

China Policy Study Group

BROADSHEET

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REVOLUTION GIVES RESULTS

Supporters of different countries and systems often hold up their achievements as worthy of emulation. Closer scrutiny reveals most of them as variants of the same pattern, though there may well be big differences between developed and undeveloped, affluent and impoverished, even publicly-owned and privately-owned. Nevertheless when China is brought into the comparison the staggering difference is that anything the Chinese people have done, by following Mao's revolutionary line, has been achieved *without debt, without devaluation, without inflation.*

The balance sheet for 1973 is, if anything, even more startling than for preceding years because adverse weather was overcome to win not merely a good harvest but a record one in all main crops, while important nodal points were passed in capital construction, petroleum production, steel and electric power supply.

The quantitative advances during the year were notable (an 8 per cent rise in the value of industrial and agricul-

tural output), while the *qualitative* advance in terms of real development (as opposed to make-believe development that can be triggered off by foreign aid) took on new dimensions.

Many of those with Western or Moscow training question the merits of 'walking on two legs'—building large and small plants, using modern and old methods simultaneously. But results speak louder, especially when the true comparison is suddenly brought home, e.g. that a country with 700 million people to feed should actually have grain reserves (40 to 50 million tons in state silos alone).

It is therefore often asked why more countries do not reproduce the Chinese methods. The fact is that the methods would soon come up against road-blocks unless the other countries were prepared to follow the revolutionary, socialist path, which responds to the demands of the ordinary people rather than to those of a minority striving for wealth and power. It is because the Chinese have given attention first of all to continuing

the proletarian socialist revolution that there is growing abundance of factories, machines, tools and produce of all kinds.

China's New Year message for 1974 said more clearly than ever before that the only way to learn to distinguish between the two lines—the revolutionary and the counter-revolutionary—is to study the classics of Marxism while engaged in the revolutionary movements of class struggle, the struggle for production and scientific experiment.

The Cultural Revolution and the movement to criticise Lin Piao have taken up much time and energy. But we can now see that, contrary to what the Western and Soviet 'experts' say, the effort to keep the Chinese Revolution on the correct political line has not interfered with production or set it back. It has encouraged initiative from below and given the workers and the peasants new strength and purpose. The remarkable achievements of 1973 in construction and production, and in the whole of the eight-year period since 1965, testify to the crucial role of politics.

ALLIANCE AGAINST THE SUPERPOWERS

Concluding our survey of the last ten years

The very word superpower brings strenuous objections from Soviet spokesmen, who have called it a non-Marxist, non-class conception. They rely on the ignorance or forgetfulness of their readers, for it was Lenin who said "world domination" is, to put it briefly, the substance of imperialist policy. And it is nothing less than world domination that the superpowers seek. Capitalism, as Marx and Lenin demonstrated, develops only by accumulating and concentrating more wealth and power and continually expanding beyond its boundaries. In its last stages, when vast national, then international, monopolies develop, imperialist governments are forced to contend for supremacy and, eventually, world domination. These are objective facts, independent of what people may desire. Old imperialist powers which cannot continue to hold their own (e.g. Britain) may be absorbed into or subjected to the vast hegemonic system of one or other superpower.

Superpowerism creates the conditions for its own destruction. More important than the enmity of rival powers is that of the classes and peoples forced into subjection, driven from their homelands, exploited and oppressed as part of the process of building up world domination. Their revolutionary upsurge under working class leadership, the establishment of their power, and their initiation of socialist development are all facts of history.

Socialist development too has its own laws. It can take place only through the revolutionary struggle of the working people. It depends on the continual identification and criticism, as mortal enemies of the socialist state, of all surviving forms of domination and exploitation in the world. Therefore a socialist state, however powerful, cannot become a superpower. It treats other states as equals and people of all countries as friends, whereas a superpower rules by dictation, compelling obedience by military or economic strength. Domination over other countries and dictation of their internal affairs are incompatible with socialism; but a world order in which all states have to be respected as equally independent and sovereign would have to be opposed by imperialism.

This is being proved in the world today: in many countries people are experiencing in practice the attempts of the superpowers to dictate to them, to decide who shall rule them and in what way, and to decide arbitrarily on matters of concern to all peoples. On the other hand they are also learning from experience that China *does* deal with other nations, even the smallest, as equals.

