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
The Realities Behind the Headlines

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US-China Peoples Friendship Association of New York

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Foreword

Recent development in Southeast Asia — the expulsion of as many as 200,000 Chinese from Vietnam, Vietnam's full-scale invasion of Kampuchea (Cambodia) launched in December, and China's subsequent actions taken against Vietnam — have provoked great concern among friends of China. The members of the US-China Peoples Friendship Association, in subscribing to its Statement of Principles, are not asked to agree or disagree with China's foreign policy, but the USCPFA has always sought to provide information that would help to explain China's position on various questions.

With respect to the situation in Southeast Asia, the editors of this pamphlet felt that providing some background on political conditions and alignments in the region would help readers to gain a sense of the total picture. It is in this spirit that the USCPFA of New York offers this publication to members friends and all those interested in China.

March 8, 1979

*Kathy Chamberlain
Fredric M. Kaplan
Co-Chairpersons*

China's Vietnam Calculation

By Hugh Deane

For the second time in a dozen years China has sent sizeable forces into Vietnam. The first crossing was at Hanoi's invitation, but the two episodes have this in common: intense concern about China's national security. The 50,000 troops ordered into Vietnam in 1965-66 engaged in railroad and airfield construction but their prime mission was to deter the U.S. from an all-out assault on the north, their presence reinforcing the repeated statements by Peking that China would not sit by with folded hands if the U.S. invaded the Red River delta and approached the Chinese frontier. Chinese efforts at deterrence were not wholly successful. They delayed but did not prevent the devastating bombings of the north. But there was no follow-up by American ground forces.

Peking's favorite claim that it has not a single soldier on foreign soil has been generally true but not always. As Allen S. Whiting has shown in a study of China's use of military force in Vietnam and against India,¹ China administers doses of force to complement diplomacy and politics in the face of perceived threats to its national security. It does so where it sees a need to provide adversaries with concrete data on what attacks on China would cost them and where it wants to give a strong signal that its declarations must be taken seriously. Deng Xiaoping told newsmen in Washington that "what China says counts," and he might have added he was quoting Chou En-lai and a number of official Peking statements of the 1960s.

A few weeks after its first anniversary the People's Republic intervened in the Korea war. Despite conclusive evidence to the contrary, the notion that Peking was an initiator of that war persists in historical best sellers: ". . . on June 25, 1950, the Communist bureaucracies of Russia, China and North Korea misread their signals and invaded Korea," Theodore H. White writes in his *In Search of History*.² In fact Peking intervened only for reasons of its own security. It repeatedly signalled that it would not peacefully permit U.S. seizure of the Yalu River border but Washington paid no heed. And, contrary to impressions caused by reportage of the Chinese role that featured hordes and human wave assaults, the Chinese intervention was calculated and limited. As I.F. Stone was among the first to observe,³ the Chinese volunteers (the pretense was one signal of China's limited intent) crossed the Yalu and struck the American forces in October, 1950 and then pulled back, waiting to see if Washington got the message. When it didn't, the Chinese came on again in great force, only to pause once more when they approached the 38th parallel. Only after three years of mutual slaughter did Washington come near to a realistic estimate of the costs of the Korean effort.

In October-November of 1962 three People's Liberation Army divisions swiftly demolished a network of outposts India had established in Himalayan territory to which China had a more valid claim. Having secured the disputed area, Peking unilaterally declared a cease fire, withdrew advance units and released Indian prisoners. More than the local infringement on Chinese territory was involved. China then saw itself threatened by both superpowers. Washington policy still re-

flected the view of men who thought they could help demonstrate that the People's Republic was a passing phase, and the USSR was the opponent in the raging debate over revisionism. China was gripped by the troubles caused by the Great Leap Forward, a mixture of success and failure, and the natural disasters of the following years. It foresaw moves by its enemies to take advantage of its difficulties. The 33-day Indian war both secured a particular frontier and served general notice that China was not a military pushover.

From 1965 on the Soviet Union built up its forces along the Chinese border and in Outer Mongolia, and as early as 1966 Mao began to suppose that it was China's most formidable adversary. In March of 1969 Chinese and Soviet troops clashed twice along the Ussuri. Accounts of the incidents differ,⁴ but what is clear is that the Chinese boldly committed substantial force locally in the face of the general superiority of the Soviet military presence. Once again tactical bellicosity aimed at deterrence.

China's assault on Vietnam was one more application of force for deterrent and cautionary purposes. Just as it did not intervene in Korea to preserve the Kim Il Sung regime, so it did not attack Vietnamese border forces narrowly to avenge the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea or the expulsion of some 180,000 ethnic Chinese from Vietnam. But Kampuchea was a principal factor in its assessment. China's overriding concern properly is its national security and the attempt of Hanoi to take over Kampuchea, in alliance with the Soviet Union, is an additional threat to it.

Peking's initial statements dealt wholly with Vietnamese border transgressions, which more or less detached Western observers believe took place.⁵ By Chinese count, 1,000 border violations occurred in 1978, 30 between February 8 and February 12 in which 34 Chinese were killed or wounded. Rifle and over-the-border mine laying coupled with broadcasting of threats and bravado by loudspeakers disrupted the life of the Chinese villages. Rifle and submachinegun fire on two trains on February 12 forced the suspension of rail service in southern Yunnan. Chinese trawlers were systematically driven back to port by Vietnamese patrol boats; several were fired on and seriously damaged, and one captain was killed. China did not go beyond words in protesting the invasion of Kampuchea, and it may be that Hanoi, emboldened by its treaty with the Soviet Union, sought by provocations to underscore what it saw as China's limited capacity to shape developments in Indochina.

But like the short Indian war, the strike at Vietnam is linked to broader calculations. Partly as a result of an extrapolation from the success of its century of revolutionary struggle, China views the long range with confidence that it will survive and prosper and that the world as a whole will, in Marxist terms, move from the era of necessity into the era of freedom. But its shorter range appraisal takes with the utmost seriousness what it sees as a Moscow-Havana-Hanoi offensive in the Third World aimed at securing bases and control of raw materials. It sees a Moscow counterpart to neo-colonialism — neo-revolutions made by imported battalions that turn into garrisons. It sees aggressive states, revolutions gone sour, now to its south as well as to its north.

