

China's social policy

Isaac Ascher



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FOREWORD

It is not easy to convey to readers in the West the realities of a society that totally rejects the belief that 'the poor are always with us'. Our concept of welfare and social services had its origin in the 'good works' of religion, which developed through the efforts of liberals and social reformers to take the edge off the worst social excesses of the Industrial Revolution, and led eventually to the Welfare State.

Today we have a 'rich and poor' society; our social welfare does not pretend to achieve equality, but is supposed to shield those at the bottom from the worst effects of poverty and underprivilege. In reality, however, there is a permanent sub-stratum of socially and economically underprivileged individuals, groups, and indeed whole regions, which in one way or another are deprived of the chance of living a full life and expanding their horizons.

It is likewise difficult to appreciate the full implications of what happens when a whole nation turns from the morality of 'every man for himself' (or at best his family), which is part of the tradition of private enterprise, to the morality of 'Serve the People'. We may admire this as a goal, but we fail to understand how such a system — in which the community's needs are primary, and the advance of the individual in personal dignity, social security, material benefit, mental and physical health, flows from (instead of running counter to) the overall advancement of the community of which he or she is part — can work.

In China a turnabout in the social consciousness of a whole people, together with structural changes in the management of factories, communes, universities and schools, to provide for the greatest possible involvement and participation of people in running their own affairs, have made possible sweeping changes. Problems which in the West would be left to specialised Government social welfare and social assistance agencies are dealt with locally. In these areas China today relies increasingly on community responsibility, and hardly at all on state aid and institutions; the policy is one of maximum self-reliance within the social group or economic unit — factory, commune or neighbourhood. All this is very much in harmony with traditional Chinese social concepts, seldom realised in practice in the old oppressive and exploitative society.

The objective of self-reliance plays an important part, too, in finding solutions to individual or family problems. The method is not to temporise with social 'first aid' but to find a way of returning to a situation in which the person or family can stand on their own feet within a community of their peers. This is obviously so much easier to achieve when 'society' in the form of the grass roots unit, rather than a specially created body with limited powers and resources takes responsibility for dealing with such problems.

Isaac Ascher refers to Mao Tsetung's article 'On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People'. This is a work which has played a major role in extending the Chinese people's understanding of the dynamics of their own society — notably that there is a basic identity of interests of the people but that within this unity, there are, and always will be, contradictions which are not antagonistic and can, therefore, be resolved by investigation, discussion and social co-operation.

Recognition of this fact gives the key to China's approach to social problems within a framework of social cohesion and collective effort. The problems of the person or the family with difficulties are first of all made known, regarded as of general concern and discussed in a frank and open atmosphere; then everyone's help is sought to find a solution satisfactory both to the individual and the community. A non-antagonistic contradiction is recognised, and collective action is taken, with the 'patient' a full participant. No longer is there the need for a battery of inspectors, case workers and a paraphernalia of welfare agencies coming down from above to dispense charity in whatever guise.

The approach to these human problems is dynamic also in that the concept of uninterrupted revolution is seen as applying not only to political and economic matters. It has its application to individual and family problems; since it is part and parcel of the current thinking of the Chinese people today, they will seek solutions for the individual or the family that accord with the notion that they too are changing within a developing community. Rehabilitation is to be achieved through putting individuals and families back on to a course of uninterrupted development. In this approach no limits are prescribed for individual and social achievement — 'the people can move mountains'. The remedies may need infinite time and patient work, but 'people are the key'; however limited his capacity, everyone can make his social contribution. Visitors to China have been impressed by the enormous pains taken to help people in difficulty — even those who have erred, or been misled, politically are given 'a way out', helped to understand and correct their mistakes and start a new life of full participation in society. The idea that 'you can't change people', so dear to those who oppose social change in other countries, is rejected in China's social policy. Just as the Chinese surgeons, nurses, even the cooks, were mobilised for patient hours, days and weeks to re-unite the severed hand of a worker, tendon by tendon, nerve by nerve, so in social rehabilitation, it seems that no time and effort are spared to help individuals and families in trouble; this is the most extensive and effective use of group therapy anywhere in the world.

Of course, solutions are easier to come by when the whole of society is bent on improving conditions by collective action. Although women at 55 and men at 60 are entitled to stop work and receive seventy per cent of their previous earnings, increasingly they stay on in the factory, their

workmates arranging for their work to be changed to suit their age and physical condition. They have the satisfaction of continuing to make their social contribution and feel that they 'belong'. Their mates have no fears of redundancy or of old age being exploited to provide cheap labour.

The process of change in social policy, as in everything else in China, continues uninterruptedly as by trial and error; relations among the people are transformed through continuous investigation, discussion and re-evaluation.

This ongoing development makes it difficult for the observer to present an up-to-date appraisal. In fact, some of the earlier institutionalised aspects of social policy mentioned by Isaac Ascher (such as the role of trade unions in the field of welfare) have already given way to broader forms of community (or economic unit) responsibility. China's social policy, as he explains, is radically different from that of any other country. The aim is to create new social and economic relations — a new community for the new socialist man, and a new socialist man for the new community.

1. INTRODUCTION

Meaning and purpose of social policy

We should pay close attention to the well-being of the masses, from the problems of land and labour to those of fuel, rice, cooking oil and salt . . . All such problems concerning the well-being of the masses should be placed upon our agenda. We should discuss them, adopt and carry out decisions and check upon the results. We should help the masses to realise that we represent their interests, that our lives are intimately bound up with theirs.

— Mao Tsetung, 'Be concerned with the well-being of the masses, pay attention to methods of work', January 27 1934, *Selected Works Vol I*, p.149.

A sharp distinction should also be made between the correct policy of developing production, promoting economic prosperity, giving consideration to both public and private interests and benefiting both labour and capital, and the one-sided and narrow-minded policy of 'relief', which purports to uphold the workers' welfare but in fact damages industry and commerce and impairs the cause of the people's revolution.

— Mao Tsetung, 'On the policy concerning industry and commerce', February 27 1948 (*Selected Works Vol IV*, p.203).

The first objective of China's social policy, emphatically confirmed in the course of her cultural revolution, is *social justice*: that is, progress towards a classless society, undertaken on the basis of a Marxist analysis of capitalist injustice manifested in a capitalist class-system. It would be misleading to regard 'social amelioration' or 'higher living-standards' as the first and immediate priority for China. Rather, social progress in material terms falls within a framework of *ideology*¹.

In our discussion the term *social policy* is used in a broad sense. It refers to the theory and practice of China's new society: hence, inseparably from ideology, politics and economics. In the west, the meaning of social policy is usually limited to specific social amelioration — alleviation of the worst features of poverty or (simply put) to the provision of welfare. The underlying assumption here is that the social system is in various ways unjust, in that deprived and under-privileged groups would suffer exceptional hardship in the absence of social insurance and welfare provision. Professor Marshall has acknowledged that *social policy* is not an exact technical term. He chose for it: the provision of services or income. The central core of meaning was taken as 'social insurance, public (or national) assistance, the health and welfare services, and housing policy', to which should be added: education, and the treatment of crime². Whilst noting such aspects of social policy with regard to China, our main concern is to place these aspects

within the context of rapid change and with reference to China's political colour, her ideological choice.

The extent and purpose of wage-differentials in agriculture, industry, and the professions are, therefore, topics just as relevant as, say, health services. Account also requires to be taken of China's historic circumstances, and of the influence exerted by particular sections of society such as the army. The formative influences on China's social policy have been the revolutionary movement, the anti-Japanese War, and the 1949 Liberation (expressed, notably, in the *Common Programme* of September 29 1949). The China Defence League founded by Soong Ching-ling (Mme Sun Yatsen) in 1938, to take one example, reorganised in 1945 as the China Welfare Fund, became the China Welfare Institute in 1950 and was reorganised again in 1952. The work of Dr Norman Bethune of Canada and Dr Dwarkanath Kotnis of India was enshrined in the Bethune Medical College and the International Peace Hospitals behind the Japanese lines in the 1930s: these institutions are now part of the health services of the People's Republic of China.

The *commune movement* occupies a central place in China's social policies. This movement is part of a massive effort to develop the countryside in a manner unknown in the west, without forcing peasants into crowded cities. Indeed a reverse process is promoted: there is a major movement from the cities to the countryside. The cultural revolution re-emphasised that living-standards, health, and education services should be as adequately provided in the countryside as in urban areas.

The broad purpose of social policy is summed up in the elimination of the 'three great differences' — between town and country, between agricultural and industrial conditions, and between mental and manual work. The major commitment to this policy was made in 1958. Under Mao Tsetung's leadership the second session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (May 5-23 1958) adopted the *General Line* of socialist construction and then (August 29 1958) the policy on the formation of *communes*.^{*} The *Great Leap Forward* in production was the third feature of this major policy commitment, constituting the *Three Red Banners* of China's policies.

Balanced development: regional and economic

The geographical (regional) aspect of China's development requires a place in these introductory remarks, although it will not be pursued in later sections. Particularly since 1956, China has been correcting the historic but one-sided emphasis on coastal development, and has promoted a balanced growth of coastal and inland industries. Furthermore, regional power has increased as against that of the central government³. In western countries the 'welfare' problem bears a regional aspect as well as a qualitative one. Not only is welfare in itself a problem, but additionally there is the much greater distress, unemployment and neglect of public services in some regions of a country as compared with others.

Nearly all iron and steel enterprises in the old China were concentrated

^{*} The Communist Party Central Committee resolution of August 29 1958 is reproduced as an Appendix (below, p 45).

in five eastern coastal or near-coastal cities: Anshan, Penki, Talién, Tientsin and Shanghai. Today major industries are found deep in China's interior. Even in Lhasa (Tibet), an iron industry is now established. Motivation for development has completely changed. Machine-shops in the old China were mainly engaged in repair work or the assembly of imported parts. Today, they make their own products, and contribute to other branches of the national economy. Chemical fertilizer plants play a significant part in assisting agricultural development. There is thus a regional aspect to industrialisation that bears on economic growth and employment and, thereby, on welfare and social conditions.

Again, Chinese industrialisation has not involved an emphatic choice in favour of heavy industry *and simultaneously against* light industry (unlike the Soviet case). Indeed light industry serves as the essential link between heavy industry on the one hand, and agriculture on the other. The consequences have been: an adequate supply of everyday goods for consumption, a stable currency, and a greater and more rapid accumulation of capital than would otherwise have been possible. In short: the peasants have not been penalised for the growth of heavy industry. Agricultural tax was fixed on a notional (standard) output, so that the proportion of production paid in tax falls as production increases. Policy has been to encourage communes to accumulate their own capital. Agriculture is regarded as the foundation of the economy, and industry the 'leading factor'⁴.

Population and population policy

By end-1970 China's population probably comprised about 800 million people. The total figure was reported as 646,530,000 on January 1 1958. 700 million was mentioned in March 1966, and 750 million in February 1968⁵. The original June 30 1953 census recorded nearly 602 million (including 7.5 million in Taiwan, and 11.7 million overseas Chinese). Rural areas accounted for 87 per cent of the total at that time, but the urban population was growing at a rate of 40 per cent from 1950 to 1954. 95 per cent of the population has been settled in the eastern region (about 58 per cent of China's land area). Nearly all the large cities are in the east and north-east, but as already noted, the interior is being developed and there is a shift under way to virgin lands in northern and western provinces. Annual net increase of population has been around 2 per cent — adding about 15 million people each year. Youth under 16 years constitute some 40 per cent of the total population.

Our interest lies not so much in a statistical analysis of these commonly-quoted figures, as in a consideration of population policy and its implications. In the mid-fifties a birth-control campaign was launched, reaching a peak in 1957. This policy — implying a pessimistic view of China's ability to provide for her ever-growing population — was however relaxed in 1958, when a more optimistic view was taken; and the General Line, the Great Leap Forward and the commune movement were introduced.

It is useful to distinguish 'population control' from 'fertility control'. Whilst contraceptives and abortion facilities are provided as a matter of

government policy ('population control'), emphasis has increasingly been laid on the voluntary postponement of marriage in the interests of quality in child-rearing ('fertility control'). Men are urged not to marry before 28 or 30, women not before 25; children should be limited to 2. This approach may be expected to find the greatest response in urban areas, the most active during the cultural revolution, and was exemplified by the attitude of students at Harbin Technical College expressed to me in August 1967. The trend to later marriage is, of course, contrary to the western trend towards earlier marriage since the 1950s. The present policy of 'fertility control' — encouraged, not enforced — may be seen as a compromise between the pre-1958 relatively stern proposals for population limitation, and the over-confidence of 1958. Dr Ma Yin-chu, the President of Peking University who in July 1957 advocated a 'stern' policy on the Malthusian grounds that population increase was outstripping economic growth, was dismissed from his post in 1960. Northern and Western provinces, however (and in line with what has been mentioned earlier), have been positively encouraged to remedy their population deficiencies.

From the foregoing sketch of the population position, and especially with regard to the high proportion of young people, it is clear that a major concern of social policy must be for the material and moral care of the young; and for their understanding of the Chinese revolution. As Mao Tsetung put it, addressing students in 1957:

The world is yours, as well as ours, but in the last analysis, it is yours. You young people, full of vigour and vitality, are in the bloom of life, like the sun at eight or nine in the morning. Our hope is placed on you . . . The world belongs to you. China's future belongs to you⁶.
and again:

We must help all our young people to understand that ours is still a very poor country, that we cannot change this situation radically in a short time, and that only through the united efforts of our younger generation and all our people, working with their hands, can China be made strong and prosperous⁷.

Family and social groups: a collectivist orientation

Sociologists considering the fate of the family in the industrialisation of western countries have sometimes concluded that a decline or weakening of the family has occurred. Women are emancipated, and young people may leave home to seek industrial employment. It has not been clear, however, whether *decline* or *weakening* are appropriate terms to be used. The family has certainly become more democratic, and parental authority has weakened. The family unit has changed.*

The family in China has traditionally been the basic social unit, reinforced in past times by ancestor-worship. The 3- or 4-generation family unit is still found in the countryside today, as might well be expected. What is interesting is that in the towns, housing estates are built at the same time as factories, and entire families including grandparents are resettled: not just industrial workers. This minimises the number of 'drifters' seeking jobs.

* See also below, pp 13-14.

The typical Chinese family today would appear to be more cohesive than its western counterpart, and if this is the case, then there would be a beneficial effect in terms of material and moral security. There does not appear to be a 'generation gap' — at least, not in the contemporary western sense. This is of course a topic on which it is extremely difficult to pronounce. On the one hand, one may cite the favourable findings of a Canadian child psychiatrist, Dr Denis Lazure (published 1962)⁸; on the other, a cardinal feature of the cultural revolution was the denunciation by young people of 'old ideas, culture, customs and habits'.

What is clear is that China has produced *new social groups* concerned with individual, family, and community welfare, and with service to the state. Neighbourhood and street committees gave rise to experimental urban communes — the first was founded in Chunshu district near Peking, in the autumn of 1958 — and these have reinforced the social fabric of town life⁹. The committees promote the self-help of neighbourhoods, factories, and schools. With constant political agitation and discussion, they have contributed to the eradication of slums, child poverty, delinquency and prostitution, drug-taking, homelessness, and distress in old age — everyday afflictions of the old China, and increasing afflictions in western countries at the present time. Changes in — and inadequacies of — the family unit in China, are thus set against the emergence of new groups and associations.

The ability to work in groups is deeply ingrained in the Chinese. It has been well argued that co-operation in irrigation projects, and civic sense in the face of natural disaster — self-help, without command from authority — have been Chinese characteristics from time immemorial¹⁰. There is a polarity here, between western and Chinese life and outlook — the western has a strong individualist, and the Chinese a strong collectivist orientation.

Western culture arose in rival Greek city-states, in regional and national groupings, and in conflicting Anglo-Saxon, Latin, Slav, and other influences, albeit within the orbit of Indo-European languages and the application of Greek, Roman, Christian, and liberal-capitalist ideas. China by contrast was unified in 221 BC — the 1,600-mile-long Great Wall was then completed — and produced a homogeneous culture on a continental scale. There was no definitive dissolution of this culture, as there was with the Roman Empire. A harmonious view of the world emerged, with concepts such as 'virtue', 'righteousness', 'duty' and 'destiny' emphasised much more than 'individual liberty', 'sectional rights' or 'economic organisation'. Western monotheistic religions, emphasising the direct access of the individual soul to divine force, undoubtedly reinforce individualism; polytheism, however, encourages inclusiveness and a collectivist outlook. Finally, the rural character of Chinese life merits attention. 'Home' — even after the formal adoption of city life — is still the ancestral village; and whereas the western concept of 'civilisation' has a root association with city life and citizenship, the Chinese concept is associated with 'the transforming influence of literature'¹¹.