The revolutionary upsurges of the last century have reached a high point in the last few years, making them a period of great turmoil. The increasing possibilities for an alliance against the superpowers are suggested by looking at the four

main contradictions in the world, as defined in the Report to the 9th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 1969 and still standing unchanged:

the contradiction between the oppressed nations on the one hand and imperialism and social-imperialism on the other; the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the capitalist and revisionist countries; the contradiction between the imperialist and social-imperialist countries and among the imperialist countries; and the contradiction between socialist countries on the one hand and imperialism and social-imperialism on the other.

The first, second and fourth contradictions are absolute and can be ended only by the defeat of imperialism and social-imperialism. The third contradiction too, that among the imperialists, will continue as long as imperialism, but it varies in intensity, the protagonists change, differences are temporarily composed; there is scope for alliance with anti-imperialist forces.

It is true, then, that virtually all countries and peoples have reason to oppose the superpowers, though with various motives and varying degrees of firmness. Imperialist governments, for instance, cannot be considered steadfast opponents of those of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. They look on the superpowers as more 'natural' friends than the Third World and hope to continue to pick up crumbs from their table. Yet even they feel the need to put their own interests first. Britain and France made this clear in the Middle East crisis. Both in connection with currency and with oil Japan has shown unwillingness to follow the U.S.

The seating of People's China in the United Nations, in October 1971, was of tremendous importance in the struggle against the superpowers. It meant that representatives of the Chinese Government had daily contact with representatives of other countries, took part with them in discussions and listened to their views. The line put forward by China at the U.N. and its agencies supported the interests of lesser powers and contrasted sharply with that of the superpowers. It is a line of united struggle against domination rather than of accepting the patronage of one side. At discussions on disarmament, on aid to under-developed countries, at the UNCTAD Conference in Santiago, at the Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, at the Sea-Bed Conference—at all these, and more, Chinese spokesmen have won the support of the Third World and other countries and exposed the responsibility of imperialism and social-imperialism.

All the evils of imperialism—its deceit, its rapacity, its belligerence—are seen in a more concentrated form in the superpowers. Private talks between them are almost continuous and their spokesmen often make it clear, as they did in the discussions that preceded the Geneva Conference on the Middle East, that they have no intention of allowing others, even the United Nations, to play other than a minor and inconsequential role. China will have nothing to do with this.

Alliance of opponents

Chinese statements consistently refer to both collusion and contention between the U.S. and Soviet government. Even a superficial study confirms this, but why is it so? The main reason is that neither is strong enough to do alone the job of holding back revolution throughout the world, or to feel sure of overcoming the other in a trial of strength.

U.S. imperialism is on the down-grade and beset with difficulties both at home and abroad. Nor are the Soviet leaders in any position to act independently, though at present having greater momentum than the U.S. Like Washington, the Kremlin is dogged by trouble; there are irreconcilable class contradictions between the working people and the managerial and governing class.

The two superpowers are therefore driven to collude in an attempt to attain immediate objectives, though both know that this collusion is temporary and unstable. It is in fact part of the manoeuvres by which each seeks an advantage over the

other. But their contention is permanent; imperialisms, as Lenin said long ago, cannot live together in peace.

At present Japan is freeing herself from the overlordship of the U.S. and the Soviet leaders are trying to draw her into an agreement with them, offering the joint exploitation of Siberian resources as a bait and hoping that Japan will take the lead in an Asian 'collective security' agreement—aimed at China. The Japanese government, however, are being very cautious and will accept only terms that are clearly profitable to them and do not restrict their freedom of action. The Japanese people want friendship with China and in this they have the support of many businessmen, who see their long-term interests as better served by fraternal relations with China than by the present profitable trade with Taiwan.

At the 10th C.P.C. Congress last year Chou En-lai said:

The awakening and growth of the Third World is a major event in contemporary international relations. The Third World has strengthened its unity in the struggle against hegemonism and power politics of the super-powers and is playing an ever more significant role in international affairs. . . . Countries want independence, nations want liberation, and the people want revolution—this has become an irresistible historical trend.

China foresaw and encouraged this trend, in the African continent, in South Asia, in the Middle East, in the Caribbean, in Latin America, in Southeast Asia, and particularly in Indochina. As a Third World country herself she has used the growing prestige and strength derived from socialist construction to assist materially and morally other countries which have relied mainly on their own people and strength to frustrate the designs of the superpowers.