China applies the word fascist to Vietnam now as it does to the

Soviet Union. Its use of the word may be too loose, but the realities of rightward changes in Vietnam are not to be denied. For years Vietnam pursued a more or less even-handed policy toward the USSR and China, but in 1978 it moved decisively into the Soviet orbit. A precise account of the why is not yet possible, but some aspects are evident. Development programs, especially in agriculture, have not gone well. One southern province achieved just nine percent of its rice sowing target;⁶ according to UN estimates, the 1978 rice deficit will be 2.5 million tons at the minimum. While the Hanoi radio was reporting starvation and emaciation in Kampuchea, actually the Kampucheans were getting a bigger rice ration than the Vietnamese. The Vietnamese invasion was secondarily a rice seizing operation. The decision-making apparatus — the leadership of a party long on centralism and short on democracy — continued a trend to the right apparent since the late 1960s, when those influenced by Mao were eliminated.⁷ Washington's refusal to extend recognition and aid did not help elements in the party favoring ties with a variety of nations so as to offset Soviet influence. More or less centrist northerners and many surviving members of the National Liberation Front leadership have been removed from key positions. Victims include Truong Chinh in the north and Mme. Binh of the NLF,⁸ who was demoted from Minister of Education to principal of a school and who now reportedly has been removed from that post. All the minorities, not just the Chinese, have been adversely affected by a sterner policy; the autonomous minority areas have been abolished, and minority representation on the Central Committee has been reduced from seven to two. Vietnam has taken on some of the characteristics of those it fought against in two wars, and in Laos and Kampuchea it pursued policies it once eloquently denounced.

Deng Xiaoping regularly inveighed against softness toward the Soviet Union during his U.S. visit and coupled his strictures with statements that Hanoi had to be taught a lesson. What China says counts, and the invasion of the Vietnamese border followed; Peking had to heed its own counsel to others. The pressures on Peking were local as well as general, as a report to the *Far Eastern Economic Review* by Nayan Chanda, written from Vientiane, suggests.⁹ He said that China's apparent inability to wage anything more than a "saliva war" following the invasion of Kampuchea had disheartened anti-Vietnamese elements in the Laotian party and government and shaken the faith of Chinese residents of Laos. Feelings that China too was a paper tiger had reduced its influence to "an all-time low."

China preaches constantly that appeasement brings aggression and leads to defeat. It believes not only in the generality that aggression must be resisted; it believes in the particularity that timely use of force, limited and controlled, can deter aggression, and it has acted on that belief periodically when it had reason to fear for its national security. In its view, treaties, declarations and speeches have their place in a war-threatened world of change and struggle, but deterrent force can be helpful too.

Hugh Deane, a former student and journalist in China, is co-editor of China and Us and an editor of New China magazine.

Notes

1. **The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence**, University of Michigan Press, 1975.
2. **In Search of History**, page 300.
3. **The Hidden History of the Korean War**, Monthly Review Press, 1952.
4. The essentials are reported in **The Chinese Red Army**, by Gerard H. Corr, New York, 1974.
5. Among those giving credence to the Chinese claims are unnamed military observers in Washington cited by the **New York Times** and Drew Middleton, the **Times'** military correspondent.
6. **Conflict in the Vietnamese Communist Party**, *Le Monde*, September 3-4, 1978, translated by Peoples Translation Service in **Newsfront International**, October 1978, No. 218. According to official statistics, 91 percent of the plan was realized in the north, 33 percent in the south. Cuu-Long Province, which reported nine percent, is in the rice bowl, the Mekong Delta.

Le Monde reported an internal party trend toward a hard line and cited veiled attacks on party "opportunists" soft on China. It reported a call by Nhan Dan, the party newspaper, for a pruning of revolutionary ranks.
7. **Vietnam: Behind the Exodus**, by Da Yu, *Monsoon*, October 1978, reports that Nguyen Chi Thanh, a member of the Politburo of the Vietnamese party known for his Maoist views, died very suddenly on July 1, 1967 of an unspecified ailment. Later, Chinese intelligence apparently concluded he had been murdered. Mao personally signed the message of condolence to the Vietnamese party published in the **People's Daily**. More recently, eight members of the Central Committee of the Vietnamese CP have been dropped because of their "Chinese connections," according to the *Monsoon* article. One, Huang Van Hoan, was also in the Politburo.

Also according to *Monsoon*, a revision of the works of Le Duan, a top VCP leader, published in July 1977 was notable for its excision of a reference to the "distinguished contribution of Mao and the Chinese Communist Party to the development and expansion of Marxism-Leninism." Also deleted was Le Duan's earlier view that the strategy of the Chinese revolution was worth the study of Communists in Asia, Africa and Latin America.
8. Keng Piao, a Deputy Prime Minister, offered this Chinese assessment of Vietnam today in a discussion with Edward Friedman of the University of Wisconsin: "To deal with the popular discontent and economic stagnation . . . , Hanoi instituted fascistic secret-police rule akin to that of the Soviet K.G.B. Vietnam's rulers, as fascists would, incited racist assaults on minority Vietnamese of Chinese descent, labeling them foreign agents; 200,000 escaped. Mr. Keng saw Vietnam's fascism as the cause of its expansionism: A militaristic, secret-police society incapable of meeting the people's material needs soon embraces chauvinistic and imperialistic goals," **New York Times**, February 4, 1979.
9. See **Radical Forum** contribution to the **Guardian** of January 31 by Gary Hansjergen. He writes that reportedly Mme. Binh was placed under house arrest. A major reorganization of the Vietnamese party has taken place in the last year and a half, he reports.
9. **Far Eastern Economic Review**, February 23, 1979.

The Invasion of Kampuchea

by Gary Hansjergen

The invasion of Kampuchea began on December 25. About 100,000 Vietnamese troops, elements of 12 divisions, attacked in three columns. The first came out of the Central Highlands into Kampuchea's northeast, where most of the earlier fighting had taken place and where much of the Kampuchean army was concentrated. The second column attacked through the Parrots Beak area west of Ho Chi Minh City, threatening Phnom Penh from the east and north. The third column attacked out of the Mekong River Delta region, striking for the port city of Kompong Som and threatening Phnom Penh from the west and south. By January 7 Vietnamese units were in Phnom Penh and were racing up both sides of Tonle Sap, the large lake in central Kampuchea, seeking out Kampuchean army strongholds and moving toward the Thai border. The Vietnamese were in control of most of the cities and national highways by the end of the second week in January.

