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EXPERIMENT WITHOUT PRECEDENT

**Some Quaker Observations
on China Today**

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Report of an
American Friends Service Committee Delegation's
Visit to China, May, 1972

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Table of Contents

	page
Preface	i
Chapter I Problems in Understanding China	7
Chapter II China Fifty and Twenty-five Years Ago	10
Chapter III Experiment Without Precedent	20
Chapter IV Egalitarian Concern	22
Chapter V Public Health and Social Norms	29
Chapter VI Conformity, Dissent, Violence	34
Chapter VII Economic Growth Under Mao	37
Chapter VIII Contacts with Foreigners	43
Chapter IX China and the World	45
Chapter X Obstacles to Better Sino-American Relations	48
Chapter XI Some Thoughts for Americans	52
Map of Itinerary	56
Members of AFSC Delegation	57

Preface

Many visitors enter the new China by walking across the trestle bridge over the Shum Chun River which separates Hong Kong and the world beyond from the People's Republic of China. As the members of our American Friends Service Committee delegation walked those one hundred yards last spring, we felt that this bridge had become a symbol, not of separation, but of communication and of the human urge to associate despite misunderstanding and hostility. The bridge is a link between vastly different kinds of lifestyle and motivation, contrasting social and political experiences, and conflicting personal and national interests. The most important thing about such a bridge is that it is being used and will increasingly be used as Americans and Chinese seek to know and understand each other better.

On May 6, 1972, an eleven-member delegation from the American Friends Service Committee walked across this bridge into China. Their entry marked the latest event in a history of our organization's efforts to communicate with, confer about, and relate to China. The first major AFSC step in this history took place when we joined with other international Quaker organizations in responding to the tragic need of the Chinese people from 1941 to 1951 during their war with Japan and their own civil war.

British Quakers had organized an international Friends Ambulance Unit (F.A.U.), later to be called the Friends Service Unit, composed over the years of men and women of many nationalities—British, Chinese, American, Canadian, New Zealand, and others. Its purpose was to help relieve the suffering caused by the war against the Japanese and later among Chinese of the different political camps. After much foot-dragging by the Kuomintang (Nationalist) government, and with the active assistance of Chou En-lai, the F.A.U., which had been operating in the Nationalist areas, was able finally to furnish medical supplies and subsequently a medical team to the International Peace Hospital at Yen-an. Thus, the F.A.U. was able to relate directly to the Communist Chinese as it had been relating to the Kuomintang Chinese.

Yen-an was the political and military center of the areas occupied by the Red Army. The Long March brought Mao Tse-tung and his comrades to this "sacred place of the Revolution," where they stayed and consolidated their strength and organized their political direction.

When the Communist forces withdrew from Yen-an in 1947, some members of F.A.U. Medical Team 19 walked out with them. The medical group continued onward 600 miles into the countryside, carrying on the work of the International Peace Hospital. A banquet in Yen-an,

commemorating F.A.U. service, was a highlight of the 1972 visit of the AFSC delegation.

In the United States in the 1950's and 60's, the political atmosphere was highly charged by the anti-Communist fulminations of the late Senator Joseph McCarthy. The government was pressured by the pro-Chiang Kai-shek activities of what was widely known as the China Lobby. Many of the men who knew and understood China best were driven from the top councils of government after being labelled Reds or crypto-Communists. As a result, they were powerless to prevent a complete American isolation from China.

The gap in U.S.-Chinese relations had begun with the U.S. military and political commitment to the Kuomintang regime during the 1940's and support for its forces in the civil war with the Communists from 1947 to 1949; when the Kuomintang fled to Taiwan in 1949, it was assisted by U.S. planes. The gap grew wider when war broke out in Korea and a northward push by American forces drew warnings and then a counter-attack from the Chinese in a conflict in which Americans and Chinese killed each other.

In 1965, when the American freeze on China was still solid despite some signs of thaw, the American Friends Service Committee published a book, *A New China Policy, Some Quaker Proposals*, which called for drastic revision of U.S. policy. This publication contributed to the opening of a public dialogue on China, although it also drew the fire of the China Lobby in Washington and its friends elsewhere.

In 1966 and 1967, both the national and regional offices of the AFSC held a series of one- and two-day conferences on U.S.-China relations and helped to broaden American dialogue about the United States and China.

AFSC regional offices distributed a periodical report on current events in China, entitled *Understanding China*. A bi-monthly AFSC newsletter of that name is now circulated nationally.

These efforts were followed, in 1971, by publication of a new booklet, *U.S. China Policy: A Fresh Start*, calling for restoration of the Chinese seat at the United Nations to its rightful occupant—the People's Republic of China—the termination of U.S. military treaties with Chiang Kai-shek, full withdrawal of the U.S. military establishment on Taiwan, the resolution of the status of Taiwan by those directly involved, and the normalization of U.S.-China relations, including eventual diplomatic recognition.

In the late summer of 1971, four persons representing the AFSC (Executive Secretary Bronson Clark and his wife, Eleanor Clark, and New England Peace Education Secretary Russell Johnson and his wife, Irene Johnson) travelled to China as guests of the People's Republic and of Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia. Russell Johnson had come to know Sihanouk personally while planning a Quaker conference for diplomats held in Cambodia in 1965. Sihanouk's government had set

itself up in exile in Peking after Lon Nol seized power in Phnom Penh. The Clarks and Johnsons travelled widely in China, making a special visit to Chengchow where Bronson Clark had worked with the Friends Ambulance Unit. They proposed to the Chinese authorities that a larger delegation of AFSC people should visit China. In due course, the People's Republic issued the invitation and the visit was set for May 6-27, 1972.

The members of the AFSC delegation had two basic purposes:

They wanted to learn about China today and to acquaint other Americans with their observations and experiences through talks, articles, slide shows, broadcasts, and the publication of a paper on the China they had seen first-hand.

They wanted to discuss with the Chinese two specific proposals for Chinese visits to the U.S.A., one of them sponsored jointly with the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, which had on two visits to China raised the subject and established the likelihood of agreement, the other for a larger delegation under independent AFSC sponsorship.

The two specific invitations for Chinese to visit the U.S.A. were accepted in principle, pending working out of the necessary details.

Throughout our travel in China, we were courteously and sensitively assisted by our three full-time Chinese companions and came to feel a bond of affection with the two men and one woman: Wang Tzu-shen, Mao Kuo-hua, and Keh An-lin. When we departed, we really felt that we were parting from close friends.

What follows is not intended as a definitive statement on the new China. We describe and comment on what we saw and heard. For example, we saw slogans on walls and signs almost everywhere we went, conveying the thoughts of Chairman Mao and the Communist Party. We talked to many persons who were Communist Party members. But we did not make a specific study of the structure and operations of the Communist Party itself. We know that it plays a central and dominant role in China. Our readers know that as well. Taking that fact as "given," we focussed our attention instead on what has happened to the lives of the people and the institutions around them, as far as we could observe. These first-hand observations are the focus of our report.

Since the American Friends Service Committee has made a number of public statements on foreign policy questions involving China, we devote some space to thoughts about current questions of China policy. Certainly one of our goals is to promote understanding between nations and peoples, and so we have expressed ourselves on the problems that Americans may encounter in seeking to understand China as well as on the challenges that the Chinese and American societies offer to each other. But we do not, in any of these efforts, pose as experts.

Our stay was for three weeks only. We travelled many hundreds of

miles by plane, train, or bus. We visited six cities: Canton, Wuhan, Shanghai, Sian, Yen-an, and Peking. We saw three of the new complexes called rural communes, with fields and paddies, irrigation locks, canals and pumping stations, stores and markets, clinics and hospitals, schools, homes, agricultural processing plants, and factories for light industrial products. We went through the Wuhan Iron and Steel Works and the Shanghai Diesel Engine factory. In elementary and middle schools we saw the production workshops with which these educational institutions ally themselves to industry. (See map on page 56.)

In addition to seeing schools in cities and on rural communes, we had the opportunity to visit with faculty and students of Fu Tan University in Shanghai, Chiao Tung Polytechnic University in Sian, and Peking University.

We visited modern and ancient historical sites: the National Peasant Movement Institute in Canton, the four homes of Chairman Mao in Yen-an, and the Great Wall, the Ming Tombs, and the Imperial and Summer Palaces in or near Peking.

We partook of Chinese popular entertainment: a People's Park in Canton, the famous Wuhan Acrobats, two of the current ballets—"Red Detachment of Women" and "The White-Haired Girl"—song and dance performances, and a cultural presentation at the National Minorities Institute in Peking. We enjoyed the great variety of delicious Chinese food, especially at banquets in Peking and Yen-an; at the Yen-an banquet we presented a photographic album of F.A.U. work in Yen-an a quarter of a century earlier. We examined Chinese goods and products at the Export Commodities Fair in Canton, at the Industrial Exhibit in Shanghai, and in department stores, both those for Chinese and those for foreign visitors, in three cities. We stayed in hotels throughout the three weeks, except for a night in the sleeping car of a railroad train.

In Peking we discussed domestic and foreign affairs with An Chih-yuan, head of the Department for International Organizations in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and with Kuo Mo-jo, Vice-Chairman of the People's Congress and President of the Academy of Sciences. Some of us visited foreign embassies in Peking and had useful discussions with foreign correspondents stationed in the Chinese capital.

Despite the heavy schedule, we were not able to penetrate deeply into Chinese society. We chose the places and people we wanted to see and found our official guides patient and accommodating. We did not see certain persons and places we asked to see, partly because of time limitations: Chinese newspaper editors and broadcasters, the Ministry of Public Health, courts of law, national scientific agencies, correctional institutions, mental hospitals, women's organizations, neighborhood associations, or Chinese formerly associated with the F.A.U.

We were able to walk the streets unaccompanied, but most of us were handicapped by ignorance of the Chinese language. We sought but largely failed to obtain statistics on some major facets of Chinese society. We

found the Chinese reticent when we probed into some issues, such as crime and punishment. They did not offer detailed accounts of any failures, although they freely admitted shortcomings and incomplete achievements in a general way.

But we had certain advantages as well. Like the British Quaker delegation that visited China in 1955, we came prepared to look at China without conscious preconceptions. We had the benefit of counsel from many persons who knew China, including Duncan Wood, a British Friend who had visited the new China, young scholars in the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, Byron and Alida Allison (AFSC staff stationed in Hong Kong), and others who had interviewed many visitors returning to Hong Kong from China.

Our group included three members who had lived in China before 1949. One was a businessman in the foreign settlement in Canton for most of the two years in 1920-21 and 1926, during which time he also travelled and visited briefly in much of eastern China. One was a member of the Friends Ambulance Unit from 1942 to 1946, who had lived and travelled very widely over the southwest and northwest and more briefly in east China. One was a medical member of the Friends Service Unit from 1946 to 1948, who had worked as a nurse in Nationalist-held Honan and in Communist-held areas in Shensi and Shansi but who had also travelled briefly in east China. Two of us knew a good deal of standard Chinese and were able to talk with people without interpreters, to understand speeches and broadcasts, to follow stage performances, and to read posters and newspapers. The three who had lived in China before retained strong affection for the Chinese people and a continuing professional and personal concern with developments in China up to the present. Most of us were well informed about contemporary China. One member of the group was a professional scholar in modern Chinese studies. Members of the delegation are listed on page 57.

We had a concern for world peace and friendship across political, cultural, and national boundaries. We were determined to see with friendly eyes, but also with as much objective discernment and perception as our own personal, national, and cultural conditioning would allow.

Where we have failed, it is because of the limits of our knowledge and understanding, the length of time we could stay in China, and the depth to which we could delve into the complex and manifold dimensions of China today.

We observed that the People's Republic, in trying to achieve its massive social and economic goals, is attempting another staggering feat. As one of the young, enthusiastic Chinese who guided us in Yen-an put it, "We are trying to unify the thinking of the Chinese people." Whereas that would be an impossible goal in some countries, it may be uniquely possible in China because of the surviving foundations of Chinese traditional thought which sought to influence minds in earlier times. Another significance of Chinese tradition is that all invaders and "alien" philos-

ophies have tended ultimately to be absorbed and converted to a form that is peculiarly Chinese. The Chinese adaptation of Marxism is a case in point.

In our three-week stay we were deeply impressed that the People's Republic is in a fluid state, an evolutionary as well as a revolutionary stage, and new modes and manifestations of experimentalism are leading toward both planned and unknowable internal developments. What we saw today leaves us unqualified to say what will happen tomorrow. But we know that we were fortunate in seeing China in a time of transition, when some of the bricks that are building tomorrow's China were being laid—and even, in a sense, being *made*—by millions of persons who never before had the occasion to make and lay bricks.

Chapter I Problems in Understanding China

How shall the Westerner look at China and its people? One might contemplate the beauty of the re-wooded Chinese landscape and its colorful and interesting people—and appreciate what the Chinese Revolution has done for the land and people—while minimizing those dimensions of the Revolution which trouble many Western observers. Or one could focus strongly on the aspects of China and its new society which are jarring—and equally miss the total reality of China. The beauty and progress, and the things that jar, cannot be separated. That makes the development of realistic convictions and attitudes among Westerners the more difficult.

Chinese society is and, except for certain periods, has long been cohesive. Prior to the Communist Revolution, the Chinese people, generally speaking, had long been encouraged to think and act in a commonly sanctioned fashion, though behavior at different class levels was not expected to be identical. Therefore, although many of the words and ideas differ greatly from the past, it is not a new kind of experience for the Chinese when the Communist Party and its interpreters urge them to think and act in certain ways. The American social experience of pluralism and diversity and the relatively ungoverned U.S. economy do not constitute a lens through which Americans can successfully examine the basis of Chinese society or the developing structure of Marxism-Leninism along lines modified by Mao Tse-tung.

Which Americans would find it natural for their immediate neighbors to summon them to a criticism session at which their conduct would be discussed and the effort made to show them why it should be modified? Which Americans would consider it normal to be directly advised how they should think, except perhaps in a church, synagogue or mosque? Or what limits there should be to their income, how responsible they should be for their parents and children, what national, political and economic goals should guide their work and thought? The Chinese traditionally have not found such counsel strange or intolerable from those outside their immediate families.

The vast majority of older Chinese whose lives began before the Communist period have experienced abysmal poverty. They had inadequate material possessions, little or no opportunity to develop their human potential, and scant expectation of social services. Above all, for more than a century there was no assurance that one of a host of

catastrophes would not strike the next day and wipe out painfully gathered resources. Their present social and economic advancement is a marked change in their total life experience, well noted and often discussed among them. For them the watershed point was 1949, the year of Liberation.

Even in the depression years, most of middle-class America has not experienced during the past half-century what China has in terms of the incidence of debilitating or fatal disease, disastrous social neglect of millions, and widespread begging for the minimal level of subsistence. Those conditions are now absent from the Chinese scene, but they continue to live vividly in the individual and collective memories of the Chinese, who know and are repeatedly reminded of what they have left behind.