With these considerations in mind, the social movements and policies described below become more readily comprehensible.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

Old and new democratic revolutions

- 1840–1919 The old democratic revolution:
From the Opium War 1840 and the Taiping Revolution 1851–64, to the Reform movement 1898, the end of the Ching (Manchu) dynasty 1911, and the May Fourth movement 1919.
- 1919–1949 The new democratic revolution:
- 1919 May Fourth movement.
 - 1921 Chinese Communist Party founded.
 - 1924–27 Peasants' movement.
 - 1926–27 First revolutionary civil war
(‘northern expedition’ against warlords).
 - 1927–37 Second (agrarian) revolutionary civil war.
 - 1927 Chinese Red Army founded.
 - 1934–35 Chinese Red Army Long March to Yen’an.
 - 1937–45 Anti-Japanese war.
 - 1946–50 Third revolutionary civil war.

Mao Tsetung:

- 1927 ‘Report on an investigation of the peasant movement in Hunan’.
- 1937 ‘On practice’ and ‘On contradiction’.
- 1942 ‘Talks at the Yen’an forum on literature and art’.
- 1949 ‘On the people’s democratic dictatorship’.

The People’s Republic

- 1949 The *Common Programme* of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC): September 29.
Proclamation of the *People’s Republic*: October 1.
- 1950 Major laws on marriage, agrarian reform, trade unions.
Sanitation, health campaigns begin.
- 1950–53 Korean war.
- 1951–52 Expansion of worker-peasant part-time education.
Reorganisation of higher education. Social insurance.
- 1952 Campaigns against corruption, waste, bureaucracy &c. (‘three antis’ and ‘five antis’ movements).
- 1953 First national census.
- 1954 Condemnation of Kao Kang for ‘economic overlordship’ of the north-eastern provinces.
Formal unification of China with national elections and adoption of *Constitution* (September 20).
- 1955 Mao Tsetung: ‘On agricultural co-operation’.
- 1956 Mao Tsetung: ‘Ten Great Relationships’.
- 1956–58 Reform of the Chinese written language begun.

- 1957 Mao Tsetung: 'On the correct handling of contradictions among the people'.
Anti-rightist and rectification campaigns.
- 1957-61 Red-and-expert campaign.
- 1958 The *Three Red Banners*:
The *General Line* of socialist construction, the *Great Leap Forward*, and the *People's Communes*.
Mao Tsetung recommends the use of *dazibao* (big-character posters).
- 1959 First well drilled at Taching oilfield.
Lin Piao replaces Peng Teh-huai as Defence Minister.
Completion of major construction projects in Peking.
- 1959-61 Three years of natural disasters.
- 1960 Lin Piao calls for widespread study of the thought of Mao Tsetung. Little red book of *Quotations* is prepared as political digest for the armed forces.
National conference on education, culture, health &c.
Adoption of 8-hour day, 6-day week.
Withdrawal of Soviet aid and technicians from China.
- 1962 First recovery from disaster years of 1959-61.
Liu Shao-chi publishes his revised edition of 'How to Be a Good Communist'.
- 1962-63 *Socialist education* campaign against corruption.
- 1964 Mao Tsetung recommends Tachai brigade as a rural model.
- 1964-65 *Four Clean-Ups* campaign in economy, politics, ideology &c.
- 1965 Major intensification of U.S. War in Vietnam.
Abolition of insignia of rank in the armed forces.
Mao Tsetung criticises Health Ministry and Culture Ministry.
Yao Wen-yuan criticises the play by Wu Han.
- 1966 The *Cultural Revolution*:
Broadcast criticism of Peking University authorities, abolition of entrance-examinations for student enrolment, closure of schools and colleges, CC CCP *16 Points Decision*, Red Guard marches, Mao Tsetung *Quotations*.
- 1967 Revolution in Shanghai. Spread of Cultural Revolution.
- 1968 *Revolutionary committees* established all over China.
Liu Shao-chi formally expelled from the Party at the Plenum.
- 1959 *Ninth National Congress* of the CCP. Report by Lin Piao.
Adoption of new Party Constitution (replacing that of 1956, itself changed from 1945).

2. LIBERATION AND REFORM

Establishment of the People's Republic

The establishment of the People's Republic, often referred to as the Liberation of 1949, was not a single event. Although proclaimed on October 1st of that year, it was, rather, a *process* of conquest, consolidation, and reform. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the Nationalist (Kuomintang) forces continued military operations on the mainland and Hainan Island during 1950.

Public organisations grew rapidly in the new China. By the beginning of 1953, trade-union membership had reached 10,200,000. The China New-Democratic Youth League had over 9 million members; the All-China Students' Federation, nearly 3½ million; and the All-China Democratic Women's Federation, 76 million. Supply and marketing co-operatives had about 148 million members. Two-fifths of all rural workers were already organised in mutual-aid teams¹².

Early in 1952 the 'three antis' ('three evils', *san fan*) movement was launched among government employees against corruption, waste, and bureaucracy. It was followed by the 'five antis' ('five evils', *wu fan*) in the sector of the economy that was still in private ownership, against bribery, tax evasion, theft of state property, cheating on government contracts, and theft of information for private speculation.

Meantime there were campaigns to repair the dikes and railways, clean up rubbish and rats, and eradicate insect pests. By end-1952, nearly all Chinese had been vaccinated against smallpox, and a number of basic health measures had been introduced.

The first reforms were made in the educational system.* By 1952, worker and peasant students constituted 80 per cent of the national enrolment in primary schools, 60 per cent in secondary schools, and 20 per cent in higher education¹³. 760 million books were published in 1952 — 4.3 times that of the highest year (1936) before Liberation.

A First Five-Year Plan (1953-57) was introduced. The 1953 census was taken in preparation for the first nation-wide elections the following year. The *Common Programme* of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) which had served as a provisional Constitution, was succeeded by a *Constitution of the People's Republic* adopted by the first National People's Congress (September 20 1954)¹⁴.

The outstanding feature of the Liberation, however, was the reform of rural society.

Agrarian reform and continuous revolution

Mao Tsetung's 'Report on an investigation of the peasant movement in Hunan' (March 1927) served as the starting-point of policy. In 1927 the peasants were joining associations established by themselves, to undermine and overthrow the local tyrants and landlords, stand up to corrupt officials, and indeed to express opposition to traditional ideas¹⁵. The principle that the peasants should combine was maintained in the major Agrarian Reform

* Below, pp 14-16.

Law of June 30 1950. Land was to be confiscated by them, for re-distribution. At the same time, the rural secret societies should be dissolved, and feudal ideas banished. Ex-landlords were given a share in the re-distribution of their former property, to assist in their self-reform. At the time of the formal enactment of this law, its provisions had in practice already been applied to an estimated 145 million people: there remained some 265 million people to be affected¹⁶.

At the expense of 4 per cent of the rural population, the status of some 50 per cent was raised from that of the lowest to the middle-peasant category. 115 million acres of land were re-distributed. Except for border regions, the basic reform was complete by the end of 1952. The vitally important point is, however, that this reform was only the beginning of *continuous revolution* in the countryside. Communist Party branches played a key role, publicising information and stimulating discussion.

The main stages of rural collectivisation were:

1950-55, formation of *mutual aid teams*: about 10 households working together, seasonally or year-round;

1955-56, formation of *elementary Producer Co-operatives*: 20-40 households. Payments were based on the contribution of land, tools and animals by each household — semi-socialist in form; leading to

1957: *advanced Producer Co-operatives*, corresponding to the village unit of government, and socialist in form; 100-300 households.

The co-operative level of organisation enlarged employment opportunities in the countryside. Middle-peasants invested much of their savings, and poor-peasants paid a membership fee (sometimes being helped to do so). From 1958 onwards, the advanced Producer Co-operatives merged into

People's Communes: about 2,000-5,000 households, corresponding to the district unit of government (*hsiang*).

The district unit of government (*hsiang*) was, in fact, taken over by the communes, which became responsible for the registration of births and deaths, the local militia, education, health services, clubs for leisure, banks, shops and factories. The first People's Commune was formed in April 1958 in Suiping County, Honan Province. By August 1958 some 8,700 communes were covering 30 per cent of the rural population. The process of collectivisation at this level was virtually complete by end-1958, with nearly 27,000 communes. (Today, with re-organisation and growth, there are some 75,000.)

The communes were of such a size as to utilise to the full the advantages of collective wealth and the division of labour. They could now afford the products of light and heavy industry and, in particular, invest in irrigation and electrification projects. Such features of peasant life as under-employment in winter months, and the under-employment of women, now began to disappear in a new expression of self-reliance. The commune enjoyed the advantages of decentralisation: its link with the centralised aspect of the national economy lay in the agricultural surplus produced and delivered to state procurement agencies through which all purchases were made.

Social aspects of agrarian reform

Class-distinctions as between poor- and middle-peasants and others, now began to disappear in the creation of a single category: commune-members. It is true that private plots of land were retained by individual families — or, if abolished in the first flush of enthusiasm for commune organisation, later restored — but these plots usually accounted for only 4-5 per cent of cultivated land. Peasant incomes, originally related to the share of land contributed to the formation of co-operatives, were increasingly based on work. At the same time, families in distress were on many communes provided with a free supply of food and fuel. Thus a wage-system was combined with a free-supply system, constituting a most reliable form of social insurance.

At the national level, social aspects of this continuous agrarian reform were indicated in the 'National Programme for Agricultural Development 1956-67', adopted at the second session of the Second National People's Congress (the Chinese parliament) on April 10 1960¹⁷. This programme listed health and housing recommendations, the protection of women and children, care of disabled ex-servicemen and their dependants, the elimination of illiteracy among the young and the middle-aged by 1968, and the establishment of part-time schools. Other provisions concerned rural communications — the extension of radio, telephone and postal networks; the promotion of commerce and rural credit co-operation; the admission of reformed ex-landlords into co-operatives; the prohibition of gambling, and of the activities of secret and superstitious societies; and mutual visiting of city workers with peasants. A report to the National People's Congress of April 6 1960 commended the commune method of payment by wages combined with the free-supply system, attributing to it a marked progress in the care of women and children.

New social relationships in industry

The transformation of rural society was accompanied by far-reaching changes in industrial organisation. A system of state contract with private firms evolved into joint state-private enterprise or indeed to complete nationalisation by 1956. Private commerce was absorbed into co-operative or state sectors. The proportion of the semi-socialist and socialist sector of industry as a whole, rose from 36.7 per cent (1949) to 61 per cent (1952) and was planned to rise to 87.8 per cent by 1957¹⁸. In urban areas as on the communes, pre-1949 class-distinctions began to disappear.

In November 1957 emphasis on central economic control was relaxed. The government repeatedly revised the details of the Second Five-Year Plan (1958-62) in relation to the commune movement and also — it may be surmised — with regard to increasing divergence from the USSR. Instead of relying mainly on large industrial units built with Soviet aid, China was now to develop hundreds of thousands of small- and medium-size plants on the communes in a *Great Leap Forward*.

From the social point of view, apart from the new property- and class-

relationships, the major achievement was the new pattern of employment offered: thereby, the first large-scale absorption into employment of many millions of people.

At the same time, the changes both in rural and in urban life induced a searching appraisal of the purposes and methods of economic and social policy which was to give rise to two lines of approach to China's problems.*

Trade-union reform and labour protection

Together with the Agrarian Reform Law of 1950 and the Marriage Law that is the subject of another section, the Trade-union Law of June 29 1950 was a major reform that broke the social relations of the old and helped lay the foundations of a new society¹⁹. Through many dark years of Nationalist (Kuomintang) rule, the trade-union idea had been kept alive. Now, at last, the movement was to establish itself. The original all-China Federation of Labour, founded in 1925, had had to work illegally after 1927. It was formally re-established at its Sixth Congress in Harbin (August 1948) and moved to its central offices in Peking in February 1949.

The first draft Trade-union Law was prepared by the newly-named all-China Federation of Trade-unions, then revised at national conferences and by the government. For the first time throughout China, trade-unions won the authority not only to represent workers in negotiations with private and state employers, but to enforce laws and regulations on labour protection.

In western countries the trade-union movement arose in opposition to private employers, to reduce work, to increase its rewards, and to improve working conditions. Even today, in western countries, trade-unions are regarded as actually or potentially disruptive, and their legal status is constantly re-examined and re-defined. The historic circumstances in China have been completely different since Liberation. There, the new movement has presided over labour protection, social security, and other social aspects of industrialisation, as a basis for further industrialisation and further self-reliance.

The introduction of labour protection was a most urgent reform — the old China was notorious for barbaric industrial conditions. According to incomplete figures for 1913-48 in Kailan Colliery at Tangshan (British-operated, and one of the largest industrial undertakings of the old China), there was an annual average of 138 deaths. Children of 12 and 13 were employed in many mines, sometimes constituting half the labour force²⁰.

On the eve of the foundation of the People's Republic, the *Common Programme* of September 29 1949 had called for the enforcement of an 8- to 10-hour working day as a first step, and administrative measures followed in March 1950. By 1953 many labour-protection officers had been trained with Soviet help: there were safety-training classes, safety- and sanitation-exhibitions, and regular inspection of industrial enterprises. Major decisions and regulations covering factory safety and sanitation, retirement, and the granting of home leave with pay, were adopted on May 25 1956 by the State Council, and on November 16 1957 by the Standing Committee of the

National People's Congress (amended on February 6 1958 by the State Council at its 70th plenary session)²¹. Depending on length of service and type of employment, retirement was fixed between the ages of 45 and 55 for women and 55 and 60 for men²². By 1960 the 8-hour day, 6-day week had been adopted nearly everywhere, with a 7- or 6-hour day in chemical works or factories involving health risk. A start was made with guaranteed annual holidays of one week, and paid leave of absence (home leave) of 2-3 weeks for workers with families living far away from the workplace.

The number of industrial workers doubled whilst the accident rate was halved in the period 1953-58. Further advances were heralded at the Third National Conference on Labour Protection in 1958. Mechanisation was the basis of an entirely new human and industrial environment, and welfare was rapidly promoted. The increasing numbers of women industrial workers was accompanied by the establishment of nurseries; thus, from having practically no nurseries in 1949, Peking was caring for 538,770 children by 1958.

In the enforcement of labour protection as in the more general field of social insurance, it is important to point out once more the Chinese style of self-reliance and autonomous administration. Not 'officials', but the recipient's own workmates, undertook responsibility for the application of these aspects of social policy. The All-China Federation of Trade Unions was over 12 million strong by 1956.

Social Insurance

Labour insurance regulations were introduced on February 26 1951 and revised on January 2 1953. They applied to state, private, and co-operative enterprises employing over 100 workers, which contributed a sum equal to 3 per cent of the total pay-roll to insurance — workmen's compensation, medical assistance, disablement pensions — covering injury and disablement both at the workplace and sustained outside the workplace. It was explicitly laid down that the insurance fund was not to be established by deduction from wages. Enterprises employing fewer than 100 workers or otherwise not within the scope of these regulations were urged to adopt similar schemes by collective agreement between management and trade unions²³.

By end-1955, 5,710,000 workers were covered by this type of insurance. As it also applied in various ways to their families, it affected some 13 million people. By 1958, 13,779,000 workers — or some 30 million people — were involved. This represented a notable proportion of the industrial population and was to be the basis for further progress.

Under the 1951/1953 regulations, employers undertook payment for medical treatment, travelling expenses, and meals, during hospitalisation. Full wages were paid for the first 6 months of sickness, and subsequently 60 per cent of full wages (or 75 per cent in the case of total disablement). On retirement 60-80 per cent of the wage was due as a pension. Following death at work, lineal dependants received 25-50 per cent (or in the case of 'model workers', 30-60 per cent) of the wages of the deceased as a monthly pension. They were also covered for funeral expenses, and entitled to a

* Below, pp 17-21.

relief benefit. (The actual sum paid was determined by the trade union welfare workers, on examination of particular family circumstances.) Lineal dependants themselves became entitled to medical treatment either free, or — at most — at half-cost²⁴.

Thus, social insurance is related to the size and progress of the enterprise in which the individual — or his close relatives — finds employment. It is also related to the position of the individual at work (the duration of his previous employment, and whether he is a 'model worker') and to his family circumstances. With some 85 per cent of the population still living in the countryside, the importance of the commune is again evident.