The Vietnamese strategy — called the Blooming Lotus strategy — was mapped out and directed by General Van Tien Dung, the chief of staff, who employed it to capture Saigon in the spring of 1975. It features a lightning attack. The Vietnamese moved fast under heavy air and artillery cover. They flew an average of 100 sorties daily, using MIG-21s and captured U.S. A-37s and F-5s to drop U.S. anti-personnel cluster bombs and the like. The attack was spearheaded by massed Soviet tanks, the latest PT-76 amphibious tanks and older T-54 tanks. The Blooming Lotus strategy was to use the roads, hit and occupy the cities, bypass sharp pockets of resistance and leave them to mop-up units. The military objective was to split the Kampuchean army into small units, destroy their contact with each other and with the command, and wipe them out before they could regroup.

Vietnam's political objective was to seize the capital city of Phnom Penh, capture Kampuchean government and army leaders and secure order in the cities and enough of the country to install a puppet government, that of the National United Front for National Salvation, which could claim legitimacy at the United Nations and around the world. The key to both objectives was rapidity of progress, and that required catching Kampuchea unprepared.

Kampuchea's Strategy

As events showed, Kampuchea was well prepared. Following an initial attempt to contain the attack in northeast Kampuchea that resulted in heavy fighting, the Kampuchean forces adopted a policy of strategic retreat. The Vietnamese assault came from too many directions and was too strong. Kampuchea then abandoned a static defense and Phnom Penh. The Vietnamese were allowed to spread their forces thin and occupy cities connected by long and tenuous lines of communication and supply.

Gary Hansjergen, a member of Concerned Asian Scholars, is active in the recently-formed Kampuchea Support Committee. His article is based on his speech delivered at a forum sponsored by a coalition held February 16.

The Kampuchean strategy during the first month of the invasion was to disperse their forces and then regroup in units of 800 to 1,000 men. Western military analysts estimate that at least four-fifths of the 60,000 Kampuchean army was thus preserved. Since last August, while warning its people and the world of the upcoming Vietnamese invasion, the Kampuchean government built up stocks of supplies in the rugged mountains of southwest Kampuchea. Government leaders and the high command moved there following the abandonment of Phnom Penh; no leading cadres were killed or captured by the Vietnamese. Kampuchea allowed the Vietnamese to overextend and immediately began small-scale attacks on the flanks and rear of the Vietnamese, destroying equipment, cutting supply lines and keeping the pressure on. On January 12 Thai military intelligence commented that Kampuchean troops "opened like a wire cutter to let the steel arrowhead of the Vietnamese forces through and are closing behind it to clip off the shaft." In addition, larger-scale attacks were launched where conditions were favorable. In mid-January Kampuchea retook the port of Kompong Som and the naval base at Riem. These cities changed hands three times.

Vietnamese control of the cities means little. Since 1975 the cities have been largely emptied, and while there is some industry there, the nation has been reorganized around a network of self-sufficient agricultural cooperatives. Vietnam must control the countryside to really control Kampuchea, and that would take a force of 100,000 even if there were no armed resistance. Vietnam faces a monumental task. An indication of the state of security is that Premier Pham Van Dong's triumphant entry into Phnom Penh, originally scheduled for January 14, was postponed three times. Finally on February 17 he visited a city empty except for corpses and 6,000 Kampucheans shipped in for the occasion. Vietnam's quest for a quick victory has failed.

Hanoi's Isolation

This failure and an aggressive worldwide diplomatic effort by Kampuchea and her friends have doomed Vietnam's efforts to obtain substantial recognition of the regime it installed in Phnom Penh. In the debate at the United Nations, Vietnam was dismayed by the lack of support for its position and its puppets. No country spoke for it except Cuba and the Soviet Union, and the Security Council vote was 13-2 to support Kampuchea and condemn the invasion.

The current situation is good for the Kampucheans and bad for the Vietnamese. Kampuchean army units are fighting back everywhere. A Thai general put the situation this way: "The most intense level of activity is in the south and west of the country. But you could hardly throw a dart at a Kampuchean map blindfolded without hitting some spot where resistance is going on." Bridges and roads have been blown up. Isolated Vietnamese are exposed to hit and run attacks. As in the last years of the U.S. war in Kampuchea, the Mekong is full of sunken and grounded freighters and Vietnamese shipping requires heavy naval protection. Agence France Presse reported February 2 that an attack on Pochentong airport outside Phnom Penh destroyed airplane fuel and lubricants and killed Soviet and Cuban advisers employed in radio communication with aircraft. Democratic Kampuchean radio claimed that in January Vietnam suffered 14,000 casualties (including 300 Soviet and

Cuban advisers) and lost 330 tanks and 12 aircraft. While casualty figures are difficult to verify, Western military sources believe that Vietnamese losses are substantial. According to a Bangkok Post report on February 4, Thai sources believe Vietnam added five divisions to its invasion force, raising the total to about 180,000 men.

On February 1-2 a national congress, called by the military commission of the Kampuchean Communist Party's Central Committee, met somewhere in Kampuchea to assess the first month of resistance. The fact that 183 leading commanders and 230 leading political and government cadres from all areas of the country were able to attend shows the quality of security and combat situations sufficiently stable to do without key commanders for a period.

Vietnam faces serious problems as it fights a war of aggression against an aroused and organized people who have a coordinated, well-disciplined army in the field. Its logistics and supply are a nightmare. The main supply problems are tank fuel, ammo and medicine. Vietnamese tanks use two types of fuel, all of which has to be imported from Warsaw Pact countries. Now bridges are blown and tanks are scattered. If they don't run out of fuel, the rainy season, which starts in mid-April, will immobilize all but the newest Soviet-built amphibious models.

The Rice Shortage

A second crucial difficulty is food. The Vietnamese army in Kampuchea needs an estimated 100,000 kilograms of rice daily, while at home Vietnam faces an enormous rice deficit, both from the failure of agricultural development and from disastrous floods last fall. The UN estimates the 1979 deficit to fall between 2.5 and 4 million tons, which is greater than the entire world trade in rice. Wholesale looting of rice from Kampuchean cooperatives has to be expected.

Within Vietnam, economic development plans have been disrupted. Instances of peasant resistance to government rice buying are reported. To save themselves from economic disaster the Vietnamese have turned completely to the Soviet Union. Talks in Hanoi January 31-February 2 between Pham Van Dong and I.V. Arkhipov resulted in a wide range of economic, scientific and technological agreements between the two countries and promises of Soviet aid to cover all contingencies. Tass reported that the talks "determined the fundamental orientation of cooperation to 1990" and that "Soviet/Vietnamese cooperation in fact comprises all realms of economy, science and technology and Soviet assistance to Vietnam involves all corners of Vietnam." The invasion has driven the final nail in the coffin of Vietnamese independence.

