labour remained neutral.

Experience at this phase of the struggle shows that peasantry was ready to seize lands as early as 1944, long before armed struggle began. It was the consciousness of the peasantry that decided the issue, whether to resort to legal means or revolutionary means. As soon as peasantry cast off legal illusions and gained confidence in its own organised strength it adopted revolutionary means. They needed no arms to reach such a stage.

Subsequently, there was repression in the form of foisting cases on revolutionaries and local leadership. There was a temporary lull in the mass activity for about a year. During this period, the landlords could use their physical force in the form of goonda attacks on the revolutionaries defiant people. We had failed to resist them successfully, without raising a local volunteer force, though we had brought some

volunteers from distant places. There was actually a fight in Palakurti village between revolutionary volunteers from outside, and landlord's goondas for a piece of land and crop of a small peasant family whose male members were arrested and the entire family was defiant even after arrests.

It was only when revolutionaries raised local volunteer force from among the local population they could fight back the goonda gangs successfully and the land of the small peasant was successfully defended.

The issue was defending a land and crop already in possession and not seizing land nor defending seized land. Enemy's armed forces were goondas having sticks in the main. One or two fire arms used to be there for exhibition. People's volunteers were armed with sticks. This was enough to fight the goondas back.

The character of the struggle was still partial though anti-landlord and militant. Legal and revolutionary forms were still being combined by using courts etc. Armed struggle had not yet started. It was only a partial struggle, of course, with a different nature with seizure of land coming on to the agenda.

Revolutionaries depended on the organised strength of the masses to repulse attacks of landlords. When masses were not in action they used physical force to defend themselves whether effective or ineffective. It was only when local volunteers force was organised, the force was effective. This step raised the level of organisation as well as consciousness higher and gave further confidence to fight back landlordism

Ideological struggle took a different form. Andhra Maha Sabha was free from the shackles of liberals. It was a united front of anti-Nizam national forces (Mainly Andhra) at the top and antifeudal united front at the village level. Therefore fight against liberalism was carried on mainly against liberals outside the Andhra Maha Sabha. Inside the party right opportunist forces were lying low. Often complaining that revolutionaries were adopting adventurist tactics where as they were having legal and hence a peaceful work. Nobody bothered about them.

To say that there was an armed struggle as a form of struggle for partial issues (forced labour, grain lending and feudal atrocities etc.) is wrong and is not born by facts. It is a distortion pure and simple. It is also not a fact to say that the struggle has no ideological foundation. The struggle against liberalism was a constant feature and it has helped in unleashing revolutionary struggle. This does not mean that the then official class collaborationist policy did not harm the movement. The very fact that the struggle was not spread throughout Telangana including major parts of Nalgonda district proves that it did harm the movement. Even then the local revolutionaries were alert and ready to seize the initiative when post war people's upsurge made its appearance, throughout India including Nalgonda district.

2. POST - WAR UPSURGE.

Two incidents in Telangana coincided with post war upsurge in India. They took place in the villages of Aknoor (Nalgonda District) and Machireddipally (Gulbarga Dist). Though the latter was in Karnatak State, the village was on the borders and was having a Telugu speaking population. In both the villages, people en masse refused to part with the grain and beat the police and revenue officials, who came to the village to collect the levy grain (a wartime measure, continued even after the war). The police as a retaliatory measure beat the people, men women and children, looted the village and raped a number of women. Though the police could temporarily suppress the resistance of the villagers, it was an indication that the people were in a retaliatory mood to resist the on-slaughts of the authorities. The two villages were outside the area of an organised movement. The issue was grain levy. The resistance was spontaneous at the same time against the authorities. It was not a partial but a basic issue like that of land. The form of struggle was not legal and peaceful but revolutionary and militant. People used force with sticks, broom sticks (used by women) and other weapons which were in common use but not the fire arms. The methods were other than those used in guerrilla warfare.

These were not the partial struggles in the strict sense of the term. These were political,

revolutionary militant as people were defying the authorities on an issue which was anti-feudal and anti-government (Local landlords accumulated huge grain and money as a result of grain collection by the government).

The revolutionaries in Nalgonda District studied the lessons of the resistance in the two villages, which were away from their area of work. They could not give a land to the resistance any further but exposed the atrocities through out the state, Andhra and India. At the same time used the lessons to organise the resistance to the landlords as well as police. A call was given to organise volunteer squads and antirepression demonstrations of the people in every village.

In one of the villages of Nalgonda district where there was an organised peasant movement i. e. Kada-Vendi, a small procession of volunteers was going on in the streets, the landlords armed men fired at the peaceful procession and a poor peasant youth, Komaraiah died on the spot. He was the first martyr in the Telangana armed struggle, which was in the process of development.

It was after the martyrdom of Komaraiah, people of the area moved enmass into revolutionary action resisting the armed men of the landlords. It was at this time land distribution began as peasants came forward to seize the lands. The land distribution as well as resistance movement spread to about 120 villages in about 5 talukas. Repression was intensified. Military came into the picture. Firing took place and about 20 peasant youth including a woman were killed. The resistance movement was temporarily suppressed. This was upto December 1946.

In this resistance movement the entire rural population moved into action. Every peasant youth took up one or the other job related to the movement and carried it to the best of his capacity. The volunteer squads used sticks and slings as their weapons. People implemented the programme of abolition of begari, illegal extractions and other forms of feudal exploitation in a revolutionary manner. There was no question of putting forward their demands by the peasa-

nts and of accepting or rejecting them by the landlords. Their organised strength was enough to enforce their demands. The same was the case with the tenancy lands. The landlords were not in a position to resist or refuse the demands of the tenants.

The lands that were distributed were of specific nature. They were once held by the peasants and later lost to the landlords in one way or the other. They were given back to the original holders.

Thus the issues involved in this phase of the movement were not only of general anti-feudal nature but land distribution in particular. The forms of organisation were a revolutionary fighting party, a revolutionary fighting Andhra Maha Sabha as a united front and mass volunteer squad with local weapons i.e. sticks and slings but not yet fire arms. The organised strength was enough to repel any attack of the landlords as well as a limited number of armed police. It was only a huge military concentration that they could not face with the then existing organisation.

It is clear that people have used force to enforce their demands, though it was not a guerilla war fare. At the same time the demands were not partial but basic leading to land distribution. There was no question of bargaining on partial demands like abolition of Begari by force. The people's organised strength was enough to enforce the demands. An armed resistance in the form of guerilla warfare was needed to defend the land peasants distributed. As there was no such a guerilla warfare the movement had a temporary set-back.

In spite of the set-back, revolutionaries had a rich experience from this struggle which they utilised in the next phase. People also realised the need for higher forms of struggle using fire arms.

To say that this was the phase where in partial struggles predominated will be wrong, unrealistic and a distortion pure and simple. Though by 1944 itself, the struggle reached the stage of land seizure, in 1946 there was a land seizure, which means agrarian revolution

in the form of land seizure was unleashed by that time. Whatever the limited armed resistance was there it was connected with a form of struggle for land seizure. Hence there was no armed struggle as a form of struggle for partial demands. Facts related to this stage of the struggle do not confirm C.P. group's formulation that there was an armed struggle in Telangana to enforce the partial demands. Hence it is a concoction as well as distortion.

This also proves that land distribution in Telangana took place only in the beginning, when the people were just learning to use force to defend the land they seized. Throughout the armed struggle they went on seizing the land and simultaneously defending it with arms. There is no evidence to say that people did not seize the land in earlier phases of the armed struggle. In fact armed struggle could survive and continue only when land distribution was taken up and intensified.

3. ANTI-NIZAM STRUGGLE UPTO POLICE ACTION IN SEPTEMBER 1948.

We had stated earlier that there was a temporary set back to peasant revolutionary movement by the end of 1946. There was a certain peculiar political situation which was utilised by the revolutionaries to regroup themselves and carry on revolutionary work. There was a conflict between the Nizam and Union Government as to the status of the Hyderabad state and its relations to the union. Both sides tried to resolve the conflict by negotiations but could not. Therefore congress started a Satyagraha in 1947 August, which fizzled out in no time as it could not withstand the repression having no agrarian programme.

Communist party had also decided to start a campaign on its own. With its own mass mobilisation i.e. public meetings, procession and demonstrations. Here again the campaign could not withstand Nizam-Razakar repression and it was about to fizzle out when party decided to take up arms. Precisely this was the time when the congress decided to take up arms so that it may be in the command of the movement and people. Armed actions from both

sides were going on for sometime. They could not withstand Nizam Razakar armed attacks. By this time the revolutionary trend in the party put forward an agrarian programme to be carried out. After some discussion it was decided that pro Nizam landlords land should be confiscated and distributed to the poor peasantry and agricultural labourers.

After initial success a ceiling was fixed at 500 acres to all landlords to distribute surplus land. After some time the ceiling was lowered to 200 acres and it was implemented on a wider scale. There was a proposal to reduce the ceiling to 70-80 acres. Before the party could take any decision on it union armies entered the struggle areas in the month of September 1948.

From this it can be seen that throughout this period armed struggle and land distribution was simultaneously going on except for a short period when the armed actions began.

The armed actions without agrarian revolutionary programme i.e. land distribution proved to be ineffective and could not be sustained for long. When the land distribution started, people began to join the armed struggle in large numbers and it assumed a mass character which enabled people to resist Nizam's armed offensive. As land was distributed intensively and extensively armed struggle has also reached new heights.

While land distributed has provided the mass basis and mass character to the armed struggle, armed defence of land had further strengthened it, thus each strengthening the other. During this process people's armed forces i.e. guerilla squads could inflict defeat after defeat on to Nizam's armed forces. Had there been a land distribution it would have been impossible to develop a mass base and mass character to the armed struggle. In fact the armed actions that the party squads started could not last long and were about to fizzle out in no time. This was our experience which is as valuable today as it was at that time.

These are the facts which nobody can deny. Then how is that C.P. group says that in Telangana armed struggle started as a form of partial

struggle. It should be known that land distribution started long before anti-Nizam-Razakar armed struggle began when people's volunteer squads were organised to defend the land and other antifuedal gains. They do not want to learn from this experience because it goes against their contention that armed struggle is a form of struggle for partial demands.

However there were certain types of lands which were in possession of landlords often big which were being cultivated with the help of 'farm servants'. There was no claims of any poor peasant or an agricultural labour that any of such plot or land once belonged to them say about 50-100 years ago. Such lands were distributed at a later stage when armed struggle was advancing rapidly. In the earlier days, the demand was for their own lands which they possessed and cultivated once. After distribution of such lands the demand for the type of lands mentioned above started. It should be noted that it took only 8-10 months to reach such a level. Earlier in 1946, the land distribution took place for a period of about 4 to 5 months and the movement temporarily suppressed.

When, once such land-once unclaimed land is distributed there will be total distribution of landlord's land. It might not have been possible to distribute such lands 20 years ago, it should be possible to distribute them among the agricultural labour and poor peasantry in the present period as they possess a higher level of consciousness. In East Godavari girijans were able to seize such lands as a result of eight months of masses revolutionary work.

We can understand the C. P. groups difficulties if they don't know the facts. When they assert that experiences of Telangana armed struggle shows that partial struggle took the form of armed struggle we contest that point as it cannot be supported by the facts nor experience. The quotation they advance in support of their argument does not give the meaning they want to ascribe to it.

By saying that in Telangana partial struggle took the form of armed struggle C. P. group is

distorting the experiences of Telangana armed struggle and misleading the party. This is not to be good at learning but an opportunist attitude of interpreting the experiences to suit ones own wrong line.

4. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE PRESENT PERIOD WHEN COMPARED TO THE PERIOD OF TELANGANA ARMED STRUGGLE.

C. P. group finds fault with us for saying that there are certain disadvantages at present when compared to the past i. e. the period of Telangana armed struggle and concludes that this amounts to advocat laying down the arms in the forest areas.

There is no such thing in our arguments which leads to laying down of arms. Correct assessment of corelation of forces between ourselves and the enemy will never lead to such a step. Only a wrong assessment-some times overestimating and other times underestimating leads either to adventuristic actions or retreating all along to lay down arms. C. P. group is victim of both these errors.

It is a fact that we said in our article on "Armed struggle and Revisionism", that more favourable situation exist at present than what it was at the time of Telangana armed struggle. It is correct and we stand by that formulation. The favourable conditions are (i) we are in an advanced stage of world revolution when national liberation struggles are going on all over the world. (ii) Level of our peoples consciousness is high. (iii) Experience of people's war of China and other countries are within the reach of revolutionaries. All these are undoubtedly advantageous factors which gives us confidence in the succes of revolution. This is the reason why we set forth with an Immediate Programme to build an agrarian revolutionary movement leading to armed struggle. The experience we had from implementing it in East Godavari District has proved this formulation to be correct. The very fact that within a period of 8 months, an agrarian revolutionary movement started form ABC has reached the stage of Land seizure proves, conclusively that we are in an advanced stage of revolution and level of

people's consciousness is high. This is indisputable.