Already at the co-operative stage of development, 'five guarantees' had been offered to peasants for food, clothing, fuel, primary education, and decent burial for the old. The commune stage of collectivisation assumed further responsibilities: old people's homes, provision for widows, orphans and the destitute, and later maternity homes and extensive medical services²⁵.*

The Emancipation of Women

For centuries China was associated in the minds of foreigners with cruel practices towards women and children, ranging from traditional foot-binding and the sale of wives and children to the ideological enforcement of women's domestic subservience as reiterated — less than two generations ago — in Chiang Kai-shek's 'New Life' doctrine. In China as elsewhere, women's emancipation should be viewed not as a movement for some abstract set of 'human rights', but more concretely: as a struggle for the right to participate in social production as part of their struggle for their total liberation. It is on this basis that related demands for equality of opportunity with men in education, politics and marriage, acquire their real meaning. The establishment of communes in 1958 represented — in this context, as in so many others — the greatest single step forward.

Before the commune movement, the Marriage Law of May 1 1950 had already marked the gulf separating the old China from the new, in the most striking terms²⁶. Compulsory betrothal and the feudal marriage of children, infanticide, bigamy, concubinage, and the system of gifts in marriage were all abolished. The minimum age for marriage was fixed at 20 for men and 18 for women. The right to retain maiden names after marriage, and equality between men and women in the possession and management of family property, were secured. Divorce was made available by mutual consent but the husband alone may not apply for divorce during the wife's pregnancy or within one year of the birth of a child. After a divorce, both parents still have the duty to support and educate their children.

Maternity benefit under the February 26 1951 (revised January 2 1953) Labour Insurance Law provided 56 days' leave of absence from work, before and after confinement, with full wages.

Allegations sometimes made in the west, that commune organisation has broken up the family unit, appear to be without foundation. In the course

of an extensive tour ranging from Shanghai to Harbin in 1967, I visited several communes with separate family accommodation — often in semi-detached houses — and with grandparents still present. However, the much more extended *clan* family, previously sanctified by veneration of ancestors, is certainly disappearing — indeed, it has been disappearing at least for two generations past.

Western-style expressions of romantic love are definitely out of favour. Priority is given to community and state service, within which love and marriage may find their place in a 2- or 3-generation family unit. The emphasis on small families previously noted* serves a double purpose: children are better cared for, and mothers have more time to work outside the home and to study.

It is not possible to say in precise statistical terms how far women's emancipation has progressed today, but there is impressive evidence for the period up to 1959. Some 100 million women began to participate in production in 1958, and in 1958-59 the number of women factory and office employees rose from 3.2 to over 8 million. (Equal pay for equal work is applied in China, with Mao Tsetung's saying often quoted: 'Women occupy half the sky'.) In rural areas, 90 per cent of all able-bodied women were engaged in agricultural work and 30 million on water-conservancy projects. In 1957 able-bodied peasant men worked an average of 249 days, rising to 300 days in 1959; in the same period women increased their contribution from 166 to 250 days²⁷. The number of women students in higher education rose from 27,000 in 1949 to 150,000 in 1958²⁸.

Whatever fluctuations there may have been since 1959, it is clear to any visitor to China today that women are playing their full part in all spheres, except that they are under-represented on revolutionary committees, a fact that is freely admitted to be the result of a political shortcoming of men and women alike.

Educational progress and ideology

China's first modern school system following the Imperial School Regulations of 1903 was modelled on that of Japan, in turn modelled on that of France. Reforms in 1912 and 1922 reflected U.S. influence and established a sequence of: 6 years' primary schooling, 3 years' junior middle-school and 3 years' senior middle-school, followed by 4 years' undergraduate study. Even in its later development, this system had provided schools for fewer than 40 per cent of school-age children and left 85 per cent of the population illiterate²⁹. Since the 1949 Liberation, education has passed through a period of very rapid growth in the number of students, a great development of part-time education, a shortening of many courses, the establishment of a constant relationship of study to work, and — above all — a complete change in the ideological content of education at all levels.

A primary school population of nearly 24 million in 1949-50 rose to nearly 64.3 million in 1957, by which time nearly all *urban* children were attending primary school. A peak pre-1949 figure of 1,496,000 middle-

* Above, pp 3-4.

* See also below, pp 23-25.

school pupils rose to 6,281,000 in 1957, and a peak pre-1949 university student population of 155,000 rose to 441,000 in 1957³⁰. Then — as in other fields — the year 1958 saw a Great Leap Forward: particularly in middle-school and university education, where the greatest proportionate increase in student numbers (over 1957) were recorded. By 1958-59, too, a national system of education had been established. The pre-1949 haphazard mixture of government, Christian-mission and private schools was reformed into an integrated state system.

In higher education, three-quarters of all institutes were re-organised in 1952, and they were re-graded: 193 of them having their heads appointed by the state council. (Of these 193, 35 were in north China, 27 in the north-east, 22 in the north-west, 44 in east China, 39 in central south China and 26 in the south-west.) By end-1956 a total of 583 Soviet experts had taken teaching posts in these institutes.

The Chinese Academy of Sciences was established in 1949. It expanded from an initial 17 research bodies to 57 by 1956, with 20 times the number of research workers, and a 12-year development plan was adopted (1956-67)³¹.

An August 1951 State Council resolution on educational reform called for recognition of the status of industrial and agricultural schools and training classes, within the national system in process of formation. Special reference was made to the difficulties facing working-class children, few of whom at that time could hope to progress far in the 6+3+3 years' educational sequence, and to a new enlarged role for technical education. Part-time schools for peasants and workers were established; notably, over 30,000 part-time agricultural high schools.

As it is the expression of an overall outlook on her needs and objectives, China's social policy merits consideration as a whole. However, if any aspect is to be singled out for special emphasis, it is, I think, her educational ideology. With such a high proportion of young people in a society still in the making, the importance of an appropriate ideology cannot be over-estimated.

The contemporary transformation of educational ideology has its source in the ideas practiced in the Kiangsi and other south China ('Soviet') areas in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Then, in Yen-an after the *Long March* (1934-35), there was integration of practical training with ideology, but with provision too for specialised higher education such as medicine. The relationships that were stressed at that time, are still regarded as fundamental: the relationship of education to manual work, of theory to practice, and of Communist commitment to technical training ('red and expert'), elaborated on many occasions and expressed in the *Common Programme*³². The culture and education of the new China is defined in that programme, as national, scientific, and popular.

The classroom is not regarded as the sole, or even the main means of public education. Sport, broadcasting, publishing, the cinema and theatre,

and art, are all cited; and — most importantly — stress is laid on the *personal experience of public service* in work and leisure, i.e. learning by doing.

Growth in popular arts and national expression

Preceding sections have illustrated China's social policy by reference to particular reforms within the mainstream of the Chinese revolution, indicating connections inherent in the Chinese approach to industrialisation and socialism. A pause in the historical account is appropriate to emphasise the qualitative change in social structure that had been achieved. Later sections will treat less of events, statistics, and the material contained in legislation, and will be more concerned with political problems, social structure, and ideology.

The period 1958-60 is a useful one at which to pause, for there is no doubt that by then the new China had attained a certain maturity of style and expression. This was especially evident in October 1959, on the occasion of the tenth anniversary celebrations of the People's Republic. Peking, beacon of the revolution, had taken on a quite new appearance. The upsurge in building construction had more than doubled the total floor-space of the pre-Liberation city. Vast new structures and monuments illustrated scientific and cultural progress, as well as revolutionary sacrifice and devotion.

The Lu Hsun Museum had already opened on October 19 1956, the twentieth anniversary of the writer's death³³, and the Peking Planetarium on September 29 1957. There followed the colossal Great Hall of the People on the west side of the Tien An Men Square, itself enlarged from the original 11 to 40 hectares. On the south side of this square the Monument to the People's Heroes — begun August 1 1952 — was unveiled on May 1 1959: it commemorates those who gave their lives from the time of the Old Democratic Revolution (1840 onwards) as well as those who fell during the Liberation and later. On the east side of the Tien An Men square stand the Military Museum of the Chinese People's Revolution, and the Museum of Chinese History built in 1959. The Central Museum of Natural History east of Tien Chiao was opened on January 1 1959, and the Art Museum in 1960.

In the field of sport, the Peking Workers' Stadium was undertaken by the All-China Federation of Trade Unions in September 1958. The stadium and swimming-pools were completed in August 1959. The gymnasium, begun in December 1959, took 15 months to complete. These were only a few of the outstanding building achievements of that time, promoting physical health and good performance in sports and swimming.

In quite other directions, music, literature, and the arts, all gave distinctive expression to the new China both in the mass media and in face-to-face performances. By 1958 the circulation of newspapers was over 5 times that of 1950, that of journals 15 times, and of books 9 times; the number of feature films produced, and of film-projection units, increased nearly 20 times over 1949³⁴.

Folk operas and dancing rapidly developed in army units and neighbourhood and city organisations, on the basis of traditions born in the 1930s. Unassuming stories of everyday devotion, as well as heroic episodes of the Long March and the Anti-Japanese War, became popular favourites. In experimental urban communes the production of traditional handicrafts was extended with modern themes. Enthusiasm for table-tennis penetrated into every corner of the People's Republic. Vividly impressive with their collective effort and meticulous organisation, were the mass exhibitions, parades and callisthenics on national holidays.

By this time too, there had already been many controversies over the style and content of proletarian culture.*

3. THE EMERGENCE OF TWO LINES

Social progress and social structure by 1958-60

What sort of society had China become by about 1958-60?

An answer cannot be easy. It was clear that many features of the pre-1949 society had been abolished — at least, in the *formal* sense. New social relations were in the making, some associated with technical progress and industrialisation, others with co-operation and socialism. Government policy was summarised in the *Three Red Banners* — the General Line of socialist construction, the Great Leap Forward, and the People's Communes.

It is easier to record the details of social progress than to judge their significance for social structure. The June 1960 Peking National Conference of outstanding groups and individuals in socialist construction in education, culture, health, physical culture and journalism, attended by over 6,000 delegates and others from 28 provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions, was the first major meeting of its kind since the foundation of the People's Republic. It was the occasion for a valuable review of progress: but this very progress implied far-reaching problems. China's *cultural revolution* was already in debate, even before it acquired ideological and political form as the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in 1965-66³⁵.

Many interesting statistics were reported to the National Conference. Over 7 million people were by 1960 professionally employed in culture and education, with a further 30 million in a spare-time capacity. Illiteracy had been eliminated among over 100 million people.

The reform of the Chinese written language was a notable aspect of the literacy campaign³⁶. In January 1956 the State Council had published three lists of characters: 230 simplified characters for immediate adoption, a further 285 of which 95 were introduced on a trial basis in June 1956, and a

further list of 54 simplified radicals (component parts of characters common to a class of characters). A speech by Chou En-lai on January 10 1958 indicated government interest at the highest level in the details of the reform, and an appreciation of popular need:

We should consider the question of language reform from the standpoint of the 600 million people and not from personal habit or temporary convenience³⁷.

Even on an issue as apparently non-political as language reform, *two lines of policy* had already emerged. Since Liberation there had been a constant process of ideological re-moulding to ensure that professional people would serve the masses and help construct a new society — and not merely live their professional lives aloof and secluded as before. The Chinese Communist Party and state organisations faced the need to change the bourgeois outlook of intellectuals on virtually every social issue, even that of language reform. The period 1957-61 called forth a *red and expert* campaign, for competent public service *and* a Left political position as well.

A number of Rightists had already attacked the principle of language reform. How much of China's past should now be preserved? What were the criteria to be employed in answering such a question? More pertinently: should policy be designed to demonstrate to the masses the advantages of education, to encourage those who could to enter the ranks of the elite? Or should the concepts themselves of *rank* and *elite* be rejected, and government and cadres merged with the masses to raise the cultural level of the entire nation: to abolish class distinction altogether?

These were not questions of abstract political theory. Apart from progress in the elimination of illiteracy, the major advances in higher education had already produced new social groups. Would these new groups have a bourgeois or a proletarian outlook? By the time of the June 1960 National Conference mentioned above, there were 810,000 full-time students in higher education institutes — 5.2 times as many as in 1947 (old China's peak year). Full-time middle-school and technical-school enrolment was nearly 13 million — 6.8 times as many as in 1946, the pre-Liberation peak.

Furthermore, millions of people now enjoyed a new-found energy and interest in public affairs, as a result of better nutrition and regular employment. In public health, China now had some 390,000 medical and health-protection institutes — 107 times the pre-Liberation number — and a public-health network based on the communes was taking form. Smallpox and kala-azar were almost eliminated, and other diseases greatly reduced. The Chinese Red Cross — reorganised in 1950 — and other organisations, stressed the prevention of disease and publicity work, with very impressive results.

But would China now be simply 'modernised' in her new welfare, or would she rather secure her welfare in a socialist society?

Mao Tsetung's theses on contradictions among the people

To the foregoing issues, many more were added by 1958-60. There was the question of China's international position. There were the practical prob-

* Below, p 42.

lems arising from her three years of natural disasters (1959-61). There was a growing dispute with the USSR, which was to culminate in the withdrawal of Soviet assistance to China (both in men and in materials) in August 1960.

On February 27 1957 Mao Tsetung delivered a crucially important speech at the eleventh session of the Supreme State Conference, later published under the title: *On the correct handling of contradictions among the people*. His analysis was dialectical in approach, examining terms and concepts within different concrete situations instead of accepting them with abstract, unchanging meaning. Mao distinguished the essential past (still supported by China's enemies) from the essential present, as antagonistic contradictions; China's internal social structure consisted of non-antagonistic contradictions. Here follow some key passages³⁸.

. . . certain contradictions do exist between the government and the masses. These include contradictions between the interests of the state, collective interests and individual interests; between democracy and centralism; between those in positions of leadership and the led, and contradictions arising from the bureaucratic practices of certain state functionaries in their relations with the masses. All these are contradictions among the people. Generally speaking, underlying the contradictions among the people is the basic identity of interests of the people. . . .

In 1942 we worked out the formula 'unity-criticism-unity' to describe this democratic method of resolving contradictions among the people. To elaborate, this means to start off with a desire for unity and resolve contradictions through criticism or struggle so as to achieve a new unity on a new basis . . . The basic contradictions in socialist society are still those between the relations of production and the productive forces, and between the superstructure and the economic base . . . survivals of bourgeois ideology, bureaucratic ways of doing things in our state organs, and flaws in certain links of our state institutions stand in contradiction to the economic base of socialism. . . .

There has been a falling off recently in ideological and political work among students and intellectuals, and some unhealthy tendencies have appeared. Some people apparently think there is no longer any need to concern themselves about politics, the future of their motherland and the ideals of mankind. It seems as if Marxism that was once all the rage is not so much in fashion now. This being the case, we must improve our ideological and political work . . . Not to have a correct political point of view is like having no soul. . . .

It will take a considerable time to decide the issue in the ideological struggle between socialism and capitalism in our country. This is because the influence of the bourgeoisie and of the intellectuals who come

from the old society will remain in our country as the ideology of a class for a long time to come. Failure to grasp this, or still worse, failure to understand it at all, can lead to the gravest mistakes — to ignoring the necessity of waging the struggle in the ideological field.

Mao went on to list six criteria for distinguishing 'fragrant flowers' from 'poisonous weeds' in Chinese political life, of which the most important concerned the socialist path and leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.

Political struggle and two lines of policy

A major debate on China's policies had evidently begun, as reflected in Mao's theses. Then, dispute over the Great Leap Forward — its early difficulties, worsened by the three years of natural disasters — provided the starting-point for a new phase of the political struggle.

Two lines of policy formed around the following issues:

What was the appropriate strategy for socialist construction? Should this strategy emphasise incentive techniques, individual reward, and individual competition — or team work and the volunteer spirit? What should be the relations between town and country, workers and peasants, and between mental and manual labour? To what extent should the Party alone decide policy, and to what extent consult the people? How much initiative should be granted to provinces and local government agencies, and how much retained at the centre? Was there more scope for worker-participation in management? Just how relevant was the USSR as a model for China, in agriculture, in industry, and in the armed forces?

Liu Shao-chi and his supporters tended, explicitly or implicitly, to favour individual material incentives: a markedly higher status for skilled workers, intellectuals and town-dwellers as compared with manual workers and peasants; centralisation; and the Soviet example. In particular, Liu stressed subjective effort and self-cultivation. His book *How to be a good communist* (originally published in July 1939, and reprinted many times thereafter) was re-published in a revised version in August 1962 in a double issue of the journal *Red Flag*³⁹.