The Kampuchean National United Front for National Salvation is a myth created by Hanoi for international media consumption. In the first stage of Vietnamese aggression into Kampuchea in 1977-78, no such front existed. Its birth was first announced by Hanoi on December 3, just 22 days before the invasion. Tass then reported from Moscow that "real and revolutionary patriotic forces are rising in a resolute struggle for national salvation in Kampuchea" and predicted that they would make "most important contributions" to the overthrow of the Pol Pot government. Heng Samrin, head of the front government, is an unknown. He is variously identified as a former Kampuchean army commander, division commander, regiment or battalion commander, but no indepen-

dent sources describe him as holding any leading post prior to December 3. A journalist delegation from the Italian Communist Party reported only Vietnamese troops in Phnom Penh and only Vietnamese administrators in the captured cities. Refugees recently interviewed in Thailand said that troops entering their village were all Vietnamese except for a Kampuchean from South Vietnam serving as interpreter.

Associated Press reporters witnessed the naval landing on Kok Kong Island January 21. The attacking flotilla flew Kampuchean National United Front flags but consisted of Soviet-built rocket-launching destroyers, landing barges, transport vessels and patrol boats. Also an American-built patrol boat given to the south Vietnam navy in 1961 and a U.S.-built oiler given to Saigon in 1970, both captured by Vietnam in 1975. The troops landing on the island were all Vietnamese; no disguise was attempted. Western military identifications of Vietnamese invasion forces came from three sources: military analysts in Thailand who rely on electronic equipment left by the U.S. that can monitor radio conversations down to the platoon level; satellite reports; and U.S. Lockheed SR-71 high-flying reconnaissance aircraft. The London Daily Mail, which had correspondents in Vietnam on the eve of the invasion, reported January 8 that "every tactical move in Vietnam's 307th Division was planned in consultation with the senior Soviet military officers travelling with it." Estimates of the number of Soviet and other Warsaw Pact advisers working with Vietnamese range up to 4,000. Western journalists have photographed hundreds of empty ammo cases with Soviet markings floating in the Gulf of Siam.

The Vietnamese Pretexs

Vietnam has offered a variety of excuses for its invasion. It asserts that violations of human rights in Kampuchea give it the right to support what it describes as an uprising of the Kampuchean people against its government. Through mid-February the Vietnamese ambassador to the United Nations claimed that there were no Vietnamese troops at all in Kampuchea. And finally Hanoi alleges that in fact it was invaded by Kampuchea and that China put the Kampucheans up to it, that Chinese residents in south Vietnam were preparing to rise in rebellion, and that Vietnam's role has been strictly defensive. The reality is plain. Vietnam is the aggressor and has brought on a people's war of resistance.

How Vietnam got itself into this situation is a central question. Although Moscow's courting of Hanoi only began to bear fruit in recent years, tendencies within the Vietnamese party for many years boded ill for its relation with revolutionary forces in Kampuchea and Laos.

Since the mid-60s the Soviet Union had peddled the idea of an Asian Collective Security Pact in southeast Asia, but until two years ago no country except Mongolia treated it seriously. For sometime after the end of the U.S. war in Vietnam the Soviet Union charged that the countries in the region, grouped into the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, were a bloc subject to U.S. imperialist domination. Vietnam took this approach too and talked a lot about supporting revolutionary struggles in the area. Initially, however, it dissociated itself from the Soviet proposal for an Asian security pact and followed policies that sometimes did and sometimes didn't correspond with those of the Soviet Union. Beginning in 1977 both the Soviet and the Vietnamese line

changed, to the surprise and guarded enthusiasm of Southeast Asian nations. Moscow cut back on its attacks on ASEAN and Hanoi for the first time sought diplomatic and trade relations with its members. It became clear that the Soviet Union and Vietnam were acting in collusion.

In the first months of 1978 Sino-Vietnamese relations broke down. With the expulsion of over 180,000 ethnic Chinese from Vietnam and mounting tension along the border, China halted its aid projects in Vietnam and the latter responded by joining Comecon, the Soviet bloc economic organization, in June 1978 — just at the time that Vietnam's first aggression against Kampuchea was stalemated. The admission of Vietnam into Comecon was not fundamentally to replace Chinese aid; only five of the 16 projects that Hanoi took to Comecon were approved, and Vietnam's trade relations with Soviet bloc countries were not significantly altered. Mainly the Comecon connection opened a pipeline of military supplies to Vietnam that started flowing at full speed in August and has continued since.

Hanoi and ASEAN

Last October Pham Van Dong toured Southeast Asia and assured each host country that an era of friendship and peace was at hand, that Vietnam would be interested in joining ASEAN and that Vietnam would give no aid to the revolutionary struggles in the region. He suggested that ASEAN be revised along the lines of the Soviet collective security proposal. Then, upon his return home, he and Le Duan, secretary of the Vietnamese party, went to Moscow and signed a "treaty of friendship and cooperation" which included a military clause. That treaty and the invasion of Kampuchea two months later halted the progress Vietnam was making in state to state relations with its neighbors, most of whom turned to the view offered earlier by China that Vietnam was playing the role of Cuba.

The invasion of Kampuchea is an ominous portent of things to come. Vietnam has mortgaged its country and its future to the Soviet Union in return for aid in carrying out its aims of dominating Indochina and extending its influence throughout Southeast Asia. The alliance with Moscow gave it a guarantee of Soviet support and involvement if China came to the aid of Kampuchea. Vietnam had to move when it did or never. Kampuchea's internal situation was improving month by month. It has become a rice exporter. Last fall it began actively to open up diplomatic relations with the rest of the world; its isolation, intensified by U.S. and Vietnamese efforts to portray it as a gross violator of human rights and a pariah among nations, was ending. The Soviet Union took advantage of Vietnam's domestic weaknesses to tie it up with economic and military ribbons and encourage its aspirations for regional hegemony.

Vietnam's 30-year stubborn struggle against foreign intruders and for independence and unification won such prestige that its friends abroad overlooked indications that hegemonistic aims were emerging. Many American friends were prepared to believe Vietnam's protestations of non-alignment and its allegations that huge China was trying to lord it over its smaller neighbor. The invasion of Kampuchea threw facts into the face of illusion.