This does not and should not mean that we should not take into consideration of the disadvantageous factors obtaining in the present period the most important being, twenty five years of counter-revolutionary preparations with increased armed forces and development of communications in forest areas and corruption of a section of local population etc. One more important factor to be noted is at the time of armed struggle in Telangana we had a national factor which we utilised to the best of our capacity we don't have at present. Our armed struggle should take the form of civil war and we are starting with guerilla forces created from among the peasantry fighting for land.

In our said article we were replying to a revisionist who said that favourable conditions did not exist in India for starting an armed struggle. Our purpose was not working out a tactical line in that article. Therefore we limited ourselves to saying that more favourable conditions do exist at present than we had at the time of Telangana armed struggle. And it was correct.

When we have to address our ranks and work out a tactical line we cannot simply say that everything is in our favour and go ahead. This amounts to husking. Instead we have to analyse favourable and unfavourable factors, prepare a tactical line and educate our ranks on that basis. This alone gives them confidence to utilise favourable factors and strength to fight against odds.

When we pointed out this mistake of theirs in our document "Left-deviation within the party" the C. P. group instead of reexamining their own defective approach tried in vain to attribute that pointing out disadvantageous factors leads to advocating laying down of arms.

By taking into consideration advantages and disadvantages, working out suitable and correct tactical line, we can strengthen armed struggle. We advocated the same. We are still of the firm opinion that only a well organised agrarian revolutionary movement can overcome

and fight back the existing disadvantages. Shutting our eyes to the disadvantages and renouncing the task of building agrarian revolutionary movement will lead us no where. The C. P. group is committing the same mistake.

We should educate our people and ranks in a revolutionary spirit giving the confidence as well as strength to fight against odds. Phrasemongering is no substitute for this. We should desist from such phrasemongering.

5. TELANGANA ARMED STRUGGLE-A 1905 FOR INDIAN REVOLUTION

Every revolution has its own ups and downs and traverse a zig-zag path. Marxism-Leninism-Mao's Thought teaches us to study the revolutionary experiences diligently and draw correct lessons from it. Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao did the same. We following their footsteps are expected to do the same.

Paris commune (1871) was defeated. But Marx and Engels studied and summed up the experiences of the commune provided the International Communist Movement with a theory of insurrection and Dictatorship of the proletariat which are fundamentals of Marxism.

The 1905 Revolution in Russia was defeated. But Lenin studied and summed up the experiences of the revolution and used them to prepare for October Revolution (1917)

Mao studied and analysed the specific features of Chinese revolution and applied the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism to the concrete practice of Chinese revolution. Thus he could work out the theory and practice of People's War

In India we had our revolutionary struggles. We should study and assimilate experiences of such struggles. Armed struggle in Telangana (1946-51) is the most important among them. It gives us necessary experience with which we can apply the theory of people's war to the practice of revolution.

There has been a tendency to negate the experience to agrarian revolution and armed struggle being inseparably linked. Revisionists

are stressing "anti-Nizam" aspect to the struggle to negate the agrarian revolution and armed struggle. Neorevisionists stress the struggle of the pre-police action period to negate anti-central government aspect of the struggle. Both are advancing theories to suit their revisionist lines, negating a full-pledged agrarian revolution and an armed struggle against both the Nizam as well as Indian ruling classes. This negation is taking place from a right opportunist angle.

There are some who negate agrarian revolution and armed struggle as being inseparably linked from a left opportunist angle. Charu Mazumdar and his group has advanced and implemented a theory of armed struggle without agrarian revolution. It took two years to realise the futility of the theory and at least a section of the comrades did realise it though a section of hard core seems to be adamant on it. The C.P. group is negating this theory by advocating armed struggle as a form of partial struggles in theory while resorting to armed actions without people in practice. Both these tendencies emanate from opportunist angle, negating the need for agrarian revolution, though the former says that land can be distributed after liberated base areas are set up and the latter says that it can take place at an advanced stage of armed struggle. Thus this tendency also negates the experience of Telangana armed struggle.

Both the right and left opportunists are second to none to hail and glorify the Telangana armed struggle. Yet it is they who are negating the fundamental aspects of the struggle i.e. agrarian revolution and armed struggle being inseparably linked. It is not a coincidence that they are united on this point.

We are firmly of the opinion that experiences of armed struggle in Telangana are applicable not only in Andhra Pradesh but all over India. Any negation of these experiences will not be in the interests of Indian Revolution. The experiences and the lessons from it are quite in accordance with theory and practice of people's war as advanced by Mao. That is the reason why we attach importance and take lessons from it.

While characterising Russian Revolution of 1905 as a prologue to coming European revolutions, Lenin has to say the following:

"We very often meet West Europeans who talk of the Russian revolution as if events, the course and the methods of struggle in that backward country have very little resemblance to West European patterns and therefore can hardly have any practical significance.

Nothing could be more erroneous. The forms and occasions for the impending battle in the coming European revolution's will doubtlessly differ in many respects from the forms of the Russian Revolution.

Nevertheless the Russian revolution precisely because of its proletarian character, in that particular sense of which I have spoken in the prologue to the coming European revolutions. Undoubtedly this coming revolutions can only be a proletarian revolutions and in an even more profound sense of the word; a proletarian socialist revolution is also in its content. This coming revolution will show to ever greater degree, on the one hand, that only stern battles, only civil wars can free the humanity from the yoke by capital, and on the other hand, that only class conscious proletarians can and will give leadership to the vast majority of the exploited".

(Lenin collected works : Vol. 23 page 252-53).

Here Lenin speaks of Russian revolution as a prologue to European revolutions. Europe consists of highly developed Western Europe and a backward Eastern Europe mainly Russia. Therefore he speaks of different forms of the revolution in each country will take. At the same time he stressed common proletarian character of all revolutions.

The same thing applies to India. Just like in China; Indian revolution has also peasant character i.e. agrarian revolution under the leadership of proletariat. It will be a protracted armed struggle with a united front of all revolutionary classes against imperialism, landlordism etc; All these points are indisputable.

What is disputed is whether Telangana armed struggle is a prologue to the Indian revolution. We say yes, it is a prologue. Though there is uneven development, India as a whole is a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country. Therefore, the form the revolution takes is one and the same. Revolutionary peoples committees (Grama Rajyas), land distribution and armed struggle in the form of guerilla warfare will be the form the revolution takes. It is a path of people's war as applied to Indian conditions. Subsequent experiences in Srikakulam armed struggle also proves the same.

There have been renegades in the leadership of all revolutions. Leadership of Indian revolutionary ranks is no exception to this. Simply because leadership of Telangana armed struggle happened to betray the struggle, unique contribution of this struggle to the path of Indian revolution can neither be minimised nor negated.

The right and left opportunists by negating the essence of Telangana armed struggle, are negating the concept that it is a prologue to Indian revolution.

It will be our endeavour to constantly study the experiences of this struggle as well as of others, sum up and apply them in the light of the theory and practice of people's war. This, we think, is the only way to advance the Indian revolution.

IV. "TWO YEARS EXPERIENCES" - EXPERIENCES OF DEPARTURE FROM MASS LINE

1 Not an Experience based on our Fundamental line:

There was a time, when revolutionaries in Telangana were in search of a revolutionary mass line. During the early days of mass work, slogan of mass activities was implementation of whatever legal facilities then existing for the people. There were two approaches regarding this slogan. One was mass mobilisation for the implementation of legal facilities. This helped building revolutionary mass movements, which was headed by revolutionaries. The other approach was liberal. Representations to the authorities and litigations was the main form with mass mobilisation as secondary. This has

not helped the revolutionary movement. Revolutionaries did use representations but as a secondary form.

After about 3 years of day today mass work question of land seizure came on the agenda (Beginning of 1945). By that time, there was no programme for land seizure; revolutionaries did not know what to do when such question came to the fore front. It took about 1½ years to organise land seizure in August 1946. This was done with local initiative when there was no such party programme. Eversince, land distribution has become main part of the revolutionary programme as far as Telangana is concerned, though implemented in a limited area.

This was not the case when we broke away from Neo-revisionists. Though in the earlier months of July and August 1968 we concentrated on ideological questions by the end of August we were ready with an outline to develop a revolutionary movement through a party circular "Lay foundations for a struggle oriented mass Movement" of 1st September 1968. This document provided a mass line and, filled a small gap that was existing. If implemented earnestly, it would have been a means to break the stagnation existing in the various parts of the state and put it on a fighting plane. But implementation was by way of exception. When we go into available records of the forest units (Warangal for example) we find neither mention nor discussion of document. However they took some forest issues for their day to day work with good results. But a comprehensive discussion of the document and implementation of the line it gives would have helped the comrades to build the forest peasant movement on firm revolutionary foundations and would have enabled the people to take up arms at an appropriate stage.

Unlike this approach, we find in East Godavari District, comrades in Kondamodalu* area implemented the line with a modest beginning. Within a short period they could develop a revolutionary movement on partial demands of an anti-landlord and anti-forest officials, thus preparing ground for land seizure.

In Kurnool district, some preparatory work was done to seize forest lands. In some of

Telangana Districts, grain seizure was organised.

Immediate Programme was ready by the end of December 1968. It was a comprehensive document when compared to the September circular of 1968. Though it was not circulated immediately, guidance for day to day work was provided basing on this document. April convention (1969) adopted it as a programmatic and tactical document.

Land was seized basing on the Immediate Programme where some preparatory work was already done. In Kondamodalu area (East Godavari) land in the possession of landlords-'personal' was seized where as forest and 'society' land in Kurnool district and Banjar lands in possession of landlords in Ananthapur District were seized.

Barring this, a vast area where party units were existing had not come into action. Either before the convention or after the convention, not a single district unit nor a local unit expressed any differences either of a fundamental or secondary nature to the party's mass line as expressed in the September circular and Immediate Programme.

We can come to the following conclusions basing on the above facts :

1. There has been a mass line for our party to act upon ever since September 1968.
2. A section of the party has acted upon it.

The experiences of the comrades who implemented it proved that the line we had adopted is correct, and it helped to advance our agrarian revolutionary movement.

3. There was a vast section of the party which did not implement it. It was rather in active.
4. The leadership of the forest areas of Warangal and Khammam went into armed actions without implementing mass line immediately after the April convention. Ever since they had been carrying on armed actions in one form or the other.
5. It is not correct to say that Immediate Programme provides only two months time to

prepare the people for land seizure. The September circular provided this programme and tactical line long before. Immediate programme gives a most comprehensive and concrete form for the line the September circular gives.

Therefore the experience that the C. P. group had in the "two years" or more is not the same as it should have been if they implemented party's accepted mass line. It is an experience from a line opposed to it. Not to know this is not to know the difference between party line and the line the C. P. group followed

The C. P. group in their documents mentions a few words, saying that "Immediate Programme is fundamentally correct". But they do not hide the fact that their entire practice and understanding is fundamentally opposed to it.

Therefore the experience the C. P. group had in the last "two years" or more is the result of departing from party's accepted mass line. If this so called experience is to be based for working out a new line, it cannot be a correct line. It will be a line, of right or left opportunism or an admixture of both in some form or the other.

While it is necessary to go into our inner party situation to identify right and left opportunism inside the party, we will confine ourselves to various conclusions C. P. group draws from the so called 'experience' and comment on them.

2. HOW "EXPERIENCE" HAVE BEEN USED TO FIGHT CORRECT REVOLUTIONARY LINE BY "LEFT" OPPORTUNISTS..

In India, while right opportunists have been using quotations from Marx, Engels and Lenin which were decidedly out of context, to divert the mass movement into legal channels and reduce the party into a class collaborationist parliamentary party, left opportunist have been using quotations from Mao to paint their 'left' opportunist line as being in accordance with Mao's thought. We have enough experience of this from Charu Mazumdar and his group.

He also advanced the theory of 'Annihilation of class enemy' as a product of experience from Srikakulam armed struggle. He used this theory to attack correct mass line as a line of revisionism. He failed in his attempts as every wrong line is bound to end in a debacle. At the same time this theory along with its concomitants could do havoc to the revolutionary movement in India. This is an experience which no one should forget because it has costed us much.

Now the C. P. group has come forward with another type of "experience". It is advocating a theory of "armed struggle" without people with all its concomitants. Important among them are that (a) armed struggle should be conducted as soon as police makes its appearance even though people do not participate in it. (b) there is no landlordism or less of land concentration in forest areas (c) people seize lands only at an advanced stage of armed struggle (d) now that the congress has a "stable" government, exposure and self-defence is the tactical line to be adopted etc.

While there is a left opportunism in talking about armed struggle with some armed squads the whole line amounts to renunciation of agrarian revolution, peoples armed struggle peoples revolutionary movement i.e. the renunciation of struggle against ruling classes. This is out and out right opportunism. Thus the line the CP group is advocating in the name of "experience" is the admixture of right and "left" opportunism.

Every class has its own experience. Ruling classes have their own experience and they are proceeding to defend their interests basing on their experiences. Revisionists have their own experience of renouncing Marxism-Leninism and they are serving the interests of ruling classes with their revisionism. In the same way, left opportunism satisfies petty bourgeoisie elements while right opportunism serves the needs of inactive and non-revolutionary elements who are entrenched in the revolutionary ranks. C.P. group's line of thinking and practice, which is said to be the product of their "Two years Experience" serves the purpose of such elements and not revolutionaries.