The history of a country basically affects the attitudes of its people. It is useful, therefore, to note briefly some important differences between the Chinese and American experiences.

Unlike the U.S.A., China is not a nation steeped in the Judaeo-Christian tradition, born in an explosion of 18th-century libertarian idealism and early exposed to the capitalist industrial revolution.

No living American has seen his country invaded or encircled by alien armies. No living Chinese adult has failed to see one or both in his lifetime.

The history of foreign aggressions against China by Western powers goes back to the 17th century. Between then and the mid-20th century, China's contacts with Portugal, Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and, on the east, Japan, each cost China indemnities, losses of territory, or infringements of her sovereignty. The United States and its nationals did not hesitate to partake of the benefits of the concessions wrested from China by these other powers, and American gunboats and marines patrolled China's rivers and concession areas, engaging periodically in punitive actions. U.S. history, by contrast, is one of ever-growing national strength from the founding days, culminating in economic and military superiority over much of the world at the end of World War II.

In dealing with the present internal problems and preparing to deal with future ones, China and America face dissimilar challenges. China is engaged in a major effort to reconstruct its economy, to alter and revamp its institutions, and to experiment in an almost incredible way with an overturned and levelled social order. America faces the challenge of immense productive power and personal affluence co-existent with poverty and severe shortages in public services. In the foreseeable future, China will probably not have to cope with the personally liberating, economically dynamic, and socially monstrous results facing an America geared to life in an automobile. The U.S.A. is struggling with industrial pollution, which is not yet a crucial problem in China, though signs of it are evident.

While the great majority of China's youth have an evident sense of

purpose, America struggles with the familial, educational, and social revolt of its youth.

Such contrasts as these illustrate the fact that China and America are dealing differently with different internal tensions. What may work for one may not be relevant for the other.

The Chinese and the Americans both claim revolutionary heritages. But America's Boston Tea Party and Valley Forge are long gone and mostly honored now in terms of patriotism, which can and sometimes does become reactionary chauvinism. China's "George Washington"—Mao Tse-tung—is still very influential. The veterans of the Chinese "Valley Forge"—the Long March—survive. Their participation in the March is today a mark of honor; many hold positions of power and responsibility and represent their country abroad as ambassadors.

Like America, China today professes nonintervention in the internal affairs of other countries. Both countries in different ways and in different degrees have failed to carry out this policy in practice. Both countries send arms abroad. But China, unlike the U.S.A., has not engaged in direct military intervention overseas. Many parts of the world today are fearful of American military power and intervention with its disastrous consequences. Indochina is a case in point.

Many parts of the world are restive or in revolt at the powerful penetration of their economies by the relatively unrestrained dynamics of American capitalism with all its political consequences. Outside our borders, and increasingly within, one hears the term "neo-imperialism" or "modern American imperialism." Americans do not generally sense the degree to which this political and economic phenomenon upsets or angers people in other countries or comprehend the reasons for the anger. On the other hand, China's foreign aid and political interest in other countries evokes uneasiness in Western circles and the Soviet Union, especially in relation to the Third World. The governments of China and the U.S.A. have conflicting interests in the Third World that influence the foreign policy of both nations.

A discussion of American understanding of China, and vice versa, in 1972 must include reference to "table tennis diplomacy" and the Nixon visit to China. While neither event in itself is wholly responsible for the new attempts of Americans and Chinese to know each other better, both have had a profound influence and will have lasting effects. It is clear that the Nixon visit significantly eased a difficult international situation, specifically the tension between China and the U.S.A., and turned a bad state of affairs in a promising direction. If this new direction is to lead to normal and constructive relations, we are convinced that Americans need to perceive and understand the realities of China rather than the myths.

Many Americans opposed to U.S. involvement in the Indochina war contended that the Nixon visit was exploited for domestic political gain in the U.S.A. In particular, they believed that the visit diverted

people's attention from the hopeful possibilities of peace in Indochina raised by the issuance of the seven-point settlement proposals of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam. That was in January, 1971, and a serious effort to discuss these proposals was not pressed. We are convinced that the announcement of the Nixon visit to China and the months-long build-up for it in the U.S.A. helped to diminish the rising anti-war sentiment of Americans at a particularly crucial moment.

There is a tendency in America, after the Nixon visit, to feel that the course of U.S.-Chinese relations has been made smooth. In fact, there are still very major differences between the two countries. In discussing them with the AFSC delegation, high Chinese officials stressed in particular that normal diplomatic relations between the U.S.A. and China are not possible while the U.S.A. recognizes the Nationalist government on Taiwan. That consideration, they said, could only be taken up when the United States military presence was gone from Indochina.

In concluding these comments on the problems of mutual understanding, we need to stress that in our brief visit we gained only a partial understanding of American and Chinese differences and dissimilarities. Our national estrangement from China has been too long and our lack of communication too absolute for a full picture to emerge easily. But our premise was, and our conclusion is, that China is inhabited not by robots but by noticeably individual human beings, who act according to motivations and aspirations comprehensible to Americans, rather than in ways that are "inscrutably Oriental" or politically fanatical. Avoiding stereotypes as much as we could, we tried to look with some objectivity at the differing priorities and institutions of China. We were able to use, to some extent, the perspective of the past in trying to understand the new departures of the present.

Chapter II

China Fifty and Twenty-five Years Ago

Our 1972 visit to China was at a moment in time—a frustratingly brief one for those of us who had lived there before. Our previous contacts with China gave us a basis for comparing moments in China's past with the present. It is useful to be able to make such comparisons, but, in making them, we are conscious—and wish to warn our readers again—

that such comparisons must be largely impressionistic, since a three-week visit does not allow for penetrating study.

A host of changes impressed us, as well as some continuities, partly because we were specifically looking for them, partly because many of them stood out so sharply.

Sun Yat Sen, the early nationalist leader at the time of the 1911 revolution which overthrew the old Manchu dynasty and began the modern period of drastic change, once complained that getting the Chinese people to work together was like trying to make a rope out of sand. Perhaps the greatest change from the China of the 1920's or 1940's is the almost incredible cohesiveness and organization of the people. They are now a national whole and, within more or less uniformly structured work- and living-groups, are bound together by common purposes and goals and by apparently shared values. It is true that neither the 1920's nor the 1940's were representative periods in the long life of Chinese society and that for most of China's previous history a considerable degree of order (based on shared values) was apparently achieved. Contemporary China's success in these terms has certainly depended to some extent on the long Chinese tradition of organization and cooperation growing out of a common morality which put group welfare before individual preferences or whims.

But there seems little question that cohesiveness and commonality have reached unprecedented levels in the past two decades. They contrast so sharply with the disorder, factionalism, divisiveness, and weak or absent public morality observable fifty or twenty-five years ago that one wonders how the change could have been accomplished at all, let alone in the 23 years since 1949. The best general answer is probably to be found, as the Chinese themselves would argue, in the cumulative degree of degeneration and weakness of the old society through the century or so which preceded 1949. Things had become so bad that most people were ready or even eager for radical and rapid changes and were willing to make heavy sacrifices to achieve those changes.

From the perspective of Westerners on the spot in the few decades before 1949, Chinese society appeared chaotic and largely lacking in social conscience. The cities and most villages were filthy and the streets crowded with beggars, cripples, underfed and ragged children and adults, and piles of refuse. The family and clan organizations were close-knit and took responsibility for their members where they could, but the distress of nonmembers was ignored. Many people died in the streets of neglect; it was considered dangerous to try to help any nonrelative, for fear of becoming involved in the misfortunes of others. Life was hard for most people and the economic margin too thin to permit room for compassion. Warlord armies periodically roamed the countryside, and there were also numerous bandit groups which made large areas unsafe. More than half of China's peasants did not own enough land to support their

families and had to rent some or all of their acreage, at increasingly extortionate rates which often left them unable to pay; rents and taxes were sometimes extorted fifteen or more years in advance; more and more peasants slipped back into full tenancy or were obliged to seek work as landless laborers. Since well over 80% of China's people were peasants, this was a disastrous pattern.

Periodic famines caused by drought, flood, insect plagues, war, or speculative hoarding brought literally millions of deaths, as for example in north China from 1920 to 1928, and again in Honan Province in 1944. Most peasants and many urban workers had to resort periodically to money lenders, who charged a rough average of 100% per annum; understandably, loans were seldom fully paid off and interest payments continued to drag the debtor down. Many peasants, driven from their land by extortionate landlords, tax collectors, money lenders, warlords, or famine, were forced to sell their children as concubines or household servants; others drifted to the cities to join the ranks of urban unemployed or marginal workers, living and dying under atrocious slum conditions. Some areas were better than others and some even among the peasantry or the city people lived under bearable or even mildly prosperous conditions. There were in particular some extensive rural oases of relative tranquillity and modest well-being. But the economic and social health of the national system as a whole was in critical condition.

The Nationalist Government, the Kuomintang, was ultimately established in 1927, two years after Sun Yat Sen's death, with its capital at Nanking, under the presidency of Chiang Kai-shek. It never made a significant dent on the problems that beset China. In the five years between gaining a measure of national control in 1932 and the Japanese invasion in 1937, it appeared to be either unwilling or unable to take more than a few steps. After the Japanese invasion, it could not take the necessary steps. The KMT was politically a coalition of Westernized Chinese who lived and became wealthy in the foreign-ruled treaty ports, such as Shanghai, Canton, and Tientsin, and large Chinese landowners, money lenders, and speculators in the rural areas.

The treaty port Chinese were businessmen and bankers, in their own right or as agents (compradors) for foreign firms. They and their landowning partners in the Kuomintang had an obvious stake in the status quo. Yet they and their compatriots were discriminated against socially by the Westerners. From time to time the Nationalist Government attempted to assert Chinese claims of sovereignty against the "unequal treaties" and the special privileges extracted from a weakened China by the imperialist powers. But the KMT was unwilling to force a real confrontation. Even before the founding of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921, treaty port Chinese, partners of the imperialists, were labelled "running dogs." The KMT remained until the end dominated by them. They had made money and achieved status from the foreign presence and they had accepted many Western values, which reinforced

their attitudes toward private property and personal gain. Many of the most prominent KMT officials were notorious speculators, using confidential government information or their official position to reap personal profits even though this was clearly against both the national interest and the public welfare.

In the rural areas the KMT represented mainly the top of the pyramid of wealth and status, not dependent on connections with foreigners but very much dependent on the exploitation of the peasantry through landholding, taxation, money lending, and conscription. There were a few brighter spots. The KMT was a national government and it did attract the support and services of many nationalist-minded and public-spirited Chinese; all KMT officials were not corrupt and self-seeking, although in time this was true of most of them. A good deal of relatively progressive legislation for economic and political change—for example, limits on land rents and provision for popularly elected bodies with substantial power—was passed, but little or no real change occurred. The KMT remained a tightly structured power elite resting on the narrowest of bases; there was little or no reform of the domestic system in any respect, and KMT power, never complete over the country as a whole where large areas remained under warlord control, rested increasingly on the apparatus of a police state.

The Japanese conquest of Manchuria in 1931, and the attack on northern China in 1937, fired Chinese national sentiment. For a time many patriotic Chinese rallied behind the KMT government. But in 1939 Chiang Kai-shek, in his own words, traded "space for time." His government retreated to its wartime capital in Chungking. (See the map on page 56.) After that, and certainly by the time the Friends Ambulance Unit began its work in west China in 1941, national morale and confidence in the KMT had been largely dissipated, and was to sink still further in the years of civil strife which followed. As one symptom of failing confidence, the KMT proved unable to control a disastrous inflation which destroyed what little economic security most people had, until the whole tottering structure fell in 1949. The China of the 1940's differed little in any basic respect from the China of the 1920's as far as the popular welfare was concerned, except that increasing areas in the north were being occupied, and revolutionized, by the communist forces which brought with them plans for land, tax, financial, and other reforms.

The new cohesiveness of the Chinese people, which we have contrasted with the past, is perhaps the most striking change we found in the China of today. Perhaps the next most striking change is best expressed in the phrase the Chinese use themselves: China has stood up. After more than a century of humiliation and exploitation by foreigners, China has freed itself of foreign domination and unwanted influence, has replaced internal weakness with strength, and is again a great power, as it was for so long in its proud past. The Chinese are quick to assert that they

will never play the role of a super-power, by which they mean that they will not attempt to dominate or manipulate other nations as do the present super-powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. But we saw ample evidence that nearly all people share an immense new national pride in China's self-reliant accomplishments and also in China's re-won prestige. Chinese national and cultural identity is buttressed by some 4,000 years in which Chinese civilization led the world, but the present self-confidence and pride contrast sharply with the demoralization and sense of shame which were produced by the preceding century.

The luxury-loving officials, landlords, and merchants of fifty or twenty-five years ago, with their often ostentatious lifestyles, are gone, as are the starving, ragged, diseased peasants or urban poor, who were far more numerous. Greed on the part of an affluent few and grinding poverty on the part of many were responsible for growing corruption, theft, and violence before 1949. Paradoxically, one of the most remarkable things about the new China is the high level of respect for public and private property. Corruption and theft are virtually unknown; people are probably safer in their persons and possessions in 1972 than most other places in the world, even on unlit city streets and alleyways at night. In the 1940's one had constantly to guard against theft; in 1972, the AFSC group's experience was different. We had difficulty getting rid of unwanted things even by putting them in waste baskets—conscientious hotel staff or our Chinese travel guides would keep returning them to us. That crime is not unknown, however, was suggested by the chains and locks we saw on parked bicycles.

Violence is not absent in the new society, but it is primarily symbolic, at least at present. Foreigners have always judged Chinese to be outstandingly patient, tolerant, and cheerful even under hardship, but interpersonal violence—perhaps especially in speech—was certainly part of the human landscape before 1949. If violence occurred, we could not identify it even in its subtler forms, in May of 1972, although we looked for it.

Part of the reason is no doubt to be found in the shared sense of purpose which has replaced the relative anarchy of the preceding decades; welfare can best be achieved and grievances settled through group action, and the revolution has provided a hierarchy of groups starting with the family and extending beyond it through larger living- and working-groups (such as the commune) to the national society as a whole. Ideally, the old society was supposed to work in the same way. There was a long tradition of avoiding violence and disorder and preserving harmony, through the subordination of individual to group interests and the provision of successively larger social organizations from family through local gentry and officials to the imperial bureaucracy and the emperor; all subscribed to a common set of values, rules, and relations based on them, which could be used to control individuals as well as to promote group

welfare or to settle disputes. The chief function of government, and of society as a whole, was to preserve harmony by these means.