But Vietnam's historic aspiration for an Indochina federation is

not a sufficient explanation for its rampage into Kampuchea. The role of the Soviet Union has to be understood. It took the initiative in the moves that brought the Vietnamese into their camp. In Indochina and elsewhere in the world it is on the march. Kampuchea was for it a preliminary bout which tested the strength of the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance against the resolve of the U.S. and China and the people of the world. The aggressive march of the Soviet Union threatens world war and Kampuchea is one of a series of warnings of that threat — others being the assassinations in Yemen, the coup in Afghanistan, the interventions in Ethiopia and elsewhere in Africa, the Soviet provocations in Japan's northern islands and against Norway. The meaning of the long list is that the Soviet Union is stepping up its military buildup and its interventions all over the world. What the Soviet Union expects from its alliance with Hanoi and the Kampuchean adventure is very concrete. It hopes that control of Kampuchean rice and fishing areas will make Vietnam stable economically and secure enough to be a real influence throughout Southeast Asia. It hopes to obtain a major naval base at Cam Ranh Bay that would enable it to threaten sea lanes traversed by oilers linking the Middle East and Japan. China is threatened from the south and all of Southeast Asia is thrown into disarray, a situation ripe for Soviet maneuvers.

But Kampuchea has something else to teach us: the lesson of resistance. The people of Kampuchea have rallied to their army and government and are waging a determined struggle for their independence. Their efforts light our way in the face of the danger of aggression and war.

Vietnam's Vietnam

In what must be one of history's greatest ironies, the Vietnamese, whose guerilla forces so recently fought the heavily-armed Americans to a bloody defeat, now find their heavily-armed columns bogged down on the roads of Kampuchea. They evidently failed to learn the very lesson they taught the Americans — that weapons and armor count for little in a war against rural guerillas in an unfriendly environment. A few weeks after their virtually unopposed drive into Phnom Penh the Vietnamese appear to have achieved little more than, literally, a hollow victory.

Far Eastern Economic Review, February 9

An Act of Flagrant Aggression

Major excerpts from Prince Norodom Sihanouk's address to the United Nations Security Council, January 11, 1979

As indeed the whole world knows, my country is the victim of a large-scale act of flagrant aggression by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, a country which had described itself as our "brother," our "faithful companion in arms in the anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist struggle," a country which had asserted that it was a "socialist comrade," "belonging, as does Cambodia, to the camp of the non-aligned States."

In the not too distant past or, more precisely, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the principal leaders of the party and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and those of the National Liberation Front and the Provisional Government of the Republic of South Vietnam . . . have never ceased to state, to affirm, to reaffirm and even to write to Norodom Sihanouk, then Head of State of Cambodia or Kampuchea, that "now as in the future and to the very end of time" their socialist Vietnam, their revolutionary Vietnam, their anti-colonialist, anti-imperialist, anti-war Vietnam held it to be and would continue to hold it to be their sacred duty scrupulously and unswervingly to respect the independence, sovereignty, neutrality and territorial integrity of "fraternal" Kampuchea.

But, on the very morrow of the final victory, in April 1975 — a victory over imperialism — and in the wake of the reunification of the two Vietnams, North and South, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam decided, cold-bloodedly, to embark upon a very special "operation" the ultimate goal of which was nothing less than to swallow up "little" Kampuchea just as a starving boa constrictor would fling itself upon an innocent animal.

Starving — that certainly is and has been an apt description of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. All the newspapers, all television and radio networks in all the countries of the world, with the exception of course of the countries closely linked to the USSR and the USSR itself, have stressed and continue to stress repeatedly that the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, ever since its victory at the end of April, 1975, has been sinking ever deeper — and with what desperation — into the abyss of economic and financial failure without any possibility of recovery, its agriculture, which had been very prosperous in the south of the country during the period of French colonialism, on the verge of collapse; its industrialization marked by disorderly planning and a surprising confusion and its administration, to say the least, becoming ever more corrupt.

Kampuchea Coveted

In the circumstances, a Democratic Kampuchea in full economic upswing, possessing vast rice paddies ever more admirably and fully irrigated and innumerable fields where fruit trees, maize, sugar-cane, all kinds of vegetables and other crops grow in great profusion, not to mention the wealth that lies in its subsoil and the harmonious expansion of its industrialization, could not but arouse envy in our great neighbor

where an age-old tradition — a tradition held in high esteem by all the successive Vietnamese regimes so far — was prompting it to undertake the highly profitable colonization of Kampuchea.

My saying what I have just said about Vietnam does not constitute interference in the internal affairs of that country; there is a necessity which makes it my duty to create a better understanding of the reasons why my country has always had to put up with acts of aggression and other armed attacks from Vietnam, which have been going on since the 15th century.

From the 15th to the beginning of the 20th century, Vietnam, in spite of the bitter and indomitable resistance of the army and the people of Kampuchea, succeeded in swallowing up a good half of Kampuchea. That half became what is known today as South Viet Nam; it used to be the south of Kampuchea.

Although this is inconceivable in the 1970s, when all the talk is of respect for the United Nations Charter and the just principles of non-alignment, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, a member moreover of the United Nations and a full-fledged member of the “family” of the non-aligned countries, is not embarrassed by any scruples. Greatly encouraged by its multifarious alliances, in particular a de facto military alliance with the USSR, one of the two world superpowers, drawing comfort from the total and unconditional support accorded it by the powers of the Warsaw Pact, with the exception of Romania, respecting the “good” old traditions of shamelessly swallowing up small neighbors whenever the opportunity presented itself, and motivated also, we must point out, by the keen appetite that it had nurtured for many years, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam came to the point of launching an all-out attack with all the power of its Hitlerite armed forces for the conquest of Kampuchea.

German-style Blitz

The irresistible advance of a host of armored tanks and cars, accompanied by a dozen infantry divisions supported by the most modern heavy artillery, preceded and protected by innumerable aircraft of all types, including MIG-21s and some MIG-23s; that advance, a veritable German-style blitzkrieg in nature, strangely reminds us of the onslaught of the Hitlerite armed forces to which so many European countries — France and Poland in particular — fell victim at the beginning of the Second World War.

All this shows how monstrous and dastardly is the current conquest of my poor little country by the big neighbor whose numerical superiority is compounded by a formidable military outfit, equipped to the teeth as it is by one of the two most formidable military powers in the world today.

I wish now to say something about the so-called National United Front for National Salvation of Kampuchea and its so-called government.

The government, press and radio of Hanoi themselves have very spontaneously been declaring to the world at large that this Front was created and existed only since the date of 2 December, 1978. I repeat, 2 December, 1978.

Now the formidable Guderian or Rommel-style blitzkrieg which

was launched by the so-called Front for the National Salvation of Kampuchea was unleashed against us on 25 December, 1978. I repeat, 25 December, 1978.