Alliance for common aims

The construction of a working, though not necessarily formal, alliance against the superpowers is far from an accomplished fact. Today the process has no more than begun and there will certainly be many shifts and new groupings in the future. By a working alliance we do not mean one embodied in a treaty after the fashion of the capitalist world. It is rather a unity of purpose transcending written agreements, based on determination to maintain independence of the superpowers.

The possible extent of such an alliance is vast. The countries of the Third World, whatever their different characteristics, form a reliable basis. Every country, from Japan, France, Germany and Britain to the smallest member of the Third World, and certainly not excluding the countries of Eastern Europe, is finding that it cannot develop without coming up against one or other of the superpowers. This is the driving force behind the opposition to them, which is growing and will grow.

One sometimes uses friendship for China as a sort of political indicator, but it is not an essential feature of opposition to the superpowers. All kinds of motives may lead a government to join a grouping against them, the main requirements being determination to maintain or win independence and to join others in doing so. In the course of the struggle political lessons will inevitably be learnt.

The period we have been considering comes to no neat end, with all problems solved. Soviet social-imperialism has replaced U.S. imperialism as the most immediate danger to the world, though appreciation of this fact is not yet universal. Present contradictions are sharper, the rate of change is speeding up, the Third World is stronger and more united. The tasks ahead are no less onerous than those of the past, yet any objective study confirms that 'the future is bright and no one can change this general trend of history.' Whatever the next ten years may hold, the Chinese people will play a main part. Their study of Marxism-Leninism and the implementation of the mass line give them, and us, solid ground for confidence. Socialist China is part of the tide of history and does not try, like the imperialists, to stem that tide.

TWO-LINE STRUGGLE NOTES

by David Crook

Two-line struggle is 'a reflection of class struggle inside the Communist Party'—especially within its leadership. There have been ten such struggles since the C.C.P. was founded in 1921, the ninth being between the line of Mao Tse-tung and that of Liu Shao-chi, the tenth between that of Mao and that of Lin Piao. In both cases Mao's line was accepted by the great majority of the Party leadership, of the rank-and-file membership and of the Chinese people.

We heard about two-line struggle everywhere during a recent tour which took us 1,200 miles south of our home in Peking. Somewhere on our trek south we were taken to see a reservoir-cum-power plant. It had been started in 1966 and began to generate power in 1969, the water which flowed to the fields turning the turbines. More irrigation, more electricity—unless, in exceptional cases, there is a surplus of water or an emergency need by industry. The dam was built in 1958, the year of the Great Leap Forward; the power plant during the Cultural Revolution. It was not only some western wiseacres who predicted that these two movements would wreck China's economy. Liu Shao-chi and his followers opposed the Great Leap and during the hard years of 1959-61, when Krushchev suddenly withdrew all Soviet experts from China, tore up hundreds of contracts for massive construction projects and stopped sending spare parts, Liu advocated capitulation to Krushchev's pressure and dependence on foreign aid. Liu's line would have turned China into a Soviet satellite and ultimately have led back to something like the former semi-colonial conditions. Mao's line was self-reliance and to go all out for building socialism.

What makes Chinese men and women carry tons of earth on their shoulders to build dams? What makes China tick? The bait of high pay and lush living? That was Liu's theory: 'Material incentives'. Mao Tse-tung's line has always been 'faith in the masses' coupled with ideological education to help them slough off the selfishness bred by centuries of struggle for existence under small-scale individual production and feudalism and capitalism.

Making tractors

At the Loyang Tractor Works—perhaps the biggest in China—we were told: between 1960 and 1962 the works management, under the influence of Liu's line of material incentives, would bargain with the workers: 'Get this job done by such and such a time and we'll give you a bonus of 30 *yuan*.' And the workers would reply: 'Make it 50 and it's a deal.' Liu's line was wooing the workers away from socialism to the capitalist road. But it was not doing much to turn out more tractors. Until the Cultural Revolution the highest output was 3,000 a year, though the plant was designed to produce 15,000. By 1972 output had been raised to 20,000 a year. This was done not by money bonuses but by the ideological education of the Cultural Revolution.