However well this system may have worked at periods in the past, it was in massive disarray by the beginning of the twentieth century. The restructuring which has taken place since 1949 has clearly exceeded in its effectiveness even the peak of the traditional system, to produce the uniformly orderly, non-violent, unselfishly other-directed behavior which we observed. It has relied heavily on propaganda to disseminate and universalize these norms; the success of this effort is best indicated by saying that the desired norms appear to be followed uniformly and spontaneously by the great majority of the population. The extent to which they have been internalized is, of course, impossible to determine on the basis of our limited experience, except to say that external pressures such as propaganda and group controls are still stressed and thus apparently still necessary.

Wherever we listened to formal presentations by Chinese spokesmen, we often heard the same phrases, whether to describe or to explain their own, others', or group behavior. All social systems attempt to universalize and to internalize values and norms and cannot survive unless there is some common acceptance of them; traditional China was no exception. It too, like contemporary America, used education, propaganda, and moral suasion in various forms to achieve these ends. What is remarkable about the new China is the extent to which these techniques have brought uniform responses from people in different parts of the country. The former gentry role as local guardians of morality and order is now even more effectively performed by the cadres who, like the gentry, are official/unofficial representatives of state and society with special responsibility for leadership and example. Model behavior, especially on the part of those in responsible positions, is still an important social cement and educational device.

The revolution has put the formerly oppressed masses—peasants and workers—on the top of the value scale. Control is exercised in their name and by many officials of peasant/worker origin. Cadres are drawn, since the Cultural Revolution, primarily from their ranks, and must do physical labor on rural communes or in factories as part of their training. Although it is still taking time and effort or pressures to persuade all would-be white collar people to behave according to these norms, the society as a whole is geared to "serve the masses" and to be understandable to them. This last is especially apparent in the arts, of which we saw, heard, or read many samples. Contemporary literature, theatre, music, and the graphic arts are to Western tastes oppressively banal, wooden, and simplistic stereotypes. Not so for the Chinese, who enjoy and widely participate in or partake of the arts. The role of the arts is to educate, not to amuse or divert, and they are aimed at the level of the masses. Though highly influential in the arts and in government, the bourgeoisie, especially the

intelligentsia, were always proportionately very small. Today the intelligentsia category includes even middle school graduates. Art must speak to and be understood by the masses, and must serve the revolution.

One final general point might be made. It is one with which earlier Quaker work in China was specifically involved. The Chinese population in the 1940's was one of the unhealthiest in the world, partly as a result of malnutrition and poor housing, partly as a result of the wide range and virulence of endemic and epidemic disease. Public health services were rudimentary at best, and medical facilities and personnel totally inadequate to needs. China has now a notably healthy population as far as we could observe. Most endemic and epidemic diseases, such as cholera, plague, typhoid and dysentery, have been eliminated or nearly so; malaria and schistosomiasis in particular were mentioned as still present though enormously reduced. Of all the achievements since 1949, this change may strike anyone who knew the old China as the most miraculous. It is also perhaps the best single testimony to the effectiveness of the new social order and its ability to work seeming miracles through organized group effort on a national scale—in this case a universal public health consciousness and a detailed network of public health teams and clinics. The flies which used to be everywhere in clouds are nearly all gone, eliminated by an effective campaign of collective fly extermination; we did see a few, but very few. Even the dogs, which were considered a public health liability and also wasteful consumers of food, are largely gone.

Competent medical care is now available in all but the most remote areas, at minimal or no cost to all patients. Adequately equipped hospitals serve urban and most rural areas. Elsewhere, although even rudimentary medical services are still not available universally, many remoter places, according to the Chinese press, are regularly visited by paramedical personnel, the so-called "barefoot doctors." They handle minor ailments, give emergency treatment, and refer appropriate cases to the nearest hospital. City and village streets are clean and largely free of refuse, except in orderly piles awaiting pickup. We could obtain no reliable statistics on the incidence of various diseases about which we inquired, but cases treated in the hospitals and clinics we visited seemed to consist primarily of degenerative disorders, accidents, tumors, and child birth or abortion. Psychoses and neuroses were reported to be far less common than in most Western societies, including our own, a pattern which clearly relates to the generally high level of physiological health as well as to the weak self-concern and strong group-orientation of contemporary Chinese society.

We saw some—necessarily haphazard—evidence of personal tension. But in general and contrary to our expectations, no one we saw seemed to be working at a feverish pace, although we know well that very hard work goes on at harvest time and on such mammoth projects as the famous Red Flag Canal. The pace everywhere seemed to our eyes,

as in the old China, relaxed and easy. We saw almost no one hurrying, and every day at any hour up to midnight crowds of people could be seen on urban streets or in parks idling along in apparent casualness without the bustle one associates with most cities elsewhere. Rural and urban work days seem generally limited to eight hours, although some factories operate around the clock on three eight-hour shifts. Nearly everyone has one and a half days off per week, usually Sunday (when parks, sightseeing places, and museums are jammed) but there is considerable provision for staggering so that every day is a rest or holiday time for some people. We sensed no direct individual work pressures on anyone, in factories, communes, schools, shops, or offices, although long hours are sometimes put in, especially on rural communes. The society as a whole values work almost in a Puritan sense, honors its Heroes of Labor, and sets ambitious goals for production. But the goals are more collective than individual, and, while they are taken seriously, the foreign visitor does not sense that the workers feel driven. The spirit that is favored was suggested by the signs on display at universities, reading "Friendship, not competition."

Perhaps most people have been taught to want, in this and all other respects, what the revolutionary society requires. The people we saw seemed happy, interested in what they were doing, and generally at peace with their individual circumstances. The surface evidence of this state of mind was striking, especially by contrast with most other societies, including our own. We cannot be sure whether this attitude results from a regimented re-education and is only superficial, or whether it goes deeper and presents a true picture of the contemporary Chinese mind and will.

Visual changes in other respects seemed to us perhaps less prominent than continuities. Practically everyone now wears peasant dress or simple uniform-style jackets and loose-fitting trousers. Buildings are now in good repair everywhere we went, as opposed to the old days when almost everything seemed shabby and crumbling. There is much new construction—government offices, schools, hospitals, factories, housing blocks, great new bridges, and many new wide streets. In many cities one gets the quick impression that perhaps as much as half of the housing is new within the last twenty years, some of it in the form of huge housing blocks, some in more widely spaced developments. But much of the old housing remains, and much of the new housing, especially in rural areas, is in traditional style. To some extent, the cities, and especially the villages and the rural landscapes, look very much like the China of a generation ago. The inward reality may have been revolutionized, but the outward reality is changing more slowly.

Those of us who had lived in China before felt visually at home wherever we went—and one or more of us had lived in or visited each of the places on our itinerary. We were especially impressed by the new level of public cleanliness; the extent of new public housing; the

widespread diffusion of electric power so that every rural landscape we saw was crossed by power lines and most houses had at least one light bulb; the widespread surfacing and expansion of what had earlier been a limited skeleton of largely dirt roads; the many new rail lines and the excellent train service; the endless lines of trees planted during the past two decades along every road and rail line and on many hillsides. Electric power was being used to operate irrigation pumps, many of which were light enough for two men to carry easily; we also saw many sections of light irrigation pipe which, like the pumps, could be moved around as needed.

The Chinese press indicates that rural electrification is still incomplete, but on the communes we visited irrigation appeared to be powered entirely by electricity or by larger pumping stations. In most of the rural areas seen from trains or buses, however, farmers appeared still to be using traditional methods—a circular chain of scoops for lifting water from one paddy to the next driven by foot- or hand-power, the traditional well-and-bucket with windlass or sweep, or two men using a bucket slung in the middle of a rope as a scoop. In such areas we saw little or no machinery; fields were being worked by hand and ploughed with water buffalo or bullocks pulling a traditional-style plough. By contrast, in the communes visited, this work is done by tractors, mechanical rice planters, or cultivators.

We did see some large and many small new dams and water control projects, but over the countryside as a whole the visible marks of change were less striking than the continuities. The increase in yields, which has been dramatic, was, of course, not directly visible. Everywhere we saw samples of the kind of organized group effort which has ended famine, greatly reduced crop losses from drought, flood, and pests (with the use of pesticides which we saw being applied), and produced, overall, perhaps a doubling of total agricultural output. What were and still are peasant villages now largely constitute the smallest units of the commune system. The chief effective functioning bodies of the commune system are the Production Teams or somewhat larger Production Brigades. Such a team or brigade may be made up of the work force of a single peasant village. The villages we saw looked very much as they had a generation or more ago, except for the absence of flies, dogs, and filth and the omnipresence of healthy, well-fed people and electric lights. Closer observation and personal conversation also left us feeling that many of the old character traits remained; the Chinese people seemed in many ways the same cheerful, competent, resourceful people we had known before, with the same ready humor, and the same propensity to gather in silent but good-natured crowds to watch the still infrequent foreigners.

But it was obvious that their inner reality had been changed. It was genuinely a united mass effort which has brought the revolutionary changes we saw and had learned about. How had this been achieved,

and at what cost? The Chinese with whom we talked repeatedly emphasized what we had read before in many published statements: that each country, each people, must shape its own solutions to its own problems. There was no mistaking how the Chinese people were being guided to address their problems. Everywhere huge billboards, posters, or loudspeakers repeated the same slogans, the same hortatory quotations from Chairman Mao, or exhibited his photograph or statue in heroic dimensions. Individuals were urged to exemplify those directives in thought, word, and deed.

One of the three or four Chinese passengers on our flight from Wuhan to Shanghai, a dock worker going back to his job, confessed to us that he had never flown before. He told us that he was very frightened as the plane taxied out for takeoff, but that then he saw the large photograph of Chairman Mao at the front of the cabin facing all the passengers; suddenly, he said, he felt much better, and was reassured for the rest of the flight. This was an entirely voluntary remark, unsolicited in any way. We mention it here primarily to illustrate our observation that most people we met repeated the current official line and appeared to work and act in keeping with it.

For some of us, the pressure for conformity was hardest to accept in what we saw and heard in the schools and universities we visited. In an earlier era, the universities operated essentially with the Western philosophy of free intellectual pursuit. The goal today is different; it is to train workers and peasants, the true revolutionaries, for leadership roles in the new society. At the time of our visit, students were not chosen on the basis of grades and of how easy it would be to educate them, but rather for their potential contribution to furthering the revolution. In September, however, came the news that university experimentation is moving in a new direction, with restoration of college entrance and promotion examinations to ensure the upholding of minimum standards. This development has led to speculation in the Western press that there may come a swing away from exclusive emphasis on the worker-peasant-soldier applicant toward those that are better prepared academically. Thus, as noted elsewhere in our report, change in China is continuing, and seemingly fixed patterns may undergo alteration.

The educational institutions today do not appear to foster independent or innovative thinking, except in the service of technology which is directly relevant to the people's material welfare. In a still revolutionary and economically developing society, this situation is understandable, but it left many of us uneasy, as did the repetition of the official line by professors and students on every subject which we discussed with them. Often when we tried gently to pursue a topic beyond that point, the common response was to change the subject, give an evasive or irrelevant reply, suggest that time was limited and we must move on, or simply say "We cannot usefully discuss this matter further."

Clearly, China remains a society in revolution, or one still profoundly

affected by the Cultural Revolution. Though concluded by 1969, effects of the Cultural Revolution appeared to dominate the university scene in May of 1972. Radical mass values and goals are uppermost.

Since the Chinese population is still composed overwhelmingly of peasants and workers, it is reasonable for the educational system to reflect and to serve their interests and needs and not to be the preserve, as it was in the past, of the tiny handful of educated elite. All the university officials we visited were frank in telling us that they were still experimenting and still feeling their way toward the best patterns for higher education. Universities were, in 1972, operating at only about a quarter of capacity, at least in terms of student numbers. One area of experiment is in setting the admissions criteria. The present policy is to accept, almost exclusively, peasants and workers direct from three years of work in their communes or factories. That, too, is an understandable pattern, but it does not address the issue most succinctly described as "freedom of the mind."

To raise the issue is in itself to emphasize that this is the perspective of outsiders rather than of insiders, of observers rather than participants in this revolutionary process. It is also to enter the realm of speculation. Intellectual freedom may still mean a good deal to the relatively few intellectuals in China; for them, the achievements of the revolution, which they would doubtless acknowledge as tremendous, have been won so far at a high cost; they might argue, as might some of us, that some or all of this cost was unnecessary. But for most of the Chinese people as of now, that issue is not a real one, or certainly not an important one; the same applies to our somewhat jaundiced view of the performing arts as we were able to observe them.

Assuming that what we saw and what we report is not misleadingly unrepresentative of May, 1972, it would be misleading to imply that the pattern is fixed. There have been many changes, of many sorts, and many major shifts in policy and action since 1949, let alone since 1946 or 1921; China is involved in the dynamic process of revolution. Those of us who knew the country at first hand before may especially wonder what the new society may look like another generation hence.

Chapter III

Experiment Without Precedent

The profound social changes in China after 1949 should not be regarded as final. Change still goes on. It is occurring now at a rate as great as any time in Chinese history. It is also affecting ancient as well as contemporary aspects of Chinese life. For example, the people

are exposed to the use of the Roman alphabet. Many street signs or names on buildings appeared first in the traditional Chinese characters and, below, in Roman characters. Most of the music we heard, in songs, concerts, and ballets, was written with the Western octave and harmonies, rather than the half tones of the old Chinese scale.

The social revolution that is now in progress should not be regarded as like any other that has taken place on the world scene. It appears to be the most massive and most rapid reordering of a society in human history. It is not surprising that such a process was not accomplished without bloodshed. What has surprised many observers is the proportionately low level of violence, especially in the post-war period, compared to the number of human beings involved.

In terms of the numbers of people affected, the Chinese experiment is without precedent. The lives of more than 800,000,000 people have been changed. With the exception of the national minority populations—Tibetans, Nighurs, Mongols and many others—which neither we nor most other Westerners have been able to visit, our observations are that the great mass of this immense population has been affected almost uniformly. The sheer size of the population directly transformed exceeds several times over the masses affected by the Russian revolution, the Islamic conquests, or any other war of liberation. To attempt major social change involving such numbers calls not only for courage but skill in altering the social processes of huge groups.

The effects of the revolution upon the daily lives of the people, whether in terms of health services for every family, the virtually universal access to primary education, or the involvement of nearly every citizen in a communal or workshop decision process, constitute a change in the basic quality of life, and are not just a matter of degree. Significant differences remain in the levels of living between new housing blocks and old, between unrehabilitated farm dwellings and new ones. But the evidence is that improvements and other fundamental changes have come to nearly all members of the society. At least we saw no great pockets of disparity and no groups of peasants or workers which have failed to benefit from the major alterations.

We went into the People's Republic with the expectation that we would find a number of communities which exemplified the solid changes described so glowingly in the colored pages of the Peking periodical *China Reconstructs*, but would encounter strong contrasts between show places and the matrix of undistinguished countryside as yet untouched by the more visible elements of revolution. In the areas we traversed by bus or train, this proved not to be the case. A commune proud of its irrigation pumps and tree planting was flanked in either direction by lands with similar aspect. Terraces and irrigation canals happily displayed along the route of one rural excursion spread out for hundreds of miles when the area unfolded next day beneath our low-flying airplane.