Therefore it is necessary that no one should be carried away by the "experience". We are undoubtedly for revolutionary experience. It can be had by implementing a mass programme and mass tactical line among the people. People moving into action in hundreds and thousands will provide their revolutionary experience to the party. We have such a programme and tactical line in the September circular and Immediate Programme. We had such revolutionary experience from girijan peasantry of Kondamodalu area (East Godavari) in the main. This experience proves that our line is mass line and correct line. Thus it stands test of revolutionary practice. This is the process of getting revolutionary experience. We correct if need be, improve and develop our line on the basis of such experience alone.

Hence the "experience" they claim to have is an experience of deviating from mass line and renouncing agrarian revolution. It is opposed to our programme and tactical line. It is but natural that we reject it.

3. POLICE REPRESSION AND ARMED STRUGGLE.

It is quite normal when we happen to move through jungles and enemy infested areas, we think of self-defence and make necessary arrangements for it. We will have fire arms, ordinary arms with necessary personnel for this. If we underestimate the danger of enemy, we may be caught unawares and our enemy may have an upper hand at the given moment. If we overestimate the enemy, we may spend our resources, time and energy to take excessive precautions without proper returns. If we have to choose between underestimation and overestimation it is always better to choose the latter. But as revolutionaries we should have a correct or near correct estimation. We have to strive for this.

We, in India, are using the term armed struggle rather loosely. The struggles that Nagas and Mizos are carrying on are called armed struggle. They are led by bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie elements. They have an aim of national independence of their home lands.

Their is a mass participation. They are adopting tactics of guerilla warfare. At the same time it is not led by the proletariat ideologically, programmatically and organisationally. This is the fundamental difference between an armed struggle led by us and that of others.

Some are using the term **armed struggle** for assassination of individuals. Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-Tung's thought is opposed to such assassination. Hence to call it armed struggle is doubly wrong. Consequently assassination squads cannot be termed as guerilla squads because function of guerilla squads is to fight the armed forces of the state, where as the function of assassination squads is to kill individuals, often un-armed. Charu Mazumdar's "annihilation of class enemy" theory is nothing but that of assassination of individuals may be political or police. We are always opposed to such theories in whatever form they may appear.

There is another theory which terms self defence as **armed struggle**. If this is to be accepted every measure of self-defence has to be called as **armed struggle**. Out of sheer necessity, individuals as well as groups are resorting to such measures all over India. Even the reactionary law permits self defence under certain limitations. It is clear that, in all self defence measures, fire arms and ordinary arms are freely used.

C.P. group poses the question in slightly different manner. They say that once revolutionaries begin to work among the rural population against the tyranny of landlord's and government officials, police does not sit with folded hands. On the other hand it makes its appearance. Hence revolutionaries must take up fire arms and defend themselves. This is to be called **armed struggle** as they claim.

While it is correct to call the struggle of Naga's and Mizo's as **armed struggle** as long as people participate in it, it is not correct to term assassination of individual and self defence measure as **armed struggle**. It is vulgarisation of the term **armed struggle**, which no Marxist-Leninist should permit.

Our conception of **armed struggle** is that of people's **armed struggle**. In the present stage of the revolution it will be the form of agrarian revolution. We will have to explain same again and again.

As against the Marxist-Leninist and Mao Tse-Tung's conception of **armed struggle** C.P. group advances the following theory in the name of "experience".

"It is good to start **armed struggle** when people come forward to distribute the lands of the landlords and to defend them. We should strive for the same. But then our practice has proved that this understanding is also wrong".

The ideas expressed in this para are self contradictory. How is it that a good thing to be strived for i.e. land distribution and **armed struggle** proves wrong in practice? There must be something wrong with the thinking and practice itself. This shows that C.P. group concedes the idea of **armed struggle** as a form of struggle for land distribution in words and violates it in practice.

Let us go further:

"The government will not sit back with folded hands when people are mobilised on class issues and come forward into militant struggles, when the people's struggles are combined with the propagation of people's war path and politics, either in forest area or in plain areas. Government will not sit waiting till people reach the stage of distribution of landlord's own lands. As soon as people begin to move on people's issues, landlords and government resort to repression. In such conditions, keeping in view the preparedness of the people for **armed struggle**, if people come forward to put up **armed resistance** against police repression, we take up the leadership for such **armed struggle**. (We) prepare the people for land distribution in the process of an **armed struggle** with direct participation of the people. Thus (we) strive for implementation of agrarian revolution".

C.P. group reveals their understanding to some extent in these lines.

Let it be clear that they expect repression as soon as we start work either in plains or in forests. They say that they will lead armed struggle if people are ready. Very brave words; What about the task of preparing people for armed struggle? In order to prepare themselves for armed struggles people must undergo the experience of series of organised struggles which alone can give them necessary strength to participate in the armed struggle. C.P. group renounces the task of organising such struggles to prepare the people for armed struggle. This is a fundamental departure from mass line. They expect the people to participate in the armed struggle on their own accord which never happens. It is in the process of a series of militant struggles, that people get prepared for armed struggle. The duration for such preparation depends on the sweep of the mass upsurge.

The C.P. group never allowed the forest people to have such experience. Therefore they could not have it for themselves. A few struggles took place in Warangal district, but they could not assimilate their experiences.

In the same period our comrades in Konda-modalu area organised people starting from small and elementary demands to seizure of landlord's lands. This is a living experience that we have. Therefore we have two understandings and two practices here. One is that of negating the role of the party to prepare the people for land seizure and armed struggle, through series of partial and militant struggles and it is represented by the C.P. group. The other is that of preparing the people for land seizure and armed struggle which is represented by us and those comrades who implemented the party's mass line in various areas especially in Konda Modalu area.

Let us understand further what the experiences of CP group mean :

'In the conditions of unpreparedness of the people for armed resistance against police, (we) have to take up to defending the movement and the cadre by organising village militants and cadre into squads. That struggle has to go on in so many forms in view of peoples help and

topography of the area. While forming armed squads and continuing self-defence struggle, people's mobilisation has to take place on people's issues. *We take necessary armed actions against people's enemies and police agents while carrying on people's mobilisation on peoples issues* we resort to self-defence from police on the other side. During this stage we collect arms not by attacks on police but through other means. We combine the entire programme with the consciousness of revolutionary politics of armed struggle. In this process people get prepared for land distribution and armed struggle after gaining consciousness for armed struggle among them. Then only necessary foundation will be laid for prolonged armed struggle". (Emphasis by CP group) C P groups' Experiences of "Two years armed struggle".

This para provides us with the basic understanding of the CP group regarding armed struggle. This group proposes armed squads, armed actions with mass mobilisation of its conception instead of building agrarian revolutionary movement to prepare the people for land distribution and protracted armed struggle. To prepare people to resist police, implementation of agrarian revolutionary programme along with necessary organisational measures as suggested in the Immediate Programme is the only way. Instead of this CP group skips over this basic phase of the revolutionary movement and enters into armed squads, armed actions etc. This line of practice, instead of preparing people for land distribution and armed struggle have deprived them of the both for the last two to three years. Experience has proved this against their contention.

The C. P. group accepts the fact that in the areas where they are working, people are not ready to resist police. They are accepting another fact that conditions are yet to be created to develop a people's armed struggle. How to create such conditions? The tactical line given in the 'Immediate Programme' and the September circular is enough for this stage of the movement. These documents provide the comrades working among the people an understanding of the issues that comrades have to take up to mobilise people into class battles, the

militant forms the struggles should take, including resistance to the police. It should be clear that throughout the document mass issues and mass forms are stressed. Nothing is contained in them to suggest that they want such steps which are ahead of mass consciousness. Hence they provide us a mass line.

By organising armed squads of local militants and cadre this group is skipping over a highly revolutionary organisation suitable to the level of the movement i. e. people's volunteer corps. With the organisation of regular squads, C. P. group is depriving the people of such a valuable revolutionary experience.

Regular armed squads are a form of organisation above the level of peoples consciousness when people are not ready to resist the police. Therefore it has its negative effects on the movement as a whole, one of them being reducing them into passivity. This is what is happening in these areas.

This group proposes to resort to armed actions against people's enemies. This has been an important component of their programme. This is nothing but assassination of individuals, political or otherwise. This is reducing armed squads into assassination squads. We have pointed out earlier that assassination of individuals is against Marxism - Leninism-Mao-Tse - Tung thought. Hence we reject it out right.

People's armed squads are meant to fight state armed forces alone. Any action they take should be directed towards this and this alone. This is possible only when people's consciousness reaches higher level to suit the needs of armed struggle and when they are participating in the armed struggle itself.

The self-defence that the C. P. group propose and practice is not a self defence in the real sense of the term. They are substituting their self-defence to the people's selfdefence. When there is no people's participation, they had to content themselves with passivity and flightism naming itself defence. This is not self-defence at all.

They often use the term 'Mass mobilisation' Masses can be mobilised in a reformist, passive

and non-militant way without offending the authorities and the landlords. This attitude does not help to raise the level of consciousness organisation and fighting capacity of the people. Our concention of mass mobilisation is worked out in the two documents i.e. Immediate Programme and September circular. It is a mobilisation for class battles to prepare the people for agrarian revolution and armed struggle. There is nothing common between the two.

Their conception and practice of getting of arms is "through other sources." It is again the result of non-participation of the people. We can think of getting arms through whatever means at our disposal, if it is for physical self-defence purposes. But to get all the arms for such a number of squads is a non-revolutionary way. This group is resorting to such measures, which are opposed to the interests of agrarian revolutionary movement for this purpose.

They have no movement to defend because they refused to build an agrarian revolutionary movement. It is a tall talk to say that they are defending the movement because that has to be done by the people under the leadership of the party. A few armed squads cannot take the place of the people in this respect.

Taking all these factors into consideration, the C.P. group is neither leading an agrarian revolutionary movement against landlordism, nor an armed struggle against state's armed forces, not even in the form of self-defence.

If this is their experianca of the last two or three years it is decidedly not the purpose of the above two documents to provide us such an experience. Their experience is an experience of departure from party's mass line.

4. HOW AGRARIAN REVOLUTION IS BEING BY-PASSED BY C.P. GROUP.

Agrarian revolution is the axis of people's democratic revolution in our country. Therefore we cannot think of revolutionary movement without agrarian revolutionary movement. The September circular and Immediate Programme provide agrarian revolutionary programme

and the tactical line to implement it. This is indispensable for starting, developing and extending armed struggle. Any one who ignores, belittles, by-passes and under-plays agrarian revolution is the saboteur of Indian revolution. C. P. group is playing the same role.

Here is what they have to say about their so called experiences regarding land question, which is the main part of agrarian revolution.

"People are coming forward to occupy only un-reserved forest lands in the whole of this area. Reserved lands are occupied in small areas only. But here and there uncultivated and grazing lands of landlords, which are their own lands have also been occupied. It is also a fact that people in Palvancha Taluka, Mulugu Taluka and one or two places in East Godavari district have come forward to occupy landlords personally cultivated lands. But the very fact that no where in Khammam, Warangal and Karimnagar district people are prepared to occupy landlord's own lands makes it clear how unreal, is the estimation given on this issue in Immediate Programme.

In some other place, they say that there is not much of land concentration in forest areas. People, having enough land are not coming forward to occupy the lands of landlords.

Everyone knows that Palvancha and Mulugu Taluks are in Khammam and Warangal districts respectively. Therefore their contention is not born by facts that in two districts, people have not come forward to occupy landlords own lands.

C. P. group is deliberately belittling the organised agrarian revolutionary movement, started and developed in Konda Modalu area of East Godavari district, by saying that in one or two places people have come forward to occupy landlords own lands.

If in these three districts, people have come forward to occupy the landlord's lands, however meagre they may be even before armed struggle has begun, is it not a fact that they failed to organise the struggle for land distribution on wider scale? When comrades in Konda Modalu area could organise such struggles why this

group could not do the same in Warangal and Khammam districts?

People will not come forward on their own accord to occupy landlords lands in thousands. They have to be organised and prepared. This is to be done by the party. If party refuses to do this job, then party renounces its role as an organiser and leader of agrarian revolutionary movement. This is exactly what the revisionists and Neo-revisionists on one hand and Charu Mazumdara group on the other hand been doing. If C. P. group wants to join their camp it is for them to decide.

It has been our experience in Telangana that people in one of the villages had come forward to occupy landlord's own land of about 200 acres. We have distributed the land and then worked out a programme for land distribution and implemented in about 120 villages. By organising and preparing people alone, we could implement it. It is sheer spontaneity to say that people should come forward on their own accord to occupy lands of landlords.

The indication that we had in the former two districts of people coming forward is enough to organise large scale land distribution. This is what our comrades have done in Kondamodalu area though small in extent. This conclusively proves that the estimation of the level of the consciousness given in the Immediate Programme is quite correct and realistic. Yet the C. P. group has the audacity to distort this living experience and tell a lie to the cadre that people are not coming forward for land occupation.

If land distribution can take place even before the armed struggle begins, why does this group want armed struggle without land distribution? It seems to us that they do not want to touch the landlord's land at this stage. This means that there is no agrarian revolution for the present. The matter ends there.