It was the same at Wuhan Steel Works. Under Liu's line it took 12 to 15 days to do a certain job. When the management switched from material incentives to rousing the workers' political consciousness the time was cut to three days. Before the Cultural Revolution they offered a bonus of 4 *yuan* a ton for iron salvaged from the slag of one furnace. Result: 50 tons of iron saved each month. In the course of the Cultural Revolution the workers turned down the bonus and salvaged 150 tons a month. What roused their enthusiasm? Studying the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao Tse-tung? That played a key rôle. But theory must be combined with practice. Reversing the trend started by Liu Shao-chi and continued by Lin Piao of building a top-heavy bureaucratic structure, put new

heart into the workers. There was a return to the spirit of '58, the year of the Great Leap Forward.

It was the same in the communes when, as a result of the Cultural Revolution, the leaders spent less time at meetings or merely inspecting the fields and got themselves covered in sweat, mud and muck.

Growing vegetables

In a commune brigade near Kweilin we got the following figures for the average output of vegetables: before Liberation (1949), the figure was around 5,000 *jin* per *mu* (15 tons per acre). Between 1949 and 1952, when land reform was completed (i.e. a smallholders' set-up replaced landlordism), the figure rose to over 6,000 *jin* per *mu*. It continued to rise, though with ups and downs, during the ensuing co-operative movement. In 1958, with the founding of the communes and the Great Leap Forward, it went up to 11,000 *jin* per *mu*. Then, during the hard years of 1959-61 Liu Shao-chi, advocating capitulation to Krushchev's pressure, called for a retreat from collective towards individual production. This trend was embodied in Liu's policy (pithily summed up in four Chinese syllables) of: extension of private plots and free markets, promotion of small private enterprises responsible for their own profit and loss, and the fixing of output quotas by the household instead of the collective (e.g. the work team). In short, back to the road leading to capitalism. Under Liu's line output fell, at its lowest, to the pre-Liberation figure of 5,000 *jin* per *mu*. The Socialist Education Movement, proposed by Mao Tse-tung to counteract this capitalist trend, brought output up to 8,000 *jin* per *mu* in 1964-65. The Cultural Revolution has boosted it to an average of 13,500 *jin* per *mu* (40 tons per acre). These figures are a record of 'the struggle between two roads and two lines' which goes on all over China.

We met it in the field of education in Wuhan. There we visited the building which had housed the Central Peasant Movement Institute in 1926-7. In 1925 Mao Tse-tung had headed a Peasant Movement Institute in Canton, to train peasant leaders. His combination of theory and practice ran through the whole of the Wuhan Peasant Movement Institute's curriculum. Mao then, as now, advocated running schools with the doors opening both inwards and outwards. Not only did the students go out to take part in revolutionary struggle, but working people entered freely both as students and teachers. Workers living in the neighbourhood, after coming off shift, flocked to Mao's lectures and also to tell the peasant students about their own conditions and struggles.

The regular students, who came from 17 Chinese provinces, sat no formal entrance exam. They were recommended by local revolutionary organisations and entered the Institute on the understanding that they would go back where they came from as 'special revolutionary envoys' to help guide local peasant organisations along revolutionary lines.

See-saw struggle

For over 20 years these same educational principles were developed and applied in Yen-an and the other Liberated Areas, and Mao called for their continuation after the setting up of the People's Republic in 1949. Liu Shao-chi immediately launched a counter-attack. In the name of 'raising academic standards' he demanded 'regularisation of schools' and 'overcoming guerrilla work-style'. The old-style intellectuals, long-entrenched in the cities, found Liu's line to their liking. Following Liu's lead they nibbled away at Mao's principles of making education 'serve proletarian politics', 'combining education with productive labour' and maintaining the Yen-an tradition of plain living.

In the mid-fifties Liu's line gained support and even inspiration from the Soviet experts. These, in the main, worked conscientiously and systematically, but they had not got rid of all the academic influence of Czarist days (which Lenin had trounced), and advised the use of teaching methods and material better suited to the cultivation of an intellectual elite. A see-saw struggle between Mao's line and Liu's went on for over ten years. So, despite the great advances made in the 17 years since Liberation, the Cultural Revolution launched in 1966 was, in Mao's words, 'most timely and necessary'.

Now, visiting Wuhan University, we found progress being made in the struggle to implement Mao Tse-tung's educational principles. Mao had actually visited the university in 1958. At that time he found that, under the impetus of the Great Leap, the students were demanding that the university should be changed into a 'half-work, half-study' school. Mao encouraged them and said they should set up small factories in their spacious grounds. But during the hard years of 1959-61, under Liu's influence, the factories were scrapped. Since the Cultural Revolution they have been started again. New students are being recruited from among workers, peasants and soldiers. Wuhan University, like all others, has hook-ups with factories and communes in the locality, and especially with the docks, so that the students and those teachers who are young and fit enough can do their annual stint of manual work. They also cultivate the land on their own campus.