Mao Tsetung and his supporters called for much more equalitarianism; fewer or no material incentives; decentralisation; and careful study and adoption of successful policies already to be found in cases of agricultural and industrial management in China itself. Mao's line reflected the principle of self-reliance to an unusual degree, e.g. the government calling on factories and communes to organise their own social security. The mass character of China's needs in public health and education implied the almost complete abolition of class distinctions in health services, and the provision of basic services of all kinds where there were few or none, rather than the pursuit of expensive research. Mao Tsetung criticised the Ministry of Culture as well as the Ministry of Health for being out of touch with popular needs: if they remained out of touch, they should be renamed 'Ministry of Health for Urban Overlords' and 'Ministry of Emperors, Kings, Generals and

Ministers', 'Ministry of Talents and Beauties' or 'Ministry of Foreign Mummies'.

In May 1963 Mao published *Where do correct ideas come from?*, insisting that correct ideas were not innate but came from social practice — from the struggle for production, class struggle, and scientific experiment⁴⁰. This article was part of a Party central committee draft decision on rural work during the *Socialist Education* campaign of 1962-63.

Much of the debate during the cultural revolution was thus to be given an ideological character.

Criticism of Liu Shao-chi

When the supporters of Mao Tsetung came to examine Liu's revised book, they pointed to the omission from it of references to the actual historic circumstances — such as the anti-Japanese War, and the Liberation — within which specific problems had arisen. They especially criticised its failure to refer to *proletarian dictatorship*. Liu's concept of communism was dubbed 'utopian', in the long tradition of pre-Marxist writing in China from *Great Harmony* in the *Book of Rites* (edited by Tai Sheng of the Western Han dynasty, 206 BC — 24 AD) to the *Book of Great Harmony* by Kang Yu-wei (leader of the 1898 Reform movement).

Liu was further rebuked for mis-quoting Lenin (by deleting two references to the dictatorship of the proletariat); and for deleting Stalin's name too (in the process, deleting also the name of Engels). These general and particular features of Liu's revised book were taken to be in line with current Soviet ideological revisions. Liu's ideas, accordingly, were bracketed with those of Khrushchev. During the cultural revolution Liu was rarely referred to by name; more commonly, he was referred to as the Top Party Person in Authority Taking the Capitalist Road, or simply as China's Khrushchev⁴¹.

The final Party verdict on Liu Shao-chi was pronounced by Lin Piao in his Report to the Ninth Party Congress, delivered on April 1 and adopted on April 14 1969. With ample references to Marxist-Leninist theory and the thought of Mao Tsetung, the dictatorship of the proletariat was taken as the touchstone to distinguish scientific from utopian socialism. The participation of the broad masses in the discussion of Liu's ideas, and the establishment of revolutionary committees, were vindicated as the methods of the cultural revolution. It was stressed that

A duplicate administrative structure divorced from the masses, scholasticism which suppresses and binds their revolutionary initiative, and a landlord and bourgeois style of going in for formality and ostentations — all these are destructive to the socialist economic base, advantageous to capitalism and harmful to socialism⁴².

There were also explicit political charges brought against Liu, such as the attempt to remove the armed forces from the command of the Party, with which — in our consideration of social policy — we are less concerned here.

In retrospect, the wide dissemination of the thought of Mao Tsetung was regarded as the most significant achievement of the cultural revolution.

* See also below, pp 30-31, 36-37, 40.

4. THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

Rural life: organisation and ideology

Three years of natural disasters (1959-61) strengthened the hand of those who wished to slow down the pace of rural collectivisation, and there were reversions to pre-commune forms of management (to advanced producer co-operatives).^{*} Concessions were made to individual producers from 1960 onwards, in the 'three extensions and 1 guarantee': extensions of private plots, free markets, and small independent enterprises, and a guarantee of output quotas based on the household. One problem was that this retreat from the original 1958 ideal might develop its own momentum, and many cadres and Party members become discouraged in making too many concessions to private as against public interests. Another problem was the need to strengthen public scrutiny of officials, such as had been previously required at critical times — in 1942 during the anti-Japanese war, in 1952 in the 'three antis' and 'five antis'^{**} and in the 1957 'rectification campaign'.

A rural *socialist education* campaign was accordingly launched in 1962-63, to enquire into and where necessary rectify corruption in the keeping of accounts, storage, public property and 'workpoint' systems of payment. It developed into a much broader movement in 1964-65: the *Four Clean-Ups* or 'four cleans' in economy, politics, organisation and ideology. Poor- and middle-peasants were enlisted in a campaign against *economism* (the pursuit of private or sectional interest) in rural organisations, and against *bureaucratism* in management. 'Two reflections' were also called for — an appeal to all peasants to reflect on and compare rural life before and after Liberation and collectivisation, and consider whether the movement for co-operation and communes was not, after all, in their own practical interest, despite discouragement and reverses suffered in 1959-61. The Tachai brigade, Shansi province, was chosen by Mao Tsetung in 1964 as a national model for rural policy; its Party secretary, Chen Yung-kuei, was elected a full member of the Central Committee of the Party at its Ninth Congress in April 1969.

In 1956 a workpoint system of payment had been adopted at Tachai. Production meetings agreed on a system of rewards, based on the relative difficulty of agricultural tasks. Allocation of rewards was required to be made both to individuals and to teams, and — together with a system of bonuses — the complicated calculations took up much time and provided scope for disputes. The Mao Tsetung line of criticism was that workpoints had been 'put in command'.

But in 1960, the Tachai Brigade experimented with a new system: workpoints now changed their meaning. Each peasant was awarded an agreed valuation of his personal *work-capacity*, arrived at by team discussion. This

* Below, p 49: Amendments to the 1958 resolution.

** Above, p 8.

valuation was to be multiplied by the number of days worked over a given period, to arrive at his earnings. Thus, the assessment of particular tasks was replaced by an assessment of individuals. The most outstanding were designated 'model soldiers', and the key element in this new, personal evaluation was: *public service*. Furthermore, work-supervision was taken out of the hands of supervisors, and given to the team-members themselves: for at each assessment-meeting, they would review opinions of their comrades and consider mutual criticism⁴³.

Team work was fostered. By 1968 over a million visitors from all over the country had studied the Tachai system, returning to their own districts to adapt it to their own circumstances. Thus was raised a choice between two lines of rural policy: emphasis on individual jobs and their reward — or on personal qualities expressed in public service and team consciousness.

Public health and traditional medicine

On June 26 1965 the Ministry of Public Health was accused by Mao of neglecting rural in favour of urban areas and moreover, in the latter, of favouring people of 'rank'. As a consequence there was a rapid development of mobile medical teams, many of them units of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Emphasis now shifted from advanced medical schooling and expensive research, to practical work in the treatment of common ailments among poor- and lower-middle peasants. Modern and costly medical equipment was in any case not available in rural areas, where a first-aid volunteer spirit was needed and did, indeed, arise. Today 2-3 years of medical training related to practical experience has replaced the long college courses of the past, as more relevant to China's needs.

A model for the Mao Tsetung line in public health was provided by a co-operative medical service organised in some districts as early as 1957. Thus, the Chunhsing production brigade (Changshih people's commune, Chuchiang county, Kwangtung province) was established with a population of nearly 3,000 as part of the move to advanced producer co-operatives, in a region with a high incidence of schistosomiasis (a debilitating and often fatal disease), and epidemics such as typhoid fever, malaria and dysentery. About 2 per cent of the population was hospitalised annually with serious illness, and 10 per cent suffered from various common diseases.

The Chunhsing co-operative medical service passed through two phases: 1957-64, when the brigade paid for all members' fees for treatment and the patient paid only a registration fee; and after 1965, when the team became the basic accounting unit. After 1965 medical expenses were shared at three levels: by the brigade, the team, and individuals. Each member of this co-operative now paid 1 yuan a year, each team contributed the same *per capita* from its welfare fund, and the brigade contributed about 2,000 yuan from sideline-occupation income. This totalled about 8,000 yuan. Apart from more extensive health cover, the Mao Tsetung line of 'serving the people' also stimulated greater effectiveness of treatment⁴⁴.

A revival of interest in traditional Chinese medicine was another outcome of the Mao Tsetung line in rural public health. Acupuncture, cautery, cup-

ping and herbs were praised as effective and economical. This was not an entirely new development, but rather a reassertion of trends that had appeared before.

At the time of Liberation China had some 10,000 western-type doctors as against 500,000 traditional ones, and there were attempts to integrate the two types of treatment in a united clinic scheme. The first such united clinics, in the north-eastern province of Heilungkiang, were the subject of Health Ministry directives in July 1951, and by the following year there were 15,000 clinics.

Traditional medicine was praised in late 1954 and there was criticism of officials such as a former Director of Public Health in Heilungkiang, Wang Pin, who regarded it as no more than a stopgap. By 1957 there were over 50,000 clinics. They were replaced by commune-run public health centres in 1958.

The nation-wide employment of 30,000 traditional doctors was confirmed by invitations to them to join the western-medicine Chinese Medical Association, and the cultural revolution with its emphasis on self-reliance (in this context, the use of herbs and local medicines, for example) brought the integration of the two types of medicine much closer. By 1966 there were 200,000 doctors with 5 years' training in both, and 330,000 graduates of the new 'secondary medical schools' providing short courses.

There have also been changes in the management of large chemists' shops which supply medical and other apparatus to hospitals and the general public. They are increasingly serving as centres for the 'red doctors of the countryside', as in Hanku district, Tientsin — in the vanguard of a campaign to bring better services to poor- and lower-middle peasants⁴⁵.

Urban medical services: the example of a Shanghai hospital

The Workers' and Peasants' hospital in the Ming Hang district of Shanghai is an interesting example of urban development in medical services during the cultural revolution, reflecting national political influences as well as local health problems.

It was founded for local people in 1960 — undeterred, therefore, by difficulties following the 1958 Great Leap — with 320 in-patients and 1,000 out-patients. Owing to local population increase and the demands of the cultural revolution, it had 361 beds and 1,800 daily out-patients by 1967. It was classed as a 'second-level' hospital, 'first-level' being clinics and 'third-level' being the best equipped. Nevertheless, it covered all branches of work including dentistry and gynaecology. Of its total of 84 doctors and 130 nurses, 15 doctors and 20 nurses were employed on visiting rounds in the rural areas nearby. The hospital Director, Dr Yu, graduated in 1942 from no. 1 Shanghai Medical College, where — until 1949 — only 60 students were selected from 600 applicants, and only 12 of them actually graduated. The old system of medical training which Dr Yu had known, was by 1967 being revised in terms of both effectiveness and ideology.

In-patients' most common ailments were acute abdominal diseases, bone fracture, heart- liver- and kidney diseases, and high blood-pressure. There

was much meningitis in spring and winter, and B-type encephalitis in summer. Out-patients suffered especially in summer from boils and piles, diarrhoea, hepatitis and ulcers, and some neurosis was known (1 or 2 of the 1,800 daily cases). The campaign against TB had resulted in the establishment of anti-TB stations in each urban district in Shanghai, to very good effect. There were adequate provisions for infant vaccination and factory workers' medical inspection.

As elsewhere, trade unions were responsible for the administrative arrangements concerning hospital treatment for their members. The cost of treatment for trade unionists and their families was borne by the factory trade union, but a charge was made for food and sent to their factory. Patients without a health-service cover, paid the following state-fixed charges: appendix removal, 10 yuan; a major operation, 35 or 40 yuan; ward accommodation, 1 yuan 50 cents daily. Most patients were here by recommendation from a factory or local clinic, but the hospital was open to all cases without prior recommendation.

Of the 84 doctors, traditional medicine in 1967 was practised by 4, 1 of whom specialised in acupuncture. Children's medical care was being revised and improved, and both practical work and research were increasingly related to 'mass' needs rather than to rare and difficult cases.

The People's Liberation Army (PLA) runs its own hospitals in liaison with local hospitals such as this one, and the militia organisations — to which all men and women between 18 and 45 belong — provide first-aid training.

Educational reform

The central importance of China's educational ideology has already been emphasised.* The cultural revolution was the occasion of a decisive strengthening of educational principles and, especially, their application. In his statement of May 7 1966 Mao Tsetung reaffirmed the Yen-an spirit, and his comments were embodied in Point 10 of the *Sixteen Points* Communist Party Central Committee decision of August 8 1966 on the cultural revolution⁴⁶. Mao had said:

While the students' main task is to study, they should, in addition to their studies, learn other things — that is, industrial work, farming and military affairs. They should also criticise the bourgeoisie. The period of schooling should be revolutionised, and the domination of our schools by bourgeois intellectuals should by no means be allowed to continue.

Teaching in schools and colleges throughout China was in fact suspended during the academic year 1966-67, and many colleges remained closed at least until 1968. Students took up extra-mural activities: on communes, they promoted literacy drives or welfare work with old people, as with students at the Peking Politics and Law Institute which I visited; or they supported the take-over of factories and offices by workers upholding the Mao Tsetung line against the influence of Liu Shao-chi.

The most important educational reform affected student enrolment in senior middle-schools and higher education. On June 13 1966 the Central Committee of the Party and the State Council issued a notice abolishing the existing entrance-examinations and recommending a new type of enrolment, combining recommendation and selection in which proletarian politics are put first and the mass line is followed . . . the best students will be admitted, selected from among those recommended for their outstanding moral, intellectual and physical qualities.

The *People's Daily* pointed out the significance of the traditional examination system in maintaining an 'establishment' and an 'elite':

Again and again the Central Committee of the Party and Chairman Mao have pointed out that the old bourgeois educational system, including the enrolling of students by examination, must be thoroughly transformed. This old examination system of enrolling students is most dangerous and harmful to our socialist cause. It places not proletarian but bourgeois politics in command, it places school marks in command. This system is a serious violation of the Party's class line, shuts out many outstanding children of workers, poor- and lower-middle peasants, revolutionary cadres, revolutionary army men, and revolutionary martyrs, and opens the gates wide to the bourgeoisie to cultivate its own successors. This system is a great obstacle to the revolutionising of young people's minds and encourages them to become bourgeois specialists by the bourgeois method of 'making one's own way' and achieving individual fame, wealth, and position . . . It is not only the system of enrolment that requires transforming, all the arrangements for schooling, for testing, for going up or not going up to the higher class, and so on must be transformed, and so must the content of education⁴⁷.

These remarks touch on much more than the place of education in China — they are relevant to the social structure of all countries. Writers on the *sociology of education*, a field of study in the west that considers the relationship of education to social class and to social mobility (movement up and down a 'social ladder' of occupational prestige), have concluded that education is today the main determinant of social position: hence the importance of educational opportunity⁴⁸. As for the examination system — despite acknowledgment of its technical imperfections or even of its undesirability on educational grounds, it is more than ever the mechanism of occupational (and thereby social) selection. As one Professor of Education has put it, the examination system regulates all manner of prospects (including the important prospect of taking more examinations):

Examination results determine a whole range of starting points throughout the occupational structure. They also play an important part in deciding occupational ceilings — as any astute reader of the situations vacant columns will have noticed. And because, in contemporary society, occupation determines a whole range of other opportunities from

* Above, pp 15-16.

marriage to mortgage, the influence of the examination system is immense . . . No one is naive enough to believe that the link between birth and occupation is eliminated: sociologists continue to demonstrate that it persists — often with unexpected strength. But what is now clear is that social advantage frequently has to be transmitted through the examination system; less and less can it bypass it . . . Something like half the pupils in the secondary schools are not even entered for any examination — either because they are regarded as unlikely to obtain even minimal success in them or because their entry would place the success rate of their school at too great a risk . . . half of the pupils are identified as failures at least a year before school leaving age⁴⁹.

In China the cultural revolution did not abolish all examination techniques under all circumstances, but did drastically reduce their importance and encouraged a variety of experiments. Written and oral tests, 'open-book' examinations, individual tests and group tests all became the subject of trial, with an emphasis on reasoning ability as against memory-work⁵⁰. Later references to educational policy, such as in July 1968, stressed the importance of science and engineering. The Shanghai Machine Tools plant was quoted as an example in the training of technicians from the bench with a view to their return to the factory.

In the countryside the Mao Tsetung line emphasised decentralisation and, accordingly, the reduction of central-government expenditure. Before 1958 (and again after the natural disasters and the difficulties of the Great Leap Forward) educational policy and expenditure were controlled by Education Ministries and applied by provincial-level Party organisations. But the intention of the Great Leap had been to transfer primary- and secondary-school responsibilities to production brigades and people's communes. In many cases too, the schools were encouraged to become partly or wholly self-supporting, by engaging in part-time agriculture, lumbering or forestry. Even where these or other activities such as the production of small transistor parts was 'uneconomic' in the short run, their long-term educational and social value in linking school to life was clear.