It is not correct to say that there is no land concentration in forest areas. Our contention is that feudal relations are stronger in forest areas than in plains. This applies to land relations also. It is quite possible, that in one or two small poc-

kets of exclusively tribal people there are no landlords worth the name. But it has been a general practice that landlords occupy all the fertile lands, once brought into cultivation by tribals and local peasants from non-tribal population. Once landlords occupy their lands, they go in for forest lands. This process goes on and is going on. This is just like a poor peasant mortgaging or selling away his own plot of land and going for cultivation of Banjar lands in plains. If we rouse the peasantry to occupy the lands of the landlords once they cultivated they will come forward. In fact they came forward for such an action even before the premature armed actions have begun. They mentioned this fact in their documents.

To represent this phenomena as having less of a land concentration is wrong and unreal. Peasants prefer their own fertile lands, not the forest lands to be cleared and cultivated.

For those who are opposed to agrarian revolution, Immediate Programme looks adventurous and unrealistic. For those who implemented it, it is revolutionary and realistic. This is also a fundamentally different approach to the question of agrarian revolution. Even the little experience the C.P. group had proves our approach to be correct. Experience of Konda Modalu undoubtedly enriches the understanding given by the Immediate Programme.

No amount of distortion by C.P. group can hide this fact!

5. AGRARIAN CRISIS AS THE BASIS FOR OUR ARMED STRUGGLE NOT THE INSTABILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT.

We have made it clear that at this stage of the people's democratic revolution agrarian revolution is the key task of the revolutionary communists in India. To carry out this task we have to build an agrarian revolutionary movement, leading to armed struggle.

There is an agrarian crisis in India. The steps taken by the ruling classes instead of resolving the crisis are further deepening it. Agrarian unrest is growing every day. It is the task

of the revolutionaries to utilise this crisis and unrest to organise a wide spread peasant revolutionary movement. Then alone it is possible to start and extend armed struggle.

We have based our tactical line on stability or instability of the government. Because inspite of government being stable, agrarian crisis continues. As long as there is agrarian crisis an organised agrarian revolutionary movement can reach the stage of land distribution, if necessary effort is made. This takes the form of armed struggle and extends as the movement spreads. An unstable government at state and central level will be an added advantage for it.

This being our approach, we advocated and still advocate people's armed struggle inspite of there being a stable government at the state or at central level or at both levels. Therefore our understanding has a consistency and sound basis. Immediate Programme has this consistency and this basis where as C.P. group has none.

C.P. group bases its tactical line on the election results. Everyone knows that in 1971 midterm parliamentary elections Ruling Congress swept the polls. The same is the case with the present general elections for the state assemblies. According to the C.P. group "(we) must assess post election situation carefully. After formulating suitable tactics for political struggle, we should advance our armed struggle". Thus their tactics change according to election results.

It is not our purpose to comment on how far the election results reflect the consciousness of the people in general. That is a separate subject to be dealt separately. We want to emphasise that irrespective of the nature of the election results, agrarian crisis continues as it is chronic and deep. Therefore agrarian revolution should go on with all its intensity taking the form of armed struggle.

Ignoring this key task C.P. group adopts the following programme to meet the needs of the post election situation.

We should make it clear to the people that the government of Indira congress is the government of big bourgeoisie and big landlord's alone.

We should expose false promises false socialist slogans of government of Indira congress to the people.

We should continue with determination the self-defence armed struggle, which we are carrying on already in struggle areas. We should extend struggle area. We should take forward people by mobilising them to struggle on class issues... ..*

In the assessment and the programme there is no trace of agrarian crisis as well as programme for agrarian revolution. Perhaps they think that due to the formation of stable government after midterm elections, no such situation exists. Any how they still harp on exposure and self-defence.

Curiously enough, neo-revisionists tactical line is the same. They limit themselves saying self-defence. They don't call it armed struggle. This is the only difference. Everyone knows that in a certain state neo-revisionists are putting up armed self-defence. They are opposed to agrarian revolution as an immediate task taking the form of armed struggle. Where is the difference between the two? Practically nil.

Therefore it is a distortion and a false statement to say that we are politically "on an inclined plain", and our arguments 'boil down to advocating laying down of arms. The boot is in the other leg. By linking their so called self-defence to the election results they are paving the way to retreat all along. They want to defend their departure from mass line with the help of so called new tactical line. With the present election results already announced their tactics may continue to be the same.

As far as we are concerned, we do not have any such manipulations as long as we relay on agrarian revolution our armed struggle will be people's armed struggle. This goes on according to military situation in a given area. The rest will be looked into as and when the situation demands.

6. DEPARTURE FROM MASS LINE ALL ALONG.

A mass line is a line which bases itself on the consciousness of the people. It is the out

come of unflinching loyalty and devotion to the people. It is a line which prepares the people for zig-zag paths; complicated situation and higher level struggles. Immediate Programme provides us with such a line. September party circular served the same purpose prior to the April convention.

C. P. group instead of adhering to such a mass line, departed from it all along. They say that though they committed mistakes in starting premature armed actions immediately after April convention, ever since they formed into a new committee (1970) after the majority of the P. C. leadership was arrested, they adopted a correct line i. e. self-defence and mass mobilisation. There is no basis for their claim.

The mistakes they said to have accepted are the result of departure from mass line. They thrust the main responsibility on the Immediate Programme and the situation obtaining before and after the convention. We have earlier explained how this is in correct. The September party circular and Immediate Programme provide the party with a correct line. The mistakes if any are only of formal and tactical nature, which did not come in the way of their implementation. The comrades in Konda Modalu area implemented it and organised an agrarian revolutionary movement. Therefore the responsibility of not implementing it lies with the C. P. group. They departed from the mass line by not implementing it. Therefore it is not a simple mistake of this action or that action. It is a mistake of violating our party line itself. It is quite possible the line that everyone in the leadership might not have opposed the line on one and the same day. But it is a fact that after April convention the leadership separately opposed it in practice.

It is after the arrest of the majority P.C. leadership, they joined together in opposing party line. They say that they adopted a correct line ever since. But they continued to renounce the task of agrarian revolution even after their formation into a committee. Their theory and practice of self-defence with mass mobilisation combined with no participation and loss of land concentration boils down to this. Therefore the same departure from the mass line continues, may be in a new form.

They boast of having a number of squads as a ray of hope for Indian revolution as an example of how they could defend the movement. There is no basis for this also. They did not build any agrarian revolutionary movement to defend. For this the landlord class is satisfied. They declared that their so called armed struggle is only for self-defence implying that it is not directed against government. Therefore, their whole attitude is an attitude opposed to people's armed struggle and agrarian revolution. Yet it is being paraded as an armed struggle before the revolutionaries and the people. There is neither an agrarian revolutionary movement to defend nor the struggle against the government going on. Here again they are departing from mass line.

Once it was correct to say that revisionists of various types do not touch arms. Nowadays it is not so. Some of the revisionists are having arms for ostensible purpose of self-defence. Therefore to carry arms or holding them up does not make a group revolutionary. A revolutionary must build an agrarian revolutionary movement in the country side and use arms to defend it when people's consciousness and organisation grow to the required level and when they are in a position to participate in the armed struggle. The C. P. group instead of playing the role of revolutionary communist is equating itself to that of a neo-revisionist who is for self defence. We reject this approach and practice to be an admixture of right and left opportunism, which has no place in our mass line.

V. RIGHT AND 'LEFT' OPPORTUNISM AND WHAT IT MEANS TO US.

We have been using the word's Right and Left opportunism denoting deviations in our ranks. Let us have a clearer understanding of these deviations in the sense as Mao described them.

In international documents as well as ours there is a consistent warning against revisionism as main danger. We revolutionaries belonging to various groups are accepting Marxism-Leninism-Mao's thought as our ideology.

There is a trend inside our ranks, which in spite of accepting Mao Tse-Tung's Thought as

its ideology, does not break with the past understanding does not see the future in concrete terms. Therefore it advocates theories which keep the mass movement for behind the realities. This is right opportunism in our ranks. Mao explained the deviation in the following terms.

"It often happens however that thinking lags behind reality: this is because man's cognition is limited by numerous social conditions. We are opposed to die hards in the revolutionary ranks whose thinking fails to advance with changing objective circumstances and has manifested itself historically as right opportunism. These people fail to see that the struggle of the opposites has already pushed the objective process forward while their knowledge has stopped at the old stage. This is characteristic of old thinking of all die hards. Their thinking is divorced from social practice and they cannot march ahead to guide the Chariot of society; they simply trail behind grumbling that it goes too fast and try to drag it back or turn it in the opposite direction".

(ON PRACTICE S.W. Vol (1) PAGE 306).

Our immediate programme provides with a line consistent with the present situation. There is an all prevailing agrarian crisis in India today. Revolutionaries in India, especially in Andhra are expected to study the situation obtaining in specific areas where they are working. Provision is made in the programme to take up all the necessary issues and adopt necessary forms of struggle to build an agrarian revolutionary movement. These struggles train and prepare the people for armed struggle at the stage of land distribution. This is a revolutionary process indispensable for agrarian revolution and armed struggle. This is tested by revolutionary practice in areas where immediate programme was implemented. Therefore we call it a revolutionary programme in consistent with Mao-Tse-Tung's Thought,

There are certain die hards in our ranks who say that situation for an agrarian revolution has not yet matured it takes a long time for peasants to distribute landlord "own lands; therefore what is needed is to limit ourselves to partial struggle and exposure of government. Their practice has been the same during the last three

years. Some of them have been consciously in active all through. The C. P group which has abandoned the task of agrarian revolution is the victim of right opportunism. It is for this reason that they are opposed to immediate programme. Having arms in their hands cannot hide this deviation.

Revisionism as a main danger does not preclude other deviations as a secondary. A secondary deviation can come to the top and become the main danger in a given circumstances. After our break with new revisionism Left opportunism appeared on an all India scale which grew into gigantic dimension after the April convention and engulfed our organisation also.

Comrade Mao explains 'Left' opportunism as follows: "We are also opposed to 'Left' phrase-mongering. The thinking of 'leftists' strips a given stage of development of the objective process, some regard their fantasies as truth, while others strain to realise in the present an ideal which can only be realised in the future. They alienate themselves from the correct practice of the majority of the people and from the realities of the day and show themselves adventurist in their actions". (On practice, S. W. Vol (1). Page.307).

This quotation from Mao should be an eye opener to one and all. Our immediate programme takes various levels of the masses into consideration and provides necessary tactical line. Left opportunists say that all this is not necessary to take up arms. They advocate that we should take up arms when the police appears on the scene. This has no relation to the consciousness of the masses whose practice in a given situation necessitates to undergo the experience of agrarian revolutionary struggle, to prepare themselves for land distribution and armed struggle. Hence our immediate programme is revolutionary, where as C. P. groups line of armed struggle as a form of partial struggle is left opportunistic. They are alienating themselves from the "The current practice of the majority of the people and from the realities of the day and show themselves adventurist in their actions" as Mao says.

There is a common point in these two deviations. It is renouncing agrarian revolution as an immediate task. Here in lies the reason for opposing immediate programme by both these deviationists. They have to look into their deviations and correct themselves.

Charu Mazumdar's group has attacked us as revisionists. But it proved to be the worst type of adventurist. The CP group did the same. It is proving itself to be the admixture of both right and left opportunism. Its adventurist actions are particularly to be noted. They are meant for covering their right opportunism.

We cannot advance our cause as long as we take a conciliatory attitude towards these deviations. Our immediate programme, Draft programme and path of Indian Revolution are the documents which represent our fundamental line. We carry on our struggle against these deviations basing on these lines.

VI. PROBLEMS OF UNIFICATION OF REVOLUTIONARY COMMUNISTS

1. A General Problem

It is clear from a pamphlet issued and distributed widely by the CP group (support Girijan armed struggle of Warangal, Khammam and Karimnagar districts) that they have declared the split openly. At the same time they are putting forward proposals for 'unity'. It is necessary to find out inner connection between the two and explain our attitude towards their proposals. We are of the opinion that the revolutionary communists in India in their efforts to unite into one party have reached a stage where they should clearly explain their attitude towards various aspects of this unity not only with regards to specific groups, but revolutionaries in general. A clear and correct understanding on this question alone can lead us to a principled unity.

Ever since we broke away from neo-revisionism there came to existence so many revolutionary groups in India. Important among them were one led by Charu Mazumdar. The other was led by revolutionary communists in Andhra. A good number of groups and individuals, though organisationally not linked with our group had contacts with us.

The Charu Mazumdar group formed itself into a party and again split into groups.

There are groups and sub-groups in various states some uniting as in Kerala and some others further splitting.

In Andhra, the situation is the same. The MLs split into two groups, while we ourselves are divided into two. The C. P. group is one of the two.

Hence the question is not only of uniting or not uniting with the C. P. group but the other groups as well at state as well as all India level.

As we see, there is a sentiment of unity among comrades, sympathisers and well-wishers. We highly respect this sentiment; we want to give it a definite and correct shape. It so happens often that these comrades, sympathisers and well-wishers express their desire that we should unite. At the same time they don't have clarity towards programme, path etc. Above all they are not aware of the causes of frequent splits that are taking place. We hope our explanation will help them to understand that we are for real and principled unity and not for fake and opportunistic unity.