Even schoolchildren at the primary level would be unable to believe that in the extremely short space of only 22 days, this tiny and insignificant so-called Kampuchea Front could recruit, equip, teach, train and lick into shape such an Olympian armed force of so many components and furthermore equipped with machines and weapons requiring a perfect mastery of electronics and ballistics, not to mention the special skills that can be possessed only by units which have already taken part in large-scale operations.

In the face of the insolent claim on the part of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to the effect that the war that is raging in Kampuchea or Cambodia is only a civil war without any Vietnamese involvement, the Kampuchean people, through me, has the honor of asserting vigorously that this war is purely a war of aggression, annexation, colonialization and regional hegemonism unilaterally, arbitrarily and unjustly unleashed by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam against little Kampuchea.

The so-called Kampuchea National United Front for National Salvation and its "government" are, in fact, only a pitiful smokescreen designed to hide from the outside world the criminal and repugnant anti-Kampuchean undertaking of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, which shows its contempt of other sovereign countries and peoples of the world by feeding them such obvious lies that even a child cannot give them any credence.

Those countries which have hastened to accord de jure recognition to the "government" of Heng Samrin, the pitiful puppet of the Vietnamese, expose themselves as the intimate accomplices that they are of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in its current attempt to annihilate independent, sovereign, neutral and non-aligned Kampuchea.

The states and the mass media which prize justice, freedom and moral and political probity have in recent days made a point of clearly denouncing the deep-dyed deceit of Vietnam and of inviting the whole world to exercise pressure on it to make it give up its criminal enterprise right away, thus making it possible, in accordance with the spirit and letter of the United Nations Charter, for Democratic Kampuchea and the Kampuchean people to recover their independence and national territorial integrity.

If by chance there is any problem dividing the Kampucheans, this problem must and should be resolved by Kampucheans alone without any interference from outside countries.

Malcolm Caldwell's Last Reflections

Malcolm Caldwell, an authority on Southeast Asia and editor of the *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, was shot and killed in Phnom Penh on December 23, the last day of his tour of Kampuchea with correspondents Richard Dudman of the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* and Elizabeth Becker of the *Washington Post*. Two days later some 100,000 Vietnamese troops began their attempted Kampuchean blitzkrieg.

Phnom Penh authorities ascribed the murder to Kampucheans in the employ of Hanoi and said that the purpose was to persuade the world that the government of Pol Pot was so weak it could not assure the safety of visitors.

Caldwell's tragic death at the age of 47 silenced an informed observer who months earlier had been skeptical of reports that depicted the Pol Pot regime as a pariah among nations and who had come to see for himself. While he did not live to assess his findings, his journalist companions testify that — contrary to allegations, after his death, by Wilfred Burchett and others — he was in general favorably impressed by what he saw.

Dudman's personal and professional assessment of Caldwell was that "he was essentially sympathetic to the revolution. He knew that it had been a very bloody revolution, he knew that mistakes were made and he didn't agree necessarily with all the policies. But he also believed that these are the characteristics of revolutions and understood this of what he saw in Kampuchea and was sympathetic with it. He was a great man."

Elizabeth Becker added this supporting comment on Caldwell's reaction to what he saw in Kampuchea: "He loved to cry out, 'Where are those armed guards oppressing the peasants?' as we passed mile after mile of rice fields with no guards in sight."

Not long before he died, Caldwell put together notes on the revolutionary struggles of Southeast Asian peoples and China's connection with them. They appeared in *Broadsheet*, publication of the China Policy Study Group, London (November and December, 1978).

In them he reported at some length the contrast between the Chinese and Vietnamese attitudes toward local revolution. While Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong pledged that Hanoi would give no aid to the struggling revolutionary movement in the region, China's Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping forthrightly refused to do so and suggested Hanoi was raising the white flag.

Pham Van Dong, Caldwell also noted, "laid a wreath at the Malaysian national monument commemorating British suppression of the Malayan people's revolutionary struggle of 1948-60. Deng carefully refrained from doing so."

Caldwell offered these assessments of the various revolutionary efforts:

THAILAND: The most crucial revolutionary campaign in the Third World is being waged here. It has developed by leaps and bounds

since the liberation of Laos and Kampuchea in 1975. Secure bases have been established in the north, northeast and south of the country. A Western journalist who went into a base area recently was astonished to be openly met by combatants in full uniform in what ostensibly was a government-held area. Their progress through numerous villages was greeted with obvious manifestations of enthusiastic peasant support. The Thai Communists are staunchly aligned with Peking and since 1975 have collaborated closely with the Kampucheans.

Cooperation between Laotian and Thai Communists is of long standing. After an agonized interlude of ambiguity, the government of Laos has now come out unequivocally for Vietnam and against Kampuchea. How this will affect border collaboration between Laos and the Thai guerrillas is uncertain. But Western visitors to Laos report that, despite official pronouncements, some cadres are prepared anonymously to express admiration for the spunk of the Kampucheans in standing up to Hanoi. Positive hostility between Laos and the struggling Thais must be considered a virtually inconceivable possibility.

BURMA: The Burmese Communist Party (White Flags) is strongly backed by China. In conjunction with the Shan and Karen minority groups, it now controls most of the border running south from China via Laos and Thailand to within a hundred miles of Malaya. In the last few years, revolutionaries in Burma, Thailand and Malaya have perfected a practical and mutually rewarding system of military and economic cooperation. Geography and self-interest dictate that it must continue.

MALAYA: The Malayan Communists also have stood constantly on the Chinese side in the Sino-Soviet split. In June it reiterated its support of China's international position and declared that the Third World struggle against imperialism and hegemonism is forging ahead and dealing telling blows to social imperialism and its lackeys.

The Communist movements in Indonesia, North Kalimantan and the Philippines similarly seemed to be aligned with Peking.

Richard Pastor

Richard Pastor, co-editor of China and Us, worked with the American Committee in Aid of Chinese Industrial Cooperatives (Indusco) in 1946 and has been an active builder of friendship with the people of China since spending the 1944-45 war years in that country.

The Takeover of Laos

In 1975 a new regime pledged to far-reaching reform and development came to power in Laos and the most politically aware Laotians were full of hope. Since then Laos has lost a quarter of a million of its three million people, and emigration at the highest rate in Southeast Asia continues.

Those fleeing include officials of the former government, members of the privileged classes and great numbers of the mountain tribespeople — the Meos and Muongs — whose leaders had sold them into the service of the CIA. But an increasing proportion of those seeking refuge in Thailand and elsewhere are idealist young professionals — badly needed by their country — who a few years ago saw themselves leading satisfying lives in the service of the Laotian people. Small units of the Laotian army also have fled across the Mekong into Thailand.

The refugees are not fleeing from Laos so much as from Vietnam, which maintains an armed force of 30,000 to 50,000 in their country and which essentially runs it through a hierarchy of advisers. Until well into 1978 a minority of the top Laotian leadership, including President Souphanouvong and Education Minister Phoumi Vongvichit, sought to modify the directives from Hanoi and create an image of a Laos which makes its own decisions. Hanoi's tolerance for this ended in the fall, and since then Vientiane has echoed Hanoi, a day or so later.

The Vietnamese presence has both affronted Laotian sensibilities and disappointed those who expected economic and social progress. Henry Kamm offers this observation in an assessment from Bangkok (New York Times, February 12): "A frequent diplomatic visitor with access to the top of the Laotian Government structure described Laos today as a nation weaker than ever, beset with insurrections, 'fragile' economic planning and administrative capacity and a 'non-existent' distribution system, in which traditional commercial channels have been dismantled and nothing has replaced them."

Dr. Didier Sicard, a French physician who left Laos recently after serving a hospital and medical school for four years, concluded in an article in a left French magazine: "The country is drained of its force. At the hospital, more and more, I diagnosed psychosomatic illnesses, ulcers — in short, the typical pathology of a state of being under constraint. Around us, all who had kept some courage were fleeing. The young ones above all, the vital force. In the void, the Vietnamese are settling, almost without conflict. Some years yet, and Laos will be a Vietnamese province."

Laos was a French artifice. In the last century Paris decided that the western frontier of its Indochina possessions should be the Mekong River and it moved therefore to establish a protectorate over the primitive, landlocked Laotian kingdom, populated by kin of the Thais and survivors of tribes pushed into the highlands long ago by the Viets. Laos remains undeveloped, without industry, its agriculture incapable of feeding its people, having little to mortgage save a strategic location. Courageous struggles against the French and the Americans led by the Pathet

Lao began to make a nation of it, but not to such an extent that it could resist the tough Vietnamese overlordship.

Even so, not all opposed to Hanoi are fleeing. Small guerrilla forces, especially active in the southern panhandle, occasionally ambush government or Vietnamese patrols. Pathet Lao cadres suspected of a China ideology and sympathy have now joined adherents of the former regime in the reeducation centers. On instructions from Hanoi, which feared some Chinese action to liberate its confined friends, the reeducation centers in the north have now been moved south. Communist and other diplomats, cited by the New York Times, February 12, agree that the Vietnamese army is now the "principal guarantor of the Laotian Government's security and its hold over the main communication lines."

The mountain tribespeople continue to resist. While scores of thousands have fled, mostly to Thailand, others are trying to survive in their ancestral lands despite destruction of their villages by the Vietnamese and their Laotian allies — one particularly brutal aspect of Vietnam's sterner policy toward minority peoples. Hanoi could have adopted a cure-the-disease-save-the-patient policy toward the tribespeople, enemies in a long war, but presumably concluded it could not make the investment in time and resources. Its planes gas the tribal villages, according to inhabitants who have fled, but the degree of toxicity is uncertain.

China's presence in northern Laos, which dates back to 1962, has been diminished. In 1965-66 Peking dispatched some 15,000 troops into Laos to engage in road construction. Since then, at a cost of about \$85 million, the Chinese have built 850 kilometers of roads in the northern Laotian provinces. Pressed by Hanoi, the Laotian Government demanded that China close its economic office (in effect, a consulate) in Oudomsay and reduce its corp of road builders. Peking complied. About 3,000 Chinese road builders remain in Laos.

But while China is acceding to Laotian requests to pull out, it reportedly retains many friends in the area. Nayan Chanda writes, in the *Far Eastern Economic Review* (February 23) that "some observers point out that China has an important constituency in the north. During 18 years' presence, the Chinese appear to have gained considerable influence by their voluntary work among the local population — helping them with public works and sanitation and providing medical assistance and much-needed consumer goods. China is also believed to have some friends in the Pathet Lao ranks in the north."

Other sources say that the Chinese in northern Laos have established friendly relations with the Meo tribespeople, who are related to minority peoples in China's southwest mountains.

G.W.J.

China Acted in Self-Defense

Chen Chu, Permanent Representative of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations, addressed the Security Council on February 23. His presentation included these points:

Chen Chu said that the Chinese delegation entirely supports the four-point appeal contained in the letter issued on February 12, 1979 by Khieu Samphan, President of the Presidium of Democratic Kampuchea, to all heads of state and government:

(1) To continue to expose and condemn Vietnam for its aggression and invasion of democratic Kampuchea, call on Vietnam to stop such actions and withdraw all its armed forces from Kampuchea, and respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kampuchea and the right of the Kampuchean people to decide their own destiny.

(2) To continue to oppose Vietnam's scheme to obtain recognition for the regime installed by it in Phnom Penh.

(3) To stop all forms of aid, including so-called humanitarian aid, to Vietnam, as it will use aid to expand its aggression against democratic Kampuchea and commit new crimes.

(4) To provide various forms of support and aid to the Kampuchean people in their just struggle under the leadership of the government of democratic Kampuchea, the sole legal government in Kampuchea.

The Chinese delegation maintains that the Security Council should take immediate action in accordance with the above-mentioned four-point appeal.

Referring to the question of Sino-Vietnamese border conflict which is the sole making of the Vietnamese authorities, Chen Chu stressed first of all that Vietnam's massive armed aggression and military occupation of democratic Kampuchea is a question entirely different in nature from China's being compelled to make limited counterattack in self-defense of the Chinese frontier as a result of the wanton provocation of border conflicts by the Vietnamese authorities. The Vietnamese aggression against Kampuchea constituted a gross violation of the United Nations Charter and norms of international law and poses a serious threat to international peace and security. The latter, namely, China's self-defensive counterattack, however, is a necessary action of self-defense taken in accordance with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. Any attempt to treat them equally only serves to confound the right and wrong and condone the real aggressors.

Chen Chu said that for a long time the Vietnamese authorities have deliberately pursued a hostile policy towards the People's Republic of China. Over a period, in addition to a large-scale persecution and expulsion of Chinese nationals residing in Vietnam, the Vietnamese authorities have massed a large number of troops in an organized and planned way along the Sino-Vietnamese border, ceaselessly creating incidents and carrying out armed provocations and hostile acts there. According to incomplete statistics, in 1974, Vietnam provoked over 100 incidents on the Sino-Vietnamese border: in 1975 the figure rose to 400 or more; in 1976 it dramatically increased to over 900; in 1977 to 752

and in 1978 even to 1,108. In the past six months alone, the Vietnamese authorities have encroached upon the Chinese border in 162 places, carried out armed provocations against China on more than 700 occasions and killed and wounded more than 300 Chinese border guards and inhabitants.

Chen Chu noted that following the ending of the anti-U.S. war and the realization of unification, Vietnam quickly embarked on the path of aggression and expansion. First, it placed Laos under its control. Then it launched a massive war of aggression against Kampuchea, occupying Phnom Penh and large tracts of other territories, in an attempt to realize its wild ambition of a "Greater Indochina Federation." At present, Vietnamese aggressor forces are expanding the flames of war to the Kampuchean-Thai border. It is only natural that the Vietnamese authorities have been opposed by the Chinese government and people for committing external aggression in such an unscrupulous way.

Chen Chu went on to say that the Vietnamese authorities have cynically capitalized on the question of a so-called "small nation" and "big power," trying to confuse the public by disguising themselves as a victim with the status of a small nation. The Vietnamese authorities think that sympathy will naturally go to them irrespective of what evil it has done. Whether or not a nation is carrying out aggression and expansion depends not on its size but on its political line and foreign policy.

He stated that it is by no means accidental that Vietnam's acts of aggression have all along been backed and abetted by the Soviet Union. Vietnam's expansionist activities abroad and armed incursion into China have suited very well the needs of Soviet greater hegemonism. The Soviet Union uses Vietnam as a pawn and accomplice in establishing its spheres of influence and carrying out aggression in Asia. With the backing of the Soviet Union, Vietnam wants to form the so-called Indochina Federation, become its master and dominate the whole of Southeast Asia. The Soviet Union and Vietnam, the greater and lesser hegemonists, working hand in glove, are the root cause of the threat to peace and tranquility in the Asia-Pacific region.

He added that over the past two years and faced with continued armed provocations by the Vietnamese authorities, the Chinese government and people, treasuring the friendship between the Chinese and Vietnamese peoples, have always exercised the maximum restraint and forbearance and given repeated advice and warnings to the Vietnamese authorities against their incessant armed provocations and hostilities along the Chinese border so as to avoid aggravation of the situation.

He continued that, sharing the same border river, the people of China and Vietnam have gone through thick and thin. In their long revolutionary struggles, the Chinese and Vietnamese peoples, sympathizing with and supporting each other, have forged a profound friendship. The Chinese government and people have made world-known national sacrifices for the liberation of the Vietnamese people, and after the war have actively assisted the Vietnamese people in their national reconstruction and rehabilitation. Unfortunately the profound friendship forged by the peoples of China and Vietnam has now been wilfully undermined by the Vietnamese authorities. This pains the Chinese people

profoundly. However, the Chinese government and people still treasure the friendship between the peoples of China and Vietnam. They have done so and will continue to do so. The Chinese government appeals to the Vietnamese authorities to treasure the friendship between the peoples of China and Vietnam, stop on the precipice, retract from the wrong path and not go any farther.

All We Want Is a Peaceful Border

The People's Republic of China issued this statement on March 5, 1979:

The Chinese frontier troops have attained the goals set for them since they were compelled to launch a counterattack in self-defense on Feb. 17 against ceaseless armed provocations and incursions of the Vietnamese aggressors against China.

The Chinese Government announces that starting from March 5, 1979, all Chinese frontier troops are withdrawing to Chinese territory.

The Chinese Government reiterates that we do not want a single inch of Vietnamese territory, but neither will we tolerate incursions into Chinese territory. All we want is a peaceful and stable border. We hope that this just stand of the Chinese Government will be respected by the Government of Vietnam and the governments of other countries in the world. We warn the Vietnamese authorities that they must make no more armed provocations and incursions along the Chinese border after the withdrawal of the Chinese frontier troops. The Chinese Government solemnly states that the Chinese side reserves the right to strike back again in self-defense in case of a recurrence of such Vietnamese activities.

We have always held that disputes between nations should be settled peacefully through negotiations. The Chinese Government proposes once again that the Chinese and Vietnamese sides speedily hold negotiations to discuss ways of insuring peace and tranquility along the border between the two countries and then proceed to settle the boundary and territorial disputes. We sincerely hope that the Vietnamese side will respond positively to our proposal. The Chinese Government is prepared to give serious consideration to any proposals that will help safeguard peace and tranquility in the border areas and resolve the disputes concerned.

Between the Chinese and Vietnamese peoples there is a traditional friendship which is not only in the interests of our two peoples but also in the interests of the people of Southeast Asia, of Asia as a whole and of the entire world. The Chinese people highly value their friendship with the Vietnamese people. Although this friendship has in recent years been damaged to our distress, we eagerly hope that it may be restored. We hope that the Vietnamese authorities will take the fundamental interests of the two peoples at heart and stop pursuing their hostile anti-

China policy so that the Chinese and Vietnamese peoples may live together in friendship from generation to generation.

We believe that our positive and constructive stand will enjoy widespread international sympathy and support. At the same time, we hope that all countries and people that love peace and uphold justice will take measures to urge the Vietnamese authorities to stop promptly their aggression against Kampuchea (Cambodia) and withdraw all their forces of invasion back to their own territory so as to serve the interest of the peace, security and stability of Southeast Asia and of Asia as a whole.

China Says Enough Is Enough

The alternative to striking out at Vietnam, as China saw it, would have been for Peking to stand exposed before the world as a paper tiger, convicted of the same crime of passivity in face of Soviet or Soviet-backed expansionism that China has laid against just about everybody else. And China had indeed felt itself pushed beyond endurance by Vietnam. The year that ended with Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia began with its expulsion of tens of thousands of Vietnamese of Chinese origin. Then, last summer, Vietnam's tilt towards Moscow became a tumblesault when it joined Russia's economic empire in Comecon and a few months later signed one of those Soviet "friendship" treaties that have a history of paving the ground for acts of aggression. China's only non-rhetorical response before this week's punitive expedition was its cut-off of aid to Vietnam last June.

The question is whether China's necessarily limited show of strength will have the desired effects. The aim is to make Vietnam and Russia more cautious in the future, and to stiffen the anti-Soviet resolve of the Third World and of China's friends and trading partners in the West. Both of these things are desirable, and if China achieves them it will have helped to make the world a slightly stabler place.

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China and Indochina

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