The rural schools, formerly run by trained teachers, are now governed by representative committees of poor- and lower-middle peasants, cadres, and students. A programme for primary and middle-school education published in the *People's Daily* of May 12 1969 may be cited as indicative. It had been drafted by the Revolutionary Committee of Lishu county, Kirin province, to stimulate discussion, and covered the moral, intellectual and physical aspects of education in relation to proletarian politics, productive labour, scientific experiment, educational management, and the example of the army:

In the problem of transforming education it is the teachers who are the main problem . . . The production brigade should take over the management of state-run primary schools in the rural areas. The teachers

should be paid instead by the brigade on the workpoint system,* supplemented by state subsidies . . .

Five courses are to be given in primary school: politics and language, arithmetic, revolutionary literature and art, military training and physical culture, and productive labour.

Five courses are to be given in middle-school: education in Mao Tsetung thought (including modern Chinese history, contemporary Chinese history and the history of the struggle between two lines within the Party), basic knowledge for agriculture (including mathematics, physics, chemistry and economic geography), revolutionary literature and art (including language), military training and physical culture (including the study of Chairman Mao's concepts on People's War, strengthening the idea of preparedness against war, and activities in military training and physical culture), and productive labour . . .

With regard to the importance of the various courses, politics is of primary importance and should be put first in order . . . Schools should open classes for about 40 weeks of the year (including the time taken up by courses in productive labour) and the students given about 35 days of leave during the busy farming seasons . . . In accordance with Chairman Mao's instruction, 'Teaching material should have local character. Some material on the locality and the villages should be included.' . . . The road of relying on our own efforts should be firmly followed and diligence and frugality should be practised in running schools so as to lighten the burden on the poor- and lower-middle peasants. Extravagance and waste and the tendency to seek grandeur and what is bourgeois should be opposed⁵¹.

Self-Reliance in Industry

Whilst in the countryside the sources of the 'two lines' of policy, followed by the cultural revolution, lay in a reassessment of the Great Leap Forward and the effects of the natural disasters, in industry there was an additional one: the withdrawal of Soviet technicians in August 1960. Natural disasters curtailed the supply of raw materials particularly for light industry — oils, cotton, tobacco leaf — whilst the Sino-Soviet dispute gave rise to ideological debate on the USSR, revisionism, rural-urban relationships, and the need for self-reliance. With the failure in many areas of the 1960 autumn harvests and the relative decline in industrial employment, workers who had settled in the cities since 1956 were urged to return to the countryside to seek work on the communes.

Industry had little alternative but to practice self-reliance. The development of this movement was remarkably vigorous and systematic. The formal planning system established in November 1957 was not changed, but economic motivation took on a new character. A new *mass-line* principle, 'com-

* Above, pp 22-23.

pare, learn, catch up, help', was proclaimed. Industrial work-teams studied each others' methods.

In particular, the revolutionary tradition of managers working at the bench was to be revived and extended. This movement, dissolving managerial exclusiveness, was soon to be a central feature of the cultural revolution in industry. It was a movement going back to 1927, when Party leaders and Red Army officers began to spend a regular part of their time with rank-and-file soldiers growing food and later — during the anti-Japanese war — in handicrafts and light industry. In urban shops, in transport, on construction sites, managers and technicians worked alongside the rank-and-file on one or more days each week; Party, government and other cadres worked in factories or on communes at least one month a year. Army officers spent one month a year as ordinary soldiers. Mao Tsetung, Chou En-lai and other leaders took a hand in digging the Ming Tombs Reservoir. Thus, labour was regarded as the yardstick by which the people measured a cadre's closeness to them, and respect for and appreciation of labour improved leadership. In the wider sense, the end of exclusiveness in the division of labour would help eliminate differences between mental and manual work — thereby reducing and eliminating also, personal and group differences in social status.

A striking example of persistent self-reliance in 1958-62 was provided by the construction of a 12,000-ton hydraulic press in the outskirts of Shanghai. A product of the Great Leap Forward, the construction of this press was undertaken against the advice of Soviet experts who listed the difficulties: lack of smelting furnaces and large-capacity cranes, the need to import heavy machine-tools, the shortage of technicians. 'Top people' in the Party agreed with the Soviet view, and arrangements were made to import the materials for such a press from Czechoslovakia; but before these materials were delivered, the press itself was built.

A score of young engineers tackled the design problem; only one engineer among them, rather older, had even seen such a press. Factories with small- and medium-size presses were visited and in two months the team was ready for comparative analysis. Thus, no foreign machine was copied — the team designed their own.

With much experiment, and the construction of a small 1,200-ton press as a model, a welded structure was built which a Soviet welding expert pronounced — to his own surprise — as good. The press finally went into operation in 1962. Appropriately enough, toy models of this press later made their appearance in the shops of Shanghai and elsewhere.

By 1964 China was producing 85-90 per cent of her machinery and steel requirements, as against 60 per cent and 75 per cent respectively in 1957. In the growth of the motor-car industry, for example, the problem was to make it independent of imports: its self-sufficiency was only 19 per cent in 1956, but over 98 per cent by 1965⁵². Constant innovation and experiment brought about this result, with two kinds of supervision — one from leader-

ship above, and another from the workers below — which were greatly extended during the cultural revolution.

By 1965 the crises of 1959-61 both in industry and agriculture had been more than overcome. An entirely new basis for further advance had been established. In terms of Mao Tsetung thought, a bad thing had been turned into a good thing. Probably the most spectacular achievement of this period — certainly one which aroused the keen attention of observers outside China — was the first nuclear-test explosion on October 16 1964. The first thermo-nuclear (hydrogen) test was to come on June 17 1967, and the first space satellite on April 25 1970. Henceforth if not before, a consideration of China's technical progress and social policy would require present-day and not merely historical comparisons with other advanced industrial nations.

Just as the Tachai Brigade* was quoted as a model for rural organisation, so the Taching Oilfield was upheld as a model of industrial initiative and self-reliance. The first well was drilled on September 30 1959, the eve of China's tenth National Day. With technical innovations and the supplementary working of adjoining pastureland, the harvesting of soya beans and grain, and the development of Taching as a decentralised municipality (the concept of an 'oil city' was rejected by the workers), a vast new agro-industrial complex made its appearance that was to contribute over one-third of China's crude petroleum.

The politics of management

The struggle between 'two lines' of policy in industry was waged in large measure over the socio-economic methods to be adopted to stimulate production. As indicated above, a volunteer spirit emerged in response to the challenge of 1958-60. Whilst Liu Shao-chi and his supporters put 'techniques', 'production', and 'economism' in command (as with 'putting workpoints in command' in agriculture), the Mao Tsetung line stressed ideology and politics.

With reference to the cultural revolution in China, 'economism' may be briefly defined as: over-emphasis on material incentives, to the point of undermining the 'volunteer spirit' and social solidarity and replacing it with self- and sectional-interest. It is interesting to recall that in Canton early in his career (1925), Liu was vice-president of the All-China Federation of Labour; he spent ten years as a trade-union organiser. In 1964 Peng Chen (first secretary of the Peking Party Committee, to be dismissed in the spring of 1966) took charge of the trade union movement. Both Liu and Peng were criticised for confining the movement to economic struggle and welfare in the factories — thereby, neglecting ideological and political struggle — and raising trade unions to the status of independent organisations. They were also criticised for prematurely proclaiming the end of

* Above, pp 22-23.

classes and class struggle, which further implied the suitability on managerial grounds alone of former capitalists as factory directors⁵³.

Choice of organisational style and managerial structure went hand-in-hand with choice of ideology. The accountability and indeed the very accessibility of industrial management to Party and rank-and-file criticism marked off two lines of policy. Under Liu's influence, and contrary to the decentralisation of the Great Leap Forward, a 'trust' movement had developed in heavy industry. National corporations were organised experimentally in 1964 and in twelve lines of industry in 1965, covering chemical plants, agricultural machinery, and rubber, aluminium, tractor and motor-car factories. Not the size of these undertakings, but that they were to be virtually independent of local Party committees owing to the 'specialised' and 'vertical' character that was claimed for them, was the point of the controversy. They would moreover leave little scope for innovations contributed by ordinary workers, and this had already been regarded as a major drawback in the employment of Soviet advisors (before their withdrawal in August 1960).

The Liu Shao-chi line of 'expertise' and 'one-man management' was attacked for its social exclusiveness. Lenin's warnings against the degeneration of the Bolsheviks into an 'industrial party', the division of the Soviet Communist Party into industrial and agricultural sections, Soviet economic reforms, and the bad example of 'economic overlordship' by Kao Kang in Heilungkiang in 1949-54, were all brought into the debate.

By mid-1967 the steel industry's 'Anshan Constitution' dating back to March 22 1960 was being proclaimed as the best defence against bureaucracy. Its principles were: putting politics in command, strengthening Party leadership, promoting mass movements, fostering technical revolution, and close co-operation between workers, cadres and technicians — foreshadowing the *triple alliance* (3-in-1 combination) of cadres, rebels, and local army men, the characteristic organisation of the cultural revolution, as will be seen below.

The course of revolution*

An historic transformation does not begin and end at set moments. However, the cultural revolution may perhaps be conventionally dated from June 1 1965 (abolition of insignia of rank in the army) or from November 10 1965 (publication of Yao Wen-yuan's critical article in a Shanghai newspaper), to September 7 1968 (national celebration of the establishment of Revolutionary Committees all over China) or April 24 1969 (conclusion of the Ninth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party).

Major events included: the formation of Red Guard groups in the summer of 1966; student revolutionary criticism of Peking University directors, and the reorganisation of the Peking Party Committee (June 1966); the

* See also above, pp 6-7.

waves of criticism of Party leaders such as Peng Chen, Lo Jui-ching, and more especially Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping and Peng Teh-huai in early- and mid-1966; the *Sixteen Points* Central Committee decision (August 8 1966); the January 1967 Shanghai Revolution; the February 1967 'adverse current' against the Mao Tsetung line; the development of the Revolutionary Committees' *triple alliance*; and the ejection from positions of authority of Liu Shao-chi and his supporters.

Liu himself was formally expelled from the Party on October 31 1968, at the Enlarged 12th Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee. But the real point of the cultural revolution lay not only in political changes but in the promotion of new attitudes and aims or — to put it another way — in the revival and extension of aspirations formed at earlier periods of the Chinese Revolution. In short, ideological choice and the dissemination of Mao Tsetung thought were of the essence.

5. IDEOLOGY and POLITICS for a NEW SOCIETY

The coming of a new generation

The almost unbelievable energy and enthusiasm of the vast upheaval that was the cultural revolution are not easy to convey. Certainly no greater error could be made than to think of China's cultural revolution as merely some power-struggle within the Party. Indeed it was that — but far more too. A fundamental assertion of popular will, a passionate discovery of socialist ideology and of China's national identity, transformed mankind's largest society and endowed it with entirely new status in the international Communist movement and in world affairs.

The cultural revolution is an expression of entirely *indigenous* forces at work in Chinese life. Many previous upheavals in Chinese history had been coloured by extraneous factors.

One may recall the Taiping revolutionary movement (1851-64) whose founder borrowed from Protestant Christian doctrine; the Reform movement of 1898 led by Kang Yu-wei, advocating western-style constitutional monarchy for China; the Yi Ho Tuan (Boxer) movement at the turn of the century — an anti-imperialist militia originally established as a secret society against the Ching (Manchu) dynasty; and Sun Yat-sen's movement, at first adopting European ideas as in some measure Japan had done, and later considering the Bolshevik Revolution as a possible guide. There was the May Fourth movement (1919), with its attendant international and cultural themes. Indeed, there was the entire history of the Chinese Communist Party itself hitherto, with its historic problem of deciding on the relevance of Soviet experience.

With the coming of a new generation, China's distinctive political colour has been proclaimed, expressing her own way forward in ideology, foreign policy, defence, rural and urban life, industrial management, political organisation and cultural values.

Ideological mobilisation and the army

Ideological mobilisation was largely achieved with the use of the little red book of *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tsetung* and of *dazibao* (big-character posters), and by the influence and example of the People's Liberation Army.

Liu and his supporters minimised the relevance of Mao's works, but educated town-dwellers had taken to them just after Liberation and there was a surge of interest in the countryside in 1955. Early in 1960 Vice-Chairman Lin Piao called for widespread, indeed universal, study. The little red book originated as a popular 'digest' in the PLA, spread in 1963, became available everywhere in 1965, and ran into a second edition with a foreword by Lin Piao (December 16 1966).

Another daily element of the cultural revolution was the *dazibao*, regularly renewed and covering almost all wall-space in the streets. The use of *dazibao* had previously been commended by Mao Tsetung in 1958⁵⁴. They

now expressed revolutionary criticism and repudiation of Top Party Persons in Authority Taking the Capitalist Road and of China's Khrushchev, criticism of local officials, and public debate on the struggle for power.

As an essential component of the Chinese style of mobilisation, the use of slogans and of psycho-social and group targets deserves special mention. While they are particularly associated with the PLA, their influence has extended very far in all sections of society. Thus, there are the 3 *Main Rules of Discipline*, the 8 *Points for Attention*, the 3-8 *Working Style*, the 4-*Good Companies*, the 4 *Firsts* and the 3 *Supports and 2 Militaries*, with the constant quotation of revolutionary maxims⁵⁵. There are also the 3 *Constantly-Read Articles* by Mao Tsetung. These are: 'Serve the people' (September 8 1944), urging mutual assistance and reverence for those who died in the cause of public service; 'In memory of Norman Bethune' (December 21 1939), a tribute to a member of the Communist Party of Canada who died in the medical service of the Eighth Route Army and an appreciation of his internationalist spirit; and 'The foolish old man who removed the mountains' (June 11 1945), a call for persistent effort in the overthrow of imperialism and feudalism:

We should fire the whole people with the conviction that China belongs not to the reactionaries but to the Chinese people⁵⁶.

Everyday life in China is thus given a sense of purpose and direction that is quite lacking in the west.

The People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the militia organisations — the latter nominally include all men and women — played key roles in the cultural revolution. During 1956-59 criticism had developed of the Soviet armed forces as a model for China, and there emerged an accompanying movement against excessive military professionalisation. This movement was related to the ideology and politics of the *Three Red Banners* — the *General Line*, the *Great Leap Forward*, and the *People's Communes* — and culminated in the dismissal of the Defence Minister, Marshal Peng Teh-huai, in September 1959. He was replaced by Lin Piao, who became not only Defence Minister but later also head of the Red Guards and, as Vice-Chairman, deputy to Mao Tsetung.

In Hangchow in 1967, following a tour of PLA comrade Tsai Yung-hsiang's memorial exhibition⁵⁷, a PLA officer stressed to me that army rank badges (introduced in 1955) were abolished on June 1 1965 in response to popular pressure, and to discourage self-interest and false pride. Furthermore, the differences in pay between ranks were very narrow. This equalitarian trend, begun in the PLA, was to extend to all aspects of life during the cultural revolution, together with long-established PLA techniques of consultation and discussion between officers and soldiers and among the soldiers themselves.

From criticism to revolution

The first *dazibao* criticism by seven students on the Top People at Peking University was broadcast on June 1 1966⁵⁸. After attempts by oppon-

ents to tear down this first *dazibao*, and the suppression by Top People in mid-June and again in mid-July of the first wave of revolution, Mao himself intervened on August 5 with a *dazibao* of his own, *Bombard the Headquarters!* — and a ferocious struggle for power was unleashed.

The formation of a new cultural revolution group directly under the standing committee of the Political Bureau had previously (May 16 1966) been announced in a circular of the central committee of the Party. There was now published the *Sixteen Points* decision concerning the cultural revolution (August 8), which came to be summarised as: *struggle-criticism-transformation*, i.e. struggle against and overthrow the Top People Taking the Capitalist Road, criticise and repudiate reactionary ideology and bourgeois academic authority, and transform education, literature and art to correspond with the socialist economic base.

The *Sixteen Points* decision was reaffirmed in the central committee communiqué of August 12, listing: democratic centralism and the *mass line* as methods; the training of new revolutionary leaders as the task; the examples of Tachai, Taching, and the PLA, to follow; and preparedness against war and natural disasters, and service to the people, as strategic principles. Other passages reiterated criticism and repudiation of Soviet revisionism, condemned the U.S. war in Vietnam — this had been particularly intensified by the U.S. government since early February 1965 — and called for the dissemination of Mao Tsetung thought as the most reliable guarantee against revisionism and the restoration of capitalism⁵⁹.

Red Guards now made their appearance in Peking. Clambering on to their green lorries, rallying at assembly-points, marching in unending columns with banners and streamers held high, they came to dominate the aspect of the great city. They were received by Mao Tsetung on August 18. Subsequent anniversaries of this event have been the occasion for nationwide celebrations.

Red Guard movements arose in Shanghai and in all towns and cities. All schools and colleges were closed down. Trade-union activities, too, were suspended — especially those concerned with part-time education. Thirteen million Red Guards marched to Peking, there to be received by Mao Tsetung on eight separate occasions. The Red Guards were fed and accommodated in towns and villages on their way to the capital. This vast movement was to have a great effect on the young people, who identified themselves with the epic Long March of 1934-35, and had a great impact too on the peasants who helped them on their way. Masses of people, perhaps little concerned with politics hitherto, were now acquainted with a literary and academic controversy which joined with revolution against bourgeois Top People.

Daily criticism and repudiation by young rebels, using the little red book of *Quotations*, of 'old ideas, culture, customs and habits', soon took practical form. There were house-searches among the bourgeois for old Kuomintang

insignia, Buddhist relics, property title-deeds and weapons. Museums and exhibitions were re-stocked. Over 2,000 Peking streets were re-named in revolutionary style within a year. Accompanied by constant processions, song and dances, the movement passed on to a bitter struggle within each city, factory, farm and school, between the rival ideologies of Liu Shao-chi and Mao Tsetung.

The new ideal of revolutionary organisation that emerged was the *triple alliance* (3-in-1 combination) of cadres, revolutionary workers and Party members, and local PLA representatives, in a revolutionary committee. This replaced the bureaucracy which previously functioned, too often as a closed unit, to administer factories, schools and municipalities.

The seizure of power

At a Shanghai clock factory the seizure of power by its take-over committee was described as follows:

Publicity given over the radio on June 1 1966 to the first *dazibao* attack on Peking University directors was taken — as in most cases throughout the country — as the signal for local *dazibao* attacks on factory bureaucrats. Following intense discussion, a revolutionary committee was established at this clock factory on November 26 1966, only to be faced with an adverse current of economism* from Liu's supporters in the Shanghai municipality. However, factory workers receiving extra pay under this influence were persuaded to return it — 80 per cent being recovered by January 1967.

In this instance if not elsewhere, the successful revolutionaries resisted the temptation to hold a 'paper-hat parade' to ridicule the former management. They took over the accounts office on January 7 and the administrative office on January 13, forming a *triple alliance* on February 16. The factory cadres were re-organised, Mao Tsetung thought was studied, and the experience of revolutionary movements in Heilungkiang and Shensi (just published at that time) was considered for its relevance. The basic seizure of power in this factory, we were proudly told, preceded by two days the issue of the 'Urgent Notice' by other Shanghai rebels announcing their seizure of power in the municipality.

Meanwhile in Shanghai city, mass meetings on November 9 and December 18 1966 demanded, but failed to secure the attendance of Top People on the municipal committee. The rebels grew in strength, claiming a membership of over a million by January 1967. After seizing power on January 9, 38 rebel organisations united in a provisional organ of power named the Shanghai people's commune, and established a *triple alliance* on February 5.

In distant Harbin, a tractor-components factory gave a similar account:

Following the *dazibao* broadcast of June 1 1966, 20 Red Guard groups with a total membership of 300 initially came together in a factory employing 1,140. After a wave of persecution by local Top People the rebels seized the First Secretary of the factory Party committee on December 5 and

* Above, pp 30-31.

subjected him to public criticism. Their membership increased to 500, and they finally took over the factory on January 14 1967. Factory administration was then simplified, office workers were released for the production lines, and a *triple alliance* was established in April 1967.

In this instance, too, were raised not only the problems of social distance between management and rank-and-file and of factory organisation, but also of economism. The bourgeois management was condemned for putting profits 'in command'.

The tractor components produced here had a low profitability. The Top People wished to produce high-profit goods instead of the low-profit items more relevant to agriculture. For example, belt-wheels were in urgent demand, to help irrigate land suffering from drought, and telegrams were received to this effect at the factory. But the Top People ignored these appeals, and were buttressed by a large bureaucracy of 16 administrative sections — 324 people, viz. over a quarter of the total of 1,140 employed.

Equalitarianism and classlessness

The links between economics, politics and ideology illustrated in the above examples may be pursued further with regard to the question of equalitarianism and the goal of a classless society.

There is no doubt that a general equality of conditions heightens the appreciation of sacrifices shared and of social solidarity. Mao Tsetung has often stressed the need for diligence and frugality and in his 1957 theses *On the correct handling of contradiction among the people* he regretted the emergence of a dangerous tendency — an unwillingness to share the joys and hardships of the masses, a concern for personal fame and gain⁶⁰.

Participation of cadres in manual work, and social equality in the army, have already been noted.* The narrow range between lowest and highest incomes in industry also represents a significant trend. Factories which I visited quoted their lowest monthly wage as around 35 yuan, their average around 55, and their highest — this being that of the factory director himself — around 120. Since 1967 these differentials have actually narrowed. Thus the range of wage-levels does not, in principle, exceed 4 to 1.

In the early history of the Bolshevik Revolution, notably in the heroic days of the Civil War when manual work was volunteered unpaid by the *subbotniki* ('Saturday communists') as in China now, the range of industrial wages was as low as 2 to 1. But it increased by the end of the New Economic Policy (1921-28) to 8 to 1. It rose further under Stalin's influence after 1931, and stood at 15 to 1 in the 1950s. Since 1959, official Soviet policy has proclaimed a narrowing — but this is unlikely to be achieved, as economic reforms have allowed 'market forces' to interfere with formal regulations on wage-levels.

Absolute equalitarianism is not advocated in China. It was opposed by Mao Tsetung, who compared it to ultra-democracy in political matters as the product of a handicraft and small-peasant economy. Some inequality will always remain — some individuals require more medical attention than

* Above, pp 29, 34.

others; fertile land will enrich its tillers more than stony ground⁶¹.

The essence of this question was put by Lenin on the occasion of the second anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. With appropriate reference to Engels' *Anti-Duhring*, he took equality to refer not to absolute equality of rewards in money terms but to *equality in the abolition of classes* which was still to be achieved⁶².

Hence the need for the *dictatorship of the proletariat*. This is the political instrument to expropriate the landlords and capitalists. But after their expropriation, differences — indeed, contradictions — between workers, peasants and other social groups, still remain. The goal of social justice, i.e. a classless society, still remains. This is a matter not only of politics and economics but of ideology as well.

These questions persisted in the further socialist development of the USSR after Lenin's death in 1924 and they are the source of the Sino-Soviet dispute over revisionism. The need for the dictatorship of the proletariat, its methods, and its aims, all call for examination.

The Bolshevik Revolution established Soviet power, but the problem of socialist construction was not finally resolved. Before his death Lenin came to regret the employment by the Soviet government of former Tsarist officials: they might be working loyally and well in their professions, but they did not appreciate nor were they devoted to the ultimate socialist and communist purpose of Bolshevik rule. The task of socialist construction was the subject of debate between Stalin and Trotsky.

The new socialist offensive did not begin until 1928-29, with the Five-Year Plan and farm collectivisation. Following industrialisation and collectivisation, the 1936 Soviet Constitution proclaimed the USSR 'a socialist state of workers and peasants' (article 1). However, the Chinese do not altogether accept this formulation, as the more profound transformation of *ideology and culture* had not yet been achieved. The dictatorship of the proletariat was still necessary. The class struggle against bourgeois ideas had by no means been won. In these matters, Stalin failed to mobilise the masses.

The dictatorship of the proletariat

As stressed by Lin Piao,* the cultural revolution in China has ensured that the dictatorship of the proletariat is exercised mainly by the broad masses of the people: not by the Party alone, or — worse — by a clique inside the Party. The *dazibao* broadcast of June 1 1966 constituted an appeal for mass criticism and examination of the purposes and methods of China's political institutions, and mass participation in their correction. The armed forces had long practised *democracy in the three main fields*: political democracy, military democracy, and economic democracy. The people were now aroused in a new *mass line: struggle-criticism-transformation*.**

* Below, p 40.

** Above, p 35.

The dictatorship of the proletariat, like so many other concepts — democracy, liberty, socialism — is complex because it includes both abstract and concrete elements. The concrete and particular enrich the abstract and general, helping to disabuse us of the supposition that a few 'basic definitions' can of themselves provide a complete understanding of political life. Concepts often help explore, rather than explain. All concepts, be they abstract and general, do have concrete and particular associations and provide some means of entry into discussion.

The concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat has its origins in Marx, was elaborated by Lenin, and was exemplified in the Paris Commune (March-May 1871) and the Bolshevik Revolution. The Chinese state system established in 1949 was described by Mao Tsetung as a *people's democratic dictatorship*⁶³.

Students of politics in western countries, basing themselves on traditional textbooks, may regard this description as nonsensical and self-contradictory. Democracy and dictatorship are usually opposite in meaning. But in Mao's terms the description is appropriate. He arrives at it by illustrating how western culture was studied in China from the 1840s onwards, only to prove unsuitable (despite adoption, with modifications, by Japan). For China needed a political culture to resist western incursions and restore her sovereignty — not be further subjected to imperialism.*

The Bolshevik Revolution, rather than western political culture, came to be regarded as the relevant subject of study — even by non-Marxists such as Sun Yat-sen. Hence the *Marxist* connotations of democracy and dictatorship, the view that democratic revolution in China would be only a prelude to socialist revolution, and the call for state power to be seized by workers and peasants to realise their emancipation.

Hence, under Chinese conditions, *democracy* refers to the rights now enjoyed by the formerly oppressed majority (workers and peasants comprising 80-90 per cent of China's population, in 1949); and *dictatorship* refers to the use of state power against the supporters of the old order, the re-moulding of their reactionary attitudes, and the denial to them of power and influence — by the denial to them of private property and social privileges in education and employment.

The concept of the *mass line* refers to the formulation of policy by the study of popular need and demand. It is quite distinct from ultra-democracy or 'direct democracy', which may imply an absence of order and discipline. The role of *leadership* is to undertake the study of popular need and demand, then — in the assurance that policy is indeed relevant — take action by persuasion and propaganda. Hence the slogan, 'From the masses, to the masses'. During the cultural revolution, propaganda teams of workers and soldiers played a most important part in bringing together hostile

groups to study the little red book of *Quotations* and the *3 Constantly-Read Articles* and consider the meaning of 'serve the people' and 'fight self, repudiate revisionism'.

Education and re-moulding: policy towards class enemies

The exercise of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the methods of political struggle in China have been quite different from those in Stalin's Russia. The Chinese themselves regard Stalin's methods as ineffective, as they could only 'touch the skin and not the soul'. The basic problem is: to arouse men to serve the people. This is an ideological problem, and unlikely to be solved by terror or the mere removal from office of particular individuals.

The methods of political struggle in China, apart from the actual seizure of power by revolutionary committees, have been education and re-moulding. Liu Shao-chi was for long retained as a butt for criticism and daily repudiation during the cultural revolution. Stress was laid on his ideas, rather than on his person: as previously noted, he was referred to as the Top Party Person in Authority Taking the Capitalist Road, or as China's Khrushchev. Textbooks embodying his ideas were kept in colleges for discussion, and not destroyed.

In his Report to the Ninth Party Congress of April 1 1969, Lin Piao put the policy on education and re-moulding and the exercise of the proletarian dictatorship as follows:

The majority or the vast majority of the intellectuals trained in the old type of schools and colleges are able or willing to integrate themselves with the workers, peasants and soldiers. . . .

With regard to people who have made mistakes, stress must be laid on giving them education and re-education, doing patient and careful ideological and political work and truly acting 'on the principle of "learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones" and "curing the sickness to save the patient", in order to achieve the twofold objective of clarity in ideology and unity among comrades'. . . .

In the struggle against the enemy, we must carry out the policy 'make use of contradictions, win over the many, oppose the few and crush our enemies one by one' which Chairman Mao has always advocated. 'Stress should be laid on the weight of evidence and on investigation and study, and it is strictly forbidden to obtain confessions by compulsion and to give them credence.' We must implement Chairman Mao's policies of 'leniency towards those who confess their crimes and severe punishment of those who refuse to do so' and of 'giving a way out'. We rely mainly on the broad masses of the people in exercising dictatorship over the enemy. As for bad people or suspects ferreted out through investigation in the movement for purifying the class ranks, the policy of 'killing none and not arresting most' should be applied to all except the active counter-revolutionaries against whom there is conclusive evidence of crimes such as murder, arson or poisoning, and who should be dealt with in accordance with the law⁶⁴.

* On basic differences between Western and Chinese culture, see above, p 5.

Underlying this policy on education and re-moulding lies the dialectical concept *unity-criticism-unity*.^{*} This assumes an *ultimate* desire for unity on the part of all involved in politics, and the resolution of disagreements and contradictions by criticism or struggle in order to re-unite on a new basis. It does not imply the elimination of opponents so much as the elimination of problems by means of a heightening in awareness of the issues raised in debate. *Two lines* are latent always, but only with reference to particular — and transient — problems and circumstances. The concept has ultimately an inclusive and collectivist implication rather than a divisive one.

Examples of the achievement of reconciliation and unity have on occasion reached very far. Two historic cases of personal reconciliation with the new China deserve mention here, for they provide fascinating glimpses of a vanished age and, thereby, serve as valuable aids for an appreciation of the present time.

The first case is that of the last Ching (Manchu) Emperor, Aisin-Gioro Pu Yi, boy king at the time of the revolution and Republic of 1911-12. He lived to witness not only China's decline, but also her contemporary resurgence. After helping foreign interests for much of his career he returned to China in 1950, at the age of 44, and became a citizen of the People's Republic in 1959. His autobiography⁶⁵ describes his feelings on wandering freely about Peking, released at last from the gilded cage into which he had been born. He redeemed himself through manual labour as a gardener in the Forbidden City and after 1959 his family feelings, social activities and citizenship status took on real meaning for the first time in his life.

The second case is that of Li Tsung-jen, former deputy to Chiang Kai-shek and Acting President of Nationalist (Kuomintang) China in 1949. He returned home on July 20 1965 after spending 16 years in the USA.

Both of these historic figures have now peacefully passed on. Their fate is in quite striking contrast to the execution of so many other representatives of the old order in past ages of revolutionary upheaval, in Cromwellian England, Jacobin France and Bolshevik Russia.

A proletarian culture

We return, finally, to art and culture for a reflection of China's social policy.^{**} If the re-moulding of men's minds — the promotion of socialist ideology — is the crucial factor, then culture is involved.

One of the first and most obvious results of the Red Guard marches was the daubing of whitewash and slogans on the Summer Palace in Peking, and on the statues in the avenue leading to the Ming Tombs, expressing rejection of the feudal past. But this was the negative side of their movement. Museums were re-stocked. The Peking Art Museum was taken over to exhibit Mao Tsetung's reception of Red Guards, and officially re-opened

^{*} Above, p 19.

^{**} Above, pp 16-17.

on August 15 1967. No artists' names were displayed on the exhibits, which illustrated aspects of work, leisure and revolutionary history in lacquer and jade carvings, embroidery, carpets and tapestries, porcelain, and everyday objects such as bowls, boxes and vases.

To display pre-Liberation rural life, a vast sculpture museum was installed on October 1 1965 in the former manor-house of Liu Wen-tsai, one-time despot and landlord of Taiyi county in Szechuan. The museum, known as 'Rent Collection Courtyard', consisted of 114 life-size clay figures reflecting the bitterness of class struggle and exploitation. In the old China, rent collection was the main method of controlling the peasants. A complete new 'Courtyard' museum of 119 figures was made of this, in 1966, and is housed in the Forbidden City. Thus has proletarian culture condemned the evils of the past.

The thesis of proletarian culture may be traced to Lu Hsun, and to Mao Tsetung's criticisms of stereotyped Party writing and his *Talks at the Yen'an Forum on Literature and Art* (May 1942). Mao raised the question: for whom should literature and art be produced? And answered for the workers, peasants and soldiers. He was opposed to the divorce of art from politics, and cited Trotsky as an example of the dualism 'Politics — Marxist, art — bourgeois'⁶⁶. However, he recognised that the 'poster and slogan' style had no artistic power.

Different forms and styles in art should develop freely and different schools in science should contend freely. We think that it is harmful to the growth of art and science if administrative measures are used to impose one particular style of art or school of thought and to ban another. Questions of right and wrong in the arts and sciences should be settled through free discussion in artistic and scientific circles and through practical work in these fields. They should not be settled in summary fashion⁶⁷.

There have been many literary battles in China, particularly since a 'People's Daily' film criticism of May 20 1951⁶⁸. There was controversy over the nature of criticism itself in September 1954, and over the meaning of the *hundred flowers* campaign of 1957.