In its 55 years of life the American Friends Service Committee has

worked with many groups in trying to promote peaceful social change. These efforts have taken place in a wide variety of locations and have included such projects as increasing the crop production on Mexican peasant farms, establishing industry in an isolated West Virginia mining community, self-help housing in a growing Zambian city, empowering tenants in the management of public housing projects in U.S. cities, provision of family planning services for workers in Algeria, combinations of work and study for young people in the United States, and welfare services in a Peruvian slum. Other such experiments could be cited. They have in common an aim to improve the lives of people, to do this nonviolently, and to assist those affected in planning and carrying out for themselves the needed work.

Against our limited background of small experiments with social change in a variety of settings, the massive Chinese experiment excites special curiosity. The Chinese argue that each revolutionary action must be suited to distinctive local conditions and history, that revolution cannot be exported. However, they believe revolutionary ideas can be carried from one place to another, and we found ourselves asking whether the modes of action practiced by the Chinese have any relevance to Friends in the United States or in developing countries who seek to change unsatisfactory social conditions.

Are there lessons to be learned from the accomplishments, failures, and social costs of the Chinese efforts? Do they give us any new insights into the potentialities and limitations of man in bringing about fundamental reorganization of a society's aims and methods? It is tempting to offer facile answers, but we have neither the competence nor the information to permit a thorough appraisal of the Chinese attempts at social reformation. A few aspects of the changes in progress, however, may be noted with the question in mind of whether they have possible importance to the search for social justice and development in other countries. As examples, we have selected: (a) the egalitarian concern for individual welfare, (b) social norms and public health, (c) the management of agreement and dissent and the role of violence, and (d) economic integration and dispersal.

Chapter IV Egalitarian Concern

Modern China represents an enormous effort to create a truly egalitarian society. We saw evidence of this everywhere; in the practical emphasis on learning from the peasants and the workers, the relatively narrow range of pay differentials, the stress on simple living and the similarity

of living standards, the allocation of housing, the commonly expressed belief that to serve the people is the greatest goal to which an individual can aspire.

Once poor and oppressed, China's peasants are now her official heroes and heroines. Many office workers, doctors, professors, teachers, party officials, and other cadres, we were told, are sent to the country to learn from the peasants or to the factories and workshops to learn from the workers. Ballets and posters exalt the virtues of the peasants. Farm workers' pay is somewhat less than that of industrial workers and cadres, but they receive much of their food from the commune, their costs of medical care are virtually negligible, and they are able to supplement their income by exchanging or, on a small scale, selling produce grown on their own small individual plots. Peasant housing was perhaps the most pleasant and spacious we visited, though we should add that our visits were few. The bearing of the peasants reflects their status in the new society; the young we met were particularly proud, and bubbled over with enthusiasm and self-confidence to the foreign visitor.

Pay differentials, as far as we could determine, fluctuate within a range of one to ten, though there are some exceptions. Thirty yuan (about U.S.\$13.50) a month is generally the lowest, though we occasionally met an apprentice making as little as 22. Three hundred yuan a month (\$135.00) is generally the highest and is uncommon. Direct comparison with income figures in other countries is difficult because housing, education, and medical care in China are all highly subsidized by the state and all other prices, including food and clothing, are set at very low levels by the state. We were told that vigorous efforts are being made to narrow the wage gap, concentrating on increasing peasant income. There are, however, significant occupational differences in pay and within occupations. Though the general rule is "more work, more pay," the situation is more complex than that. Each person is assigned to one of a number of pay grades by agreement among each work unit. Skill, effort, output, political attitude and probably "class origin" are among the factors which affect pay.

Perhaps more important than the figures is the fact that those with a larger income do not seem to express interest in living at a higher standard. To Americans accustomed to the allurements of advertising and to different levels of income and property, this may seem strange. But the Chinese are living in a different context in which the emphasis is on improvement for the group and the whole society. Thus, two- or three-room flats, some with shared kitchen and bath, some with private facilities, are regarded as adequate by the Chinese, at least for the present, and serve workers and cadres alike. In the suburbs and countryside we also saw communal bathing and toilet facilities. Clothing is uniformly simple and unostentatious. No one has a private car. Most families have one or more thermos flasks and one or two bicycles. People's possessions may include a radio, a sewing machine, a clock, a

few wrist watches, a camera. When we interviewed men and women who were saving more than they were spending, they often seemed to be at a loss or at least reticent to talk about how to spend the money in the bank, where it earns 3.3% interest. After all, they would say, they had everything they needed, and the money was helping the motherland by providing for capital accumulation.

"Perhaps I will give it to my aged parents," one man told us. "They do not need it, for the work brigade will take care of them when they become too old to work. But I would still like them to have it."

When we asked what would happen when a person dies, leaving money in the bank and possessions in the apartment, we were told it would go to the surviving family members.

Housing is provided for workers and their families at a very low rent, in our observation never more than 5% of income. Retired workers are permitted to stay on in the housing block where they lived when employed. On the communes, families often occupy their own houses, which they build themselves with the help of members of their work brigade. City housing is in somewhat short supply and young couples must occasionally delay their marriage until housing becomes available.

Nowhere does the striving for egalitarianism reveal itself more strongly than in the status of women. "Before liberation we were doubly oppressed," Chinese women told us, "by the exploiting class and by the men." In old China small girls were often sold to serve as concubines or household servants, wives had no legal rights, widows were not permitted to remarry, and many upper class women suffered the painful crippling of bound feet, which were regarded as a status symbol.

All this was changed by the Marriage Law of 1950 to which we heard repeated reference. Men and women were made equal partners in the marriage. Dowries and forced marriages were outlawed. Women were permitted to divorce their husbands and were given property rights. Young Chinese now have comparatively greater freedom to choose each other as marriage partners, although parental advice and consent is still common. Advice and consent of work supervisors is often also necessary. Young couples pride themselves on the sharing of household tasks. The mother-in-law no longer rules the home but shares decision-making with the daughter-in-law, and this may be the biggest change of all.

Formerly, in those households that could afford an amah (nurse) for the children, the mother-in-law had the luxury of doing little herself but to order all the other women around. Now all able-bodied mothers-in-law, not just some, look after their young grandchildren while the mothers work in field, factory, or office.

Throughout our visit we saw concrete evidence that China's women were sharing equally the task of building the new China. While most of the women work on the land, we also saw women wearing hard hats on construction jobs, operating overhead cranes in factories, at work on lathes. We saw school girls repairing electrical equipment, women pulling

heavy loads of produce or of baggage or driving trucks. All these soon became familiar sights. Nearly one-third of the doctors are women, and there were always some women, although usually a minority on the revolutionary committees of each commune and factory we visited. In the country, women work in the brigades along with the men.

We found Chinese women proud of their new status. They like to quote Chairman Mao's statement that men and women are equal and that anything a man can do a woman can do also. They like to point out that they receive equal pay for equal work. In the latter regard we were not always convinced. On those few opportunities when we had a chance to compare salaries, the women seemed to be getting slightly less. On the communes, where pay is based on work points, women were never given as high a rating as men, principally, we were told, because they did not seem to have as much strength for the heaviest work.

In the distribution of jobs there is some tendency to cling to traditional patterns. That is, we met only women in the nurseries and kindergartens, while there were more men than women in the universities. Women doctors and nurses predominated in the pediatrics and maternity hospitals we visited, and we were told that they were in the majority in the textile mills. Women play a role in decision-making bodies, but not in proportion to their numbers. For example, we sometimes found that on a 21-person revolutionary committee, there would be seven women comrades. The Chinese do not seem to put the same stress as the Americans on equal representation. Sometimes when we asked how many women were in the work force or on a particular committee, the answer was, we haven't counted.

Soong Ching-ling, the famous Madame Sun Yat Sen, has recently written on the liberation of Chinese women, noting that there is still room for improvement. Several of the more intellectual women with whom we talked corroborated this. In the countryside there is still a tendency, for example, to keep on having babies until a boy is produced. The problem of unequal work points remains unsolved, and many women feel there ought to be more women in political life. "But remember that our revolution is only twenty-three years old," these women pointed out. "The new Chinese woman, the true daughter of the revolution, is very young. Give us time. We are moving in the right direction, and when some of us have gained a little more experience, we will play a still greater role in the new China."

It was the feeling of our group that Chinese women have made truly great strides in their liberation. They are women in the best sense—simple, direct, seemingly unconscious of their natural beauty, wearing little or no cosmetics, free of either coquetry or aggressiveness, oriented to work, not consumption. They do not seem preoccupied with their bodies. Many appear to have a good sense of humor. Most married women use their own names, not their husband's. When one sees a handsome young Chinese woman helping along her grandmother who

hobbles on cruelly bound feet (once deformed and broken in childhood, the feet must continue to be bound for standing and walking), one realizes with what breathtaking speed this change has taken place.

Women are enabled to play a full role in the reconstruction of China because the society has freed them of much of the drudgery that was once part of their lives. Household duties such as laundry and shopping appear to be more equally shared by husbands and wives in China than in the U.S. Canteens provide hot meals for workers who prefer not to eat at home, vegetable markets offer presliced vegetables and meats for the convenience of the hurried cook (male or female). It is often possible to buy ready-cooked rice. Special quarters are provided by most work or housing units for babies up to 18 months of age so that a nursing mother can work and still feed her baby. There are nurseries, kindergartens, and primary schools near every place of work, and some nurseries will keep children all week if their parents' jobs are too demanding to permit them to take care of them each night. It appears that the society is geared to give support to the working mother and so spare her the double burden which is hers in so many other parts of the world.

This support, this caring for the needs of the individual, be she working mother or retired worker, a child or grandmother, is another striking aspect of the new egalitarian China. It seems to us a relatively compassionate society. Former landlords and other 'class enemies' who have not been eliminated long ago or suitably reformed since may find something other than compassion; we heard of one, at least, whose treatment by his rural neighbors was at the level of bare tolerance tempered by distrust and dislike. But generally speaking, everyone has his place, everyone has needed, useful work to do, there is little evidence that, except for surviving 'class enemies,' anyone is excluded, shut away, left to drift, to beg, to starve. There appear to be no skid rows in China. We saw no large institutions full of human derelicts.

Partly this is the result of the traditional strength of the Chinese family. It is not unusual to find three or even four generations living together in apparent harmony and mutual cooperation. In one instance we met a 91-year-old great-grandmother who did the cooking, a 54-year-old grandmother who spent most of her time supervising extracurricular activities for children in her block of workers' housing, a father and a mother who both worked. One frequently sees grandfathers as well as grandmothers minding young babies.

"The old people need us, and we need them," one man said simply. "It would not do for us to live apart."

China seems to be preserving the family unit despite growing industrialization and the new demands of loyalty to the party and the state.

There are troubling exceptions. The families of cadres, many white collar workers, and young married couples are often separated for long periods of time because the state requires their services in different areas.

In Yenan, for example, we met a young travel guide and interpreter who saw his wife, a textile worker in Sian, and their two children once a year.

"Isn't it rather hard to be separated?" we asked.

He laughed in an embarrassed fashion. "It is important to go where one is needed," he explained. "I keep too busy to think about them."

Nevertheless there is evidence that some citizens of the People's Republic do mind. Among the refugees who show up in Hong Kong are those who say that long periods of family separation led to their decision to leave the People's Republic. Whether this was the true reason for disaffection or a rationalization for other troubles is not possible to say.

It appears, however, that the state does not separate families unless it is deemed necessary for reasons of its own. One of our guides had been allowed to take his wife and children with him for several weeks of his three-year stay at a May 7th cadre school. When couples are separated, they are given a month's vacation to spend with each other. Our impression, despite the exceptions, was that China seems proud of her consistently strong family life.

Compassion extends beyond the family. In the case of old people who do not have sons and daughters to look after them, the work brigade or the neighborhood committee assumes the responsibility. Several times we heard of elderly retired workers living alone being cared for by their neighbors. When a family needs help in caring for a sick relative, or paying medical expenses for a member not covered either by the commune cooperative or workers' insurance, the neighborhood association pitches in to help.

We did not have the opportunity to visit any homes for the aged in China, but we were told that they were few in number, located mainly in the communes, and populated by those very few old people who had both no relatives and no connection with a local work brigade. We also did not have a chance to visit a mental hospital. Brain-damaged and retarded children are generally cared for at home, we were told by pediatricians.

People with problems, wives and husbands who don't get along, women with bad tempers, men who disregard their neighbors' interests, are helped or pressured by their local neighborhood committee to reform. Using the slogan of "criticism, struggle, transformation," neighborhood units work with persons in difficulty, pointing out to them the relevant passages in the thoughts of Chairman Mao and giving them help in changing their behavior. Only in those cases when this treatment fails are the services of the divorce court or the administrators of justice brought into play.

In the creches, nurseries, and hospitals we were struck with the tender, loving care with which teachers and nurses treated their charges. As foreign visitors, we were also cared for in a manner to which we were quite unaccustomed. It almost seemed that our every wish was foreseen,

our needs met before we could voice them. It was not only our guides who treated us in this fashion; it was the men and women we met in the factories and communes, in the stores, and even on the streets.

In a commune workshop one member of our delegation discovered her ballpoint pen had leaked inside her pocket. Trying to repair the damage, she got ink all over her hands. She was looking around for a scrap of paper with which to clean off her fingers when an observant factory worker came to her rescue with a soft cloth, while another went to bring soap and a wash basin, all without a word spoken.

Sensitivity and considerateness for the individual are noticeable in China in some ways that differ from very competitive societies. We instantly noticed when we returned across the border to Hong Kong that we were importuned by older women and small children peddling soft drinks, fans, and chewing gum.

These two factors, the egalitarianism of modern China and its preservation of compassionate care for the individual, seemed to us to account in part for the marked composure and confidence of the Chinese people. They have a quiet bearing, an air of being at peace with themselves, that struck us as quite without precedent. They go about their business seemingly neither harried nor fear-driven; they seem unhurried, relaxed, interested in their children, gifted with humor. In short, they give the appearance of a happy people.

We did not see discontent or recognize it if we saw it. There are the refugees entering Hong Kong, who feel that life is too hard in the People's Republic. Recent interviews reveal that these are primarily young men and women with an urban background and intellectual interests who had been sent down to the country with very little prospect of ever returning to city life, and a few who object to the long separations from their family.

One Hong Kong refugee, a member of a former bourgeois family, is reported to have said that in her opinion the regime has improved the life of the people and has the enthusiastic support of 98% of them, even though her own family has had grave difficulties. With little to go on but impressions, this seems like a fair estimate. The men and women we interviewed stressed over and over their sense of having achieved social importance. Their pride, their sense of purpose, their serenity made a deep impression on us all.