There are certain unity moves of a tactical nature. While the C.P. group took all the necessary measures for splitting whatever organisation existed, it is coming forward with unity "proposals". Obviously they are meant for placating those who are with us on fundamental line and with C.P. group organisationally. They are also meant for splitting those who are with our fundamental line and organisationally outside the C.P. group.

We cannot entertain any such "tactical" moves simply because they are "tactics" and nothing more. Tactics are means to lead the revolution to success and defeat the enemy. It is impermissible to use them for inner-party purposes.

We are for a real and principled unity. For us unity is an organisational principle to which we adhere. Our conception of unity does not limit to formal acceptance of Marxism-Leninism Mao-Tse-Tung's Thought, but extends to the

application to the practice of Indian revolution. We want a fundamental line, a programme and a path. We want a discussion on this fundamental line not on the basis of violation but implementation of the line.

Therefore, we cannot achieve principled unity either with the sentiments or with the tactics. Where as we can achieve it through comradely discussion based on revolutionary practice. For this, we should have a programme, a path and revolutionary practice. We have them in our immediate programme, Draft programme and path of Indian Revolution. Basis of unity will be their acceptance and their implementation. All discussions should be based on them alone.

This does not mean, we refuse to discuss the programmes, tactical lines and experiences of other groups and comrades. We welcome them. We express our opinions on them: We learn from them. We seek for common points if any. If there are fundamental differences, we will explain our view point and try to convince the otherside. This is the only way to achieve unity. We will take all possible and necessary measures to expedite this process of unification.

Therefore let us concentrate our efforts to understand the problems of unity and achieving a real and principled unity.

2. A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE SITUATION INSIDE OUR ORGANISATION.

(i) Formation of co-ordination committee and after:

As everyone of us knows, we in Andhra broke away from neo-revisionists in the month of July 1968 after the formation of All India Co-ordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries (AICCR). Being in a majority position in the State Committee, we could carry on an explanatory campaign of our revolutionary line extensively through our state. This step of ours helped us to mobilise the support of a good number of cadres, party members than existing and sympathisers for our line.

The entire campaign was based on explaining ideological differences with a reference to

some aspects of Indian situation. We could not prepare a draft programme and path of Indian revolution immediately after the break. This was not an issue just for discussion. It was a practical and immediate issue as revolutionary movement in Srikakulam had reached a new higher level and demanded higher forms of struggle. This also posed the problem of developing agrarian revolutionary movement in other parts of state.

This is one aspect of the situation existing immediately after the break. The other aspect was the formation of All India Co-ordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries. Though the All India leadership i. e. Charu Mazumdar group seemed to have no differences with us in the initial stages, they began to come to the surface by the time we broke away from neo-revisionists. We could not formulate our differences with Charu Mazumdar group by that time. In our explanation to our ranks, we minimised them and characterised them as though they are the result of misunderstandings arising out of omission and commissions in our document. At the same time we were conscious that we cannot pull together in a Committee as they were characterising us as "opportunists" simply because we did not break away with neo-revisionists earlier.

This development made it amply clear that acceptance of Mao-Tse-Tung's Thought alone is not enough for unification of revolutionaries. Its application to the practice of Indian revolution was the fundamental thing which was required. And unity could be achieved through this application alone. This needed preparation of a draft programme and tactical line explaining the path of Indian revolution. Once prepared it would have served as a basis of discussion and implementation. It would have been a sound basis for unity. In the absence of comprehensive documents a preliminary outline would have gone a long way for arranging together all active and fighting elements inside our ranks. It took only two months to relaise such a document in the first week of September 1968.

We had some negative features in our organisation which we inherited from neo-revi-

sionists. They were also the result of structure of organisation at the time of break. Our break was ideological and organisational no doubt. We cannot boast that we had done away with the remnants of the past: We had inherited a good number of cadres and party members from neo-revisionist party who are not accustomed for any serious revolutionary work. Even among the leadership the understanding of various problems facing the movement was rather academic and pragmatic. It is no wonder if some of the elements from top to bottom had romantic and adventuristic conceptions of armed struggle which was not only a subject of discussion but of an immense practical importance as far as Andhra is concerned.

There were number of groups in various state proclaiming their adherence to Mao's Thought. Charu Mazumdar group preferred one group from each state or most of the states to the exclusion of others. Thus a good number of groups and individuals whose loyalty to Marxism-Leninism-Mao's Thought cannot be questioned were kept away from the AICCR for factional purposes.

The same thing happened in Andhra also. There was a group which owed allegiance to Charu Mazumdar group, which later became an affiliate of AICCR functioned in Andhra. There were Comrades who were formally with us but who owed their loyalties towards Charu Mazumdar group for various reasons.

The structure of the co-ordination committee was such that everyone was having his own way. While this was the general pattern majority decisions were used to be taken whenever there was an occasion for it. The level and needs of the mass movement in Andhra needed a highly disciplined party with a firm leadership.

This situation led into double loyalties, double talk and double play in the organisation which was discussed more than once, but nothing could be done.

All this shows that there was opportunism at all levels opportunism in politics, tactical and organisational line, inspite of accepting Mao's Thought as an ideology and armed struggle as a path. This was the state of affairs inside

our organisation immediately after our break with neo-revisionists.

To provide the organisation with a mass revolutionary line, we have issued a party circular as early as in September 1968 in which preliminary steps for building a mass agrarian revolutionary movement were explained.

With the circulation of this party circular, we found more than one trend within the organisation. There was a trend, a feeble trend at that which attempted to correctly understand and implement the line given in it. This we find in Konda Modalu area of East Godavari district and in some parts of Kurnool and Warangal district. It is only in the area of Konda Modalu a systematic agrarian revolutionary movement was built. In other parts, issues were taken up, people were mobilised, but no further advance could be made. In the rest of Andhra Pradesh no concrete steps were taken to implement the line.

There are some who departed from the party's fundamental line, who accuse us that though we had given a line, we did not take any follow up action. With responsible and experienced leadership as we are said to have in the district committees, there is no basis for such an accusation. The fact of the matter was that the leadership did not want to move into action nor they wanted to orientate themselves towards mass revolutionary work. They just kept silent over the party circular as if nothing had happened. Opportunism reflected in this form as far as these Committees and leadership is concerned.

Certain important developments took place during this time, which were a pointer to the shape of things to come. They are:

(a) In Nalgonda district, while one trend was working for mass actions and mass struggle another trend was working towards individual actions and assassinations. We convened meeting of the D.C. and explained how such tendencies harm the development of mass revolutionary movement. We had explained the programme contained in the party circular and asked them to implement it.

In spite of this the adventurist trend got upper hand in the district, resorted to individual assassinations and actions with the result that the organisation and the movement got dislocated and disorganised.

Subsequently another D.C. meeting was convened, mistakes were pointed out and corrected. It should be understood that by this time, there was a trend in the P.C. leadership which was defending such actions.

Experience has proved that all those who had adventurist ideas and practice and who failed to correct themselves left the organisation once and for all. This is the fate of all those who have no conviction on the mass line.

(b) We were making preparations for armed struggle in Srikakulam, basing on the experiences of Telangana armed struggle. The leadership of the Srikakulam district had their own criticism partly justified and partly unjustified that the P.C. leadership was not doing its best for armed struggle in Srikakulam.

Meanwhile a campaign to propagate the armed struggle of Telangana (1946-51) was launched in the month of October 1968. Though it had certain positive results in activating our ranks and rousing people into action, though solidarity towards Srikakulam peasant struggle was included in the campaign, objectively, it had diverted the attention of the party and the people from Srikakulam where peasant movement was about to take the form of armed struggle. The misunderstandings and misgivings that were already existing among comrades in Srikakulam were further strengthened and they fell a prey to the vicious propaganda of Charu Mazumdar's group to drive a wedge between State Co-ordination Committee and district leadership.

(c) A campaign was started by Charu Mazumdar group in Andhra that State Co-ordination Committee should affiliate itself to AICCCR here and now. While the leadership of AICCCR (Charu's group) categorically stated that some other group existing in the state was their affiliate committee. With this campaign a major part of the state, district and local leadership

lost their bearings and began to demand that the state unit should join the AICCCR unconditionally and without a common basis to work together.

The State unit met and discussed the whole affair. There was no difference of opinion on the question of affiliation as such. There never was such a difference at any time. The point of difference was whether, we should first discuss our differences, clarify our position and work out a basis for common programme of action and then join the AICCCR or join first and then explain our position. It was decided by a majority of five to three to join without clarifying our differences at the outset. One was neutral and another drafted the resolution for the majority and voted for the minority. (Out of the six, including the draftman of the resolution four, deserted the organisation at one time or other. The rest of the two are no more with party's fundamental line).⁴

Thus the process of affiliation was completed. It should be clear to us all that a small section who wanted affiliation without differences being discussed, was already turning "left"-opportunistic by advocating some sort of "actions" (Nalgonda) and the rest had no definite views regarding the differences nor they were serious of implementing party's mass line.

This shows that there was a vast number of comrades in the leadership at various levels who were vocal, at the same time inactive, who were a hindrance for the organisation to take up to mass line.

We discussed the following differences with Charu Mazumdar: (1) armed struggle (2) elections (3) Characterisation of those who did not leave the CPM by then and who were revolutionaries as "opportunists" (4) Charu Mazumdar's factional activities in Andhra.

While there was no difference of regarding the need for immediate armed struggle we made it clear that our conception of armed struggle was that of Telangana armed struggle (1946-51), for which he suggested that perhaps we were wrong in understanding that armed struggle.

As far elections we made it clear that due to uneven development of the mass movement, it is not correct to renounce elections as a form of struggle. For which he held his own view saying that in individual cases we may have to consider.

We made it clear that there are a number of revolutionaries left in the CPM for whom some time may be necessary to come out. In fact they were having contacts with lower units in West Bengal. He neither rejected nor accepted our view. When we mentioned his factional activities, he said, 'Let us forget the past!' Thus ended our conversation.

Next day, we had to explain our view point regarding Parvatipuram agency area (Srikakulam) as a base area. We said that it is not possible and correct as it is a small area surrounding by communication lines. We further explained how surrounding areas can be developed as armed struggle areas and how all these areas taken together could be developed into base areas. He did not accept our view point. He had already decided for it and instructed Srikakulam comrades accordingly.

Thus it was clear that there was already a difference of approach on the issue of armed struggle between Charu Mazumdar and us. This we have minimised for the present. It came out openly at a later stage.

It was clear that a right opportunist trend of conscious inactivity and a "left" opportunist trend of individual assassinations, had already raised their head which were preventing our organisation from taking up mass line and getting consolidated on its basis.

There was a tendency inside the state unit to underestimate the "left" opportunism. Our understanding of revisionism as a main danger was rather mechanical. Break with neo-revisionism does not mean that right opportunism in some form or other does not appear again and again. Again revisionism as a main danger does

not mean that there is no danger from left opportunism as a secondary deviation where there is former danger. At a given time "left" opportunism can be a main danger also. In fact there has been a veiled tendency inside the party at all levels, of thinking "left" opportunism to be better than right opportunism. It is again opportunism of the worst kind to select one of the two. Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse Tung's Thought teaches us that we have to fight both these tendencies and root them out to be able to uphold to mass revolutionary line.

We tried to correct "left" opportunist tendencies whenever they appeared. Only a few comrades could correct themselves. The rest left the organisation at various occasions.

It took a lot of time to locate right opportunism entrenched in the form of conscious stagnation. It has become possible to weed out this tendency after our ideological struggle reached a certain stage.

By the time we joined AICCCR, a number of "left" elements left our organisation and joined Charu Mazumdar group in Andhra. A section of those who remained with us had sympathies with that group, but prepared not to join them on the one hand and not to be active in our fold on the other.

In this situation it became imperative for us to clarify our mass line, we prepared immediate programme as our fundamental line, in which basic points of our programme and line to build an agrarian revolutionary movement constitute in the forest the main aspects. In fact we guided the peasant movement areas on the basis of this programme alone.

(ii). DISAFFILIATION OF OUR UNIT FROM AICCCR AND STATE CONVENTION.

Our affiliation with AICCCR did not solve any of our problems. There was neither a further discussion of our differences nor there was any attempt to co-ordinate our activities between All India and State level. Charu Mazumdar group in the state was kept intact and that group was dealing with All India Centre directly. Armed struggle in Srikakulam was started but the district leadership refused to base its rela-

tionship with the P.C. on democratic centralism. They were ready to continue to have the relationship of co-ordination committee as usual, which meant that the decision making authority rests with the district leadership. Charu Mazumdar group had already started guiding the armed struggle if it meant anything.

Democratic centralism is the basic organisational principle to be observed in normal party life. It is even more important when there is an armed struggle going on in a guerilla warfare, there is a centralism of command co-ordinated with decentralisation. Principle of co-ordination to the exclusion of democratic centralism is unheard of in any armed struggle. Therefore we had no voice in the Srikakulam armed struggle and Charu and his group was in firm command of its affairs.

We have to explain how this has come about. It is not due to this failure or that failure of the leadership, though there had been failures and short comings, some of which were explained in our document on Srikakulam. It was fundamentally different approach to the armed struggle which made us part with each other and Srikakulam leadership and Charu's group join together. No other explanation can be political.

After achieving a measure of success in disrupting our organisation, Charu's group continued to slander us as opposing armed struggle etc... For this it has utilised every omission and commission. This situation had further diverted the organisation into endless and fruitless discussions. As a result, it was paralysed more or less in plains.

It is not a coincidence that everytime we advance our conception of peoples armed struggle as a form of agrarian revolution we are accused of opposing armed struggle. It is true we are opposed to the concept of an "armed struggle" which is another name for assassination of individuals.

We have to admit a failure on our part. We had minimised our differences with Charu's group. We answered his criticisms and accusations in a defensive tone of. We did not mean

this or that, and Charu is unnecessarily criticising us. We were always eager to find out common points between the two. Thus we failed to raise out differences to a fundamental level and deal them in like manner. This has crippled out activity, thinking and organisation like anything. It should be known that the conciliators and agents of Charu's group were there at all levels including state level, who facilitated this process.

As a climax of this came the disaffiliation of our unit by AICCCR. This development led to desertion of some more in the various levels of leadership.

Inside the forest areas the tendency was to take up some forest issues. But there was no conscious direction to the movement towards an agrarian revolution.

Whatever efforts the comrades were putting up were diverted by an incident of snatching guns. There was a controversy over this issue whether it was correct to snatch them or not. The issue came for discussion in the state committee along with Pagideru incidents which took place after convention.

With this incident the tendency of "left" adventurism came to the surface. It was dealt as a local affair. For the present it seemed that the wrong attitude was corrected.

(iii) Convention and After

By this time immediate programme was ready. Another document dealing with Srikakulam armed struggle was also ready. Our attitude towards agrarian revolution and armed struggle was amply made clear in them.

We wanted to hold convention earlier. But the crisis that developed between centre and state units has prevented any such step. Therefore it was held in April 1969.

The convention was historic step, towards the formation of a revolutionary party of Marxism-Leninism Mao-Tse-Tung thought. The immediate programme and the decision to transform into a party, provided the organisation a programme and a tactical line to build an agrarian revolutionary movement. This has served as a basis for revolutionary mass work and as a weapon fight to against and left opportunism. Herein lies historic importance. The convention had its own short comings as well. But they in no way minimised the significance of the programme nor they indicate the need to change it. It is quite a normal thing to all revolutionary periods, that petty bourgeois and unstable elements drop away from mass line taking right and "left" opportunist positions. Our deserted friends also did the same.

Within a week of the convention Pagideru incidents and within a month armed actions in Warangal district took place. They were a hammer blow on our immediate programme, on our mass revolutionary line, on our efforts to build a revolutionary party and movement. It was an open revolt against the party line. As a result of this the organisation, already weak, inactive inheriting a number of weaknesses from neo-revisionism, has become a victim of right and left opportunism.

We know that there was no democratic centralism in our organisation before convention. But the same thing continued even afterwards. Srikakulam comrades were frank enough to state that they don't accept democratic centralism as a basis for relations between district and state unit. But the authors of these actions could not show that much honesty.

This led to an all embracing crisis inside the the organisation. There is no satisfactory explanation to this day from authors of the these incidents. They assert that it is the adventurist line given by the immediate programme which is responsible for such actions. As far as we are aware revisionists and neo revisionists call our programme as left adventurism. How is that this group has joined them?

Though revisionists and neo-revisionists accusing our programme being adventurism may not be a conclusive proof of its being correct, our practice shows that it is correct. Hence C.P. group joining their group in attacking our programme is surprise to us.

Here one would like to make it clear that this leadership acting separately, did not accept the leadership of the P.C. at any time after its formation. They had different concept of armed struggle which they had implemented. Their sending exaggerated reports were meant to mislead the party and the leadership. All the aspects were dealt in our documents "Left deviation in the party". We do not want to repeat them here.

If they genuinely feel that they had committed mistakes by violating the party line they had an opportunity to correct them. Subsequently, first when P.C. intervened and later when they joined together to form into a committee, after the arrests of the majority of the P.C. leadership. The correction could have been only on the basis of party line, and nothing else. This group instead of following such a line, which alone could restore the unity adopted a different line implementing their own line in opposition to immediate programme. Therefore their committee had become a committee of rival programme rival activities and hence a rival committee.

July (1969) P.C. meeting took the line of rejecting the Pagideru actions as violation of party line at the same time hailing and defending the armed struggle on the other for the following reasons:

(1) P.C. decided that the incidents were against party line. Comrades in Khammam area were asked to correct their attitude, implement party line and develop agrarian revolutionary movement. P.C. thought it improper to keep silent over or denounce these incidents publicly. We trusted the area leadership and used persuasive and corrective methods.

(2) The leadership of Mulugu area claimed that the movement has reached the stage of armed struggle. They said that the respite of one or two months would have added advantages.

They could deal the matter without harm done to the movement. We could not go into the affair and check it up in advance as they also started actions on their own without referring the matter to P.C.

(3) In Konda Modalu area of East Godavari district a mass revolutionary peasant movement was developing. This has reached a stage where people used their local arms, where volunteer squads sprang up and it was taking the form of mass armed struggle. It is true that the regular guerilla squads were not formed nor went into action by them. Subsequent information showed that a squad was formed; but due to sabotage of 'left' adventurists, it could not function and got dissolved.

In short we were on the verge of a guerilla war in Konda Modalu where as in Warangal and Khammam areas it was not so (we later checked up the situation in Warangal by oral reports and found that the resolution of the area committee that situation for armed struggle was ripened was baseless). The state Committee, after a thorough examination of the reports and review of the situation in the first week of July 1969 came to the conclusion that the armed actions launched in the forest area and the outlook behind those actions were quite different from the accepted line of the Party. Thus so far as the party is concerned the P.C. had followed the principle of criticism and self-criticism. At the same time it decided to publicly defend the actions. Thus the P.C. had never adopted a compromising attitude on the ideological question.

The public statement that was given at the time by P.C. incorporated all these points while the document meant for inner party circulation, criticised in a fortnight way that the entire practice of the two areas especially Khammam area is opposed to the party line (The problems faced by the revolutionary mass movement of Khammam area.) It was wrong on our part not to have continued this approach in our subsequent documents when referring to the premature armed actions. Instead we took the line of the public statement, whose objective was limited and time bound. This mistake of ours was used in full to

create confusion that we had been supporting their premature armed actions etc. Our adversaries, when they are incapable of attacking our fundamental line take shelter behind our omissions and commissions and try to attack from those positions. This leads them nowhere.

While dealing with experiences we should be objective whether the document concerned is a public one meant for inner-party circulation. It was a mistake of our part that we did not stick to this principle in some of our documents. We are correcting them. This is a lesson we draw from our experience.

It is an slander against us to say that we created the inner party crisis. The facts prove otherwise.

This crisis started in organisation and movement when adventurist individual actions were started in Nalgonda district after the circulation of September party circular.

The crisis came to the surface at the time of Manthena^a incident which was adventurist. It was again in violation of the party line. A section of the P.C. leadership defended the outlook behind the incident till recently. Now it has committed volte-face saying that it too was adventurist (Regional Committee document).

The crisis was worst in its form and content when within a week of April convention and adoption of immediate programme, the forest leadership resorted to armed and adventurist actions in violation of party line. Centres which were more than one came to the surface.

The crisis was there when Mulugu area committee resolved and demanded the P.C. to merge the entire organisation in Charu Mazumdar's group (which formed the M.L. party) which was carrying out a left adventurist policy in all aspects.

The crisis took a different form when the majority of the P.C. leadership was arrested by the ruling classes, when the leadership of both

areas (forests) joined together to form into a group to formulate and implement 'left' opportunist line which was opposed to party line and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse Tung's Thought.

The last straw that broke the organisation's back was "Reply of Khammam area Committee" and its circulation. Questioning the correctness of Immediate Programme it sets forth that they have an alternate programme which they are implementing and which was proved to be correct by their "Two years experience." This was a full fledged "left" opportunist line which the CP subsequently developed it to be an admixture of left and right opportunist line.

The "left" opportunism, which had raised its ugly head in Andhra was part of All India phenomenon. We tried our level best to correct it but representatives of this deviation refused to correct their mistakes. In the end they forced a split. Thus the "left" opportunism is anti-party trend which is behind the split.

These are the facts. What basis they have when they say that it is we who have created present crisis and not they?

Faced with these facts we have taken certain firm steps to see that immediate programme is defended and implemented. We circulated our documents directly to the ranks to avoid delay and we created organisational guarantees too. This is inevitable and necessary in the present situation.

Our organisation being inherited from revisionism was too weak to fight the disruption of the C. P. group. Establishing a political line is the precondition to take firm steps in the field of organisation. Now that we have one such political line, we are in a position to take firm organisational steps and we are taking them. From the above it is clear that it is not we who are splitting the party on the other hand we are fighting opportunism' right and left. In this process some unstable' weak and opportunist elements will certainly go out of our fold. That is all for good we have nothing to worry.

To sum up the following is the situation as it stands to-day.

- 1). There is a "left" opportunist leadership advocating, armed actions of struggle for partial demands and practising individual assassinations. It controls the major part of the organisation in the forest areas. It is utilising its sources to slander our revolutionary line and its representatives. We do not rule if small sections join them in plains as well if they have not yet joined already.
- 2). There is a right opportunist leadership which is consciously inactive and which does not work for an agrarian revolution. It lives on the laurels of heroic deeds of forest comrades. But the leaderships are merged into one to fight our revolutionary line.
- 3). There is a revolutionary wing accepting and implementing the immediate programme. This wing highly politically conscious as it is, is working for it. This wing has a fundamental line and is defending it. It is a growing force whose immediate task is to develop agrarian revolution with armed struggle as its form of struggle.

The combined leadership of right and "left" opportunism has its own organisation and the revolutionary wing has one for it. Both are functioning. It will be the task of the revolutionary wing to fight right and "left" opportunism to the finish. This should be done not only on a local but on an all India scale also. The revolutionaries have already set forth on this task:

In view of their policies and practices, we will explain our attitude towards so called "unity proposals" they offered through their documents.

3. EXPERIENCE OF UNITY AND SPLIT IN THE PAST.

There had been differences leading to formation of groups in the party prior to the split in 1964. Even in CPM there had been groups at various levels. While breaking away from CPM we have inherited some of the groups.

The same thing happened when there was a split in 1964. Such groups are having their own impact on moves of unity as well as split in our own organisation. Right opportunism is having its source in these elements.

Ever since our separation from neo-revisionism left opportunism gradually gained ground, first at all India level (AICCCR, CPIML) and then at state level (CP group). They could organise splits with "left" phrase mongering and adventuristic actions. They were their main weapons to fight revolutionary line.

"When the state co-ordination committee was formed we were hesitant to join AICCCR then and there as we found that we were moving apart. By that time they began their attack from left angle while organising their own group. In the process of this attack there was a temporary retreat when we joined them. And the attack started again and ended in disaffiliation. At that time it was decided to have non-antagonistic relations between the two units. Charu Mazumdar group has never maintained at any time a non-antagonistic relations with us. Immediately after our disaffiliation they began to attack us saying that we are opposed to armed struggle and we are revisionists. For some time we stuck to their offer of non-antagonistic relations. At a certain point we had to come out attacking their "left" adventurism in the open through our documents "problems of peoples war" and "Left trend in Indian revolutionaries".

Here two points come out sharply. Acceptance of Mao Tse Tung's Thought was not enough to work together, nor unite in one organisation. Programmatic and tactical questions came in the way. That they can be discussed and decided, is a general phenomena in all parties. But we could not do. Though structure of the co-ordination committee was not competent to perform such important task "left" opportunism and groupism was in the main responsible for this failure. This group attacked armed struggle as a form of struggle for agrarian revolution as revisionism and opposed it while it could pose rather temporarily assassination of individuals as armed struggle. A good number of genuine revolutionary elements were swayed by such left phrase mongering and adventuristic actions.

Therefore division between revolutionary line and "left" opportunism prevented unity of revolutionaries into one organisation. Thus the two main groups developed according to their programmes and the other was adventuristic.

The same experience got repeated in Andhra in a slightly different form. As we saw earlier there were already 'left' opportunist elements in our ranks. They formally accepted our mass line but in practice resorted to left phrase mongering and started, defended adventuristic actions as and when the occasion arise. When we tried to correct them they lay low for some time. They changed their slogans that theirs is armed struggle for self defence and partial struggles while practicing assassination of individuals. When we further criticised this line basing on our revolutionary line, they are now attacking us saying that our arguments lead to advocating laying down arms and we are virtually revisionists.

Here we can see that the C. P. group also adopted the same "tactics" (rather perversion of concept of tactic) of attacking us from a so called left angle. This may facilitate, though temporarily, to mobilise a section of militant elements in the forests.

This group is also attacking us from a right opportunistic angle, saying that agrarian revolution is a distant possibility, and not an immediate one; hence we are adventurists.

Within this group are joined the right opportunist elements who are opposed to an armed struggle and agrarian revolution as an immediate task. They support the former's selfdefence and pose themselves as supporters of armed struggle.