With the emergence during the cultural revolution of proletarian plays and operas, the representative figures of the old China — emperors, generals, priests and beauties — were swept off the stage. They were replaced by workers and peasants and soldiers, in performances of 'Seizure of the bandits' stronghold', 'The Red Army fears not the trials of a distant march', 'On the docks', 'Red detachment of women', and the 'White-haired girl' — the last, perhaps the best-known, composed in 1949 to illustrate class-struggle in China. In July 1964 a festival of Peking Operas on contemporary themes was the subject of a Forum addressed by Chiang Ching (wife of Mao Tsetung)⁶⁹.

On November 10 1965 there was published a critical review in the Shanghai 'Wen Hui Daily' entitled *Comment on the new historical drama 'The dismissal of Hai Jui'*. Written by Yao Wen-yuan under the direction of Chiang Ching, this review was an attack on Wu Han — then deputy

mayor of Peking, an historian, and author of the 1961 play on 'Hai Jui'⁷⁰. His play, ostensibly concerned with the unjust dismissal of a Ming dynasty official by the Emperor, was actually intended as a political defence in dramatic form of Marshal Peng Teh-huai who had been dismissed from his post as Defence Minister in September 1959.*

Even after publication in Shanghai, the Peking publication of Yao Wen-yuan's critical review was delayed owing to the influence of Wu Han and also of Peng Chen (then mayor of Peking, to be dismissed on June 3 1966). There followed criticism of other literary works regarded as reactionary, and a Forum on literature and art in the armed forces in which both Lin Piao and Chiang Ching were involved (February 2-20 1966)⁷¹. In culture as in other spheres, the time was ripe for the cultural revolution.

* Above, p 34.

6. CONCLUSION

China is not — and cannot be — a western-type society with a 'welfare state'⁷². Her policies merit appraisal in terms of her own history, culture, and contemporary aspirations.

The origins of social policy, ultimately traceable in the Old Democratic Revolution (1840-1919), are particularly to be found in the peasants' movement of 1924-27 so strikingly described in Hunan by Mao Tsetung.

With the second — agrarian — civil war (1927-37) and the final conquest of power by Liberation forces in 1949-50, the political circumstances were established for the application of social policy throughout the country. Rural cooperation was the means, culminating in the commune movement of 1958. Both the ends and means of social policy were reaffirmed during the cultural revolution of 1965-69: ideology — the dissemination of the thought of Mao Tsetung — was asserted as all-important.

From the outset the new China adopted a perspective of *continuous revolution* in rural and urban life. She has tenaciously held to her revolutionary ideology. Not 'welfare' but self-reliance and socialist production; not 'material incentives' but the volunteer spirit; not elitism and inequality, but fraternity and classlessness and a very large measure of equality, have marked out her social policy.

Whilst this contrast with western society has been the main implication underlying our discussion, subsidiary contrast and comparison have also been involved. These have been with the USSR, the world's first socialist state. There are very interesting comparisons between China now and the first phase of Soviet development, but there are increasing divergencies and contrasts with the USSR in its contemporary phase. These comparisons and contrasts with western and with Soviet society throw light not only on China's social policy in terms of its means, but also its ends; on the nature of socialism, and the quest for social justice.

APPENDIX

RESOLUTION ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEOPLE'S COMMUNES IN THE RURAL AREAS,

adopted by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on August 29 1958⁷³

1. The people's communes are the logical result of the march of events. Large, comprehensive people's communes have made their appearance, and in several places they are already widespread. They have developed very rapidly in some areas. It is highly probable that there will soon be an upsurge in setting up people's communes throughout the country and the development is irresistible. The basis for the development of the people's communes is mainly the comprehensive, continuous leap forward in China's agricultural production and the ever-rising political consciousness of the 500 million peasants. An unprecedented advance has been made in agricultural capital construction since the advocates of the capitalist road were fundamentally defeated economically, politically, and ideologically. This has created a new basis for practically eliminating flood and drought, and for ensuring the comparatively stable advance of agricultural production. Agriculture has leaped forward since right conservatism has been overcome and the old technical norms in agriculture have been broken down. The output of agricultural products has doubled or increased severalfold — in some cases more than ten times or scores of times. This has further stimulated emancipation of thought among the people. Large-scale agricultural capital construction and the application of more advanced agricultural technique are making their demands on labour power. The growth of rural industry also demands the transfer of some manpower from agriculture. The demand for mechanisation and electrification has become increasingly urgent in China's rural areas. Capital construction in agriculture and the struggle for bumper harvests involve large-scale co-operation, cutting across the boundaries between co-operatives, townships and counties. The people have taken to organising themselves along military lines, to working with militancy, and leading a collective life, and this has raised the political consciousness of the 500 million peasants still further. Community dining-rooms, kindergartens, nurseries, tailoring groups, barber shops, public baths, 'happy homes' for the aged, agricultural middle schools, and 'red and expert' schools, are leading the peasants toward a happier collective life and further fostering ideas of collectivism among the peasant masses. What all these developments illustrate is that the agricultural co-operative with scores of families or several hundred families can no longer meet the needs of the changing situation. In the present circumstances, the establishment of people's communes with all-round management of agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, side occupations and fishery, where industry (the worker), agriculture (the peasant), exchange (the trader), culture and education (the student), and

military affairs (the militiaman) merge into one, is the fundamental policy to guide the peasants to accelerate socialist construction, complete the building of socialism ahead of time, and carry out the gradual transition to communism.

2. Concerning the organisation and size of the communes: generally speaking, it is at present better to establish one commune to a township, with the commune comprising about 2,000 peasant households. Where a township embraces a vast area and is sparsely populated, more than one commune may be established, each with less than 2,000 households. In some places, several townships may emerge and form a single commune comprising about 6,000 or 7,000 households, according to topographical conditions and the needs for the development of production. As to the establishment of communes of more than 10,000 or even more than 20,000 households, we need not oppose them, but for the present we should not take the initiative to encourage them. As the people's communes grow, there may be a tendency to form federations with the county as a unit. Plans should be drawn up right now on a county basis to ensure the rational distribution of people's communes. The size of the communes and the all-around development of agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, subsidiary production, and fishing as well as of industry (the worker), agriculture (the peasant), exchange (the trader), culture and education (the student) and military affairs (the militiaman), demand an appropriate division of labour within the administrative organs of the communes; a number of departments, each responsible for a particular kind of work, should be set up. They should be compactly and efficiently organised and cadres should take a direct part in production. The township governments and the communes should become one, with the township committee of the Party becoming the Party committee of the commune, and the township people's council becoming the administrative committee of the commune.
3. Concerning the methods and steps to be adopted to merge small co-operatives into bigger ones and transform them into people's communes: the merger of small co-operatives into bigger ones and their transformation into people's communes is now a common mass demand. The poor- and lower-middle peasants firmly support it; most upper-middle peasants also favour it. We must rely on the poor- and lower-middle peasants and fully encourage the masses to air their views and argue it out, unite the majority of the upper-middle peasants who favour it, overcome vacillation among the remainder, and expose and foil rumour mongering sabotage by landlord and rich-peasant elements, so that the mass of the peasants merge the smaller co-operatives into bigger ones and transform them into communes through ideological emancipation and on a voluntary basis, without any compulsion. As to the steps to be taken, it is of course better to complete the merger into bigger co-

operatives and their transformation into communes at once; but where this is not feasible, it can be done in two stages, with no compulsory or rash steps. In all counties, experiments should first be made in some selected areas and the experience gained should then be popularised gradually.

The merger of smaller co-operatives into bigger ones and their transformation into communes must be carried out in close co-ordination with current production to ensure not only that it has no adverse effect on current production, but becomes a tremendous force stimulating an even greater leap forward in production. Therefore, in the early period of the merger, the method of 'changing the upper structure while keeping the lower structure unchanged' may be adopted. The original, smaller co-operatives may at first jointly elect an administrative committee for the merged co-ops to unify planning and the arrangement of work, and transform themselves into farming zones or production brigades. The original organisation of production and system of administration may, for the time being, remain unchanged and continue as before; and later, gradually merge, readjust, and settle whatever needs merging or readjusting and whatever specific questions demand solution during the merger, so as to make sure there is no adverse effect on production.

The size of the communes, the speed of carrying out the merger of small co-operatives into bigger ones and their transformation into communes, and the methods and steps to be taken in this connection will be decided in accordance with the local conditions by the various provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the central authorities. But no matter when the merger takes place, whether before or after autumn, in the coming winter or next spring, the small co-operatives that are prepared to merge should be brought together from now on to discuss and jointly work out unified plans for winter capital construction in agriculture and to make unified arrangements of all kinds for preparatory work for an even bigger harvest next year.

4. Concerning some questions of the economic policy involved in the merger of co-operatives: in the course of the merger, education should be strengthened to prevent the growth of departmentalism among a few co-operatives, which might otherwise share out too much or all of their incomes and leave little or no common funds before the merger. On the other hand, it must be understood that with various agricultural co-operatives established on different foundations, the amount of their public property, their indebtedness inside and outside the co-operatives and so on will not be completely equal when they merge into bigger co-operatives. In the course of the merger, the cadres and the masses should be educated in the spirit of communism so as to recognise these differences and not resort to minute squaring of accounts, insisting on equal shares and bothering with trifles.

When a people's commune is established, it is not necessary to deal with

the question of reserved private plots of land, scattered fruit trees, share funds and so on in a great hurry; nor is it necessary to adopt clear-cut stipulations on these questions. Generally speaking, reserved private plots of land may perhaps be turned over to collective management in the course of the merger of co-operatives; scattered fruit trees, for the time being, may remain privately owned and be dealt with some time later. Share funds, etc., can be handled after a year or two, since the funds will automatically become publicly owned with the development of production, the increase of income, and the advance of the people's consciousness.

5. Concerning the name, ownership, and system of distribution of the communes: all the big merged co-operatives will be called people's communes. There is no need to change them into state-owned farms. It is not proper for farms to embrace industry, agriculture, exchange, culture and education, and military affairs at the same time.

After the establishment of people's communes, there is no need immediately to transform collective ownership into ownership by the people as a whole. It is better at present to maintain collective ownership to avoid unnecessary complications arising in the course of the transformation of ownership. In fact, collective ownership in people's communes already contains some elements of ownership by the people as a whole. These elements will grow constantly in the course of the continuous development of people's communes and will gradually replace collective ownership. The transition from collective ownership to ownership by the people as a whole is a process, the completion of which may take less time — three or four years — in some places, and longer — five or six years or even longer — elsewhere. Even with the completion of this transition, people's communes, like state-owned industry, are still socialist in character, where the principle of 'from each according to his ability and to each according to his work' prevails. After a number of years, as the social product increases greatly, the communist consciousness and morality of the entire people are raised to a much higher degree, and universal education is instituted and developed, the differences between workers and peasants, town and country, and mental and manual labour — legacies of the old society that have inevitably been carried over into the socialist period — and the remnants of unequal bourgeois rights which are the reflection of these differences — will gradually vanish. Then the function of the state will be limited to protecting the country from external aggression but it will play no role internally. At that time Chinese society will enter the era of communism, when the principle of 'from each according to his ability and to each according to his needs' will be practiced.

After the establishment of the people's communes it is not necessary to hurry the change from the original system of distribution, in order to avoid any unfavourable effect on production. The system of distribution should be determined according to specific conditions. Where conditions

permit, the shift to a wage system may be made. But where conditions are not yet ripe, the original system of payment according to work days may be temporarily retained (such as the system of fixed targets for output, work days, and costs, with a part of the extra output as reward; or the system of calculating work days on the basis of output). This can be changed when conditions permit.

Although ownership in the people's communes is still collective ownership and the system of distribution, either the wage system or payment according to work days, is 'to each according to his work' and not 'to each according to his needs', the people's communes are the best form of organisation for the attainment of socialism and gradual transition to communism. They will develop into the basic social units in communist society.

6. At the present stage our task is to build socialism. The primary purpose of establishing people's communes is to accelerate the speed of socialist construction and the purpose of building socialism is to prepare actively for the transition to communism. It seems that the attainment of communism is no longer a remote future event. We should actively use the form of the people's communes to explore the practical road of transition to communism.

AMENDMENTS

The sixth session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (November 28 — December 10 1958) adopted a series of amendments to the above Resolution, which made current policy less ambitious.

The amendments postponed the establishment of urban communes, and re-emphasised payment 'to each according to his work', small-scale private ownership, family life, the separation of militia leadership from commune leadership, and the leading role of the Party.*74

* Above, p 22.

NOTES

Abbreviated references:

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| SR | 'Selected Readings From the Works of Mao Tsetung', Peking 1967. |
| SW I II III IV | 'Selected Works of Mao Tsetung', Peking, vols. I, II, & III, 1965; vol. IV, 1961. |
| 'Quotations' | 'Quotations from Chairman Mao Tsetung', second edition, Peking 1967. |
| 'Important Documents' | 'Important Documents on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China', Peking 1970. |

- 1 The point was made at an early stage in the development of Leninism, viz. that the political seizure of power, and the organisation of a new society, must take priority over political work for working-class advancement within the existing (capitalist) society. Among Russian Marxists at the turn of the century, there were polemics over the relative importance of political work for immediate workers' welfare as against the main task — **class struggle for the overthrow of capitalism**. Influenced by the German Marxist-Revisionist, E. Bernstein (1850-1932), there emerged a group of Legal Marxists led by P. Struve (1870-1944: he was to become a Cadet, i.e. on the Right) advocating reform in preference to revolution. There followed the group of **Economists** (E. Kuskova, 1869-1959, and her husband S. Prokopovich, 1871-1955, who were also to become Cadets) who emphasised immediate welfare. In 1898 P. Axelrod (1850-1928) criticised their views; and Lenin's attack on **economism** gave rise to the key work, 'What is to be done?' (1902). This short book became the ideological foundation of the Bolshevik faction within the old Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. Lenin called for a Party of a new type to lead the working class in revolutionary (not reformist) struggle, and insisted on the need for genuine socialist consciousness within such a Party. Although these issues were first raised in the Russian revolutionary movement, under the specific conditions of that time, their importance has persisted because they are issues of fundamental principle. They were raised once more during the cultural revolution in China. The relative emphasis to be laid on working-class short-term material advancement, as distinct from the cultivation of socialist consciousness and the goal of a classless society, remains a problem just as much after the seizure of power as before. Khrushchev's views on Soviet material progress, and the 1961 Soviet Communist Party Programme which gives further expression to those views, have been criticised by the Chinese. In their view, Khrushchev lost sight of the goal of a classless society: 'By propagating material incentive he is turning all human relations into money relations and encouraging individualism and selfishness' ('On Khrushchev's phoney communism and its historical lessons for the world', by the editorial departments of the 'People's Daily' and 'Red Flag', July 14 1964; reprinted in: 'The polemic on the general line of the international Communist movement', Peking 1965, pp 415-480). The Chinese vigorously condemn Khrushchev's 'goulash communism' and 'second pair of trousers' programme. For them, ideology — socialist consciousness — is all-important. Affluence and security are not disavowed, but they cannot be put 'first': hence their emphasis on 'serving the people', 'fighting self and repudiating revisionism'. Mao Tsetung goes so far as to suggest that if classes and class struggle were forgotten, and if the dictatorship of the proletariat were forgotten, then it would not be long before the Marxist-Leninist party would become a fascist party. ('Important Documents', pp 21-22.)
- 2 Marshall, T. H., 'Social Policy', Hutchinson 1965, p 7.
- 3 These problems were presented by Mao Tsetung as 'Ten Great Relationships' in April 1956. See Chen, J. (ed), 'Mao: Great Lives Observed', USA, Prentice-Hall 1969, pp 65-85.
- 4 See Mao Tsetung, 'On the correct handling of contradictions among the people', sections III and XII (SR, pp 366-368, 385-386). Also: SR, p 330 (top).
- 5 Chandrasekhar, S., 'China's Population', Hong Kong University Press, 1959. Field, R. M., 'A note on the population of Communist China', 'China Quarterly' April-June 1969.
- 6 'Quotations' p 288.
- 7 Ibid, pp 288-289.
- 8 Lazure, D., 'The family and youth in new China: psychiatric observations', in: 'Canadian Medical Association Journal', Montreal, January 27 1962, vol. 86. A summary of the findings is in: Snow, E., 'Red China Today', Pelican 1970, pp 294-296.
- 9 'Chunshu's progress report', in 'Peking Review' May 31 1960, pp 23-25.
- 10 For these and other comments, see Lattimore, O., 'China today: some social aspects', London: Journal of the Royal Society of Arts, July 1968, p 665 and passim.

- 11 For a short comparison between the history of Europe and China: Fitzgerald, C. P., 'Europe and China: an historical comparison', Australia: Sydney University Press / Australian Humanities Research Council, 1969.
On culture: Bodde, D., 'China's cultural tradition', USA: Holt, Rinehart 1957. The reference to the concept of civilisation is on p 32 (note 76).
- 12 Liao Kai-lung, 'From Yen-an to Peking', Peking 1954, pp 155, 159, and *passim*.
- 13 *Ibid*, p 168.
- 14 'Constitution of the People's Republic of China', Peking 1954, 1962 and other editions. The Constitution is also reproduced in the valuable anthology edited by Chen, T. H. E., 'The Chinese Communist regime: documents and commentary'. London, Pall Mall Press, 1967, pp 75-92.
- 15 SW I, pp 23-59; published as a separate pamphlet in many editions. See also: Chen Po-ta, 'Notes on Mao Tsetung's report on an investigation of the peasant movement in Hunan', written 1944, published in Peking 1954, 1966; and Chen Po-ta, 'A study of land rent in pre-Liberation China', written 1945-46, published Peking 1958, 1966.
- 16 The agrarian reform law is in Chen, T. H. E., *op. cit.* (note 14 above), pp 196-203.
- 17 'National programme for agricultural development 1956-67', English edition, Peking 1960. Also found in: 'Second Session of the Second National People's Congress' of the People's Republic of China: 'Documents', Peking 1960, pp 98-126.
- 18 Kuan Ta-tung, 'The socialist transformation of capitalist industry and commerce in China', Peking 1960, pp 28, 42, 67; the figures refer to gross industrial output value. See also Hsueh Mu-chiao, Su Hsing and Lin Tse-li, 'The socialist transformation of the national economy of China', Peking 1960, p 29 and *passim*, for similar if not exactly identical figures.
- 19 The trade union law is in 'Important labour laws and regulations of the People's Republic of China', enlarged edition, Peking 1961, pp 1-10. It is also to be found with a few omissions and slight changes of English text, in Chen, T. H. E., *op. cit.* (note 14 above), pp 274-280. Another — unofficial — translation is in Chao Kuo-chün (ed), 'Economic planning and organisation in mainland China: a documentary study, 1949-57', vol. 2; USA: East Asian Research Centre, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., pp 77-84.
- 20 'Labour protection in new China', ed. by the Labour Protection Bureau, Ministry of Labour, Peking 1960, pp 2-4.
- 21 All the decisions and regulations are in: 'Important labour laws &c', *op. cit.* (note 19 above). Some of the decisions and regulations are again to be found in unofficial translation in the collection edited by Chao Kuo-chün, *op. cit.* (note 19 above).
- 22 'Important labour laws &c.' (note 19 above), pp 72-73.
- 23 'Important labour laws &c.' (note 19 above), p 12.
- 24 'Important labour laws &c.' (note 19 above), p 19.
- 25 Strong, A. L., 'The rise of the people's communes, & six years after', New World Press, Peking 1964, pp 76-77; 225-226 and *passim*.
Crook, I. & D., 'The first years of Yangyi commune', Routledge 1966, pp 164-165 and *passim*.
- 26 The Marriage Law is reproduced (pp 10-17) with a useful introduction and appendix, in Russell, M., 'Chinese women: liberated', New York: 'Far East Reporter' pamphlet, n.d. but after 1969.
The Law is also reproduced in Chen, T. H. E., *op. cit.* (note 14 above), pp 270-274.
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Article 16 (Maternity Benefits) of the February 26 1951 (revised January 2 1953) Labour insurance law is in 'Important labour laws &c.' (note 19 above), pp 22-23.
See also: Snow, H. F., 'Women in modern China', The Hague, Mouton 1967.
- 27 Figures quoted on the occasion of International Women's Day in Peking, 'Peking Review', March 8 1960, p 8.
- 28 'Handbook on People's China', Peking, April 1957, p 152.
- 29 'Handbook' (note 28 above), p 149.
- 30 'Ten Great Years': statistics of the economic and cultural achievements of the People's Republic of China, compiled by the State Statistical Bureau. Peking 1960, p 192.
- 31 'Handbook' (note 28 above), pp 140, 142.
- 32 The 'Common Programme', September 29 1949, Chapter V, articles 41-49.
The 'Common Programme', together with other basic documents — the Organic Law of the CPPCC, the Organic Law of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, and the Declaration of the first plenary session of the CPPCC — is in: 'Important Documents of the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference', Peking 1949.
The 'Common Programme' and the Organic Law of the Central People's Government are reproduced in Chen, T. H. E., (*op. cit.*, note 14 above), pp 34-45 and 46-51.
- 33 Lu Hsun (1881-1936) 'was the supreme commander in China's cultural revolution; he was not only a great man of letters, but also a great thinker and a great revolutionary' (Mao Tsetung, 'On New Democracy', January 1940, section XIII; in: SW II, p 370).
'The true story of Ah Q' (1921) is regarded as Lu Hsun's representative work in repudiating the old China.
- 34 'Ten Great Years' (note 30 above), pp 206, 207.
- 35 In broad terms China was of course undergoing a cultural revolution all the time.
In his work 'On new democracy', January 1940, section XIII (SW II, pp 339-384, especially pp 371-378) Mao Tsetung distinguished four periods in the history of the united front in the cultural revolution: 1919-21, 1921-27, 1927-37, and 1937 to the time of his writing.
'A cultural revolution is the ideological reflection of the political and economic revolution and is in their service' (SW II, p 373).
- 36 'Reform of the Chinese written language', Peking 1965.
- 37 Chou En-lai, 'Current tasks of reforming the written language': speech of January 10 1958, in the above booklet (note 36), p 4.
- 38 Mao Tsetung, 'On the correct handling of contradictions among the people', Peking 1957. The passages quoted are extracted from pp 3, 9, 14, 16, 31 and 38, and are also to be found in SR, pp 351-352, 355, 359, 361, 371, 375-376.
Some of the problems presented here had previously been raised by Mao Tsetung as 'Ten Great Relationships' in April 1956 (note 3 above, p 50).
- 39 Liu Shao-chi, 'How to be a good communist', Peking, February 1964, is the translation of Liu's revised edition which appeared in 'Red Flag' nos. 15-16, 1962. Previous English editions appeared in October 1951, and February and October 1952.
Two useful extracts are in Schurmann, F., & Schell, O. (eds), 'China readings 3: Communist China', Pelican 1968, pp 68-76, from the 1964 English edition of Liu's book.
- 40 Mao Tsetung, 'Where do correct ideas come from?' is available as a pocket-size pamphlet and is also in SR, pp 405-406.
- 41 A detailed criticism of Liu's book is in: 'Betrayal of proletarian dictatorship is essential element in the book on "Self-Cultivation"', by the editorial departments of 'Red Flag' and 'People's Daily', and reproduced in the 'Peking Review', May 12 1967, pp 7-11.
- 42 Lin Piao, 'Report to the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China', in: 'Important Documents', pp 46-47.
- 43 For an account of workpoint systems, see: Myrdal, J., and Kessle, G., 'China — The revolution continued', Chatto & Windus 1971, pp 81-105.
- 44 'Peking Review', January 17 1969. This type of co-operative medical service has undergone much development. See Myrdal, J., & Kessle, G. (*op. cit.* above, note 43), pp 109-114.
- 45 'Peking Review', July 4 1969. — In general, see: Horn, Dr J. S., 'Away with all pests: an English surgeon in People's China, 1954-1969', Paul Hamlyn, London 1969.
- 46 The **Sixteen Points** decision of August 8 1966 is in 'Important Documents', pp 129-156, and is also reproduced in full in: Robinson, J., 'The cultural revolution in China', Pelican 1969, pp 85-96; new edition, 1970.
- 47 'People's Daily', June 18 1966; 'Peking Review', June 24 1966. Some key passages are reproduced in: Schurmann, F., & Schell, O., (eds), 'China readings 3' (*op. cit.* note 39 above), pp 606-610.
- 48 For a useful introductory survey of the sociology of education, see: Banks, O., 'The sociology of education', Batsford 1970. Of special note are the studies by Douglas, J. W. B., 'The home & the school', Panther / MacGibbon & Kee 1964, and its sequel 'All our future', Peter Davis 1968. A comprehensive review of this 1968 work is in the 'Times Literary Supplement', January 30 1969.
A major failing of the British 'welfare state' is illustrated in the fact that over the years one aspect after another of the educational system has been examined in expensively-produced government reports, but practically no action has been taken to implement their recommendations. On this failure, see: Corbett, A., 'Much to do about education: a critical survey of

- the fate of the major educational reports'. London: Council for educational advance (Hamilton House, Mabledon Place, W.C.1), second edition September 1969.
- 49 Eggleston, S. J., 'Exams: integral part of the social system', article in the 'Times Educational Supplement', September 25 1970, p 4.
- 50 See (e.g.) Chang Chien, 'Open-book examinations bring good results', in: 'China Reconstructs', January 1966 — even before the major decisions of the cultural revolution were taken; note 46 (above).
- 51 'People's Daily', May 12 1969; 'Hsinhua' News Agency, London, Weekly Issue 14, May 15 1969, pp 16-20.
- 52 Hu Liang, 'China's automobile industry', in: 'China Reconstructs', March 1965. See also, e.g. Niu Huang, 'China's industries — new stage in labour emulation', in 'China Reconstructs', December 1964.
- 53 This was the theme of many articles in the press, e.g. 'Peking Review', June 28 1968; January 10 1969. In general, see: Wheelwright, E. L. E., and McFarlane, B., 'The Chinese road to socialism: economics of the cultural revolution', Monthly Review Press, 1970.
- 54 Mao Tsetung commended the use of dazibao in 'Introducing a co-operative', April 15 1958. SR pp 403-404 and p 404 (note 2).
- 55 **3 main rules of discipline:** formulated in the spring of 1928 by Mao Tsetung, during the Ching-kang mountains march of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, viz.: (1) Obey orders in your actions; (2) Don't take anything from the workers and peasants; and (3) Turn in all things taken from local bullies.
8 points for attention: also formulated by Mao Tsetung, in the summer of 1928; originally as 6 points, then rewritten by him after 1929 as follows:
(1) Put back the doors you have taken down for bedboards; (2) Don't take a single needle or piece of thread from the masses; (3) Turn in everything captured; (4) Pay fairly for what you buy; (5) Return everything you borrow; (6) Pay for anything you damage; (7) Don't bathe within sight of women; and (8) Don't search the pockets of captives.
On October 10 1947 the GHQ of the PLA issued new, standardised versions as follows:
(3 main rules of discipline): (1) Obey orders in all your actions. (2) Don't take a single needle or piece of thread from the masses. (3) Turn in everything captured.
(8 points for attention): (1) Speak politely. (2) Pay fairly for what you buy. (3) Return everything you borrow. (4) Pay for anything you damage. (5) Don't hit or swear at people. (6) Don't damage crops. (7) Don't take liberties with women. (8) Don't ill-treat captives.
3-8 working style: The '3' refers to a firm and correct political orientation, an industrious and simple style of work, and flexible strategy and tactics; the '8' refers to the 8 characters which represent: unity, alertness, earnestness and liveliness.
4-good Companies: Companies (military units) that are 'good' in: political thought, the 3-8 working style, military training, and economic management.
4 firsts: (1) As between man and weapons, give first place to man; (2) As between political and other work, give first place to political work; (3) As between ideological and routine tasks in political work, give first place to ideological work; (4) In ideological work, as between ideas in books and the living ideas currently in people's minds, give first place to the living ideas currently in people's minds.
3 supports and 2 militaries: Support industry, agriculture, and the broad masses of the Left; and: military control, and political and military training.
- 56 'The foolish old man who removed the mountains', June 11 1945: SR pp 260-263; SW III pp 321-324.
- 57 PLA comrade Tsai Yung-hsiang lost his life at the age of 18 on the Chientang River Bridge, October 10 1966, whilst removing a log — 'planted by class enemies' — from the path of a train taking Red Guards to Peking. 60,000 people attended a commemorative meeting in his honour. His brother joined the PLA to replace him, and stood guard over the same bridge.
- 58 The upheaval at Peking University is a story in itself, well worthy of consideration. See Nee, V., 'The cultural revolution at Peking University', in: 'Monthly Review', July-August 1969.
There is already a considerable literature on the cultural revolution. Apart from the little red book of 'Important Documents', see: Robinson, J., 'The Cultural Revolution in China', Pelican 1969, new edition 1970; and two anthologies of documentary material: Fan, K. H. (ed), 'The Chinese Cultural Revolution: Selected Documents', Monthly Review Press 1968; and: 'The Great Cultural Revolution in China', compiled and edited by the Asia Research Centre: Rutland, Vermont and Tokyo, Japan: publ. Charles E. Tuttle, 1968.
- 59 'Important Documents', pp 129-156, 157-177. The reference to Vietnam is on pp 170-171. Much new material of the greatest interest is now available on the U.S. war in Vietnam; see especially, 'The Pentagon Papers' as published by 'The New York Times', containing key documents and other valuable information: USA, Bantam Books 1971.
- 60 'Quotations', p 190; SR p 384.
- 61 Mao Tsetung's comments against 'absolute equalitarianism' are in: 'On correcting mistaken ideas in the Party', December 1929: SW I, pp 110-111.
- 62 Lenin, V. I., 'Economics and politics in the era of the dictatorship of the proletariat', October 30 1919 ('Pravda' no. 250, November 7 1919), section 5.
The allusion to Engels' 'Anti-Dühring' is to Part I, chapter X towards the end:
The demand for equality in the mouth of the proletariat has (therefore) a double meaning. It is either — as was especially the case at the very start, for example in the peasants' war — the spontaneous reaction against the crying social inequalities, against the contrast of rich and poor, the feudal lords and their serfs, surfeit and starvation; as such it is the simple expression of the revolutionary instinct, and finds its justification in that, and indeed only in that. Or, on the other hand, the proletarian demand for equality has arisen as the reaction against the bourgeois demand for equality, drawing more or less correct and more far-reaching demands from the bourgeois demand, and serving as an agitational means in order to rouse the workers against the capitalists on the basis of the capitalists' own assertions; and in this case it stands and falls with bourgeois equality itself. In both cases the real content of the proletarian demand for equality is the demand for the abolition of classes. Any demand for equality which goes beyond that, of necessity passes into absurdity . . .
The idea of equality, therefore, both in its bourgeois and in its proletarian form, is itself a historical product, the creation of which required definite historical conditions which in turn themselves pre-suppose a long previous historical development.
- 63 SW IV, pp 411-424.
- 64 'Important Documents', pp 53, 54, 55-56.
- 65 Aisin-Gioro Pu Yi, 'From Emperor to Citizen', Peking 1964 (2 vols).
- 66 SR, p 221; SW III, p 86.
Trotsky's view was put as follows:
It is fundamentally incorrect to contrast bourgeois culture and bourgeois art with proletarian culture and proletarian art. The latter will never exist, because the proletarian regime is temporary and transient. The historic significance and the moral grandeur of the proletarian revolution consists in the fact that it is laying the foundations of a culture which is above classes and which will be the first culture that is truly human.
Trotsky, L., 'Literature and Revolution', Introduction dated July 29 1924. Ref. edition published in the USA, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press 1960, p 14.
- 67 'Quotations', p 303; SR, p 374.
- 68 This was an editorial written by Mao Tsetung, criticising 'The life of Wu Hsun', a film begun by the Kuomintang Central Film Studio but unfinished by them.
- 69 Chiang Ching, 'On the revolution of Peking opera' (July 1964), in: 'On the revolution of Peking opera', Peking 1968, pp 1-7.
- 70 See Ansley, C., 'The heresy of Wu Han: his play "Hai Ju's dismissal" and its role in China's cultural revolution', OUP/University of Toronto Press 1971; Pusey, J. R., 'Wu Han: attacking the present through the past', USA: East Asian Research Centre, Harvard University Press 1969.
- 71 'Important Documents', pp 201-238.
- 72 'The welfare state is the institutional outcome of the assumption by a society of legal, and therefore formal and explicit, responsibility for the basic well-being of all its members . . . The point at which a state, in expanding social services to its citizens earns this label is imprecise and controversial.
— 'Welfare State', in: 'International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences', edited by Sills, D. L. USA: The Macmillan Company & the Free Press, 1968; vol. 16, p 512.
- 73 'Peking Review', September 16 1958, pp 21-23.
- 74 Excerpts from the December 10 1958 amending Resolution are in Chen, T. H. E. (op. cit., note 14, above), pp 228-239.

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