Chapter V Public Health and Social Norms

The Chinese are well along with a revolution in public health. The results, as measured by people served and improvement in quality of health, are unprecedented. However, they cannot be understood if examined only in terms of the organization and medical techniques employed. China succeeds in reaching its health goals because of wide acceptance of standards for human care and cooperation. Similarly, in other sectors of daily life, generally held norms of individual behavior prevail. This makes possible programs which in other societies would either fail or require a complex system of rules, regulations, and bureaucratic procedures.

In every commune, factory, or school which we visited, the maintenance of the health of its members is a major goal. In every such instance, as well as in large city hospitals, there is pride in the physical facilities, the numbers of medical personnel, and the availability of all the services to all of the community served. Heavy emphasis is placed on preventive measures in contrast to clinical treatment and hospital care. Classes in physical exercise and health instruction are given in every school. In city streets early in the morning, scattered individuals or loose aggregations of people are to be seen going through the slow, graceful movements of traditional Chinese exercise systems.

As with exercises, so with the way in which needed medical talents are brought within the reach of individuals. The services include various combinations of specialists in Chinese herb medicine and acupuncture, specialists in Western medicine, midwives, laboratory technicians, nurses, assistant nurses, pharmacists, dentists, barefoot doctors, and neighborhood health workers. They are housed in large, clean, uncluttered hospitals boasting much modern equipment, in small rural hospitals with crude emergency operating facilities, in clinics occupying corners of commune or factory buildings, and in the living quarters of city housewives or of field hands who double as barefoot doctors. We could not discern any rigid system or hierarchy for integration of these services. All kinds of varying arrangements seem to be practiced without apology.

A few general standards seemed generally understood. With a few exceptions, every person is entitled to any needed type of service. There is usually a small annual fee for medical service, but it may be free for some. Every medical worker does what she or he can for a patient and consults or refers to a more experienced worker whenever advisable. Every experienced worker in a city hospital expects to spend a substantial

amount of time in a commune or factory clinic helping in some suitable way. Taking care of the patient, and especially preventing disease, takes precedence over professional status and research. It is customary for classrooms, production teams, and factory work units to have one member who is given responsibility for health questions and chosen for special instruction. The member selected refers major problems to more expert persons.

To observers accustomed to the rigidities of U.S. medical services, some curious situations result. Our nurse member was pleasantly surprised by the answer to our inquiry about the assignment of nursing duties in a commune ward. "Nurses and doctors are a team: we decide together each morning what needs to be done for each patient, and do it." We asked about abortions and were told in one commune that only physicians perform them at a hospital; in a large city hospital the administrator said midwives handle most abortions; and a gynecologist told us that her colleagues train barefoot doctors to perform abortions in their local health centers. A physician who has carried out significant research notes that he expects to spend 3-4 months each year in a remote commune and, when asked what happened to his research, replies, "We work as a team so that when one of us is away the others continue. Moreover, when we go to the country, my students and I always learn something new about the people's needs."

A young surgeon while serving in a rural factory expects as a part of his service to help improve the local water supply. The staff of a large municipal hospital assume they will spend every third year in the countryside. In its outpatient department, specialists in Chinese and Western medicine occupy adjoining consulting rooms and refer patients to each other as appropriate. To the question of whether "barefoot doctors" (paramedical personnel) and health workers might exceed their knowledge in caring for patients, a senior physician, recently returned from a period of training barefoot doctors on the paddy fields, counters, "Why should they? They talk over their problems with all the people concerned and, if it is agreed more expert help is needed, they ask for it. They are not trying to make a reputation or keep any professional secrets. The next time an expert visits them people will discuss whether or not the decision was right."

Many specialists develop their roles, not because there is an elaborate chart of organization, but because the specialists share the same aims and judgments as to ways of acting. Given this agreement, they work out whatever local arrangements seem to them in the best interest of the people served. In that process they stress going to the people. This emphasis results in the periodic assignment of professional people to commune and factory where they try to take part in the patient's mode of life. It shows, too, in the attention paid to finding out more about traditional and peasant herbal remedies, to combining field observation and collection with laboratory tests, and to acupuncture. As a unique

Chinese contribution dating back to the 2nd century B.C. and possibly even earlier, while being rejected by Western doctors until very recently, acupuncture is believed to offer major advantages in a variety of cases over Western methods of anesthesia and therapy.

As we watched, a portion of a cancerous lung was removed from a 38-year-old steel worker whose only anesthetic was a single needle inserted in the wrist. We realized that, whatever benefits were derived from his retaining an alert consciousness without anesthetic side effects during the operation, the use of the needle symbolized a determination to be selective in using the best of ancient China and the best of Western science in helping cope with China's human needs.

The medical and non-medical staff at all levels are directly involved in the administration of health services: the revolutionary committee for a hospital may include senior doctors, a surgeon fresh out of medical school, nurses, a laboratory technician, a janitor, and the business manager. There is no easy way for the visitor to find out how decisions are made. But the guiding norms of "serving the people" and "learning from the people" are stated vigorously and show consistently in action in 1972.

No portion of the health services illustrates more aptly the effect of universally practiced standards of behavior than does the field of family planning. There are no official statistics for current population numbers and growth rates, although these have been the object of much speculation. We inquired about population trends and family planning activities. On the basis of those observations and of the reports of other observers, we think it is likely that at the present time the average number of children per family is running between 2 and 2.5, although it may run higher in rural areas, where most Chinese still live. If it remained at two over a generation, the population growth would be close to zero.

In every place where we visited, we found three general conditions related to family planning. One is that contraceptive methods and advice on their use are readily available to all married couples. The whole range of contraceptive devices is known and is provided at little or no charge: 22-day pills are the most commonly used in cities, and intrauterine devices in countryside. Injections, vasectomies, and tubal ligations are provided on request. Abortion is available, using the vacuum method.

A second condition is that marriage is commonly deferred until age 23-25 for women and age 25-28 for men; it is claimed that there is almost no premarital sexual intercourse. As a result of the latter condition, there is very little demand for assistance in birth control before marriage, and educational activity on family planning is deferred until shortly before marriage; it is not discussed in schools and universities. Venereal disease is reported to be rare.

A third condition is that family planning is considered an integral part of health services and commonly is not separated out for purposes of information and practice. Limitation and spacing of births is regarded as one essential feature of healthy family life. At no place did we encounter

any reference to national or world population growth or resource limitations as a justification for family planning. But we were told, "Anarchism in giving birth to babies will not do. People should have planned families."

In these circumstances, the explanation for the low birth rates and the widespread use of birth control measures is to be found primarily in the accepted standards of behavior rather than in technical services. The aspirations and values established by the society require the use of those services. When asked why there were so few extramarital pregnancies, one professor remarked, "It is because our people have a sense of purpose. Family planning helps them serve in the advancement of the Socialist Revolution. If I may be candid, that may be why the Americans have so many unwanted children, take drugs, are worried about venereal disease, crowd the mental hospitals, and look for places to put away their old people. I read your journals. You Americans have no common sense of purpose."

In China there are no formal regulations against sexual promiscuity or setting limits on marriage age and children. There is a long Chinese tradition of disapproval of premarital intercourse, and there was strong Confucian emphasis on a shared moral code. The constraints exercised by the contemporary society through emphasis on socialist goals, as pervasively reinforced in teaching, literature, and art, are extremely strong. The teaching of Mao builds on deep traditions of family and social process. To attempt to appraise a technical service like family planning, or an entire health service or any other social measure, independent of the value system in which it is sturdily embedded is to miss the most important point. A sense of unity in social purpose, a pride in building, the extraordinary changes of the past two decades, and sensitivity to the group process by which neighborhood judgments are reached, all contribute to the carrying out of programs of reform even though the formal prescriptions are weak or lacking. The norms are supported at every point in information and educational programs.

Sexual morality, for example, is reinforced indirectly through the undistinguished garb of women, the lack of any attention to women as erotic objects in music, ballet, opera, and graphic art, and their usual treatment as equals in school and work situations. To be sure, married couples are modestly affectionate in public, and younger couples are occasionally seen holding hands while strolling dark streets and in parks at night.

While some societies look upon religious belief and instruction as a means of establishing accepted norms, modern-day China either ignores religious organization or occasionally brands it as the lackey of imperialists. A ballet shows the malevolent landlord's family engaged in Buddhist rites. Certain of the worst features of the old medical and educational system are presented as associated with Christian missionaries. All foreign religious ties were cut.

The only confirmed open Christian services being held in the People's

Republic since the Cultural Revolution are Catholic and Protestant services held in Peking, primarily for foreigners. Some scholars think that small home meetings of Christians continue. But church attendance as such by the Chinese is not a current phenomenon. There are more mosques open than in the past, probably because of the large Moslem minorities in China. The Moslems seem to be the most tolerated sect, probably because they are not directly associated with foreign influence, 'imperialists,' or an alien ideology.

While the outward trappings of traditional religions are rejected, there is much in the teachings and practice of Chairman Mao that corresponds to the moral codes associated with religious practice. The belief in the capacity of man to shape his future, the commitment to sacrifice for the common good, and the adoption of a set of guiding moral principles are examples. All of these are essential parts of the system of norms underlying and shaping the character of particular programs such as public health, agricultural production, or literary expression. We doubt that any nation in the world today displays as much consistency and uniformity in articulated aims and values as do the Chinese people in 1972.

Our observation of these social developments leaves us with three unresolved questions:

1. The Chinese display and appear to have achieved, or internalized, an unprecedented degree of consensus on social norms. How did it come about?

2. What is the effect of such uniformity on the spiritual well-being of the people? A reaction to conformist pressures does not show in the ordinary ways, common to Western society, of organized resistance to prescribed behavior, minority protest, underground humor, or scrawled objections. The reasons why Chinese cross the line to Hong Kong could be most revealing.

3. How long can the current fervor and strength of revolution be sustained? When the memories of pre-liberation sufferings fade, when the monumental gains in material well-being are taken for granted, when Chairman Mao no longer is the living personification of the wisdom of the people, and when, if ever, the border military threats subside, will the current unified devotion be maintained? Will it be necessary, as some Chinese suggest, to have a new Cultural Revolution every decade? And could a society stand such recurrent turmoil and soul searching?

Chapter VI Conformity, Dissent, Violence

China has sometimes been described, especially in America, as a place where brain-washing, thought control, and intense propaganda have been developed to the state of an art. Recognizing that some of China's critics have been self-serving, and that what they see as brain-washing the Chinese would see as justified and necessary re-education, it is nevertheless true that the Chinese have used approaches and techniques which Americans would consciously reject for themselves and have grave doubts about being used for any other people.

Americans, for that matter, are not at all free of calculated influences on their thoughts nor of indoctrination in patriotic and nationalistic themes. The U.S.A. has perhaps the world's most highly developed and ingenious system of manipulation of consumer wants and increasingly of political views by means of market research and public opinion polls geared to highly-skilled advertising and political and public relations techniques. It is doubtless fair to say that the Chinese are as critical of American approaches and techniques as Americans are of the Chinese practices. The difference, in part, lies in the fact that the American practice involves both government and private interests while the Chinese practice and purpose is centralized.

Another important difference is that the American practices occur within a framework of individual choice and there is freedom, or apparent freedom, to choose. Efforts at thought control in America have always had to confront this element of freedom. In China, the framework for influencing belief is the progress of the people and the achievement of the goals of the Revolution. These aims have for the Chinese a spiritual quality which outsiders may not and usually do not feel.

In America there is a tendency to look upon government controls and influence as negative, an unnecessary evil. With the Cultural Revolution largely behind them, the Chinese today find their state and society unified.

The U.S. has a multitude of voluntary associations and organizations seeking to promote their special interests and concerns within a broad legal framework. In China there is no separation between the political, economic, social, and moral spheres.

In China the good man or woman is also the good citizen and vice versa. The goodness or badness of a citizen relates to the contribution he or she makes to the state-defined common welfare. To the Chinese there are few sins greater than "parasitism"—living on the benefits of

others' efforts and making little or no contribution to the common welfare. In America personal and private morality does not necessarily make a person a good citizen, and many widely acclaimed as good citizens are known to have different moral standards than those usually praised in press and pulpit.

In China a central fact is that the totality of life of the average Chinese citizen is governed by group values. These values have deep roots in the past and have been nurtured and built upon by the government and the party under the leadership of Chairman Mao. One underlying principle seems to persist: order is still given the highest priority and is the guiding rule in organizing the life of the country. The development of the group is more important than that of the individual.

In the Chinese People's Republic there is striking evidence of mass conformity; social pressures are exerted in traditional and new forms. This is manifested in all aspects of life, from the style of men's and women's clothing to the "official line" incorporated in the arts.

In the educational setting—from kindergarten through university—stress is placed on giving the individual the capacity for self-discipline, for regulating his or her own personal desires and needs with those of the state. Values which are now being inculcated are designed to serve the needs and desires of the whole Chinese people.

"To Serve the People" is no empty slogan; in actual fact, as expressed in current activities it appears to instill in the individual a deep sense of identity with commonly shared goals and gives the average Chinese citizen a very strong sense of national pride. Many elements in this phenomenon parallel the process of "Americanization" which has been the central thrust of much American public school education. However, there is a significant difference: the Chinese educational system inculcates values which emphasize group effort and self-sacrifice—not private development or individual success.

In our visit to the Children's Palace in Shanghai, we saw a striking demonstration of learned conformity. Here the young children, candidates or members of the little Red Guard, were putting into practice the teachings of Chairman Mao. These young persons were involved in all kinds of useful projects (art work of various types, model making, games, theatre, orchestra, and choir groups), and all seemed imbued with an immense youthful revolutionary fervor. They expressed complete dedication to the goals and objectives of the revolution; their adulation of Chairman Mao had to be seen to be believed.

The colleges and universities were hard hit by the Cultural Revolution. The more traditional teaching methods and curricula were thrown out and teachers committed to them had to modify their ways, often in a setting of violence.

In China today, as in the past, the extended family is the primary socializing agent, which promotes in the individual a sense of conformity to group norms. Although there have been significant changes in the

role of women, men-women relationships and the status of the young and old, the family still seems to be the basic agent for inculcating the social norms. Through face-to-face relationships, pressure is also exerted on individuals to meet certain commonly accepted norms through their neighborhood and work (commune or factory) groups.

Individuals deviating from such norms face from these groups condemnation and social pressure to conform, but this is tempered by an attitude which favors treating deviant behavior as non-criminal rather than criminal behavior. Therefore, it becomes possible to change such behavior by example, education, and persuasion; there is no compulsive need to punish. Such an attitude is compatible with Communist ideology, which states that human beings are significantly molded by social and class conditions.

In search of security and to safeguard the gains made by the revolution, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) plays a unique role. In China, PLA members mix freely in the society and work of the country. Much of the army's role is taken up, in addition to preparing for battle, in a variety of socially significant tasks such as helping to harvest the crops, building roads, and making itself generally useful and available to society. Thus the PLA is more than a military force because it contributes to economic production and plays an important role in maintaining the kind of work Americans do in VISTA and the Peace Corps. Perhaps that is why the pervasive presence of PLA uniforms did not suggest a militarily-regimented society.