This is peculiar situation in Andhra where right and left opportunism has joined together in one organisation i. e. C. P. group to attack and fight our revolutionary line.

Therefore we are faced here also with two distinct lines. One is a revolutionary line. The other is an admixture of right and left opportunism. Facing the party fait accompli, organising coups inside the party, spreading lies and

slanders etc, have become the order of the day for this group. We do not know what they are going to do the next moment.

These are the conditions under which revolutionary party units came into existence to defend and implement our mass revolutionary line. At the moment we are not the number of such cadres. What we desire is that they must be revolutionary units who can implement, defend and fight for this line. Experience has shown us that while not minimising the importance of discussions revolutionary practice has a decisive role in our struggle for a single organisation because such practice alone proves the correctness of a line or otherwise. Our practice in Telangana in the past, Srikakulam and Konda Modalu (in East Godavari) during this period has proved that our line is correct. This gives added strength to fight the line. Had there been no such line there would have been no revolutionary units to defend the line. With this line we stood against the onslaughts of Charu Mazumdar's group. And now again we are determined to fight against the C.P. group. It is our right to do so.

There is a section in CPI (ML) which had a bitter experience with Charu Mazumdar group. Both of them could not work together in one party. There are other groups who are having the same experience with that group, either on an all-India level or on a state level. "Left" opportunism and groupism has led to this situation.

All this experience proves to us that we should have a line, a revolutionary line which can stand the test of revolutionary practice basing on which alone we can unite in one organisation.

An organisation which is able to implement defend and explain the line is necessary. Unscrupulous elements, groups in our ranks are active now more than ever. The line has to be defended against the onslaught of such elements. Therefore the organisation which we have set up will help in the long run, the process of unification of revolutionaries in India and state as well.

4. THE REAL FACE OF THE "PROPOSALS"

A fight for correct line has already started and is going on. To the extent the line successfully advances, the revolutionaries are united around the line. To the extent revolutionaries are united, the line can be advanced vigorously. Therefore both are inseparable. To think of unity without a correct line is an utopia, if at all one is sincere in his desire.

A fight for correct lines presupposes existence of more than one line clear or confused. Experience has proved even a co-ordination committee could not accommodate them or a full-fledged party like CPI (ML). Our experience in Andhra has proved the same. Therefore we should search for more concrete and definite form of organisation than the present amorphous and formal organisations which are falling like house of cards as soon as unscrupulous elements began to attack them.

There is an attempt on the part of these groups to isolate the leadership by all possible means mostly unscrupulous and to win over the rank and file. For this purpose they have been adopting suitable policies. Ruling classes in every capitalist colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal countries adopt what is known as "carrot and stick" policies. While they try to suppress mass struggles with iron hand, they offer minor concessions to the fighting people. If such methods are introduced in our struggle for correct line among revolutionaries we have to oppose them and put an end to them.

Charu Mazumdar's group has adopted such methods in the past and the C.P. group is doing the same at present. They have been attacking us that we are revisionists etc., at the same time trying to win over our rank and file with the plea for unity. Both cannot go together.

Let us examine their proposals in this context.

(i) The 'proposals'.

Though there have been some variations between various proposals incorporated in their

various documents the following may be considered to be important.

- a) The present committee consisting of exclusively C.P. group should be recognised by one and all to be an authoritative committee to deal with all affairs; political, organisational and everything.
- b) This committee will conduct inner Party discussions. Comrades in jail can send their documents. They will be circulated.
- c) A convention will be held in which a party line will be adopted and a new committee will be elected which will be all powerful and authoritative.
- d) The units implementing and defending immediate programme etc., should be dissolved here and now and the Comrades concerned must accept the authority of the above committee.

This group is saying a few words in a low voice that they are committed to immediate programme for the present and they express their determination in a high pitch that they are going to revise it for which they have an inherent right as they claim.

If there was a well knit organisation these proposals were not necessary. Everything would have been done in the normal process. The very fact such proposals are made confirms that there is no such organisation.

The organisation that existed prior to April 1969 convention was a weak, formal, disjointed one which was broken by the revolt of the C.P. group against party line through armed actions. In spite of this certain units loyal to the party line were functioning.

After the arrest of majority of the PC leadership the group opposed to party line came to the top, conducted the affairs in such a way that they began to mobilise the units and rank and file behind their alternative line as against the party's official mass revolutionary line (Circulation of the document of "Khammam area

Committee's reply".) A plan for revising the party line through a convention was also revealed. We took steps to expose this game and organisational guarantees were created to implicate and defend party line.

A group which is not convinced of the correctness of the party line conduct the affairs of party organisation as well as mass revolutionary movement. It will always try to take them in the direction in which it is moving. In fact it is doing the same all the while. Experience has proved this conclusively.

This group consists of pastmasters in organising coups in the party in facing the party with faith accompli etc. They had enough opportunities to correct themselves if they so desire. But they proved unfit for this.

Accepting a committee consisting of this group as all powerful is worse for the party. If they can provide correct leadership comrades will automatically recognise their leadership. They need not demand recognition from them. Here the question is fight between two lines in which they can not represent official line. Hence the non-recognition.

They promise to conduct inner party struggle. It is not limited to circulating this document or that document. The leadership should be able to formulate issues under discussion and see that opinions are expressed in an orderly manner. The way in which this group is distributing pamphlets in public denouncing us virtually as revisionists has no parallel in any inner-party struggle of any party. Once such pamphlets are distributed the leadership forfeits all rights to conduct our inner party struggle.

Their document are diversionist. If the point of difference between us and the C. P. group is whether the armed struggle is to be a people's or some armed actions with the purpose of assassination of individuals can be called the armed struggle. The C. P. group diverted the whole discussion into one of laying down the arms vs holding up arms. This is a cheap demagogy which has nothing to do with inner party struggle. Their campaign of lies and slanders with

a differentiated approach has no place in the inner party struggle. When they have degenerated the term inner party struggle into mudslinging how can we expect that they can even conduct inner party struggle in right earnest manner.

Our conception of inner party struggle is not fruitless discussion without relating to basic points nor do we permit discussion on already settled points. For example an armed struggle should be a people's armed struggle is a settled question. Assassination of individuals is against Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse Tung's Thought is also a settled question. If somebody takes up this position we criticise and try to correct him. If he corrects himself well and good. If he does not, he has no place in our organisation.

The same is the case with the C.P. group and its policies. The theories they advance are not new. They were there in the past and they were condemned as being anti-Marxist anti-Leninist anti-Mao Tse Tung's Thought. The wrong theories appear in new forms in new-conditions. It is not necessary to open inner-party struggle simply they happen to appear in new forms.

At the same time there are questions of a fundamental nature which are to be discussed and settled. The programme and the path are such questions. We have prepared the drafts on these questions and are releasing these for discussion are not limited to our own ranks. Other revolutionaries outside our periphery should also discuss them. Since we want to unite with them on the basis of these drafts their discussion assumes all the more importance.

Hence we reject the committees competence to conduct the inner party struggle.

(ii). THE QUESTION OF CONVENTION.

Our state convention was and will be a gathering of representatives of various units. Formerly its purpose was to review our activities ever since our break with neo-revisionism adopts

immediate programme and elect a new committee. The proposed convention as we understand is meant for legalising C.P. groups' activities of violations of Immediate Programme anew to revise Immediate Programme, to adopt draft programme path and to elect a new committee.

Apparently everything looks taking democratic process and comrades who do not know its implications say that let us accept the democratic verdict of the party. We are opposed to such formal concept of convention which is nothing, but a formal democracy without relation to the revolutionary practice. We in the past had conventions, conferences, plenums etc. They themselves could not unite the party. Every one of us know that all the revisionists and neo-revisionists policies were adopted at congress consisting of delegates duly elected in a 'democratic process'. Therefore a democratic process alone could not prevent the party being transformed into a revisionist or neo-revisionist one.

Our April (1969) failed to unite us. Within a week and a month the present C.P. group, together with some leading comrades conducted armed action in their respective area in violation of the accepted party line. Ever since the split continued.

The CPI (ML) comrades were no exception to this. They organised a conference or congress in the month of May 1969, adopted programme etc. and elected leading committees. It took about a year to appear cracks inside the party. Now it is divided in more than two groups. Such examples can be added.

Experience of the conventions, conferences, congresses shows that formal democracy alone cannot unite the party. Something more is necessary. It is the correct revolutionary practice based on that line, combined with a democratic process in the form of above representative meetings.

Our organisation is at present divided into two. There are units at state and district levels which are for immediate programme and its implementation. They want a convention of

representatives with revolutionary experience gained in the process of implementing Immediate Programme. They will hold one such convention at an appropriate time. On the other hand C. P. group wants a convention of violators of Immediate Programme. Most of their representatives will be from violators of various hues including a number of inactive elements. This convention is organised and headed by violators. By holding such a convention they would like to revise the Immediate Programme into right and left opportunist directions.

There is no regular party membership enrolled and checked. Mass revolutionary work has never been the criteria. The entire membership if there is any, is loose. It deserves to be checked thoroughly.

The committees though reorganised occasionally have never been the committees of implementing party line. They have either violated party line or kept inactive. Now they joined the violators. The representatives of such units have nothing to contribute towards a correct line.

Our experiences of April convention showed that not many of them had revolutionary experience and revolutionary convictions. They disassociated themselves with the accepted Immediate Programme as and when it suited their convenience. Now most of them are desertors as far as the programme is concerned. Present position is still worse. These comrades in order to cover up their desertion are resorting to abuse slanders, double talk and what not. Nothing useful to our revolutionary party will come out of them.

This being situation all talk of convention is a deception and empty talk as far as party unity is concerned. Even it is held it will be a show piece and nothing more.

We are for a convention or conference or congress in due course. It will be held on the basis of enrolment of revolutionary party membership, continuity of revolutionary committees and on the basis of revolutionary experience. We gained by implementing our mass revolutionary line. This is the only way of holding

convention etc. such representative meetings alone can unify the party.

(iii). QUESTION OF OUR UNITS.

The inner party discussion that took place hitherto has produced a number of comrades who formed themselves into units at different levels. They accept the party's revolutionary line with convention; they are trying to implement the line to the best of their capacity. These units will grow and form into a full fledged party because they are based on a correct programme and path. They have a historic task to perform. They are doing it without hesitancy.

To ask us to dissolve these units means asking us to fore go a weapon to fight for the accepted revolutionary line, to forego the right of implementation of the line which we are not going to do. These cannot be called rival committees as they made the party line their line. Where as the committee headed by C. P. group are the rival committees because they are massed with violators of party line and then practice is also violation.

While the C. P. group pratties about inner party democracy it is creating all sorts of hardship for comrades who are critical of then wrong line and who are in the forests. Such comrades are being segregated and no organisation and proper discussion is being allowed. The entire cadre is fed on the distortion and slanders.

Such being the situation is the need for such units all the more to seek a place in the convention organised by C. P. group defend and implement the party line.

In a properly constituted party there will always be provisions for inner party democracy inner party struggle and conventions etc. They are not conditional. Here the C. P. group makes these provisions conditionally by saying that if the supreme authority of this committee is accepted and if our units are dissolved inner party democracy will come into being. A queer logic. This shows there is no properly constituted highest committee there is no inner party democracy. The entire organisation has no sound

revolutionary foundations. Hence our units and our organisation.

The C. P. group wanted to hold the convention some where in the middle of middle of 1971. It has postponed it till the conspiracy case is over saying that comrades who are acquitted can have an opportunity to participate in it. A good number of comrades who have participated in the connection have disassociated themselves from immediate Programme either explicitly or implicitly which is the basis for the case. In the present conspiracy case such disassociation pays its dividends. Whether this postponement has anything to do with this is anybody's guess.

We had an oral proposal from one of the comrades who claims to be responsible person in C. P. group that in the interest of unity document should be withdrawn from circulation from both sides. Our comrade to whom the proposal is mooted had rightly rejected it out, right.

In this proposal they admit their weakness by implication the very fact that they are in a mood to withdraw their document shows that they are not convinced of correctness of the line coming in their documents. Of course this has come in the form of an individual proposal. Therefore we cannot attribute it to the leadership of the group. Our comment refers to all persons having such views.

As far we are concerned we think that our line is correct as contained in documents. Hence no need to withdraw them.

There are certain spine-less elements who disowned immediate programme pose themselves as one with CP group say that granted that the CP group has committed a number of mistakes though having guns in its hands has raised the prestige of the party. Therefore all glory to it according that its admirers had such trumpeters in the past; and we are having some in the present. If having guns in their hand is a glory and not Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse Tung thought, we have so many such persons in India with guns in their hands. Why do not the same apply for them also? A people's

armed struggle is always different from individuals holding guns. The persons having no conviction in people's armed struggle can alone praise such individuals. All such persons have already turned into right opportunists.

There are comrades who naively ask us how long this division would continue? Is there no end to it? We should tell these comrades frankly that they are carried away by the sentiments and not looking into realities. As long as there is opportunism in our ranks right or "left" or both, a fight against opportunism and for a correct line should go on. We at present having no single party organisation. These opportunist elements are trying to form themselves into groups. Normally they join them without difficulty. But they try to win the revolutionary elements into their fold. This is the bone contention between us and the opportunist groups. The fight goes on to win them over.

We are witnessing the phenomena of group dividing into sub-groups. There is another phenomena which is growing that all opportunists are coming together in one form or other. On the other side all genuine revolutionaries are coming together. Our move in the direction of constituting in to a party organisation with a correct programme and path is a clear indication of this and facilitates this process of unification of revolutionaries.

This does not mean that opportunists will not have any programme and path. They to have their own. They will have them tomorrow if not to-day. They will advance their opportunist slogans to win the genuine revolutionaries and people as well. We have to carry on an uncompromising fight against them. As this fight takes a definite form, polarisation will take place at state level as well as all India level. The more it takes the better for us. Because there it will be a straight fight between the two contending forces.

This also does not mean there will not be any differences among revolutionaries now in the process of formation of a party. It is quite natural and we have to resolve them applying principles of inner party democracy. Our constitution is based on such principles.

Some other comrades ask us; Why don't you take a minority position and fight for your line? These comrades do not understand the peculiar circumstances in which we are functioning.

We have a party line which was adopted by April convention (1969). A section of the leadership violated the line and is implementing its own line. For various reasons this section was not expelled hoping that they will correct themselves and implement party line. They instead of correcting themselves are implementing their own line. They want to formalise it in a proposed convention.

We on the other hand are with the party defending and implementing. There is no scope for implementing as long as we are tied to the group. The only course left open to us is either fall in line with them or have our own way. We preferred the latter.

Though we are functioning on the basis of revolutionary party principles yet we cannot forget the fact that we have not organised ourselves into a party. This situation is being utilised by opportunist elements for their factional or group purposes. Arrest of the majority of the party-leadership was a Godsend to them. Therefore here is the situation wherein there is an official party line which the C.P. group renounced once and for all. A line which came into being by renouncing the party's official line cannot be a majority nor the official line can be a minority line. Ours is the officially accepted mass revolutionary line and we are taking organisational steps to implement it. The comrades who ask such questions are wrong. They instead of starting from politics start from organisation as it is existing to-day. It will be wrong on our part to go on legalising what ever illegal acts are done by a section of the organisation facing it with faith and accomplishment. We reject this attitude once for all.

All this amply makes it clear that the proposals the C.P. group forwarded or the suggestions of various comrades if implemented, lead to an unprincipled and fake unity. We have had such unity for the past 3 to 4 years but could not achieve anything worth the name. Let us

come down to realities and work for principled and real unity, even after this bitter experience.

We are of opinion that a principled and real unity can be achieved only on the basis of our draft programme and the path. It alone can be a lasting unity. At the same time we are ready to learn from other groups and comrades. If they claim that their programmes, paths and practices provide any basis for unity we are ready to consider it.

5. HOW TO ACHIEVE UNITY.

Experience has shown that formal acceptance of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse thought is not enough to unite in one organisation. Therefore it is necessary to go a step forward i.e. we should have a programme and path. For this purpose we are releasing the following documents:

1. Immediate programme.
2. The draft programme of communist party of India (Revolutionaries).
3. The path of Indian Revolution (Draft).
4. Preliminary Draft constitution of the Communist Party of India (Revolutionaries).

These documents will form the basis of day to day mass revolutionary work and our views regarding national and international questions. Therefore they will be the basis for unification of Indian revolutionaries as far as we are concerned. We carry out discussions with individual revolutionaries and revolutionary groups. On the basis of these documents with the objective of achieving unification.

The main purpose of immediate programme was to provide an agrarian revolutionary programme and a tactical line for agrarian revolutionary movement in Andhra Pradesh. Every state has its own specific features in agrarian relations. Therefore a separate agrarian programme can be considered for each state. But the tactical line remains the same fundamentally.¹¹

Our releasing these documents does not mean that they are closed subjects. They are drafts for the present and they will be draft for some time to come. At the same time they are the drafts for implementation as well as discussion. Therefore our discussions will not be academic. They will be related to our revolutionary practice of present and past. Such an attitude will enrich our understanding and clarify many points relating to the subjects under discussion.

As a result of this discussion if some changes are made they will be taken up at an appropriate stage. Much depends on implementation of this line.

(i) HOW TO UNITE WITH INDIVIDUALS.

Individual revolutionaries having no groups will not have any difficulty in uniting with us. Such comrades should study our documents first and express their opinions on all important points and if possible on all points. An appropriate committee will go into his or her views and will find out whether any basis for unification exists or not. If there is some basis the committee will provide him some more important documents in which our views regarding some of these subjects are clarified. He can go through these documents and get necessary clarifications from the committee. If he is not a newcomer into revolutionary ranks, he should submit a report on his activities during past three years and documents if he has written any. Such reports and documents give us an understanding of what his thinking and practice was. The appropriate committee after satisfying that he can be taken into our organisation will take necessary steps as provided in the draft constitution.

At any rate final decision rests with the committee and not on the individual revolutionary. At the same time all facilities will be provided to him or her to be able to convince the committee of his or her fitness to join the organisation.

(ii) HOW TO UNITE WITH GROUPS.

This is the most complicated question. There are a number of groups and sub-groups of revolutionaries in India. Some are non-antagonistic

and others are antagonistic towards us. Our approach will be in accordance with this.

We are ready to open discussions with those groups which are not antagonistic towards us. We would like to know the opinion of each group on our documents before we start any discussion. If there is not sufficient number of common points to go ahead a further discussion on our other documents might be come necessary to clarify our position. We will discuss the groups documents thoroughly to find out its view point This process will bring us closer and pave the way for unification.

We would like that our documents are discussed by the entire membership of the group. The leadership can send their comments to their ranks if they so desire. A wider discussion of these documents will help us to know the other's view point more clearly.

We would like to have relation with such groups on the reciprocal basis. Exchange of documents, views on experiences can go a long way to bring us together into one organisation.

We may have to take series of steps which we can not specify here and which can be decided upon by mutual agreement to expedite the process of unification.

Here we are not thinking of groups who join us in united fronts. This is entirely a separate subject We will discuss it when such questions arise.

There are other types of groups which have been taking an hostile attitude towards us. Charu Mazumdar's is one of it. As long as this hostility continues we cannot think of uniting with it. Taking its composition and practice into consideration we may not have much to expect from this group.

There is another group which has been part of our organisation till recently. This is C. P. group. This too has taken an hostile attitude towards us by calling us virtually revisionists advocating laying down arms. We have exposed the falsity of its accusation. As we examine

their documents there is no common point between us regarding the question of armed struggle. In such a situation there is no point in searching for unity with them. However all are not likely to share the same opinion. Those who want to unite with us can do so on the following conditions.

- 1). They must accept the party line as enunciated in the documents and must be ready to implement it.
- 2). They must self-critically examine the activities in the past three years and rectify the past mistakes under the guidance of the appropriate party committees.
- 3). They must agree to necessary organisational steps to ensure the implementation of party line

We assume corrective approach to all misguided comrades at all levels while a firm attitude will be taken against those who are conscious behind the present crisis.

On all accounts acceptance of party's line and its implementation is the main criteria to gauge ones desire for unification.

The CPI (ML) is no more a homogenous party. Therefore we are not dealing with it as a party. It is divided into groups and sub-groups. We would like to deal with them as such.

We are adopting the same attitude towards forming into a party. Unless there is unity on party's fundamental line there is no use in thinking of uniting organisationally. Therefore we try to achieve unity on the basis of fundamental line first and then necessary steps can be taken for final merger.

6. A CLARIFICATION.

Some comrades may ask us "what about your self-criticism? Have you not committed any mistakes?" Our answer is that our fundamental line is correct. As far as this is concerned there is no need for any change in it. We had our omissions, commissions and mistakes in its explanation and implementation. We have been correcting and will correct them in future whenever they are found.

Controversies and discussions of the past two years, inspite of the harm done to the

organisation and revolutionary movement by the disruption of the C.P. groups, have helped us to clarify our views and to know various view points inside our organisation. These are the positive results we gained. Present discussion of our documents will also help us with further clarification. This is the only way to improve our mass revolutionary line.

The documents which we circulated from the beginning will be there as official documents. Our fundamental line being correct all basic formulations contained in these documents continue to hold good even to this day. However words inadvertently used, sentences giving a meaning of over emphasis or under emphasis will be corrected, explained and necessary notes will be added. We had summed up our experiences of past and present in these documents. They help in educating and unifying the ranks. Therefore we retain them as our official documents.

We are able to work out this line because we are relying on revolutionary practice of the past and present. We are deriving confidence from this practice. A correct line combined with revolutionary practice alone can lead us to victory.

CONCLUSION.

We have discussed important aspects of our differences with C.P. group. This discussion shows that we do not have any points of importance that unite us. This discussion can be summed up in the following points.

1). We have a fundamental line which we think it to be correct and it stood the preliminary tests. We uphold it. There is no change in the line as far as we are concerned.

Where as the C.P. group has no such fundamental line. It is attacking our line from right and "left" opportunist angle. This is an opportunism pure and simple.

2). We are for an armed struggle as a form of struggle for agrarian revolution. For this an agrarian revolutionary movement has to be

built based on an agrarian revolutionary programme. Immediate Programme provides this. CP group distorts experience of Telangana armed struggle and states without any factual basis that in Telangana partial struggles were conducted as armed struggle which is totally false. CP group advocate in words armed struggle as a form of partial struggle. In practice it carries on armed actions without people's participation which are nothing but assassination of individuals.

3). Experience of armed struggle in Telangana conclusively proves that armed struggle can be a form of struggle at the stage of land distribution not at the stage of partial struggles. Where as CP group distorts the experiences of Telangana armed struggle and states without factual basis that in Telangana partial struggles took the form of armed struggles.

4). Our experience before and after April connection provided that the land distribution is possible and necessary to build and advance the agrarian revolutionary movement. We could gain this experience by implementing immediate programme whereas CP group refused to implement the programme, violated it by going into premature armed actions. It now says that neither agrarian revolution nor armed struggle as its form of struggle is impossible now. Thus it renounces the task of agrarian revolution and advocates individual associations. It says that this is the experience that they had during last two years.

5). We are of the opinion that any unity inside the organisation is possible only on the basis of our fundamental line. It has to be implemented and improved upon the basis of experience we gain by implementing it. Any convention or representative meeting should be held on this basis. We think, such a process alone will unify and strengthen our organisation.

The C.P. group wants a convention of loose elements who have experience in violating our fundamental line from a right and "left" opportunist angle. They reduce the accepted fundamental line to a negligible position. They want to legalise their departure from mass line under the cover of convention

They carried the "Inner-party struggle" in the streets by virtually denouncing us as revisionists and as advocating laying down of arms in their pamphlets, documents and oral propaganda. This has no parallel anywhere in any party. In our opinion this is an open declaration of split and any talk of unity on the part of C.P. group is a deception and fraud.

Faced with this situation, we think it necessary to reorganise whatever organisation remaining with us on sound revolutionary lines. And we are having one such organisation. It has a programme path and a constitution. It is

applying Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse Tung Thought to the practice of Indian revolution. This organisation will try to unite all genuine revolutionaries all over India including those in the C. P group. The path we have chosen is difficult yet a correct one.

Every proletarian party and every revolutionary movement has its own zig-zags in its course. In the earlier days the difficulties are all the more severe. Under the guidance of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse Tung's Thought, we revolutionaries will surmount all the difficulties. unite and lead Indian revolution to a success.

March 23, 1973

Andhra Pradesh Communist Committee
(Revolutionaries)

NOTES:

1. "Nine comments": The nine articles written by the CPC leadership exposing Modern Revisionism of CPSU leadership.
(Period 1963).
2. "A reply of Khammam Area Committee": It is a document written and circulated by Chandra Pulla Reddy and his associates. It was in reply to the P.C. document which deals with his violation of the general line of our own organisation. (1970-71).
3. The document on "Morals", which again was circulated by C.P. group advocating sex-anarchy inside the Party.
4. This refers to the conspiracy case against Communist Revolutionaries led by T. Naga Reddy, filed by the Andhra Pradesh Government. Curiously enough the Communist Revolutionaries defended the Party's general line in the court, while the C.P. group has disowned it.
5. C.P. group in the whole document refers to Chandra Pulla Reddy group, which broke away from Andhra Communist Revolutionaries in 1970. Subsequently, it has merged in the CPI (ML).
6. "Razakars": Literally means volunteers. They were a para - military organisation, which has functioned as an appendage to Nizam's Armed Forces.
7. "Reject": is a part of the title of the document, circulated by the C.P. group. It contains the "left" opportunist line it advocated, while asking the ranks to "reject" party's correct fundamental line.
8. "Two Years Experiences": A part of the title of the document in which the C.P. group has summed up the experiences of its armed actions which they characterised as armed struggle.
9. Manthana incident: This refers to an incident in the forest area of Kareem Nagar district when some arms were seized from a Christian Missionary, by the party workers functioning in the area.
10. A Draft Constitution was ready even by 1971-72, which was circulated to our ranks. It is mentioned elsewhere in the document.
11. This point was further clarified in the "Path of Indian Revolution".