Besides this, the students play their part in running or supervising the university, according to the C.C.P.'s policy that workers, peasants and soldiers should 'go to school, take part in running the school and reform the school according to the Thought of Mao Tse-tung'. Since 1970, seven 'Great Debates' have been conducted at which the entire university population—not only students and teachers, but also cooks, drivers, office workers, housewives—are all entitled to take part. Debate topics have included: length of the university course; how to compile teaching material suited to the needs of the incoming worker-peasant-soldier students; teaching methods; proportions of time to be spent on class-work and homework, on professional studies, politics, manual work, etc.

Precept and practise

All this accords with Mao Tse-tung's line in education. He has always preached 'faith in the masses'—and practised it. His launching of the Cultural Revolution—the most colossal mass movement in history—is evidence of it.

Liu, too, to give the devil his due, practised what he preached. He not only put his faith in experts, Chinese and foreign; he held it was the highest duty of the rank-and-file Communist Party member to 'be a docile tool'. And when, at the start of the Cultural Revolution, the students rose in answer to Mao Tse-tung's call to 'overthrow power-holders in the Party who are going along the road to capitalism', Liu sent work teams to suppress them. Lin Piao was a double-dealer: 'Always with the red book in his hand and "long live" on his lips', as Chou En-lai has described him, pretending to support the Cultural Revolution but secretly egging on the ultra-left to acts which would have discredited that Revolution at home as well as abroad and would ultimately have wrecked it. It was Lin who took the lead in lavishing all those 'greats' and 'greatests' on Chairman Mao, who himself abhorred them. Lin praised Mao to the skies, so as first to become known as his most devoted follower and then to take his place. But when his 'adulation' was exposed as ambition he realised that, though he had managed to get himself proclaimed successor, in fact he would never succeed—by legitimate means. Then he planned coups d'état. What could be further from faith in the masses, relying on them, learning from them, which is the source of Mao's greatness?

So despite these personal contrasts, the struggle between the lines of Liu and Lin on the one hand and that of Mao Tse-tung on the other, was not a personal one. Liu and Lin were representatives of a class whose philosophy is individualism, the capitalist class. Mao is the representative of the mass of the people, of collectivism, of socialism. While Liu Shao-chi relied on 'experts', Lin went further and established a cult of 'geniuses'—big ones at the very top, lesser ones a little lower down.

The struggle, first against Liu, then against Lin, was thus a struggle between two political lines, a struggle over what road to take, the one to socialism or the one to capitalism. This struggle is not yet over. Mao, like Marx and Lenin, says it will last throughout the whole historical era of socialism, the transitional period between capitalism and communism, and that this may last another five to ten generations. But he has boundless confidence that socialism will prevail, based on his boundless confidence in the common people.

REPORT TO READERS

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We enclose with this issue the Index for 1973. It is somewhat more informative than earlier ones and we hope readers will find it useful.

Bound volumes and back issues

By the end of February bound volumes containing all 1972 and '73 numbers should be reading. The price will be £3.00 by post. We still have a few volumes of 1970 and '71 (price £3.00) but all earlier ones are sold out.

We can supply, unbound, most back issues of BROADSHEET (price 6p per copy by post), though the number out of print is rapidly increasing. Xerox copies of out-of-print numbers are available but the price must be higher (20p per copy) and getting them made is very time-consuming as we have no copier in the office. So please don't order back issues earlier than January, 1969 unless they are really essential to you.

Paperbacks

In the three months since publication we have sold over 2,000 of George Thomson's new book, *Capitalism and After*, and have had enquiries about translations into Japanese, Malayalam and Spanish. Both this and the companion work, *From Marx to Mao Tse-tung*, can be obtained from C.P.S.G. Books, 41 Great Russell Street, London, W.C.1, price 60p per copy by post. Please send cash with order and do not combine it with an order for BROADSHEET.

Donations

In the last quarter of 1973 we received the excellent total of £134. This amount is unfortunately not likely to be repeated very soon, as it included a special gift which paid half the cost of our new addressing machine. This is helping to simplify the job of sending out BROADSHEET, something which has become more complicated as both our circulation and the number of different postage rates around the world increase.

THE CHINA POLICY STUDY GROUP

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