Premier Chou En-lai recently asserted that many young people either wish to join the PLA or to emulate in their lives its sense of purpose and sacrifice—so many, we were told, that the army is easily recruited without conscription. Many young men and women are said to wear the drab and baggy clothing of the PLA because it indicates a commitment and identification with a group which is seen as selfless and willing to sacrifice its all in defending and promoting the revolution. It is interesting to observe that the PLA today, unlike traditional armed forces, wear on their uniforms no insignia to distinguish officers from enlisted men.

Dissent outside the system (party, workplace, neighborhood groups, etc.) is not easy to identify and there is relatively little room for it to occur—or at least to have it officially sanctioned. However, we do know that, especially during and following the Cultural Revolution, many administrators, intellectuals, and artists became targets for attack by the young Red Guards, often in the name of Chairman Mao.

Many of these dissenters were sent for long periods to May 7th schools where, it was said, they had their revolutionary consciousness raised. A few Chinese chose to leave the country, but that is not easy to do, especially if one has socially useful skills and abilities. It is estimated by some China watchers in Hong Kong that perhaps 10,000-25,000 persons come out of China each year, mainly for economic and family reasons. Accurate figures, however, are not obtainable.

How much violence is there in present-day China? The evidence we saw suggests there is little of it. However, in the arts—particularly the eight officially recognized ballets and operas—symbolic violence is omnipresent. The youthful heroine brandishes a weapon (usually a rifle or revolver, sometimes a hand grenade or bayonet) in the struggle for liberation from the foreign invaders and the landlords. In the background of such actions one hears the martial music and songs which stir the audience to further empathy with the forces of good against evil. There is no doubt that violence in this context is glorified. It supports what is considered a socially desired objective.

In the department stores, there are military-style toys for children—planes, tanks, artillery, and toy ambulances for carrying the wounded.

An added dimension of symbolic violence is seen in the militant posters glorifying armed defense and certain quotations of Chairman Mao which are widely displayed throughout China. But the symbolic violence usually falls within what could be called a defense posture.

The Chinese are not exposed to the kind of violence which abounds on the American scene. There are no Chinese TV programs exploiting violence for its own sake, nor is the Chinese press full of crimes of violence; if they occur, they are certainly not featured in newspapers. Wherever we travelled in China, we were struck by the minimal amount of violence evident, although we knew that, not long before our visit, the Cultural Revolution had occasioned some violence, bloodshed, and death. The early years following 1949 included periods of violence on at least as great a scale, especially the campaigns against landlords and urban counterrevolutionaries. But it needs to be repeated that violence has been and remains almost incredibly rare in relation to the immense scale, radicalness, and speed of this revolution, which has genuinely revolutionized the lives of more than 800,000,000 people and the character of the world's oldest living civilization. For the most part, this has been accomplished less by force than by persuasion.

Chapter VII

Economic Growth Under Mao

"Of all things in the world, people are the most precious." This phrase of Mao's and its meaning run through all aspects of the Chinese revolution and its social, political, and economic implementation. The public welfare must be served, for *all* the people, but it is welfare, as contemporary China defines it, and not economic growth per se which is the goal. The concept of Gross National Product (GNP) as a measure of accomplishment is rejected. Welfare is not seen as being served by production

of many of the things which, for example, swell the U.S. GNP total, such as the value or cost of advertising, cosmetics, private cars, or electric carving knives; nor is production itself the goal—it is *man* that counts.

There is an almost explicit contradiction here between the very strong drives for increased production—the achieving of somewhat arbitrary quotas—and the elevation of *man* as the focus; some production seems strangely related to welfare—nuclear weapons, Mao buttons. But it is certainly true that there is a basic difference between Chinese and Western economic goals and patterns, revolving primarily around the issue of what economic growth is supposed to be for.

For the present at least, the good life is seen in what, by American standards, are relatively spartan terms, but the moral corruption which luxurious affluence can bring (and has brought to many Americans) is explicitly recognized and hence is guarded against. The basic goal is to provide adequate welfare for *everyone*, on a more or less egalitarian basis.

Chinese economic planning so far has differed from the Soviet model in its apparent willingness to maintain welfare and consumption levels even though this may limit overall growth rates in basic manufacturing turning out producer goods. Despite major fluctuations, the industrial growth rate has nevertheless been very high since 1950. Agricultural deliveries to the state, for example, necessarily the chief source of capital for industrial investment in this still predominantly agrarian economy, have been kept at a rate which has permitted continued increases in peasant consumption except for the bad years from 1959 to about 1963. Even then, although there were overall and local food shortages, it would appear that no one starved, a tribute to the organizing and distributing abilities of the system and its commitment to mass welfare.

There has been a continuous effort to improve the quality of rural life and to bring rural consumption standards up to urban levels, a process not yet complete but well along, although it is difficult to reproduce in the countryside an urban range of goods and services and the more general amenities or attractions of urban living. Mobile film units and travelling theatre and ballet groups do serve rural communes, but the excitement of the city is not transportable. Most peasants continue to live and work under less materially comfortable as well as less stimulating circumstances than most city people, a situation which helps to explain the reluctance of some people to share the peasant experience as official policy urges or requires them to do.

More concretely, it has evidently not been practical to provide big rural department stores and the variety of other retailing—museums, parks, sports events, etc.—found only in cities. We saw numerous samples of such facilities in several cities and were perhaps especially impressed by the great range, and the cheapness, of department store stocks, all seemingly available in adequate quantities and without rationing or queues. Stocks were more numerous and varied than we anticipated. We were not surprised, however, at the absence of luxury items (mink coats, gadgets,

dress clothes, etc.) which the planners understandably choose not to produce and/or which are considered degenerate, unnecessary, or inappropriate to the mass line based on peasant and worker values, modes, and needs. Our necessarily haphazard observations in homes visited and crowds seen on streets or in parks and museums, suggest that most urban and many rural people now have small possessions limited to the relatively wealthy before the revolution. In the cities, perhaps as many as one third of the people we saw visiting parks or cultural monuments were carrying cameras and/or transistor radios (all made in China of course), and virtually every rural or urban household we visited had a bicycle or two, a sewing machine, and a radio.

We saw all these goods for sale in many stores, at prices which did indeed bring them well within the range of what we gather are average wages, although we were told by one resident foreigner that there were the beginnings of complaints from some about what they felt were excessive prices for items in universal demand, especially bicycles, watches, and radios. Consumerism is frowned on, and our efforts to discuss its insidious grasp on people as incomes and production rise, using the American example, were met with firm denials that such a problem could ever become a serious one in this society of the “continuous revolution.” Nevertheless, we wonder about the future. The Chinese clearly intend their economy to continue growing; production will go up, and although the state may set wages and prices as it judges fit, there may be mounting pressures over time for the present relative austerity in a context of self-sacrificing revolutionary zeal to give way to a rising level of material comfort and other amenities, or even frivolities. Perhaps our Chinese friends are right that this will never happen to them; with an American example of excessive consumerism in our minds, we sincerely hope they are right, and wish them well.

One answer to the urban/rural dichotomy, in the Chinese model, is to exalt the virtues of the rural life as well as to increase its material welfare and to locate as much manufacturing as possible in the countryside. Although this may in some cases result in slightly higher-cost production, costs are secondary to welfare, and to the goal of self-reliance. The benefits and the experience of industrial modernization are to be distributed as widely as possible, and each area is to be as nearly as practicable self-sufficient, drawing on local material resources and local skills and manpower to reproduce everywhere the same technological advantages. China as a whole is also to be self-reliant, a goal especially important since the split with the Soviet Union in 1959-60, the withdrawal of Soviet aid, and the reduction of trade with the U.S.S.R. China's foreign trade is small by comparison with its population or production, and there has been no external aid from any source since 1960.

China is newly and doubly proud of its self-reliant achievements, which are indeed impressive, and especially of its ability to improve on foreign models and foreign advice, a point repeatedly stressed. The energies and

innovative genius of peasants and workers have produced many technological improvements on what foreign "experts" designed and, in many cases—or so we were often told—have solved problems or developed techniques which these same experts had insisted were impossible. Particular pride was taken in specific projects designed and built by the Chinese alone, such as the new Yangtze Bridge at Nanking, as well as in the overall design for economic growth and industrial spacing.

Perhaps the simplest and most graphic illustrations are the electric power lines and light bulbs we saw so widely distributed throughout those parts of the countryside where we travelled, plus the great variety of small-scale industrial operations we observed in every commune we visited as well as in every primary school, middle school, and university. Whatever the cost effectiveness of such a distribution of industrial production (hard data, especially on costs, are difficult to come by), such considerations are not thought to be controlling—again it is man that counts. It is, of course, rational to make use of available local labor which may otherwise be under-employed, especially at slack periods in the agricultural year, to engage in non-agricultural or sideline enterprises as well as in land reclamation and improvement, and to produce and repair tools and machines used in the local system, including electric pumps and other machinery. The communes we visited made use of available local labor for this purpose. The presence of industrial operations in educational institutions is explained partly in the same terms, partly in terms of the commitment to the importance of practical training and manual labor in keeping with the "half work, half study" model on which most education is based.

But it is not necessarily irrational, purely in cost terms, to make rural areas as self-sufficient as possible in many of the industrial goods they require, if only because of the considerable saving in transport costs. The shortage of transport facilities is, in any case, an important reason for the dispersion. The earlier effort at the time of the Great Leap Forward in 1958 to have nearly every village and even household produce iron and steel in the so-called "backyard furnaces" was quickly abandoned, and it will probably never make sense to distribute heavy production of that sort, including petro-chemicals, in every small center. But the small shoe and clothing factories we saw in communes, the workshops turning out light bulbs or metal wheel rims, the small match and paper plants, the machine shops, and the variety of other light- and medium-industrial establishments in rural areas, all using the available electric power, make sense in the context of individual welfare. They supply each area with much of what it needs, are able in many cases to provide surplus goods to other areas, increase local income, employment, and living standards, and involve the population as a whole in the experience and the benefits of planning and carrying out industrialization. At the same time, this pattern of industrial dispersion may help the Chinese avoid the overcrowding, alienation, and concentrated environmental deterioration which

are all part of the urban/industrial model in most of the rest of the world. Each larger region is also now designed to be self-sufficient even in heavy industry and to depend on local sources of raw materials, which are, fortunately, widespread. Every Chinese province, for example, has substantial coal deposits, and most are now self-sufficient in coal, iron, and steel production, some of it coming from quite small local mines and factories.

Existing Chinese cities, and many industrial centers established since 1949 in previously underdeveloped or remote areas, are not to be abandoned, but the policy is to limit their growth and to locate as much new industry as possible in the countryside or in new cities whose growth will also be controlled. Such a policy is not importantly influenced by strategic considerations but is part of the new national plan to disperse the process of technological modernization as widely as possible and to continue to narrow the overall gap between city and countryside and between mental and manual labor, bureaucrat/manager/expert and peasant or worker. The cities are the original home of the bourgeoisie; they were also bastions of the imperialists since most of China's big cities were once treaty ports. City life, especially for bureaucrats and intellectuals, is seen as having corrupting tendencies, and unchecked urban growth is in any case poor planning. Shanghai, for example, still the largest city and the chief industrial center, has purposely been cut back from what was considered to be an overinflated size and is now said to contain six million people, all fully employed and housed. An incidental but significant note about Shanghai which underscores a particular feature of the new society: we were told that there is no city-wide garbage collection, owing to the frugality of the people and a general disapproval of wastefulness.

All people in the work force are assigned by job and area where the need is greatest; travel, residence, and employment are controlled by permit. The values of Chinese society continue to stress the importance as well as the virtue of physical labor in the countryside, and sooner or later all people except industrial workers and urban laborers must do at least a spell of it, including high officials and would-be university students.

Many of these elements of the Maoist model for economic growth have been criticized by Western analysts as impractical, uneconomic, or Utopian. The Chinese acknowledge that in many respects they are still feeling their way, that their system still has many shortcomings, and that they have much to learn. They emphasize that theirs is still a relatively poor country economically, and they know that economic growth is not easy. It will be made easier for China by what one is inclined to guess (again there are no reliable data) is their success in greatly reducing the birth rate as well as the death rate.

The even greater Chinese advantage in promoting net economic growth, apart from a generally favorable natural resource base, is, of course, their highly organized system of group effort. Production, both agricultural

and industrial, must continue to rise for some time before the Chinese feel that welfare levels for all are sufficient. From the Western perspective, the chief problem of the future may be to avoid the corruption which affluence seems always to bring. The Chinese we spoke to deny that it will ever entrap them; they see their revolution and its lean purity as continuing permanently.

Whatever the eventual outcome of that issue, few people in the rest of the so-called developed world can look at their own urban/industrial system or their overall economic structure without seeing as many problems as virtues. China has the advantage of a relative late-comer to industrialization and economic modernization. Atmospheric pollution is already present in Shanghai and some other industrial centers, although on a relatively small scale—just enough, perhaps, to show the Chinese a pitfall which the rest of the industrialized world has discovered very late. In any case, the Chinese are already pollution-conscious. City buses (still inadequate to apparent need, judging from the enormous queues) are widely electrified or are limited to diesel power. There are no private cars and only a few taxis or officials cars. Most of the population moves around only locally and on bicycles. Some long-distance travelling takes place, but moves almost entirely by train or, for shorter distances, by bus or truck. Air travel is minimal, although it seems likely to increase. Old industrial plants are not being rebuilt, although some effort is being made to limit emissions; new plants are reported to be designed with an eye to reducing environmental damage.

China is still so little industrialized or urbanized by American, Japanese, Soviet, or European standards that it has by comparison almost a clean sheet. As Mao put it long ago, "The Chinese people are poor and blank" (i.e. unpoliticized). "This may seem a bad thing, but actually it is a very good thing. On a blank sheet of paper the most beautiful words can be written, the most beautiful pictures painted." The Maoist blueprint for economic growth compares indeed very favorably, especially for those with a social conscience, with the urban/industrial economic model created in the West and Japan. We had just seen the Maoist model at work when, on our return trip, we were jolted by the contrast between it and overcrowded, polluted Hong Kong, with its luxurious high-rise hotels and apartments, blatant commercialism, wealthy tourist-centered shops, appalling slums, and shocking level of mindless violence and drug abuse. However Utopian the Maoist Chinese solution to the problem of economic growth may seem and whatever its pitfalls may be, there is a good chance that it will avoid some of the failures of other economic systems and thus contribute to the search for better ways to order economic life.

Chapter VIII Contacts with Foreigners

In the course of our travels in China, we saw evidence—at the Export Commodities Fair, the Shanghai Industrial Exhibit, in commune grain mills where grain sacks had export identifications stencilled on them—of the growth of Chinese overseas trade, but not enough to discuss the subject at any length. We saw enough evidence of international trade, however, to gain additional insight into another aspect of China today: her exposure to foreigners within her borders.

China's doors are open to assorted foreign visitors and contacts. For the foreseeable future there will be more foreign visitors to China than Chinese visitors elsewhere. ("One Chinese person is needed at home to do the work of ten.") When we were in China, we encountered several American and other foreign delegations, individual visitors, businessmen and, of course, many overseas Chinese. These visits to and from China will increase but, according to the Chinese we spoke with, slowly and selectively. The Chinese stress that limits on foreign visitors are necessary because of limitations on hotel space, rail and air transport, and the availability of interpreters and guides. There may be additional reasons, but they were not voiced to us.

Commercial contacts in China are increasing and not only at the Canton international trade center, with its scores of private bureaus for discussing sales. We met representatives of the Boeing Company of Seattle and the president of a large Japanese shipping line. There were doubtless scores of others we did not see. In our hotel in Peking we met Michelangelo Antonioni, the Italian film-maker, filming a documentary in China, and talked with two Norwegian film-makers shooting film in China.

Pakistan International Airlines and Air France already have commercial service to Canton and/or Shanghai. We were told that China International Airline, with new Ilyushin-62s, planned air service to Europe, starting with Tirana, Albania, and later servicing Rumania and Yugoslavia. There may later be service to Africa. While we were in Peking, we were told that Iranian and Ethiopian airline representatives were there discussing air service. A Chinese delegation concerned with air service was scheduled for visits in April, 1973, to Albania, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Ethiopia with briefer stops in Teheran and Ankara. Flights to and from Japan were under discussion. A new air-link with Canada had been initially agreed on a few days before we arrived in Peking. Chinese agreement to purchase of two supersonic Concorde has been reported. China has also signed up for several Boeing airliners. We were informed

that more and more Chinese delegations were going abroad, presumably for purposes of friendship, exchange, commerce, scientific exchange, and diplomatic activity. While we were in Peking, large new structures were being built to accommodate the expanding needs for foreign diplomatic offices and residences.

The growth of travel reflects the increase in commercial and cultural exchanges and the development of Chinese participation in the U.N. as well as wider diplomatic recognition of the People's Republic.

But neither the commercial, cultural, nor diplomatic visitor to China can expect to have easy opportunities to become freely acquainted with unofficial Chinese. There is a long tradition of wariness toward foreigners. There is also today a clear separation of Chinese and foreign residents in China. Foreigners, including a few Americans, who live permanently in China and identify with the Chinese revolution, we were told, must make a choice: live in the Chinese community and avoid constant contact with foreigners or live in the foreigners' compound. Foreign correspondents told us their view that the Chinese want to avoid the corrupting influence of foreign ideas and customs. Yet, in September of 1972, an interesting departure was reported. For the first time the Chinese agreed to allow children of diplomats and foreign residents of Peking, including correspondents, to attend kindergartens with pre-school age Chinese children, according to a Reuters news dispatch.

Members of the AFSC delegation were greatly impressed by the warm hospitality of the Chinese. But we sensed, on occasion, our own "foreignness." In particular, we often felt starved for the daily news, especially when we visited the smaller cities.

We had little access to the Chinese press, except for three national dailies: *People's Daily*, *Red Flag*, and *Liberation Daily*. Foreign correspondents and diplomats stationed in Peking or travelling in other cities say that they cannot acquire copies of the local newspapers. Vendors have flatly refused to sell them to foreigners.

A good English-language digest of both New China News Agency (Hsinhua) and foreign daily news (AP, UPI, Reuters, Agence France Presse, New York Times Service) is available, and we had daily access to it when in Canton, Shanghai, and Peking. But foreign correspondents said that they had never seen the more extensive Chinese-language digest of foreign and domestic news which Hsinhua, the Chinese news agency, distributes to top cadres throughout the country. They know that it exists. They have had the experience of talking to cadres in places far from Peking who said, "Oh yes, I know your name. I read your article on such and such."

Having experienced the sensitivity of our Chinese hosts to the interests and needs of foreign visitors, it seems probable to us that the Chinese will develop new ways of making visitors feel even more welcome and comfortable than they do today. But there is little evidence that the Chinese will make it any easier for the foreign visitor to move freely into

contact and deeper interaction with the life of the average Chinese. Thus, it seems clear that China will continue to sanitize her society from foreign influence, even as she welcomes foreign visitors and develops relations with foreign states.

Chapter IX China and the World

China's role in the world, like her internal society, is in a period of development. The Chinese have been preoccupied with constructing the new society we have described, but within the context of the following international developments to which spokesmen referred on several occasions during our visit:

- (a) the big-power struggle, which involves critical military threats to China's territorial and ideological integrity;
- (b) national independence in a world of sovereign nations which the Chinese firmly believe should come to respect the Five Principles of Co-existence * enunciated at Bandung in 1955;
- (c) a contemporary popular revolutionary ferment abroad which is seen in transnational as well as national forms and which revolts against old-style colonialism and economic and military imperialism in their various new forms;
- (d) an expanding effort to promote commercial and cultural relationships with other countries and peoples.

Ultimately, the Chinese hope to achieve genuine communism as envisaged in the theories of Marx, Engels, and Lenin and modified by the thoughts of Chairman Mao. They stress that they are currently far from achieving their goal. They also hope for a time when compatible revolutionary forces will liberate the world's people from oppression, as they define that in its several forms, and foster national self-determination and development along lines of mutual self-interest.

But they are pragmatic and patient as well as ideological and revolutionary. They are fully prepared, if necessary, to pursue these goals over a long period of time. Their long-range goals, however, require contemporary actions; they are constantly at work on tasks that they have set for themselves. They would clearly prefer to pursue their objectives in a framework of international co-existence of sovereign nations and an

* Mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, nonaggression, noninterference in others' internal affairs, equality and mutual benefits, peaceful co-existence.

absence of international war. They are, however, preparing their internal defenses and developing external alliances as well as their own brand of nuclear deterrence. They assert no claims or designs on territory abroad, beyond adjacent areas to which they state a historical right. These include territories on the Indian and Soviet borders, Tibet, and Taiwan. It is anticipated that they will reclaim the New Territories, adjacent to Hong Kong, when the British Crown lease expires in 1997; however, the island of Hong Kong itself is legally British in perpetuity.

They describe themselves as a non-aggressive nation. However, they openly state their revolutionary right to support national liberation movements in other lands and to help overcome what they define as the imperialistic practices of other world powers; in this category they now include the Soviet Union. They do not consider that this position conflicts with the principle of non-intervention in other states.

Despite their stated commitment to national liberation movements, the Chinese did not support the revolt of the oppressed Bengalis but allied themselves with Pakistan against Bangladesh. To be sure, to have done so would have necessitated violation of their alliance with Pakistan. It seems that in this case, as in others, China's interests were more focussed on the power struggle among larger nations than on the social and political problems of the people of Bangladesh.

While they expressly consider the world situation excellent in terms of their revolutionary aspirations for themselves and others, the officials whom we met explicitly accused the two superpowers of trying to control the world and carry out aggression against small countries. They quoted Chairman Mao (May 20, 1970) that the danger of a new world war exists and that vigilance is necessary.

Their program of "proletarian internationalism" contains four points: (1) friendship with socialist countries; (2) support for the revolutionary struggles of all oppressed peoples and nations; (3) the five principles (see p. 45) of co-existence in friendly relationship with countries of different social systems; and (4) struggle against countries with policies of imperialism and war.

For themselves, they deny any wish to become a superpower. They did not openly oppose the May 1972 U.S.-Soviet superpower summit in Moscow, but they publicly expressed the hope that it would not affect "the interests of other countries."

They were not ready to speculate to us about what role the United Nations could play in pursuing world peace and justice. "We have been there only six months. We are still not very familiar with the work and organization of the U.N. We lack that experience. But the small countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America are now playing a larger role. It seems ever more difficult for one or more superpowers to manipulate the U.N."

The increasing small-country role, they felt, was manifested, for example, in the restoration of the U.N. seat to the People's Republic of China

and in the UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) meeting in Chile. The Chinese clearly align themselves with the countries of the southern half of the globe and anticipate complicated and vigorous struggles at the U.N.

The Chinese say that they are preparing themselves for the possibility of attack from the Soviet Union (and possibly from other countries), stationing strong military forces in the northern border areas and creating a massive underground air raid shelter program in nearly all medium-sized and major cities and elsewhere. In Shanghai particularly, we saw evidence everywhere of shelter construction, and in Peking some of our group descended into the remarkable and extensive underground shelter system. That this effort involves just about everyone was evident from the information given us that the four million residents of Peking each made 50 bricks apiece for the shelters—and it still was not enough.

One high official, in the context of inviting us to visit the shelters, asserted that there were along the northern border 44 divisions (which he did not identify as Russian), more than a million soldiers, armed with nuclear weapons. He said there are more than 40,000 foreign troops in the Mongolian People's Republic. These facts were cited as the reason for the necessity of making defensive preparations for carrying out "resistance to the end" against any foreign invasion. That they consider the preparations to be defensive rather than offensive was underscored by quoting Chairman Mao that the Chinese should not attack unless first attacked.

Chinese fears of foreign attack are currently centered on the Soviet Union but they speculated in conversations with us that the tremendous expansion of the Japanese economy and the increasing military power of the Japanese might contain a future threat both in military and neo-imperialist terms. Their bitterest and strongest memory of foreign invasion is of the Japanese occupation of large areas of China in the 1940's. They do not discount the possibility of a future attempt. The current Chinese cordiality towards Japanese efforts for rapprochement undoubtedly represents the use of diplomacy to modify relationships with a potentially dangerous neighbor.

The hostility toward the Soviet Union has military, territorial, and ideological grounds. To be sure, Stalin's picture is to be found all over China in a line of four with those of Marx, Engels, and Lenin facing a picture of Mao Tse-tung. Stalin's political writings are on sale and read by many Chinese, as well as studied by the higher cadres. Stalin is seen by them as an advocate of a strong party and a firm believer in the dictatorship of the proletariat. Credit is given to the Russians for their technical assistance in the 1950's, but there is bitterness at the swift withdrawal of that help under Krushchev. In the internal struggle of the Cultural Revolution the Chinese leaders who supported the Russian model were angrily called revisionists, along with the Russians. Even the term "imperialism" has been applied to the Russians in an ideological vein;

they are "social imperialists." This does not stop Sino-Russian cooperation in limited ways, notably at this writing in the flow of Soviet weapons to North Vietnam—but the Chinese control the rail lines over which it moves. Thus, the present military and ideological attitude of the Chinese toward the Russians (and vice versa) is hostile, but they are still socialist comrades at many given points.

The Chinese exhibit a realistic awareness that they are encircled by hostile powers and bases and in some senses are besieged. Russian troops and the threat of Soviet nuclear attack combine at the north end of a circle with American or American-encouraged forces in Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan, Indochina, Thailand, and India to the south and, completing the circle, the Soviet Union to the west.

The Chinese strongly maintain that they have refrained from launching invasions across their borders. They did not cross the Yalu River in the Korean War until Korean and U.S. forces pressed northwards and threatened to bomb beyond the Chinese border and, then, only after repeated warnings that they would do so if the northward attack imperiled Chinese soil. When after three years of voicing claims they entered disputed territory in their southern border conflict with India, they voluntarily halted their advance and then voluntarily withdrew to the line they maintained to be the true Chinese border. Their conquest of Tibet they defend on three grounds: that Tibet was historically part of China, that the Tibetan people were oppressed, and that they have now given Tibet autonomous status. Acquiring control of Tibet also closed off the risk of Tibetan inability to prevent foreign military intrusion through that country, or of acquiescence to foreign bases on Tibetan soil.

The hot war in Korea, in which Chinese and American soldiers shot at, killed, and captured each other, stirred tragic hatred in the hearts of their countrymen. It was the worst period in two stormy decades of U.S.-China relations.

Chapter X Obstacles to Better Sino-American Relations

From 1949, when the Nationalist Chinese fled to Taiwan, until 1969, when the People's Republic of China began to show signs of a change in its foreign policy and when the U.S. government in turn began to modify its policy toward China, China and the U.S.A. saw each other in hostile terms. A number of American actions undertaken during that period need careful attention if normal relations are to be achieved.

An occasion for mutual mistrust and suspicion between China and America arose over the American post-war political, economic, and mili-

tary tutelage of Japan, so recently the invader and hated occupier of Chinese soil. China saw the American role as that of developing a client state to counter Chinese influence in the Pacific and to pose a military threat to China proper. American official and political arguments that Japan should, in conflict with the U.S.-established 'peace clause' in its constitution rejecting armed forces, assume an active posture in the Pacific "defense" system were not lost on Chinese ears. The recent rapprochement and mutual diplomatic recognition between China and Japan show that the Chinese now believe they can begin to deal with Japan as a genuinely independent, and neighboring Asian, country.

But American military and naval bases still ring the Pacific. The 1969 figure for U.S. bases in Asia was 194 (Congressional Quarterly Service). The host of troops, planes, ships, and nuclear weapons includes the formidable U.S. Seventh Fleet, which until recent years was a permanent "visitor" to the Straits of Taiwan. Critics of this outreach of U.S. foreign policy have for years tried to stimulate American understanding of Chinese reactions to this presence by asking Americans how they would feel if there were a Chinese navy near and a large Chinese military establishment on Long Island off America's Atlantic coastline. There is little evidence that this effort has impressed the many Americans who "bought" the idea of containing Chinese communism.

The gradual and then accelerated intervention of America in military guidance and then active participation in the Vietnam war, which spread to all of Indochina, brought China face-to-face with the fact that a military power from thousands of miles away was operating as close to her borders as northern Mexico is to Texas. The American air and naval onslaught on the Democratic Republic of Vietnam brought exploding American bombs and missiles to a point 25 miles from China's border. Official U.S. claims that the North Vietnamese brought this on themselves did not in any degree lessen Chinese apprehension at U.S. military action so close to Chinese soil.

The Chinese officials who talked about Vietnam to us stressed two things: (1) that understanding with the United States on the subject of Taiwan could not be reached until the Vietnam war was settled, because in the Chinese view the two questions were connected, that is, both constituted, in Chinese eyes, elements in the U.S. containment and encirclement policy toward China; (2) that the Chinese have a fraternal, socialist relationship with the Vietnamese which would be fulfilled in this time of war by acts of military assistance, despite a desire for improved relations with the U.S.A.

In 1945 China attended the Founding Conference and in 1946 was seated in the United Nations and given a permanent seat on the vital Security Council. From 1949 until 1971 the United States sought to prevent the People's Republic of China, by all odds the rightful tenant of those seats, from occupying them. When the United Nations finally acted in 1971 to seat the representatives of the People's Republic of China,

the United States voted for that action but linked it to an intense international campaign to make a seat in the General Assembly simultaneously for the Republic of China (Taiwan). This was seen by the P.R.C. and the majority of other governments as flatly contradictory to the policy of seating the P.R.C.

The role of America in U.S.-Chinese relations in the 1949-1969 decades was nearly disastrous. This should in no way excuse Chinese failures in the same era. Fearful as she was, preoccupied with domestic crises and the development of her new system, hopeful as she overtly was of stimulating and supporting foreign revolutionary movements and wars of liberation, China evoked official U.S. apprehension and response.

There is no greater merchant of arms to other countries than the U.S.A., qualitatively or quantitatively, but she is not alone in this alarming form of activity. The People's Republic has also been active as an arms supplier and self-righteously defends its policies as justified by its revolutionary fraternalism and its official commitment to resist imperialist aggression. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in its 1971 publication, "The Arms Trade and the Third World," has listed national recipients of Chinese weapons and Chinese aid to revolutionary movements. Arms went from China to the governments of North Korea, 1950-1965; North Vietnam from 1950 to the present; Cambodia from 1964 to 1969; Pakistan from 1965 to the present; Guinea from 1963-65; Mali from 1961-68; Congo from 1964 to the present; Tanzania from 1964 to the present; Algeria in 1965 and 1966; Syria in 1969. Aid to revolutionary movements went from China to eight organizations in Asian countries, two Palestine liberation groups in the Middle East, the National Liberation Front in Algeria in the early '60s, 13 sub-saharan countries in Africa. The Stockholm reports note which groups received weapons and training, financial aid and/or "verbal support."

Thus, China has contributed to international tensions and has, though in a degree and manner different from the United States, taken steps beyond her borders to intervene in other countries. For years, the People's Republic was kept outside the United Nations and could ignore the concern of the world community over activities that threaten the peace. The other big powers of the world, which were in the United Nations, had less excuse to by-pass it and to violate its spirit, if not its letter. Today the People's Republic is in the United Nations. The challenge to China today—as it is to the United States and all other powers—is to re-assess unilateral and bi-lateral military activities. The world in the thermo-nuclear and space age must find a different road, one of organized cooperation, primarily through the U.N. This is essential but the need to sustain and strengthen the U.N. does not diminish the equal necessity for Americans to urge and move their government to take other steps necessary to establish proper, normal relations with China. We believe these include: ending U.S. military activity and support in Indochina; withdrawal of all military support from Taiwan and the legal termina-

tion of the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Nationalist Chinese government; ending the policy of military containment of China; putting trade with China on the same footing as U.S. trade with other communist countries; and expending U.S. cultural exchanges with China.

Some of the conditions for normal relations have begun to be met; others await the first step. If the U.S. is to have the kind of relations with China which the majority of Americans now evidently favor, more is called for than is now forthcoming from the American side.

But if Americans are to have confidence in establishing normal relations with the Chinese in this century of war and violence, they need to know how to measure China's words against her actions.

Although the Chinese government has often issued strong and even belligerent statements denouncing the policies of other states or declaring its right or duty to take corrective action, it has in practice been extremely cautious about concrete responses. Except for minor frontier skirmishes, China's military forces have been used beyond its borders on only two major occasions since 1949: in Korea in 1951-52 and in the Himalayan boundary dispute with India in 1962. Neither case suggests that China is interested in pursuing an aggressive or expansionist foreign policy, or even in taking supposedly "defensive" actions beyond the immediate area of its land frontiers. Korea had for many centuries been either a part or a dependency of the Chinese empire.

Chinese denunciations of renascent Japanese militarism and their even stronger statements about Taiwan—the U.S. role there, the nature and role of the Nationalist Government, the Chinese duty to liberate Taiwan—have not been accompanied by any commensurate aggressive action. The Chinese now, as in their imperial past, appear not to be greatly disturbed by seeming inconsistencies between the verbal and symbolic images of national power on the one hand and its reality or action on the other.

Peking develops what it identifies as a correct policy position, and it is enunciated forcefully. But such positions may be inexpedient, unnecessary, or practicably impossible to enforce, especially beyond China's borders.

The Chinese maintain that their military power is still almost entirely defensive. It includes almost no offensive capability at any great distance from its borders, especially against a militarily superior force armed with large navies, airfleets, and missiles. Chinese action has therefore had to be prudent and restrained.

In the case of Indochina since 1964 China has not responded to U.S. provocation close to its frontier. The U.S. attacked a closely allied and friendly neighboring state, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, itself an area which for two thousand years was a Chinese possession or dependency. But from the Chinese point of view, the correct policy position is obvious and needs to be stated as strongly as possible.

As and if China's offensive military power increases, will it tend to match its words and actions more closely? Not necessarily. Part of the apparent discrepancy between prudent action (or non-action) and belligerent or angry talk may reflect the frustration of relative military weakness abroad. But no actions since 1949 suggest that China is interested in using its military force far beyond China's frontiers. Its official role is the defense of China. This includes defense against what are regarded as unreasonable border claims or direct threats to border areas, where they can be effectively countered by a Chinese military response, as in the Himalayas or Korea.

Beyond her border areas, official Chinese policy may state strong positions on many issues. But this includes the assertion that each country must work out its own political and military solutions.

Chapter XI

Some Thoughts for Americans

We of the AFSC delegation understood from the beginning, as did our hosts, that one important reason for our visit to the People's Republic of China was the opportunity to see something of the new China for ourselves, so that we might be better able to help interpret it to our countrymen. We never suggested that we would come with uncritical minds, nor did we do so. Some things we saw disturbed us, others excited us. Many aspects of the Chinese experience seemed irrelevant to the American situation, others more directly relevant.

We think that it is basically important for all Americans to know and to understand as much as possible of the new China. A quarter of the world's people live there. China is a major power which must be reckoned with. Its political system has weathered repeated and varied crises over twenty-three years and has shown flexibility and stability. It is willingly supported, in our opinion, by the great majority of the Chinese people. From their point of view it has delivered real and enduring benefits. Past regimes failed, but the People's Republic succeeded in replacing grinding poverty with economic security, disorder with order, mass oppression with mass justice, weakness with strength, and national humiliation with national pride. Whatever their political views, Americans must accept it as a major sector of the one world in which all live. The American posture with respect to China has too often been based on unreasoning and ill-informed hostility, or even on totally irrational paranoia, both of them frighteningly dangerous to the world peace on which human survival depends. The American posture urgently needs instead to be based

on intelligent understanding, a view long put forward by Senator Fulbright, Chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Fear is perhaps the greatest enemy of friendship. In the 20th Century, fear and feelings of insecurity have led to the most expensive arms race in history, one in which, to a far lesser extent than the U.S.A. or the U.S.S.R., the Chinese have also been caught up. But we believe Americans need have little fear of China as a military threat. The Chinese do not seem to be interested in pressing beyond their own borders. China has a negligible long-distance air force, no external bases, and the smallest of navies composed of coastal patrol craft and submarines.

By all accounts, China's nuclear weaponry is relatively limited and its long-range intercontinental capability non-existent. As long as the nuclear arms race continues and as long as nuclear military power is a factor in international relations, China's nuclear power will surely grow. But it seems unlikely ever to match the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers, which are growing much faster and which constitute the far greater threat to Americans and everyone else. The reader will have his or her own evaluation of the official Chinese pronouncement that China will never be the first to use nuclear weapons. If that is difficult to accept at face value, one can weigh how ready China would be to invite a nuclear response from mightier nations by initiating a nuclear attack.

If China lacks the power, or the will, to engage in military adventures abroad, there is no lack of power and will to be well-prepared for defense at home. From what we saw, we gather that virtually every adult under 60 of both sexes has some military training, as do most children. Each is fully prepared to play a military role in the tradition of the revolution. China in this sense should be a formidable fortress against any invader.

Like other states China is no doubt anxious to aid its friends and embarrass its opponents abroad as well as to foster the spread of movements and governments which share its views or are willing to serve as allies. Its efforts of this sort seem pale by comparison with those of the United States. Like the U.S., and nearly all other states, it does make some use of espionage abroad and attempts to spread its own political doctrines in some other countries through propaganda and through encouragement of sympathetic groups or movements. But it has on the whole been cautious and restrained in this respect and has consistently maintained that each nation must work out its own political solutions in its own way.

China believes that its solutions to universal human problems are better answers than have been developed elsewhere and that it therefore has a mission to help mankind by promoting where it can the spread of similar efforts. This does not distinguish China from other states, particularly not from other major powers. What does distinguish China from the two superpowers, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., is China's unwillingness to promote change abroad by the use of its own military force, directly or indirectly. The ideas and the model of the Chinese revolu-

tion do directly challenge the contemporary American alternative. But it is an ideological rather than a military challenge. In the tradition of free competition of ideas and systems, Americans need not regard this as a threat but rather as a stimulus. It may be hoped that as relations between our two countries become less marginal, the Chinese may learn something from the U.S.A., as they told us they want to do, just as the U.S.A., may learn something from them.

The Chinese experience since 1949 provides a radically different set of approaches to common problems, and is worth examining in those terms. This may especially be the case in view of their apparent success in coping, where American society has faltered, with economic injustice, violence, drug abuse, and the alienation, purposelessness, divisiveness, and despair on which they feed.

The Chinese pattern may not be transferable or, for whatever reason, desirable. But even a casual look at the new China enables Americans to see their own society in a new and perhaps therapeutic perspective. Such a perspective suggests that many of the problems which currently exercise this country and which many Americans feel to be hopeless are not necessarily inevitable or unsolvable. Perhaps many of them stem from a combination of morally deadening affluence and power with a weakened sense of purpose, as people and groups pursue their separate and often selfish paths in search of privilege rather than responsibility.

One important American misconception is now beginning to be more clearly recognized as such. It is that the American system for economic growth and for political and social organization is widely applicable elsewhere. In particular Americans have greatly overestimated the extent to which it provides an appropriate model for the so-called "developing" world. The Chinese may suffer from a similar misconception. They may overstate the extent to which *their* system offers the best blueprint or example for the developing world. However, since Chinese circumstances and needs are much closer to those of the poor two-thirds of the world, the Chinese model for change may have more to offer them. The Chinese emphasis on self-help and manual labor is important in this respect.

Neither America nor China is an appropriate model for all of humankind. Every society is necessarily shaped, and to some degree limited, by its own particular circumstances. If humans are to achieve in this difficult world some of the aspirations held in common across national and ideological boundaries, the powerful nations of the world have to help create the conditions to make such achievements possible. In this respect China and America have much to accomplish, as two of the world's greatest nations which have for more than 20 years emphasized mutual and global tensions rather than common humanity and common welfare.


For America, that means, in part, accepting the reality of the new China. The Chinese quarter of mankind threatens our country in no way. To treat it as an enemy is to force it into an adversary role. Let us instead

welcome its increasing integration with the world community, in peace, and learn from it as we hope the Chinese may in time learn something of value from us.

For China, there is a need to move beyond its conception of America only as a superpower, a new-style military and economic imperialist nation with expansive and aggressive policies, an important world power with which it must seek accommodation out of self-interest. Although at present sadly eclipsed, there is another America which cherishes universal peace in the world, the self-determination of other peoples and nations, the right of individuals to certain freedoms which no state or society should eliminate. That other America will continue to struggle toward realization of its own ideals and for achievement of world institutions and a world community of people which is interdependent, not only because the world's resources are limited and must become far better shared, but because it is intrinsically right for all the people of the world to live without fear of each other in military, economic, or political terms.

China needs to learn about and learn to work with that America, no less than America needs to learn about and work with the new China.

CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC



Members of 1972 AFSC Delegation to China

Wallace Collett Chairman of the Delegation to China. Businessman. Chairman of the American Friends Service Committee's Board of Directors. Involved in civic affairs in Cincinnati, Ohio. AFSC Board of Directors since 1964 and chairman of the Vietnam Committee. Currently Chairman of the Board of Directors of Wilmington College.

Margaret Bacon AFSC Director of Information. Professional journalist with social work background. Author of *QUIET REBELS*, *LAMB'S WARRIOR*, forthcoming biography of Abby Kelley Foster, and many magazine articles.

Harold Hochschild Retired businessman. Long involved with AFSC. Lived in China 1920-21; hiked in interior. Trustee emeritus Institute of Advanced Studies at Princeton. Trustee African-American Institute and Correctional Association of New York. President Adirondack Historical Association.

Kenneth Kirkpatrick Since 1961 AFSC Director of Peace Education in the Pacific Northwest Regional Office; Executive Director of the Pacific Northwest New Mobilization to End the War in Vietnam in 1969. In 1969, 1970, 1971 and 1972 he visited Paris to observe the four-party talks on Vietnam and, in the summer of 1970, he spent one week each in North and South Vietnam and made brief visits to Laos and Thailand.

Marilyn McNabb Since 1970 staff member of AFSC's National Action/Research on the Military Industrial Complex (NARMIC) in Philadelphia.

Rhoads Murphey Member of the Friends Ambulance Unit in China, 1942-46, and a professional China scholar since 1950. In 1952, Associate Secretary of Friends Committee on National Legislation in Washington, D.C. AFSC Director of the Quaker Conferences for Diplomats Program in Asia from 1954 to 1956. Since 1964, at the Center for Chinese Studies at the University of Michigan, where he served as Director since 1969. In 1965 served on a Service Committee working party which prepared *A NEW CHINA POLICY: SOME QUAKER PROPOSALS*. Speaks, reads, and writes Chinese.

John A. Sullivan Former AFSC Executive Secretary in the New England and later the Pacific Northwest Regional Offices and currently Associate Executive Secretary of the national AFSC, with responsibility for public information. Former newspaperman and news broadcaster.

Margaret Stanley Tesdell Public health nurse. In 1946, joined the Friends Ambulance Unit in China, serving as a nurse in Chengchow, Changte, and in the Liberated Areas including the International Peace Hospital in Yen-an until 1948. In 1949-50 member of the Quaker team administering relief to Arab refugees in the Gaza Strip. Since 1970, Project Nurse in a Parent-Child Center Demonstration Program administered by the Minnesota State Department of Health.

Stephen Thiermann Director of Quaker International Conferences and Seminars in Europe, based in Geneva, Switzerland, since 1968. Served for twenty years as the Executive Secretary of the AFSC Northern California Regional Office. Author, WELCOME TO THE WORLD. In the fall of 1972, becomes Secretary of the International Affairs Division for AFSC in Philadelphia.

Hulen Hill Watson Staff coordinator for the Third World Coalition of AFSC. Based in Houston, Texas. Previously worked with the Texas Consumer Participation and Planning Project of AFSC in Houston. Active in the black community of Houston with tenants organizations and the Pan African movement.

Gilbert White Member of AFSC Board of Directors, Chairman 1963-69. Currently Professor of Geography and Director of the Institute of Behavioral Science at the University of Colorado. Former administrator of AFSC China-India program. President of Haverford College, 1946 to 1956. In 1961-62 and 1970 he served as water resources consultant to the Committee on Coordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin.